Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment

Judgment:

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			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
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			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
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			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
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			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
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		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
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		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
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		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
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		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => null,
		'pubs' => null,
		'ratiodecidendi' => null,
		'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'sub' => 'Company law',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
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$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '73',
	(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/73/bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
)
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1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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		'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
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	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
)
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2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
		(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => null,
		'pubs' => null,
		'ratiodecidendi' => null,
		'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'sub' => 'Company law',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
)
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2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
		(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
)
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2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
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	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
		(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => null,
		'pubs' => null,
		'ratiodecidendi' => null,
		'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'sub' => 'Company law',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
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$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '73',
	(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/73/bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
)
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2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
		(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
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3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => null,
		'pubs' => null,
		'ratiodecidendi' => null,
		'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'sub' => 'Company law',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
)
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3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
		(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
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3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
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	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
		(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => null,
		'pubs' => null,
		'ratiodecidendi' => null,
		'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'sub' => 'Company law',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
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$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '73',
	(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/73/bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
)
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3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
		(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
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4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
		(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => null,
		'pubs' => null,
		'ratiodecidendi' => null,
		'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'sub' => 'Company law',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
)
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1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
)
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2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
		(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => null,
		'pubs' => null,
		'ratiodecidendi' => null,
		'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'sub' => 'Company law',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
)
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3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
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5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
		(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => null,
		'pubs' => null,
		'ratiodecidendi' => null,
		'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'sub' => 'Company law',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
)
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Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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		'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
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	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
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Issue No.2

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
		(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => null,
		'pubs' => null,
		'ratiodecidendi' => null,
		'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'sub' => 'Company law',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
)
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6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
		(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
)
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7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
		(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => null,
		'pubs' => null,
		'ratiodecidendi' => null,
		'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'sub' => 'Company law',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
)
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8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
		(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
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9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-

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			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
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	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
		(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => null,
		'pubs' => null,
		'ratiodecidendi' => null,
		'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'sub' => 'Company law',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
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$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '73',
	(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/73/bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
)
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Article

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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		'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
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	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
)
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Description of the suit

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
		(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => null,
		'pubs' => null,
		'ratiodecidendi' => null,
		'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'sub' => 'Company law',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
)
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Period of limitation

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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		'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
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	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
)
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	'title_for_layout' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
		(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => null,
		'pubs' => null,
		'ratiodecidendi' => null,
		'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'sub' => 'Company law',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
)
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	'title_for_layout' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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		'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
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	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
)
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For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
		(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => null,
		'pubs' => null,
		'ratiodecidendi' => null,
		'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'sub' => 'Company law',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
)
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Three years

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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		'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
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	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
)
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	'title_for_layout' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
		(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => null,
		'pubs' => null,
		'ratiodecidendi' => null,
		'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'sub' => 'Company law',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
)
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	'title_for_layout' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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		'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
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	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
)
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For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
		(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => null,
		'pubs' => null,
		'ratiodecidendi' => null,
		'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'sub' => 'Company law',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
)
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Three years

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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		'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
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	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
)
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When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
		(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => null,
		'pubs' => null,
		'ratiodecidendi' => null,
		'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'sub' => 'Company law',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
)
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10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
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1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
		(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => null,
		'pubs' => null,
		'ratiodecidendi' => null,
		'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'sub' => 'Company law',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
)
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2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&E) and another]

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
)
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3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
		(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => null,
		'pubs' => null,
		'ratiodecidendi' => null,
		'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'sub' => 'Company law',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
)
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11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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		'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
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	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
)
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Article

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
		(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => null,
		'pubs' => null,
		'ratiodecidendi' => null,
		'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'sub' => 'Company law',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
)
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Description of the suit

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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		'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
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	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
)
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Period of limitation

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
		(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => null,
		'pubs' => null,
		'ratiodecidendi' => null,
		'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'sub' => 'Company law',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
)
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	'title_for_layout' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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		'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
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	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
)
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	'title_for_layout' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
		(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => null,
		'pubs' => null,
		'ratiodecidendi' => null,
		'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'sub' => 'Company law',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
)
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Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
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12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
		(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => null,
		'pubs' => null,
		'ratiodecidendi' => null,
		'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'sub' => 'Company law',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
)
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13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
		(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
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14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
		(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => null,
		'pubs' => null,
		'ratiodecidendi' => null,
		'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'sub' => 'Company law',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
)
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(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
		(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
)
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(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause;

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
		(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => null,
		'pubs' => null,
		'ratiodecidendi' => null,
		'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'sub' => 'Company law',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
)
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(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and]

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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		'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
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	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
)
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(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
		(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => null,
		'pubs' => null,
		'ratiodecidendi' => null,
		'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'sub' => 'Company law',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
)
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15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
		(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
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16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:

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			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
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	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
		(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => null,
		'pubs' => null,
		'ratiodecidendi' => null,
		'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'sub' => 'Company law',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
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$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '73',
	(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/73/bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
)
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17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
		(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
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(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
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			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
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	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => null,
		'pubs' => null,
		'ratiodecidendi' => null,
		'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'sub' => 'Company law',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
)
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18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
		(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
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4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the Arbitration Act, 1940, thus, has been taken away.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
		(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => null,
		'pubs' => null,
		'ratiodecidendi' => null,
		'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'sub' => 'Company law',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
)
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19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
		(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
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20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.

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			'id' => '73',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
			'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
			'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
			'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Issue No.2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">27</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">55</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three years</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Description of the suit</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Period of limitation</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Time from which period begis to run</p><p style="text-align: justify;">112</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
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			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
			'sub' => 'Company law',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
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	'casename_url' => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '73',
		(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
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$title_for_layout = 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs M S Wipro Net Ltd - Citation 73 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '73',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51006/companies-act-1956-complete-act">Companies Act, 1956</a>; Limitation Act - Article 112; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; <a href="/act/51678/arbitration-act-1940-repealed-complete-act">Arbitration Act, 1940</a>; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)',
		'appealno' => 'C.S.No.318 of 2006',
		'appellant' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'casenote' => 'Companies Act, 1956 -- On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. 8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. Central Government shall-It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. Additional Issue: The suit suffers dismissal.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-06-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S. PALANIVELU, J.',
		'judgement' => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.</p><p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-</p><p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.</p><p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.</p><p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.</p><p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-</p><p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.</p><p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.</p><p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.</p><p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-</p><p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?</p><p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?</p><p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?</p><p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-</p><p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?</p><p>Issue No.2</p><p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.</p><p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.</p><p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>27</p><p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.</p><p>55</p><p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.</p><p>Three years</p><p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.</p><p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:</p><p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]</p><p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]</p><p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]</p><p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:</p><p>Article</p><p>Description of the suit</p><p>Period of limitation</p><p>Time from which period begis to run</p><p>112</p><p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p><p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.</p><p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.</p><p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-</p><p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,</p><p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; </p><p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] </p><p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]</p><p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.</p><p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.</p><p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.</p><p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -</p><p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.</p><p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :</p><p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.</p><p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => null,
		'pubs' => null,
		'ratiodecidendi' => null,
		'respondent' => 'M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.',
		'sub' => 'Company law',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
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$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '73',
	(int) 1 => 'bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/73/bharat-sanchar-nigam-limited-vs-wipro-net'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '1. The Civil Suit is filed for a judgment and decree, directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- in respect of the Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125 installed by the plaintiff together with interest @ 18% from the date of bill till the date of payment in full on the principal sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with costs.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The following are the contents in the plaint:-',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2.(a) The plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>, having its Registered office at New Delhi and having its other offices at various places and the plaintiff office is situated at Chennai, from whom the defendant availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125 under the agreement form in the year 2000, that in the said form the defendant had agreed to pay the annual rental at the rates prescribed by the department, that by letter dated 9.5.2001 the defendant requested the plaintiff for shifting the Primary MUX provided at Mylapore Exchange to Haddows Road Exchange, that by letter dated 11/15.5.2001 the plaintiff sent a reply expressing the request for shifting cannot be acceded to, that again by letter dated 21.6.2001 the defendant informed the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed and installed at Mylapore PCM, for which the plaintiff permitted to shift MUX equipment and install at Mylapore PCM.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2.(b) By letter dated 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6 Fibre Cable working between Wipro Limited and Mylapore Exchange, that a bill was raised for outstanding amount and a reminder was also sent on 15/22/4/2004 in respect of Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, that on 18.10.2004 the plaintiff sent a reminder for settlement of outstanding of Rs.36,45,624/- due as on that date, that after scrutiny of accounts a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- was also adjusted towards the outstanding and the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.27,30,419/- with interest 18% p.a., which works out to Rs.9,56,663/- totalling Rs.36,87,082/-, that the plaintiff sent reminders on 29.11.2004 and 31.1.2005 and thereafter the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant on 2.3.2005 through his counsel, calling upon the defendant to pay the outstanding with interest from the date of bill till the date of payment, that after the issuance of notice, a sum of Rs.9,15,205/- had been adjusted from the outstanding liability of Rs.36,45,624/- and thus the defendant is liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/-.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>2.(c) Though the defendant had duly acknowledged the said notice, neither he paid the amount due nor replied to the said notice, that by letter dated 7.7.2005 the defendant requested the plaintiff to give an opportunity to discuss the issue pertaining to the outstanding amount, that the defendant also sent another letter on 25.7.2005 to grant 2 days time to discuss the issue, that by letter dated 6.8.2005, after meeting the officials of the plaintiff on 28.7.2005 and sought time upto 13.8.2005, the defendant requested further time and that since the plaintiff had given sufficient time to the defendant to clear the outstanding amount due, the defendant has not shown any interest to settle the dues, the plaintiff have no other alternative remedy except to approach this Court to recover the amount due by way of this Civil Suit.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the following are averred:-',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3.(a) The allegations contained in the plaint are denied, that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine, that the defendants have surrendered and the plaintiff have cancelled the leased lines on 28.11.2002 itself and hence the present suit in March 2006 is barred by limitation, that the letter dated 11/15/5/2001 from the plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint was not received by the defendant, that though the defendant sent letter to the plaintiff on 21.06.2001 requesting to shift and install both the MUX equipment at Mylapore PCM which would avoid having a MUX equipment at their premises and also avoid other additional hardware, the plaintiff took no action for more than a month and the defendant was forced to send reminder on 11.7.2001 and that the system was not removed from the premises by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>3.(b) There was no high speed connectivity despite the cable installation at site, since the required channel cards were not given by the plaintiff which also led to the downfall in the defendant's business, that the defendant could not cope up with the expectation and demand of their national customers, that due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff to install the cables of over 10 months and further delay of almost a year in transferring the MUX equipment, the defendant had lost all their prospective customers, as the defendant were not able to keep up their commitments to the customers and all work orders of Chennai were held due to want of this facility, that on 14.11.2002 the defendant informed the plaintiff of their exit out of ISP business and also requested the plaintiff to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and the plaintiff disconnected the said lines on 28.11.2002, that the defendant not only suffered monetary loss but also their reputation was harmed with their customers due to the inordinate delay caused by the plaintiff in installing the lay of the Optic Fibre Cables and make the system operational in Chennai.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>3.(c) The plaintiff have adjusted Rs.9.15 lakhs towards outstanding dues from the defendant without any valid rhyme or reason or formal communication and without any explanation, that a letter dated 18.10.2004 from the plaintiff was received demanding an alleged sum of Rs.26,45,624/- as outstanding dues for Circuit Nos.10000124 and 10000125, however the same was denied, that the defendant are not liable to pay Rs.27,30,419/- alongwith interest 18% per annum as mentioned in the plaint, because the said claim is not only barred by limitation but also vague and most of these bills were issued after termination of the connection and that the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. On the strength of the above said pleadings, the following issues were framed by this Court:-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.36,87,082/- as claimed with interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of payment?',
	(int) 11 => '<p>2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?',
	(int) 12 => '<p>3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other reliefs?',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. After hearing the arguments of both sides, this Court framed the following Additional Issue:-',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Whether the remedies sought for in the suit is hit by Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act 1885?',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Issue No.2',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. The suit has been filed to recover rental charges from the defendant, who had availed Dedicated Cable Circuit bearing No.10000124 and 10000125. Ex.P.2 is the copy of licence agreement entered into between both parties dated 4.12.1998. It provides that annual rent of Rs.3,44,670/- shall be retained for a minimum period of ten years. The defendant had to pay the annual rental as prescribed by the department to the expiry of the initial guarantee period. By means of Ex.P.2 the defendant agreed to hire the optical fibre cable (6 fibre) between their premises in TTK Road and Mylapore on an annual rent above stated for a minimum period of 10 years. On 9.5.2001 under Ex.P.3, the defendant had requested the plaintiff for shifting primary MUX provided at Mylapore exchange to Haddows Road Exchange. The plaintiff did not accede to the shifting as requested by the defendant. Hence the defendant sent Ex.P.4 letter informing the plaintiff that due to short fall in the availability of MUX equipment, one MUX equipment will be removed from their premises and installed at Mylapore and by letter under Ex.P.5, the plaintiff has permitted the defendant to shift the MUX equipment as requested.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7. On 14.11.2002 the defendant requested the plaintiff by Ex.P.6 communication for closure of R&amp;G 140Mbps System and 6Fibre Cable working between the defendant's place and Mylapore Exchange. Ex.P.7 is the reminder issued by the plaintiff on 18.10.2004 for settlement of outstanding dues by the defendant. Exs.P.8 to P.17 are the exchange of communications between both the parties with regard to the payment.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. It is the quintessence of the defendant that the suit claim has miserably been barred by limitation. Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant would submit that by means of Ex.P.6 the defendant intimated the plaintiff that the R&amp;G 140Mbps system and 6Fibre Cable working may be closed with immediate effect due to business reasons and that they are exiting out of retail ISP business. By means of that letter they have also requested the plaintiff to arrange to remove the system on or before 25.11.2002 and hence the suit should have been filed on or before 24.11.2005, but it was filed on 31.3.2006 and the same is hit by Article 27 and 25 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, it is to be noted that the due payable by the defendant was demanded by means of supplementary Bills Exs.P.9 to P.11 in 2003-2004 by the plaintiff and also by the letters Exs.P.12 to 14 for the said purpose. Finally, by means of Ex.P.15 legal notice, the plaintiff demanded the outstanding on 2.3.2005. Ex.P.8 is dated 9.5.2000 which is much earlier to Ex.P.6. The plaintiff issued Ex.P.7 letter on 18.10.2004 claiming Rs.36,45,624/-. But the notice was returned without service upon the defendant. The returned notice is also enclosed in Ex.P.7. Outstanding amount as claimed in Ex.P.7 became due on the closure of the system on 25.11.2002 as mentioned in Ex.P.6. It is to be noted that in the subsequent communications emanated from the plaintiff, it is mentioned about the exact date of closure of the system. Hence, it is to be construed that the system was closed on 25.11.2002 and the dues of the plaintiff became payable as on 25.11.2002. Hence, the suit should have been filed within three years from 25.11.2002, but it was filed on 31.03.2006.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that as per Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by time. The said provisions are as follows:-',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 21 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 24 => '<p>27',
	(int) 25 => '<p>For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 27 => '<p>When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>55',
	(int) 29 => '<p>For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Three years',
	(int) 31 => '<p>When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) it ceases.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>10. Repelling the above said contentions the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr.S.Udayakumar would say that the plaintiff is a Government of India undertaking and hence the limitation period for enforcing the claim by the plaintiff is 30 years. He placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contention:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>1. AIR 1962 SC 1281 [R.C. Jall Parsi and another v. Union of India and another]',
	(int) 34 => '<p>2. (2004) 13 SCC 14 [Accountant General (A&amp;E) and another]',
	(int) 35 => '<p>3. AIR 1998 KERALA 31 [Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Financial Corporation, Vellayambalam and others]',
	(int) 36 => '<p>11. Article 112 of the Limitation Act reads thus:',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Article',
	(int) 38 => '<p>Description of the suit',
	(int) 39 => '<p>Period of limitation',
	(int) 40 => '<p>Time from which period begis to run',
	(int) 41 => '<p>112',
	(int) 42 => '<p>Any Court [except a suit before the Supreme Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction] by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>12. In AIR 1962 SC 1281 the plaintiff was Union of India and the suit was filed by the Central Government. In the case in (2004) 13 SCC 14, the Accountant General is the plaintiff who has issued notice to recovery of State house rent allowance illegally drawn by the respondent who was Section Officer in Accountant General office at Trivandurm. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench asserted that the claim for recovery was barred by time since the claim was made beyond 3 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court has held that under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for recovery of money, so far as the state is concerned, is 30 years and not three years and hence there is no question of limitation arising in the case. Insofar as the decision in AIR 1998 Kerala 31 is concerned, the Kerala Financial Corporation invoked provisions of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act notifies that the amount due to the above said institution has to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of Section 68 and as such Article 112 of the Limitation Act shall govern the case. It is held therein that the claim was not barred by time.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff is organ of Central Government or the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on behalf of the Central Government. The long cause title of the plaint would show that the plaintiff is a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. There is no provision in any of the Acts to the effect that the amount due to the plaintiff have to be treated on par with the amounts due to the Central Government. The plaintiff is a separate entity and the same is governed by its own articles of association. There is no material to show that the plaintiff is purely or wholly owned by the Central Government. To add further, the Union of India has not been impleaded as one of the parties in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not to be treated as an organ of Central Government and dues payable to it cannot be construed to be due to the Central Government.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>14. In order to ascertain whether the plaintiff is to be treated as Central Government, the Court has to wade through various provisions in the concerned Acts. Neither in the Limitation Act, nor in the Telegraph Act 1885, the definition of the terms Central Government and State Government have been defined. Hence, it is apposite for this Court to take aid of the definition clause in General Clauses Act, 1897, in which Section 3(8), Central Government has been defined as follows:- 3(8). Central Government shall-',
	(int) 46 => '<p>(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and shall include, (i) in relation to functions entrusted under Sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section, and (ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the said Act; and (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,',
	(int) 47 => '<p>(i) in relation to functions entrusted under Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State [before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956], the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be] [and] ',
	(int) 49 => '<p>(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution:]',
	(int) 50 => '<p>15. The plaint is specific in the matter of describing the plaintiff as a limited company incorporated under the <a>Companies Act, 1956</a>. Hence, it is a statutory body possessing a distinct legal entity so far as the initiation of legal proceedings are concerned. It may be true that the functioning of the plaintff company is controlled by the Central Government, however, mere control of the Central Government over the plaintiff company would not make the plaintiff as Central Government. In order to possess the status Central Government, it should come within the purview of Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, aforementioned. Even though it is constituted under special statute at the behest of the Central Government, the plaintiff would not acquire the status of Central Government. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not at all Central Government and it is far fetching contention that Article 112 of the Limitation Act would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.',
	(int) 51 => '<p>16. An identical issue came before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Judge has held that Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited is not Central Government and as far as the point of limitation is concerned, Article 112 is not applicable. It is reported in AIR 2007 NOC 2269 (Punjab and Haryana) = MANU/PH/0735/2007 =(2007)4 PLR 414 [ Bharat Sanchar Niham Limited v.Pawan Kumar Gupta]. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered therein. In this context Article 27 and 55 of the Limitation Act would apply and it is held that the present suit is barred by time, since the same has not been initiated within three months from 25.11.2002, the date of closure of the system by the defendant. I answer this issue in affirmative. Additional Issue:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the defendant would strenuously contend that the dispute which has arisen between the parties should have been referred to the Arbitration as per Section 7 (B) of the Telegraph Act 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence this Court has got no jurisdiction to try the same. The statute provides for a specific and separate mechanism for resolving the dispute which arises between the BSNL on the one part and the other party like the defendant on the other and the plaintiff has chosen a wrong forum to settle the issue, he further added. It is profitable to extract the relevant provision of Section 7(B) of the Act which reads as follows - 7-B. Arbitration of disputes.',
	(int) 53 => '<p>(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.',
	(int) 54 => '<p>18. The Act has also clarified and furnished the relevant procedures to be adopted by the Arbitrator and it has also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be conclusive between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 481 [Deptt. of the Telecommunications v. M.Krishnan] wherein Their Lordships while dealing with the dispute which came before the tribunal constituted under Consumer Protection Act which was regarding the disputes in respect of telegraph bills, held that when a special remedy is provided under Section 7 (B) of the Act, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred and that the special law overrides the general law. In 1996 (3) SCC 119 [M.L.Jaggi v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Ltd.] , the Supreme Court had expressed identical opinion as to the statutory remedy available under the Act. The relevant portion is as follows -',
	(int) 55 => '<p>4. It is a statutory remedy provided under the Act and, therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised, the only remedy provided is by way of arbitration under Section 7-B of the Act. By operation of sub-section (2) thereof, the award of the arbitrator made under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. The statutory remedy under the <a>Arbitration Act, 1940</a>, thus, has been taken away.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>19. The above said M.L.JAGGI's case has been referred and followed in a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/1413/2001. This Court in 2004 (3) CTC 241 = 2004 (3) MLJ 246 [The General Manager, Telecommunications and Ors. vs. K.Natrayan] has also echoed the same principle. It has held therein that in the light of specific bar under Section 7(B) of the Act and in view of Section 9 of CPC as well as explained by catena of decisions that in respect of any dispute relating to the matter specifically provided in sub-section (1), the only remedy for the affected person to resolve the same is by way of arbitration proceedings and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. In view of the principles laid by the Honourable Supreme Court and as followed by this Court and other High Courts, it is held that the present dispute between both the parties would squarely come within the purview of Section 7(B) of the Act and the arbitrator appointed as per the provisions of the Act has to deal with the same. The resolution of dispute between the parties concerned is within the domain of the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. In such view of this matter, I am fortified in my view that the present dispute should have been referred to the arbitrator under the Act as aforementioned and the suit is not maintainable before this Court. I answer this issue accordingly. Issue Nos.1 and 3 :',
	(int) 57 => '<p>20. As discussed under the additional issue, the appropriate authority to resolve the dispute between the parties is the arbitrator, to be appointed under Section 7(B) of the Telegraph Act and whatever be the merits of the matter have not been touched by this Court since the decision on merits of this case would not come within the ambit of jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, these issues are answered to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief before this Court and they should have invoked the provisions of Telegraph Act. The suit suffers dismissal.',
	(int) 58 => '<p>21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.'
)
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21. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.

Subject	Company law
Court	Chennai High Court
Decided On	Jun-06-2011
Case Number	C.S.No.318 of 2006
Judge	S. PALANIVELU, J.
Acts	Companies Act, 1956; Limitation Act - Article 112; Constitution of India - Articles 239, 249; Consumer Protection Act; Arbitration Act, 1940; Telegraph Act - Section 7(B)
Appellant	Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited
Respondent	M/S. Wipro Net Ltd.
Appellant Advocate	Mr. S.Udayakumar, Adv.
Respondent Advocate	Mr. Mohammed Shaffiq; M/s.G.R.M.Palaniappan, Advs.

Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/S. Wipro Net Ltd. - Court Judgment