Regional Cancer Centre Vs Gopalan - Citation 729830 - Court Judgment

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			'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.         ',
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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.A. Abdul Gafoor, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Challenge is against Ext. P4 order passed by the Kerala State Human Rights Commission. The first respondent filed Ext. P1 petition before the said Commission alleging human rights violation consequently on an alleged act by the petitioners herein, during his treatment at the hospital of the 1st petitioner. The 2nd petitioner is the Director of the hospital. The petitioners objected on the grounds of limitation. Section 36(2) the <a href="/act/51674/protection-of-human-rights-act-1993-complete-act">Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993</a> provides that 'State Commission shall not enquire into any matter after expiry of one year from the date on which the act constituting violation of human rights alleged to have been committed'. Therefore, Ext. P1 petition was filed belatedly beyond the said period from the date of alleged-human rights violation namely, administration of certain chemicals on 13.1.2000, 14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000. Even according to the 1st respondent on 13.1.2000,14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000 he was given M4N and G4N injections and on 18.1.2000 he was subjected to asurgery. Ext. P1 petition was filed on 1.8.2001. This is beyond the period provided for objection in Section 36(2), the petitioners submits. But this contention was tried as preliminary issue was overruled in Ext. P4, finding that the effect of 'Act' may still continue and in such circumstances by no stretch of reasoning it can be said that the petition was barred by limitation under Section 36(2). This finding was entered into relying on Page No. 36 of the Law Laxicon edited by Y.V. Chandrachood, Former Chief Justice of India.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Assailing Ext. P1 it is contended by the petitioners that period of limitation prescribed in the said statute is to be strictly construed. The court cannot stretch the period of limitation beyond the period made mentioned of in the statute concerned. The decisions, in (AIR 1999 SC 3101) Lachhman Das Arora v. Ganeshi Led and others and (AIR 1999 SC 1351) Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. & another have been cited in support of this contention. As held in the former case 'the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party, but it has to be applied with all its vigour when the statute so prescribes. The court cannot extend the period of limitation on equitable ground more particular in the matter of filing of election petitions under the Act.' This was on a question of limitation in terms of Representation of Peoples' Act. The period of limitation prescribed in this case is also in terms of special statute namely Protection of Human Rights Act. Dealing with converse situation in the latter case, the Supreme Court held that when the statute does not prescribe any period of limitation the court cannot throw out a petition on the ground of limitation. Going by the pleadings contained in Ext. P1 and the dates of administration of the alleged chemical or medicines as the case may be, during January 2000, the petition was filed beyond the period of limitation of one year provided in Section 36(2). Ext. P1 was filed only on 1.8.2001. Applying strict rule of limitation contained in Section 36(2) of the Act, Ext. P1 petition ought to have been dismissed upholding the preliminary objection rather than rejecting it as per Ext. P4.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. It is contended by the 1st respondent that the administration of medicine was in January 2000 as averred in Para 5 of Ext. P1 petition. The medicine had been consumed by him bonafide believing that it had been prescribed by the doctor to cure his ailment. This cannot be taken as the dates for the purpose of limitation. No symptoms were noticed by mere administration of the medicine on the said dates. Symptoms arose when adverse reactions were noticed. According to him as averred in para 6 of the Ext. P1. he experienced foreign body sensation in throat on 14.1.2000 and thereafter he was subjected to laryngoscopy and biopsy and the result disclosed that a further tumour had developed. According to him it was developed after injuctingthese chemicals as averred in para 6 of Ext. P1. New tumour was noticed after14.1.2000, It developed because of administration of the medicine, he submits. Ofcourse that is a matter which shall be left to be strictly proved by him. There is clearallegation that he experienced alleged adverse effect of administration of the medicine,on 14.1.2000. That is the date of knowledge, so far as he is concerned, about theadversity he is alleged to be suffering. Therefore, that shall be taken as the startingperiod of limitation, the 1st respondent submits.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is worthwhile to refer the decision in (AIR 1961 SC 1500) Harish Chandra v. Deputy L.A. Officer in connection with the period of limitation provided in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It was held that the period of limitation in the statute shall be construed from the date of knowledge of the order of the administrative authority concerned.. Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act provided a period of limitation of six weeks from the date of Collector's award to seek reference to the Civil Court, The Apex Court held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The knowledge of the party affected by the award either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice the expression 'the date of the award' used in the proviso must mean that date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructing. In our opinion, therefore, it would be unreasonable to construe the words 'from the date of Collector's award' used in the proviso to Section 18 in a literal or mechanical way.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The date of knowledge is taken as relevant criterion to count the period of limitation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. In this case also mere administration of medicine, allegedly chemical, on the 1st respondent, prescribed by competent doctors in the reputed institution cannot be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. The date of experience of adverse effects on a subsequent date of administration, alone can be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. On the basis of the averment in para 6 of Ext. P1 the 1st respondent experienced a new foreign body sensation on 14.1.2000 and the pathology-report was suggestive, according to him, of a new tumour. Therefore, that shall be me date of knowledge of the difficulty experienced by him, which according to him was because of the alleged administration of the medicine-chemical. So, counting the period of one year from 14.1.2000, it cannot be taken that Ext. P1 is beyond the period of limitation. Therefore, Ext. P4 can be sustained on the aforesaid reasoning. But whether the formation of the new tumour is because of the administration of G4N and M4N or because of the delayed surgery is a matter to be strictly proved by the 1st respondent while prosecuting Ext. P1 claim. Original Petition is closed as above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'judgement' => '<p>K.A. Abdul Gafoor, J. </p><p>1. Challenge is against Ext. P4 order passed by the Kerala State Human Rights Commission. The first respondent filed Ext. P1 petition before the said Commission alleging human rights violation consequently on an alleged act by the petitioners herein, during his treatment at the hospital of the 1st petitioner. The 2nd petitioner is the Director of the hospital. The petitioners objected on the grounds of limitation. Section 36(2) the <a>Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993</a> provides that 'State Commission shall not enquire into any matter after expiry of one year from the date on which the act constituting violation of human rights alleged to have been committed'. Therefore, Ext. P1 petition was filed belatedly beyond the said period from the date of alleged-human rights violation namely, administration of certain chemicals on 13.1.2000, 14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000. Even according to the 1st respondent on 13.1.2000,14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000 he was given M4N and G4N injections and on 18.1.2000 he was subjected to asurgery. Ext. P1 petition was filed on 1.8.2001. This is beyond the period provided for objection in Section 36(2), the petitioners submits. But this contention was tried as preliminary issue was overruled in Ext. P4, finding that the effect of 'Act' may still continue and in such circumstances by no stretch of reasoning it can be said that the petition was barred by limitation under Section 36(2). This finding was entered into relying on Page No. 36 of the Law Laxicon edited by Y.V. Chandrachood, Former Chief Justice of India.</p><p>2. Assailing Ext. P1 it is contended by the petitioners that period of limitation prescribed in the said statute is to be strictly construed. The court cannot stretch the period of limitation beyond the period made mentioned of in the statute concerned. The decisions, in (AIR 1999 SC 3101) Lachhman Das Arora v. Ganeshi Led and others and (AIR 1999 SC 1351) Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. & another have been cited in support of this contention. As held in the former case 'the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party, but it has to be applied with all its vigour when the statute so prescribes. The court cannot extend the period of limitation on equitable ground more particular in the matter of filing of election petitions under the Act.' This was on a question of limitation in terms of Representation of Peoples' Act. The period of limitation prescribed in this case is also in terms of special statute namely Protection of Human Rights Act. Dealing with converse situation in the latter case, the Supreme Court held that when the statute does not prescribe any period of limitation the court cannot throw out a petition on the ground of limitation. Going by the pleadings contained in Ext. P1 and the dates of administration of the alleged chemical or medicines as the case may be, during January 2000, the petition was filed beyond the period of limitation of one year provided in Section 36(2). Ext. P1 was filed only on 1.8.2001. Applying strict rule of limitation contained in Section 36(2) of the Act, Ext. P1 petition ought to have been dismissed upholding the preliminary objection rather than rejecting it as per Ext. P4.</p><p>3. It is contended by the 1st respondent that the administration of medicine was in January 2000 as averred in Para 5 of Ext. P1 petition. The medicine had been consumed by him bonafide believing that it had been prescribed by the doctor to cure his ailment. This cannot be taken as the dates for the purpose of limitation. No symptoms were noticed by mere administration of the medicine on the said dates. Symptoms arose when adverse reactions were noticed. According to him as averred in para 6 of the Ext. P1. he experienced foreign body sensation in throat on 14.1.2000 and thereafter he was subjected to laryngoscopy and biopsy and the result disclosed that a further tumour had developed. According to him it was developed after injuctingthese chemicals as averred in para 6 of Ext. P1. New tumour was noticed after14.1.2000, It developed because of administration of the medicine, he submits. Ofcourse that is a matter which shall be left to be strictly proved by him. There is clearallegation that he experienced alleged adverse effect of administration of the medicine,on 14.1.2000. That is the date of knowledge, so far as he is concerned, about theadversity he is alleged to be suffering. Therefore, that shall be taken as the startingperiod of limitation, the 1st respondent submits.</p><p>4. It is worthwhile to refer the decision in (AIR 1961 SC 1500) Harish Chandra v. Deputy L.A. Officer in connection with the period of limitation provided in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It was held that the period of limitation in the statute shall be construed from the date of knowledge of the order of the administrative authority concerned.. Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act provided a period of limitation of six weeks from the date of Collector's award to seek reference to the Civil Court, The Apex Court held as follows:</p><p>'The knowledge of the party affected by the award either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice the expression 'the date of the award' used in the proviso must mean that date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructing. In our opinion, therefore, it would be unreasonable to construe the words 'from the date of Collector's award' used in the proviso to Section 18 in a literal or mechanical way.'</p><p>The date of knowledge is taken as relevant criterion to count the period of limitation.</p><p>5. In this case also mere administration of medicine, allegedly chemical, on the 1st respondent, prescribed by competent doctors in the reputed institution cannot be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. The date of experience of adverse effects on a subsequent date of administration, alone can be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. On the basis of the averment in para 6 of Ext. P1 the 1st respondent experienced a new foreign body sensation on 14.1.2000 and the pathology-report was suggestive, according to him, of a new tumour. Therefore, that shall be me date of knowledge of the difficulty experienced by him, which according to him was because of the alleged administration of the medicine-chemical. So, counting the period of one year from 14.1.2000, it cannot be taken that Ext. P1 is beyond the period of limitation. Therefore, Ext. P4 can be sustained on the aforesaid reasoning. But whether the formation of the new tumour is because of the administration of G4N and M4N or because of the delayed surgery is a matter to be strictly proved by the 1st respondent while prosecuting Ext. P1 claim. Original Petition is closed as above.<p></p><p>',
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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.A. Abdul Gafoor, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Challenge is against Ext. P4 order passed by the Kerala State Human Rights Commission. The first respondent filed Ext. P1 petition before the said Commission alleging human rights violation consequently on an alleged act by the petitioners herein, during his treatment at the hospital of the 1st petitioner. The 2nd petitioner is the Director of the hospital. The petitioners objected on the grounds of limitation. Section 36(2) the <a href="/act/51674/protection-of-human-rights-act-1993-complete-act">Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993</a> provides that 'State Commission shall not enquire into any matter after expiry of one year from the date on which the act constituting violation of human rights alleged to have been committed'. Therefore, Ext. P1 petition was filed belatedly beyond the said period from the date of alleged-human rights violation namely, administration of certain chemicals on 13.1.2000, 14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000. Even according to the 1st respondent on 13.1.2000,14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000 he was given M4N and G4N injections and on 18.1.2000 he was subjected to asurgery. Ext. P1 petition was filed on 1.8.2001. This is beyond the period provided for objection in Section 36(2), the petitioners submits. But this contention was tried as preliminary issue was overruled in Ext. P4, finding that the effect of 'Act' may still continue and in such circumstances by no stretch of reasoning it can be said that the petition was barred by limitation under Section 36(2). This finding was entered into relying on Page No. 36 of the Law Laxicon edited by Y.V. Chandrachood, Former Chief Justice of India.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Assailing Ext. P1 it is contended by the petitioners that period of limitation prescribed in the said statute is to be strictly construed. The court cannot stretch the period of limitation beyond the period made mentioned of in the statute concerned. The decisions, in (AIR 1999 SC 3101) Lachhman Das Arora v. Ganeshi Led and others and (AIR 1999 SC 1351) Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. & another have been cited in support of this contention. As held in the former case 'the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party, but it has to be applied with all its vigour when the statute so prescribes. The court cannot extend the period of limitation on equitable ground more particular in the matter of filing of election petitions under the Act.' This was on a question of limitation in terms of Representation of Peoples' Act. The period of limitation prescribed in this case is also in terms of special statute namely Protection of Human Rights Act. Dealing with converse situation in the latter case, the Supreme Court held that when the statute does not prescribe any period of limitation the court cannot throw out a petition on the ground of limitation. Going by the pleadings contained in Ext. P1 and the dates of administration of the alleged chemical or medicines as the case may be, during January 2000, the petition was filed beyond the period of limitation of one year provided in Section 36(2). Ext. P1 was filed only on 1.8.2001. Applying strict rule of limitation contained in Section 36(2) of the Act, Ext. P1 petition ought to have been dismissed upholding the preliminary objection rather than rejecting it as per Ext. P4.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. It is contended by the 1st respondent that the administration of medicine was in January 2000 as averred in Para 5 of Ext. P1 petition. The medicine had been consumed by him bonafide believing that it had been prescribed by the doctor to cure his ailment. This cannot be taken as the dates for the purpose of limitation. No symptoms were noticed by mere administration of the medicine on the said dates. Symptoms arose when adverse reactions were noticed. According to him as averred in para 6 of the Ext. P1. he experienced foreign body sensation in throat on 14.1.2000 and thereafter he was subjected to laryngoscopy and biopsy and the result disclosed that a further tumour had developed. According to him it was developed after injuctingthese chemicals as averred in para 6 of Ext. P1. New tumour was noticed after14.1.2000, It developed because of administration of the medicine, he submits. Ofcourse that is a matter which shall be left to be strictly proved by him. There is clearallegation that he experienced alleged adverse effect of administration of the medicine,on 14.1.2000. That is the date of knowledge, so far as he is concerned, about theadversity he is alleged to be suffering. Therefore, that shall be taken as the startingperiod of limitation, the 1st respondent submits.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is worthwhile to refer the decision in (AIR 1961 SC 1500) Harish Chandra v. Deputy L.A. Officer in connection with the period of limitation provided in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It was held that the period of limitation in the statute shall be construed from the date of knowledge of the order of the administrative authority concerned.. Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act provided a period of limitation of six weeks from the date of Collector's award to seek reference to the Civil Court, The Apex Court held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The knowledge of the party affected by the award either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice the expression 'the date of the award' used in the proviso must mean that date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructing. In our opinion, therefore, it would be unreasonable to construe the words 'from the date of Collector's award' used in the proviso to Section 18 in a literal or mechanical way.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The date of knowledge is taken as relevant criterion to count the period of limitation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. In this case also mere administration of medicine, allegedly chemical, on the 1st respondent, prescribed by competent doctors in the reputed institution cannot be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. The date of experience of adverse effects on a subsequent date of administration, alone can be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. On the basis of the averment in para 6 of Ext. P1 the 1st respondent experienced a new foreign body sensation on 14.1.2000 and the pathology-report was suggestive, according to him, of a new tumour. Therefore, that shall be me date of knowledge of the difficulty experienced by him, which according to him was because of the alleged administration of the medicine-chemical. So, counting the period of one year from 14.1.2000, it cannot be taken that Ext. P1 is beyond the period of limitation. Therefore, Ext. P4 can be sustained on the aforesaid reasoning. But whether the formation of the new tumour is because of the administration of G4N and M4N or because of the delayed surgery is a matter to be strictly proved by the 1st respondent while prosecuting Ext. P1 claim. Original Petition is closed as above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'judge' => ' K.A. Abdul Gafoor, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.A. Abdul Gafoor, J. </p><p>1. Challenge is against Ext. P4 order passed by the Kerala State Human Rights Commission. The first respondent filed Ext. P1 petition before the said Commission alleging human rights violation consequently on an alleged act by the petitioners herein, during his treatment at the hospital of the 1st petitioner. The 2nd petitioner is the Director of the hospital. The petitioners objected on the grounds of limitation. Section 36(2) the <a>Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993</a> provides that 'State Commission shall not enquire into any matter after expiry of one year from the date on which the act constituting violation of human rights alleged to have been committed'. Therefore, Ext. P1 petition was filed belatedly beyond the said period from the date of alleged-human rights violation namely, administration of certain chemicals on 13.1.2000, 14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000. Even according to the 1st respondent on 13.1.2000,14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000 he was given M4N and G4N injections and on 18.1.2000 he was subjected to asurgery. Ext. P1 petition was filed on 1.8.2001. This is beyond the period provided for objection in Section 36(2), the petitioners submits. But this contention was tried as preliminary issue was overruled in Ext. P4, finding that the effect of 'Act' may still continue and in such circumstances by no stretch of reasoning it can be said that the petition was barred by limitation under Section 36(2). This finding was entered into relying on Page No. 36 of the Law Laxicon edited by Y.V. Chandrachood, Former Chief Justice of India.</p><p>2. Assailing Ext. P1 it is contended by the petitioners that period of limitation prescribed in the said statute is to be strictly construed. The court cannot stretch the period of limitation beyond the period made mentioned of in the statute concerned. The decisions, in (AIR 1999 SC 3101) Lachhman Das Arora v. Ganeshi Led and others and (AIR 1999 SC 1351) Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. & another have been cited in support of this contention. As held in the former case 'the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party, but it has to be applied with all its vigour when the statute so prescribes. The court cannot extend the period of limitation on equitable ground more particular in the matter of filing of election petitions under the Act.' This was on a question of limitation in terms of Representation of Peoples' Act. The period of limitation prescribed in this case is also in terms of special statute namely Protection of Human Rights Act. Dealing with converse situation in the latter case, the Supreme Court held that when the statute does not prescribe any period of limitation the court cannot throw out a petition on the ground of limitation. Going by the pleadings contained in Ext. P1 and the dates of administration of the alleged chemical or medicines as the case may be, during January 2000, the petition was filed beyond the period of limitation of one year provided in Section 36(2). Ext. P1 was filed only on 1.8.2001. Applying strict rule of limitation contained in Section 36(2) of the Act, Ext. P1 petition ought to have been dismissed upholding the preliminary objection rather than rejecting it as per Ext. P4.</p><p>3. It is contended by the 1st respondent that the administration of medicine was in January 2000 as averred in Para 5 of Ext. P1 petition. The medicine had been consumed by him bonafide believing that it had been prescribed by the doctor to cure his ailment. This cannot be taken as the dates for the purpose of limitation. No symptoms were noticed by mere administration of the medicine on the said dates. Symptoms arose when adverse reactions were noticed. According to him as averred in para 6 of the Ext. P1. he experienced foreign body sensation in throat on 14.1.2000 and thereafter he was subjected to laryngoscopy and biopsy and the result disclosed that a further tumour had developed. According to him it was developed after injuctingthese chemicals as averred in para 6 of Ext. P1. New tumour was noticed after14.1.2000, It developed because of administration of the medicine, he submits. Ofcourse that is a matter which shall be left to be strictly proved by him. There is clearallegation that he experienced alleged adverse effect of administration of the medicine,on 14.1.2000. That is the date of knowledge, so far as he is concerned, about theadversity he is alleged to be suffering. Therefore, that shall be taken as the startingperiod of limitation, the 1st respondent submits.</p><p>4. It is worthwhile to refer the decision in (AIR 1961 SC 1500) Harish Chandra v. Deputy L.A. Officer in connection with the period of limitation provided in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It was held that the period of limitation in the statute shall be construed from the date of knowledge of the order of the administrative authority concerned.. Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act provided a period of limitation of six weeks from the date of Collector's award to seek reference to the Civil Court, The Apex Court held as follows:</p><p>'The knowledge of the party affected by the award either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice the expression 'the date of the award' used in the proviso must mean that date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructing. In our opinion, therefore, it would be unreasonable to construe the words 'from the date of Collector's award' used in the proviso to Section 18 in a literal or mechanical way.'</p><p>The date of knowledge is taken as relevant criterion to count the period of limitation.</p><p>5. In this case also mere administration of medicine, allegedly chemical, on the 1st respondent, prescribed by competent doctors in the reputed institution cannot be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. The date of experience of adverse effects on a subsequent date of administration, alone can be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. On the basis of the averment in para 6 of Ext. P1 the 1st respondent experienced a new foreign body sensation on 14.1.2000 and the pathology-report was suggestive, according to him, of a new tumour. Therefore, that shall be me date of knowledge of the difficulty experienced by him, which according to him was because of the alleged administration of the medicine-chemical. So, counting the period of one year from 14.1.2000, it cannot be taken that Ext. P1 is beyond the period of limitation. Therefore, Ext. P4 can be sustained on the aforesaid reasoning. But whether the formation of the new tumour is because of the administration of G4N and M4N or because of the delayed surgery is a matter to be strictly proved by the 1st respondent while prosecuting Ext. P1 claim. Original Petition is closed as above.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '2003(3)KLT982',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Gopalan',
		'sub' => 'Civil',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'regional-cancer-centre-vs-gopalan'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '729830',
	(int) 1 => 'regional-cancer-centre-vs-gopalan'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/729830/regional-cancer-centre-vs-gopalan'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'Harish Chandra v. Deputy L.A. Officer<br>'
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 120
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

- code of civil procedure, 1908.[c.a. no. 5/1908]. section 100-a [as substituted by c.p.c. amendment act, 2002]: [v.k. bali, cj, kurian joseph & k. balakrishnan nair, jj] applicability held, section is not retrospective. all appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. but subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro court appeals against judgment of single judge is not maintainable. provisions of section 100-a, c.p.c., will prevail over the provisions contained in the kerala high court act, 1959.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: kword [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 123]Code Context                                    }

                                //highest occurence of word in the judgement

                                echo $this->Wand->highlight($this->Excerpt->extractRelevant($kword,strtolower(strip_tags($desc['Judgement']['judgement']))), $query) . "</div>";
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Regional Cancer Centre Vs Gopalan - Citation 729830 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '729830',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51674/protection-of-human-rights-act-1993-complete-act">Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993</a> - Sections 36(2)',
			'appealno' => 'O.P. No. 10174 of 2002',
			'appellant' => 'Regional Cancer Centre',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Regional Cancer Centre Vs. Gopalan',
			'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.         ',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Harish Chandra v. Deputy L.A. Officer;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' N.N. Sugunapalan, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' P.S. Sreedharan Pillai,; S. Sreekumar,; M.A. Firoz,;',
			'court' => 'Kerala',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2002-08-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.A. Abdul Gafoor, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.A. Abdul Gafoor, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Challenge is against Ext. P4 order passed by the Kerala State Human Rights Commission. The first respondent filed Ext. P1 petition before the said Commission alleging human rights violation consequently on an alleged act by the petitioners herein, during his treatment at the hospital of the 1st petitioner. The 2nd petitioner is the Director of the hospital. The petitioners objected on the grounds of limitation. Section 36(2) the <a href="/act/51674/protection-of-human-rights-act-1993-complete-act">Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993</a> provides that 'State Commission shall not enquire into any matter after expiry of one year from the date on which the act constituting violation of human rights alleged to have been committed'. Therefore, Ext. P1 petition was filed belatedly beyond the said period from the date of alleged-human rights violation namely, administration of certain chemicals on 13.1.2000, 14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000. Even according to the 1st respondent on 13.1.2000,14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000 he was given M4N and G4N injections and on 18.1.2000 he was subjected to asurgery. Ext. P1 petition was filed on 1.8.2001. This is beyond the period provided for objection in Section 36(2), the petitioners submits. But this contention was tried as preliminary issue was overruled in Ext. P4, finding that the effect of 'Act' may still continue and in such circumstances by no stretch of reasoning it can be said that the petition was barred by limitation under Section 36(2). This finding was entered into relying on Page No. 36 of the Law Laxicon edited by Y.V. Chandrachood, Former Chief Justice of India.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Assailing Ext. P1 it is contended by the petitioners that period of limitation prescribed in the said statute is to be strictly construed. The court cannot stretch the period of limitation beyond the period made mentioned of in the statute concerned. The decisions, in (AIR 1999 SC 3101) Lachhman Das Arora v. Ganeshi Led and others and (AIR 1999 SC 1351) Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. & another have been cited in support of this contention. As held in the former case 'the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party, but it has to be applied with all its vigour when the statute so prescribes. The court cannot extend the period of limitation on equitable ground more particular in the matter of filing of election petitions under the Act.' This was on a question of limitation in terms of Representation of Peoples' Act. The period of limitation prescribed in this case is also in terms of special statute namely Protection of Human Rights Act. Dealing with converse situation in the latter case, the Supreme Court held that when the statute does not prescribe any period of limitation the court cannot throw out a petition on the ground of limitation. Going by the pleadings contained in Ext. P1 and the dates of administration of the alleged chemical or medicines as the case may be, during January 2000, the petition was filed beyond the period of limitation of one year provided in Section 36(2). Ext. P1 was filed only on 1.8.2001. Applying strict rule of limitation contained in Section 36(2) of the Act, Ext. P1 petition ought to have been dismissed upholding the preliminary objection rather than rejecting it as per Ext. P4.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. It is contended by the 1st respondent that the administration of medicine was in January 2000 as averred in Para 5 of Ext. P1 petition. The medicine had been consumed by him bonafide believing that it had been prescribed by the doctor to cure his ailment. This cannot be taken as the dates for the purpose of limitation. No symptoms were noticed by mere administration of the medicine on the said dates. Symptoms arose when adverse reactions were noticed. According to him as averred in para 6 of the Ext. P1. he experienced foreign body sensation in throat on 14.1.2000 and thereafter he was subjected to laryngoscopy and biopsy and the result disclosed that a further tumour had developed. According to him it was developed after injuctingthese chemicals as averred in para 6 of Ext. P1. New tumour was noticed after14.1.2000, It developed because of administration of the medicine, he submits. Ofcourse that is a matter which shall be left to be strictly proved by him. There is clearallegation that he experienced alleged adverse effect of administration of the medicine,on 14.1.2000. That is the date of knowledge, so far as he is concerned, about theadversity he is alleged to be suffering. Therefore, that shall be taken as the startingperiod of limitation, the 1st respondent submits.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is worthwhile to refer the decision in (AIR 1961 SC 1500) Harish Chandra v. Deputy L.A. Officer in connection with the period of limitation provided in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It was held that the period of limitation in the statute shall be construed from the date of knowledge of the order of the administrative authority concerned.. Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act provided a period of limitation of six weeks from the date of Collector's award to seek reference to the Civil Court, The Apex Court held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The knowledge of the party affected by the award either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice the expression 'the date of the award' used in the proviso must mean that date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructing. In our opinion, therefore, it would be unreasonable to construe the words 'from the date of Collector's award' used in the proviso to Section 18 in a literal or mechanical way.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The date of knowledge is taken as relevant criterion to count the period of limitation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. In this case also mere administration of medicine, allegedly chemical, on the 1st respondent, prescribed by competent doctors in the reputed institution cannot be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. The date of experience of adverse effects on a subsequent date of administration, alone can be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. On the basis of the averment in para 6 of Ext. P1 the 1st respondent experienced a new foreign body sensation on 14.1.2000 and the pathology-report was suggestive, according to him, of a new tumour. Therefore, that shall be me date of knowledge of the difficulty experienced by him, which according to him was because of the alleged administration of the medicine-chemical. So, counting the period of one year from 14.1.2000, it cannot be taken that Ext. P1 is beyond the period of limitation. Therefore, Ext. P4 can be sustained on the aforesaid reasoning. But whether the formation of the new tumour is because of the administration of G4N and M4N or because of the delayed surgery is a matter to be strictly proved by the 1st respondent while prosecuting Ext. P1 claim. Original Petition is closed as above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2003(3)KLT982',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Gopalan',
			'sub' => 'Civil',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'regional-cancer-centre-vs-gopalan',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '729830',
		(int) 1 => 'regional-cancer-centre-vs-gopalan'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Regional Cancer Centre Vs Gopalan - Citation 729830 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '729830',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51674/protection-of-human-rights-act-1993-complete-act">Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993</a> - Sections 36(2)',
		'appealno' => 'O.P. No. 10174 of 2002',
		'appellant' => 'Regional Cancer Centre',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Regional Cancer Centre Vs. Gopalan',
		'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.         ',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Harish Chandra v. Deputy L.A. Officer;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' N.N. Sugunapalan, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' P.S. Sreedharan Pillai,; S. Sreekumar,; M.A. Firoz,;',
		'court' => 'Kerala',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2002-08-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' K.A. Abdul Gafoor, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.A. Abdul Gafoor, J. </p><p>1. Challenge is against Ext. P4 order passed by the Kerala State Human Rights Commission. The first respondent filed Ext. P1 petition before the said Commission alleging human rights violation consequently on an alleged act by the petitioners herein, during his treatment at the hospital of the 1st petitioner. The 2nd petitioner is the Director of the hospital. The petitioners objected on the grounds of limitation. Section 36(2) the <a>Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993</a> provides that 'State Commission shall not enquire into any matter after expiry of one year from the date on which the act constituting violation of human rights alleged to have been committed'. Therefore, Ext. P1 petition was filed belatedly beyond the said period from the date of alleged-human rights violation namely, administration of certain chemicals on 13.1.2000, 14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000. Even according to the 1st respondent on 13.1.2000,14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000 he was given M4N and G4N injections and on 18.1.2000 he was subjected to asurgery. Ext. P1 petition was filed on 1.8.2001. This is beyond the period provided for objection in Section 36(2), the petitioners submits. But this contention was tried as preliminary issue was overruled in Ext. P4, finding that the effect of 'Act' may still continue and in such circumstances by no stretch of reasoning it can be said that the petition was barred by limitation under Section 36(2). This finding was entered into relying on Page No. 36 of the Law Laxicon edited by Y.V. Chandrachood, Former Chief Justice of India.</p><p>2. Assailing Ext. P1 it is contended by the petitioners that period of limitation prescribed in the said statute is to be strictly construed. The court cannot stretch the period of limitation beyond the period made mentioned of in the statute concerned. The decisions, in (AIR 1999 SC 3101) Lachhman Das Arora v. Ganeshi Led and others and (AIR 1999 SC 1351) Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. & another have been cited in support of this contention. As held in the former case 'the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party, but it has to be applied with all its vigour when the statute so prescribes. The court cannot extend the period of limitation on equitable ground more particular in the matter of filing of election petitions under the Act.' This was on a question of limitation in terms of Representation of Peoples' Act. The period of limitation prescribed in this case is also in terms of special statute namely Protection of Human Rights Act. Dealing with converse situation in the latter case, the Supreme Court held that when the statute does not prescribe any period of limitation the court cannot throw out a petition on the ground of limitation. Going by the pleadings contained in Ext. P1 and the dates of administration of the alleged chemical or medicines as the case may be, during January 2000, the petition was filed beyond the period of limitation of one year provided in Section 36(2). Ext. P1 was filed only on 1.8.2001. Applying strict rule of limitation contained in Section 36(2) of the Act, Ext. P1 petition ought to have been dismissed upholding the preliminary objection rather than rejecting it as per Ext. P4.</p><p>3. It is contended by the 1st respondent that the administration of medicine was in January 2000 as averred in Para 5 of Ext. P1 petition. The medicine had been consumed by him bonafide believing that it had been prescribed by the doctor to cure his ailment. This cannot be taken as the dates for the purpose of limitation. No symptoms were noticed by mere administration of the medicine on the said dates. Symptoms arose when adverse reactions were noticed. According to him as averred in para 6 of the Ext. P1. he experienced foreign body sensation in throat on 14.1.2000 and thereafter he was subjected to laryngoscopy and biopsy and the result disclosed that a further tumour had developed. According to him it was developed after injuctingthese chemicals as averred in para 6 of Ext. P1. New tumour was noticed after14.1.2000, It developed because of administration of the medicine, he submits. Ofcourse that is a matter which shall be left to be strictly proved by him. There is clearallegation that he experienced alleged adverse effect of administration of the medicine,on 14.1.2000. That is the date of knowledge, so far as he is concerned, about theadversity he is alleged to be suffering. Therefore, that shall be taken as the startingperiod of limitation, the 1st respondent submits.</p><p>4. It is worthwhile to refer the decision in (AIR 1961 SC 1500) Harish Chandra v. Deputy L.A. Officer in connection with the period of limitation provided in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It was held that the period of limitation in the statute shall be construed from the date of knowledge of the order of the administrative authority concerned.. Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act provided a period of limitation of six weeks from the date of Collector's award to seek reference to the Civil Court, The Apex Court held as follows:</p><p>'The knowledge of the party affected by the award either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice the expression 'the date of the award' used in the proviso must mean that date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructing. In our opinion, therefore, it would be unreasonable to construe the words 'from the date of Collector's award' used in the proviso to Section 18 in a literal or mechanical way.'</p><p>The date of knowledge is taken as relevant criterion to count the period of limitation.</p><p>5. In this case also mere administration of medicine, allegedly chemical, on the 1st respondent, prescribed by competent doctors in the reputed institution cannot be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. The date of experience of adverse effects on a subsequent date of administration, alone can be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. On the basis of the averment in para 6 of Ext. P1 the 1st respondent experienced a new foreign body sensation on 14.1.2000 and the pathology-report was suggestive, according to him, of a new tumour. Therefore, that shall be me date of knowledge of the difficulty experienced by him, which according to him was because of the alleged administration of the medicine-chemical. So, counting the period of one year from 14.1.2000, it cannot be taken that Ext. P1 is beyond the period of limitation. Therefore, Ext. P4 can be sustained on the aforesaid reasoning. But whether the formation of the new tumour is because of the administration of G4N and M4N or because of the delayed surgery is a matter to be strictly proved by the 1st respondent while prosecuting Ext. P1 claim. Original Petition is closed as above.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '2003(3)KLT982',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Gopalan',
		'sub' => 'Civil',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'regional-cancer-centre-vs-gopalan'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '729830',
	(int) 1 => 'regional-cancer-centre-vs-gopalan'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/729830/regional-cancer-centre-vs-gopalan'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'Harish Chandra v. Deputy L.A. Officer<br>'
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 123
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 123]Code Context                                    }

                                //highest occurence of word in the judgement

                                echo $this->Wand->highlight($this->Excerpt->extractRelevant($kword,strtolower(strip_tags($desc['Judgement']['judgement']))), $query) . "</div>";
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Regional Cancer Centre Vs Gopalan - Citation 729830 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '729830',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51674/protection-of-human-rights-act-1993-complete-act">Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993</a> - Sections 36(2)',
			'appealno' => 'O.P. No. 10174 of 2002',
			'appellant' => 'Regional Cancer Centre',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Regional Cancer Centre Vs. Gopalan',
			'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.         ',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Harish Chandra v. Deputy L.A. Officer;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' N.N. Sugunapalan, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' P.S. Sreedharan Pillai,; S. Sreekumar,; M.A. Firoz,;',
			'court' => 'Kerala',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2002-08-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.A. Abdul Gafoor, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.A. Abdul Gafoor, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Challenge is against Ext. P4 order passed by the Kerala State Human Rights Commission. The first respondent filed Ext. P1 petition before the said Commission alleging human rights violation consequently on an alleged act by the petitioners herein, during his treatment at the hospital of the 1st petitioner. The 2nd petitioner is the Director of the hospital. The petitioners objected on the grounds of limitation. Section 36(2) the <a href="/act/51674/protection-of-human-rights-act-1993-complete-act">Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993</a> provides that 'State Commission shall not enquire into any matter after expiry of one year from the date on which the act constituting violation of human rights alleged to have been committed'. Therefore, Ext. P1 petition was filed belatedly beyond the said period from the date of alleged-human rights violation namely, administration of certain chemicals on 13.1.2000, 14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000. Even according to the 1st respondent on 13.1.2000,14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000 he was given M4N and G4N injections and on 18.1.2000 he was subjected to asurgery. Ext. P1 petition was filed on 1.8.2001. This is beyond the period provided for objection in Section 36(2), the petitioners submits. But this contention was tried as preliminary issue was overruled in Ext. P4, finding that the effect of 'Act' may still continue and in such circumstances by no stretch of reasoning it can be said that the petition was barred by limitation under Section 36(2). This finding was entered into relying on Page No. 36 of the Law Laxicon edited by Y.V. Chandrachood, Former Chief Justice of India.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Assailing Ext. P1 it is contended by the petitioners that period of limitation prescribed in the said statute is to be strictly construed. The court cannot stretch the period of limitation beyond the period made mentioned of in the statute concerned. The decisions, in (AIR 1999 SC 3101) Lachhman Das Arora v. Ganeshi Led and others and (AIR 1999 SC 1351) Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. & another have been cited in support of this contention. As held in the former case 'the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party, but it has to be applied with all its vigour when the statute so prescribes. The court cannot extend the period of limitation on equitable ground more particular in the matter of filing of election petitions under the Act.' This was on a question of limitation in terms of Representation of Peoples' Act. The period of limitation prescribed in this case is also in terms of special statute namely Protection of Human Rights Act. Dealing with converse situation in the latter case, the Supreme Court held that when the statute does not prescribe any period of limitation the court cannot throw out a petition on the ground of limitation. Going by the pleadings contained in Ext. P1 and the dates of administration of the alleged chemical or medicines as the case may be, during January 2000, the petition was filed beyond the period of limitation of one year provided in Section 36(2). Ext. P1 was filed only on 1.8.2001. Applying strict rule of limitation contained in Section 36(2) of the Act, Ext. P1 petition ought to have been dismissed upholding the preliminary objection rather than rejecting it as per Ext. P4.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. It is contended by the 1st respondent that the administration of medicine was in January 2000 as averred in Para 5 of Ext. P1 petition. The medicine had been consumed by him bonafide believing that it had been prescribed by the doctor to cure his ailment. This cannot be taken as the dates for the purpose of limitation. No symptoms were noticed by mere administration of the medicine on the said dates. Symptoms arose when adverse reactions were noticed. According to him as averred in para 6 of the Ext. P1. he experienced foreign body sensation in throat on 14.1.2000 and thereafter he was subjected to laryngoscopy and biopsy and the result disclosed that a further tumour had developed. According to him it was developed after injuctingthese chemicals as averred in para 6 of Ext. P1. New tumour was noticed after14.1.2000, It developed because of administration of the medicine, he submits. Ofcourse that is a matter which shall be left to be strictly proved by him. There is clearallegation that he experienced alleged adverse effect of administration of the medicine,on 14.1.2000. That is the date of knowledge, so far as he is concerned, about theadversity he is alleged to be suffering. Therefore, that shall be taken as the startingperiod of limitation, the 1st respondent submits.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is worthwhile to refer the decision in (AIR 1961 SC 1500) Harish Chandra v. Deputy L.A. Officer in connection with the period of limitation provided in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It was held that the period of limitation in the statute shall be construed from the date of knowledge of the order of the administrative authority concerned.. Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act provided a period of limitation of six weeks from the date of Collector's award to seek reference to the Civil Court, The Apex Court held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The knowledge of the party affected by the award either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice the expression 'the date of the award' used in the proviso must mean that date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructing. In our opinion, therefore, it would be unreasonable to construe the words 'from the date of Collector's award' used in the proviso to Section 18 in a literal or mechanical way.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The date of knowledge is taken as relevant criterion to count the period of limitation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. In this case also mere administration of medicine, allegedly chemical, on the 1st respondent, prescribed by competent doctors in the reputed institution cannot be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. The date of experience of adverse effects on a subsequent date of administration, alone can be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. On the basis of the averment in para 6 of Ext. P1 the 1st respondent experienced a new foreign body sensation on 14.1.2000 and the pathology-report was suggestive, according to him, of a new tumour. Therefore, that shall be me date of knowledge of the difficulty experienced by him, which according to him was because of the alleged administration of the medicine-chemical. So, counting the period of one year from 14.1.2000, it cannot be taken that Ext. P1 is beyond the period of limitation. Therefore, Ext. P4 can be sustained on the aforesaid reasoning. But whether the formation of the new tumour is because of the administration of G4N and M4N or because of the delayed surgery is a matter to be strictly proved by the 1st respondent while prosecuting Ext. P1 claim. Original Petition is closed as above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'judgement' => '<p>K.A. Abdul Gafoor, J. </p><p>1. Challenge is against Ext. P4 order passed by the Kerala State Human Rights Commission. The first respondent filed Ext. P1 petition before the said Commission alleging human rights violation consequently on an alleged act by the petitioners herein, during his treatment at the hospital of the 1st petitioner. The 2nd petitioner is the Director of the hospital. The petitioners objected on the grounds of limitation. Section 36(2) the <a>Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993</a> provides that 'State Commission shall not enquire into any matter after expiry of one year from the date on which the act constituting violation of human rights alleged to have been committed'. Therefore, Ext. P1 petition was filed belatedly beyond the said period from the date of alleged-human rights violation namely, administration of certain chemicals on 13.1.2000, 14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000. Even according to the 1st respondent on 13.1.2000,14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000 he was given M4N and G4N injections and on 18.1.2000 he was subjected to asurgery. Ext. P1 petition was filed on 1.8.2001. This is beyond the period provided for objection in Section 36(2), the petitioners submits. But this contention was tried as preliminary issue was overruled in Ext. P4, finding that the effect of 'Act' may still continue and in such circumstances by no stretch of reasoning it can be said that the petition was barred by limitation under Section 36(2). This finding was entered into relying on Page No. 36 of the Law Laxicon edited by Y.V. Chandrachood, Former Chief Justice of India.</p><p>2. Assailing Ext. P1 it is contended by the petitioners that period of limitation prescribed in the said statute is to be strictly construed. The court cannot stretch the period of limitation beyond the period made mentioned of in the statute concerned. The decisions, in (AIR 1999 SC 3101) Lachhman Das Arora v. Ganeshi Led and others and (AIR 1999 SC 1351) Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. & another have been cited in support of this contention. As held in the former case 'the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party, but it has to be applied with all its vigour when the statute so prescribes. The court cannot extend the period of limitation on equitable ground more particular in the matter of filing of election petitions under the Act.' This was on a question of limitation in terms of Representation of Peoples' Act. The period of limitation prescribed in this case is also in terms of special statute namely Protection of Human Rights Act. Dealing with converse situation in the latter case, the Supreme Court held that when the statute does not prescribe any period of limitation the court cannot throw out a petition on the ground of limitation. Going by the pleadings contained in Ext. P1 and the dates of administration of the alleged chemical or medicines as the case may be, during January 2000, the petition was filed beyond the period of limitation of one year provided in Section 36(2). Ext. P1 was filed only on 1.8.2001. Applying strict rule of limitation contained in Section 36(2) of the Act, Ext. P1 petition ought to have been dismissed upholding the preliminary objection rather than rejecting it as per Ext. P4.</p><p>3. It is contended by the 1st respondent that the administration of medicine was in January 2000 as averred in Para 5 of Ext. P1 petition. The medicine had been consumed by him bonafide believing that it had been prescribed by the doctor to cure his ailment. This cannot be taken as the dates for the purpose of limitation. No symptoms were noticed by mere administration of the medicine on the said dates. Symptoms arose when adverse reactions were noticed. According to him as averred in para 6 of the Ext. P1. he experienced foreign body sensation in throat on 14.1.2000 and thereafter he was subjected to laryngoscopy and biopsy and the result disclosed that a further tumour had developed. According to him it was developed after injuctingthese chemicals as averred in para 6 of Ext. P1. New tumour was noticed after14.1.2000, It developed because of administration of the medicine, he submits. Ofcourse that is a matter which shall be left to be strictly proved by him. There is clearallegation that he experienced alleged adverse effect of administration of the medicine,on 14.1.2000. That is the date of knowledge, so far as he is concerned, about theadversity he is alleged to be suffering. Therefore, that shall be taken as the startingperiod of limitation, the 1st respondent submits.</p><p>4. It is worthwhile to refer the decision in (AIR 1961 SC 1500) Harish Chandra v. Deputy L.A. Officer in connection with the period of limitation provided in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It was held that the period of limitation in the statute shall be construed from the date of knowledge of the order of the administrative authority concerned.. Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act provided a period of limitation of six weeks from the date of Collector's award to seek reference to the Civil Court, The Apex Court held as follows:</p><p>'The knowledge of the party affected by the award either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice the expression 'the date of the award' used in the proviso must mean that date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructing. In our opinion, therefore, it would be unreasonable to construe the words 'from the date of Collector's award' used in the proviso to Section 18 in a literal or mechanical way.'</p><p>The date of knowledge is taken as relevant criterion to count the period of limitation.</p><p>5. In this case also mere administration of medicine, allegedly chemical, on the 1st respondent, prescribed by competent doctors in the reputed institution cannot be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. The date of experience of adverse effects on a subsequent date of administration, alone can be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. On the basis of the averment in para 6 of Ext. P1 the 1st respondent experienced a new foreign body sensation on 14.1.2000 and the pathology-report was suggestive, according to him, of a new tumour. Therefore, that shall be me date of knowledge of the difficulty experienced by him, which according to him was because of the alleged administration of the medicine-chemical. So, counting the period of one year from 14.1.2000, it cannot be taken that Ext. P1 is beyond the period of limitation. Therefore, Ext. P4 can be sustained on the aforesaid reasoning. But whether the formation of the new tumour is because of the administration of G4N and M4N or because of the delayed surgery is a matter to be strictly proved by the 1st respondent while prosecuting Ext. P1 claim. Original Petition is closed as above.<p></p><p>',
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k.a. abdul gafoor, j. 1. challenge is against ext. p4 order passed by the kerala state human rights commission. the first respondent filed ext. p1 petition before the said commission alleging human rights violation consequently on an alleged act by the petitioners herein, during his treatment at the hospital of the 1st petitioner. the 2nd petitioner is the director of the hospital. the petitioners objected on the grounds of limitation. section 36(2) the protection of human rights act, 1993 provides that 'state commission shall not enquire into any matter after expiry of one year from the date on which the act constituting violation of human rights alleged to have been committed'. therefore, ext. p1 petition was filed belatedly beyond the said period from the date of alleged-human rights.....

Judgment:

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			'judge' => ' K.A. Abdul Gafoor, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.A. Abdul Gafoor, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Challenge is against Ext. P4 order passed by the Kerala State Human Rights Commission. The first respondent filed Ext. P1 petition before the said Commission alleging human rights violation consequently on an alleged act by the petitioners herein, during his treatment at the hospital of the 1st petitioner. The 2nd petitioner is the Director of the hospital. The petitioners objected on the grounds of limitation. Section 36(2) the <a href="/act/51674/protection-of-human-rights-act-1993-complete-act">Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993</a> provides that 'State Commission shall not enquire into any matter after expiry of one year from the date on which the act constituting violation of human rights alleged to have been committed'. Therefore, Ext. P1 petition was filed belatedly beyond the said period from the date of alleged-human rights violation namely, administration of certain chemicals on 13.1.2000, 14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000. Even according to the 1st respondent on 13.1.2000,14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000 he was given M4N and G4N injections and on 18.1.2000 he was subjected to asurgery. Ext. P1 petition was filed on 1.8.2001. This is beyond the period provided for objection in Section 36(2), the petitioners submits. But this contention was tried as preliminary issue was overruled in Ext. P4, finding that the effect of 'Act' may still continue and in such circumstances by no stretch of reasoning it can be said that the petition was barred by limitation under Section 36(2). This finding was entered into relying on Page No. 36 of the Law Laxicon edited by Y.V. Chandrachood, Former Chief Justice of India.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Assailing Ext. P1 it is contended by the petitioners that period of limitation prescribed in the said statute is to be strictly construed. The court cannot stretch the period of limitation beyond the period made mentioned of in the statute concerned. The decisions, in (AIR 1999 SC 3101) Lachhman Das Arora v. Ganeshi Led and others and (AIR 1999 SC 1351) Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. & another have been cited in support of this contention. As held in the former case 'the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party, but it has to be applied with all its vigour when the statute so prescribes. The court cannot extend the period of limitation on equitable ground more particular in the matter of filing of election petitions under the Act.' This was on a question of limitation in terms of Representation of Peoples' Act. The period of limitation prescribed in this case is also in terms of special statute namely Protection of Human Rights Act. Dealing with converse situation in the latter case, the Supreme Court held that when the statute does not prescribe any period of limitation the court cannot throw out a petition on the ground of limitation. Going by the pleadings contained in Ext. P1 and the dates of administration of the alleged chemical or medicines as the case may be, during January 2000, the petition was filed beyond the period of limitation of one year provided in Section 36(2). Ext. P1 was filed only on 1.8.2001. Applying strict rule of limitation contained in Section 36(2) of the Act, Ext. P1 petition ought to have been dismissed upholding the preliminary objection rather than rejecting it as per Ext. P4.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. It is contended by the 1st respondent that the administration of medicine was in January 2000 as averred in Para 5 of Ext. P1 petition. The medicine had been consumed by him bonafide believing that it had been prescribed by the doctor to cure his ailment. This cannot be taken as the dates for the purpose of limitation. No symptoms were noticed by mere administration of the medicine on the said dates. Symptoms arose when adverse reactions were noticed. According to him as averred in para 6 of the Ext. P1. he experienced foreign body sensation in throat on 14.1.2000 and thereafter he was subjected to laryngoscopy and biopsy and the result disclosed that a further tumour had developed. According to him it was developed after injuctingthese chemicals as averred in para 6 of Ext. P1. New tumour was noticed after14.1.2000, It developed because of administration of the medicine, he submits. Ofcourse that is a matter which shall be left to be strictly proved by him. There is clearallegation that he experienced alleged adverse effect of administration of the medicine,on 14.1.2000. That is the date of knowledge, so far as he is concerned, about theadversity he is alleged to be suffering. Therefore, that shall be taken as the startingperiod of limitation, the 1st respondent submits.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is worthwhile to refer the decision in (AIR 1961 SC 1500) Harish Chandra v. Deputy L.A. Officer in connection with the period of limitation provided in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It was held that the period of limitation in the statute shall be construed from the date of knowledge of the order of the administrative authority concerned.. Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act provided a period of limitation of six weeks from the date of Collector's award to seek reference to the Civil Court, The Apex Court held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The knowledge of the party affected by the award either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice the expression 'the date of the award' used in the proviso must mean that date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructing. In our opinion, therefore, it would be unreasonable to construe the words 'from the date of Collector's award' used in the proviso to Section 18 in a literal or mechanical way.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The date of knowledge is taken as relevant criterion to count the period of limitation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. In this case also mere administration of medicine, allegedly chemical, on the 1st respondent, prescribed by competent doctors in the reputed institution cannot be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. The date of experience of adverse effects on a subsequent date of administration, alone can be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. On the basis of the averment in para 6 of Ext. P1 the 1st respondent experienced a new foreign body sensation on 14.1.2000 and the pathology-report was suggestive, according to him, of a new tumour. Therefore, that shall be me date of knowledge of the difficulty experienced by him, which according to him was because of the alleged administration of the medicine-chemical. So, counting the period of one year from 14.1.2000, it cannot be taken that Ext. P1 is beyond the period of limitation. Therefore, Ext. P4 can be sustained on the aforesaid reasoning. But whether the formation of the new tumour is because of the administration of G4N and M4N or because of the delayed surgery is a matter to be strictly proved by the 1st respondent while prosecuting Ext. P1 claim. Original Petition is closed as above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'judgement' => '<p>K.A. Abdul Gafoor, J. </p><p>1. Challenge is against Ext. P4 order passed by the Kerala State Human Rights Commission. The first respondent filed Ext. P1 petition before the said Commission alleging human rights violation consequently on an alleged act by the petitioners herein, during his treatment at the hospital of the 1st petitioner. The 2nd petitioner is the Director of the hospital. The petitioners objected on the grounds of limitation. Section 36(2) the <a>Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993</a> provides that 'State Commission shall not enquire into any matter after expiry of one year from the date on which the act constituting violation of human rights alleged to have been committed'. Therefore, Ext. P1 petition was filed belatedly beyond the said period from the date of alleged-human rights violation namely, administration of certain chemicals on 13.1.2000, 14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000. Even according to the 1st respondent on 13.1.2000,14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000 he was given M4N and G4N injections and on 18.1.2000 he was subjected to asurgery. Ext. P1 petition was filed on 1.8.2001. This is beyond the period provided for objection in Section 36(2), the petitioners submits. But this contention was tried as preliminary issue was overruled in Ext. P4, finding that the effect of 'Act' may still continue and in such circumstances by no stretch of reasoning it can be said that the petition was barred by limitation under Section 36(2). This finding was entered into relying on Page No. 36 of the Law Laxicon edited by Y.V. Chandrachood, Former Chief Justice of India.</p><p>2. Assailing Ext. P1 it is contended by the petitioners that period of limitation prescribed in the said statute is to be strictly construed. The court cannot stretch the period of limitation beyond the period made mentioned of in the statute concerned. The decisions, in (AIR 1999 SC 3101) Lachhman Das Arora v. Ganeshi Led and others and (AIR 1999 SC 1351) Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. & another have been cited in support of this contention. As held in the former case 'the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party, but it has to be applied with all its vigour when the statute so prescribes. The court cannot extend the period of limitation on equitable ground more particular in the matter of filing of election petitions under the Act.' This was on a question of limitation in terms of Representation of Peoples' Act. The period of limitation prescribed in this case is also in terms of special statute namely Protection of Human Rights Act. Dealing with converse situation in the latter case, the Supreme Court held that when the statute does not prescribe any period of limitation the court cannot throw out a petition on the ground of limitation. Going by the pleadings contained in Ext. P1 and the dates of administration of the alleged chemical or medicines as the case may be, during January 2000, the petition was filed beyond the period of limitation of one year provided in Section 36(2). Ext. P1 was filed only on 1.8.2001. Applying strict rule of limitation contained in Section 36(2) of the Act, Ext. P1 petition ought to have been dismissed upholding the preliminary objection rather than rejecting it as per Ext. P4.</p><p>3. It is contended by the 1st respondent that the administration of medicine was in January 2000 as averred in Para 5 of Ext. P1 petition. The medicine had been consumed by him bonafide believing that it had been prescribed by the doctor to cure his ailment. This cannot be taken as the dates for the purpose of limitation. No symptoms were noticed by mere administration of the medicine on the said dates. Symptoms arose when adverse reactions were noticed. According to him as averred in para 6 of the Ext. P1. he experienced foreign body sensation in throat on 14.1.2000 and thereafter he was subjected to laryngoscopy and biopsy and the result disclosed that a further tumour had developed. According to him it was developed after injuctingthese chemicals as averred in para 6 of Ext. P1. New tumour was noticed after14.1.2000, It developed because of administration of the medicine, he submits. Ofcourse that is a matter which shall be left to be strictly proved by him. There is clearallegation that he experienced alleged adverse effect of administration of the medicine,on 14.1.2000. That is the date of knowledge, so far as he is concerned, about theadversity he is alleged to be suffering. Therefore, that shall be taken as the startingperiod of limitation, the 1st respondent submits.</p><p>4. It is worthwhile to refer the decision in (AIR 1961 SC 1500) Harish Chandra v. Deputy L.A. Officer in connection with the period of limitation provided in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It was held that the period of limitation in the statute shall be construed from the date of knowledge of the order of the administrative authority concerned.. Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act provided a period of limitation of six weeks from the date of Collector's award to seek reference to the Civil Court, The Apex Court held as follows:</p><p>'The knowledge of the party affected by the award either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice the expression 'the date of the award' used in the proviso must mean that date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructing. In our opinion, therefore, it would be unreasonable to construe the words 'from the date of Collector's award' used in the proviso to Section 18 in a literal or mechanical way.'</p><p>The date of knowledge is taken as relevant criterion to count the period of limitation.</p><p>5. In this case also mere administration of medicine, allegedly chemical, on the 1st respondent, prescribed by competent doctors in the reputed institution cannot be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. The date of experience of adverse effects on a subsequent date of administration, alone can be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. On the basis of the averment in para 6 of Ext. P1 the 1st respondent experienced a new foreign body sensation on 14.1.2000 and the pathology-report was suggestive, according to him, of a new tumour. Therefore, that shall be me date of knowledge of the difficulty experienced by him, which according to him was because of the alleged administration of the medicine-chemical. So, counting the period of one year from 14.1.2000, it cannot be taken that Ext. P1 is beyond the period of limitation. Therefore, Ext. P4 can be sustained on the aforesaid reasoning. But whether the formation of the new tumour is because of the administration of G4N and M4N or because of the delayed surgery is a matter to be strictly proved by the 1st respondent while prosecuting Ext. P1 claim. Original Petition is closed as above.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Challenge is against Ext. P4 order passed by the Kerala State Human Rights Commission. The first respondent filed Ext. P1 petition before the said Commission alleging human rights violation consequently on an alleged act by the petitioners herein, during his treatment at the hospital of the 1st petitioner. The 2nd petitioner is the Director of the hospital. The petitioners objected on the grounds of limitation. Section 36(2) the <a>Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993</a> provides that 'State Commission shall not enquire into any matter after expiry of one year from the date on which the act constituting violation of human rights alleged to have been committed'. Therefore, Ext. P1 petition was filed belatedly beyond the said period from the date of alleged-human rights violation namely, administration of certain chemicals on 13.1.2000, 14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000. Even according to the 1st respondent on 13.1.2000,14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000 he was given M4N and G4N injections and on 18.1.2000 he was subjected to asurgery. Ext. P1 petition was filed on 1.8.2001. This is beyond the period provided for objection in Section 36(2), the petitioners submits. But this contention was tried as preliminary issue was overruled in Ext. P4, finding that the effect of 'Act' may still continue and in such circumstances by no stretch of reasoning it can be said that the petition was barred by limitation under Section 36(2). This finding was entered into relying on Page No. 36 of the Law Laxicon edited by Y.V. Chandrachood, Former Chief Justice of India.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Assailing Ext. P1 it is contended by the petitioners that period of limitation prescribed in the said statute is to be strictly construed. The court cannot stretch the period of limitation beyond the period made mentioned of in the statute concerned. The decisions, in (AIR 1999 SC 3101) Lachhman Das Arora v. Ganeshi Led and others and (AIR 1999 SC 1351) Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. & another have been cited in support of this contention. As held in the former case 'the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party, but it has to be applied with all its vigour when the statute so prescribes. The court cannot extend the period of limitation on equitable ground more particular in the matter of filing of election petitions under the Act.' This was on a question of limitation in terms of Representation of Peoples' Act. The period of limitation prescribed in this case is also in terms of special statute namely Protection of Human Rights Act. Dealing with converse situation in the latter case, the Supreme Court held that when the statute does not prescribe any period of limitation the court cannot throw out a petition on the ground of limitation. Going by the pleadings contained in Ext. P1 and the dates of administration of the alleged chemical or medicines as the case may be, during January 2000, the petition was filed beyond the period of limitation of one year provided in Section 36(2). Ext. P1 was filed only on 1.8.2001. Applying strict rule of limitation contained in Section 36(2) of the Act, Ext. P1 petition ought to have been dismissed upholding the preliminary objection rather than rejecting it as per Ext. P4.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. It is contended by the 1st respondent that the administration of medicine was in January 2000 as averred in Para 5 of Ext. P1 petition. The medicine had been consumed by him bonafide believing that it had been prescribed by the doctor to cure his ailment. This cannot be taken as the dates for the purpose of limitation. No symptoms were noticed by mere administration of the medicine on the said dates. Symptoms arose when adverse reactions were noticed. According to him as averred in para 6 of the Ext. P1. he experienced foreign body sensation in throat on 14.1.2000 and thereafter he was subjected to laryngoscopy and biopsy and the result disclosed that a further tumour had developed. According to him it was developed after injuctingthese chemicals as averred in para 6 of Ext. P1. New tumour was noticed after14.1.2000, It developed because of administration of the medicine, he submits. Ofcourse that is a matter which shall be left to be strictly proved by him. There is clearallegation that he experienced alleged adverse effect of administration of the medicine,on 14.1.2000. That is the date of knowledge, so far as he is concerned, about theadversity he is alleged to be suffering. Therefore, that shall be taken as the startingperiod of limitation, the 1st respondent submits.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. It is worthwhile to refer the decision in (AIR 1961 SC 1500) Harish Chandra v. Deputy L.A. Officer in connection with the period of limitation provided in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It was held that the period of limitation in the statute shall be construed from the date of knowledge of the order of the administrative authority concerned.. Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act provided a period of limitation of six weeks from the date of Collector's award to seek reference to the Civil Court, The Apex Court held as follows:',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'The knowledge of the party affected by the award either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice the expression 'the date of the award' used in the proviso must mean that date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructing. In our opinion, therefore, it would be unreasonable to construe the words 'from the date of Collector's award' used in the proviso to Section 18 in a literal or mechanical way.'',
	(int) 6 => '<p>The date of knowledge is taken as relevant criterion to count the period of limitation.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. In this case also mere administration of medicine, allegedly chemical, on the 1st respondent, prescribed by competent doctors in the reputed institution cannot be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. The date of experience of adverse effects on a subsequent date of administration, alone can be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. On the basis of the averment in para 6 of Ext. P1 the 1st respondent experienced a new foreign body sensation on 14.1.2000 and the pathology-report was suggestive, according to him, of a new tumour. Therefore, that shall be me date of knowledge of the difficulty experienced by him, which according to him was because of the alleged administration of the medicine-chemical. So, counting the period of one year from 14.1.2000, it cannot be taken that Ext. P1 is beyond the period of limitation. Therefore, Ext. P4 can be sustained on the aforesaid reasoning. But whether the formation of the new tumour is because of the administration of G4N and M4N or because of the delayed surgery is a matter to be strictly proved by the 1st respondent while prosecuting Ext. P1 claim. Original Petition is closed as above.<p>',
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K.A. Abdul Gafoor, J.

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			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51674/protection-of-human-rights-act-1993-complete-act">Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993</a> - Sections 36(2)',
			'appealno' => 'O.P. No. 10174 of 2002',
			'appellant' => 'Regional Cancer Centre',
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			'casename' => 'Regional Cancer Centre Vs. Gopalan',
			'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.         ',
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			'judge' => ' K.A. Abdul Gafoor, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.A. Abdul Gafoor, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Challenge is against Ext. P4 order passed by the Kerala State Human Rights Commission. The first respondent filed Ext. P1 petition before the said Commission alleging human rights violation consequently on an alleged act by the petitioners herein, during his treatment at the hospital of the 1st petitioner. The 2nd petitioner is the Director of the hospital. The petitioners objected on the grounds of limitation. Section 36(2) the <a href="/act/51674/protection-of-human-rights-act-1993-complete-act">Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993</a> provides that 'State Commission shall not enquire into any matter after expiry of one year from the date on which the act constituting violation of human rights alleged to have been committed'. Therefore, Ext. P1 petition was filed belatedly beyond the said period from the date of alleged-human rights violation namely, administration of certain chemicals on 13.1.2000, 14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000. Even according to the 1st respondent on 13.1.2000,14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000 he was given M4N and G4N injections and on 18.1.2000 he was subjected to asurgery. Ext. P1 petition was filed on 1.8.2001. This is beyond the period provided for objection in Section 36(2), the petitioners submits. But this contention was tried as preliminary issue was overruled in Ext. P4, finding that the effect of 'Act' may still continue and in such circumstances by no stretch of reasoning it can be said that the petition was barred by limitation under Section 36(2). This finding was entered into relying on Page No. 36 of the Law Laxicon edited by Y.V. Chandrachood, Former Chief Justice of India.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Assailing Ext. P1 it is contended by the petitioners that period of limitation prescribed in the said statute is to be strictly construed. The court cannot stretch the period of limitation beyond the period made mentioned of in the statute concerned. The decisions, in (AIR 1999 SC 3101) Lachhman Das Arora v. Ganeshi Led and others and (AIR 1999 SC 1351) Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. & another have been cited in support of this contention. As held in the former case 'the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party, but it has to be applied with all its vigour when the statute so prescribes. The court cannot extend the period of limitation on equitable ground more particular in the matter of filing of election petitions under the Act.' This was on a question of limitation in terms of Representation of Peoples' Act. The period of limitation prescribed in this case is also in terms of special statute namely Protection of Human Rights Act. Dealing with converse situation in the latter case, the Supreme Court held that when the statute does not prescribe any period of limitation the court cannot throw out a petition on the ground of limitation. Going by the pleadings contained in Ext. P1 and the dates of administration of the alleged chemical or medicines as the case may be, during January 2000, the petition was filed beyond the period of limitation of one year provided in Section 36(2). Ext. P1 was filed only on 1.8.2001. Applying strict rule of limitation contained in Section 36(2) of the Act, Ext. P1 petition ought to have been dismissed upholding the preliminary objection rather than rejecting it as per Ext. P4.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. It is contended by the 1st respondent that the administration of medicine was in January 2000 as averred in Para 5 of Ext. P1 petition. The medicine had been consumed by him bonafide believing that it had been prescribed by the doctor to cure his ailment. This cannot be taken as the dates for the purpose of limitation. No symptoms were noticed by mere administration of the medicine on the said dates. Symptoms arose when adverse reactions were noticed. According to him as averred in para 6 of the Ext. P1. he experienced foreign body sensation in throat on 14.1.2000 and thereafter he was subjected to laryngoscopy and biopsy and the result disclosed that a further tumour had developed. According to him it was developed after injuctingthese chemicals as averred in para 6 of Ext. P1. New tumour was noticed after14.1.2000, It developed because of administration of the medicine, he submits. Ofcourse that is a matter which shall be left to be strictly proved by him. There is clearallegation that he experienced alleged adverse effect of administration of the medicine,on 14.1.2000. That is the date of knowledge, so far as he is concerned, about theadversity he is alleged to be suffering. Therefore, that shall be taken as the startingperiod of limitation, the 1st respondent submits.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is worthwhile to refer the decision in (AIR 1961 SC 1500) Harish Chandra v. Deputy L.A. Officer in connection with the period of limitation provided in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It was held that the period of limitation in the statute shall be construed from the date of knowledge of the order of the administrative authority concerned.. Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act provided a period of limitation of six weeks from the date of Collector's award to seek reference to the Civil Court, The Apex Court held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The knowledge of the party affected by the award either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice the expression 'the date of the award' used in the proviso must mean that date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructing. In our opinion, therefore, it would be unreasonable to construe the words 'from the date of Collector's award' used in the proviso to Section 18 in a literal or mechanical way.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The date of knowledge is taken as relevant criterion to count the period of limitation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. In this case also mere administration of medicine, allegedly chemical, on the 1st respondent, prescribed by competent doctors in the reputed institution cannot be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. The date of experience of adverse effects on a subsequent date of administration, alone can be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. On the basis of the averment in para 6 of Ext. P1 the 1st respondent experienced a new foreign body sensation on 14.1.2000 and the pathology-report was suggestive, according to him, of a new tumour. Therefore, that shall be me date of knowledge of the difficulty experienced by him, which according to him was because of the alleged administration of the medicine-chemical. So, counting the period of one year from 14.1.2000, it cannot be taken that Ext. P1 is beyond the period of limitation. Therefore, Ext. P4 can be sustained on the aforesaid reasoning. But whether the formation of the new tumour is because of the administration of G4N and M4N or because of the delayed surgery is a matter to be strictly proved by the 1st respondent while prosecuting Ext. P1 claim. Original Petition is closed as above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'judge' => ' K.A. Abdul Gafoor, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.A. Abdul Gafoor, J. </p><p>1. Challenge is against Ext. P4 order passed by the Kerala State Human Rights Commission. The first respondent filed Ext. P1 petition before the said Commission alleging human rights violation consequently on an alleged act by the petitioners herein, during his treatment at the hospital of the 1st petitioner. The 2nd petitioner is the Director of the hospital. The petitioners objected on the grounds of limitation. Section 36(2) the <a>Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993</a> provides that 'State Commission shall not enquire into any matter after expiry of one year from the date on which the act constituting violation of human rights alleged to have been committed'. Therefore, Ext. P1 petition was filed belatedly beyond the said period from the date of alleged-human rights violation namely, administration of certain chemicals on 13.1.2000, 14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000. Even according to the 1st respondent on 13.1.2000,14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000 he was given M4N and G4N injections and on 18.1.2000 he was subjected to asurgery. Ext. P1 petition was filed on 1.8.2001. This is beyond the period provided for objection in Section 36(2), the petitioners submits. But this contention was tried as preliminary issue was overruled in Ext. P4, finding that the effect of 'Act' may still continue and in such circumstances by no stretch of reasoning it can be said that the petition was barred by limitation under Section 36(2). This finding was entered into relying on Page No. 36 of the Law Laxicon edited by Y.V. Chandrachood, Former Chief Justice of India.</p><p>2. Assailing Ext. P1 it is contended by the petitioners that period of limitation prescribed in the said statute is to be strictly construed. The court cannot stretch the period of limitation beyond the period made mentioned of in the statute concerned. The decisions, in (AIR 1999 SC 3101) Lachhman Das Arora v. Ganeshi Led and others and (AIR 1999 SC 1351) Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. & another have been cited in support of this contention. As held in the former case 'the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party, but it has to be applied with all its vigour when the statute so prescribes. The court cannot extend the period of limitation on equitable ground more particular in the matter of filing of election petitions under the Act.' This was on a question of limitation in terms of Representation of Peoples' Act. The period of limitation prescribed in this case is also in terms of special statute namely Protection of Human Rights Act. Dealing with converse situation in the latter case, the Supreme Court held that when the statute does not prescribe any period of limitation the court cannot throw out a petition on the ground of limitation. Going by the pleadings contained in Ext. P1 and the dates of administration of the alleged chemical or medicines as the case may be, during January 2000, the petition was filed beyond the period of limitation of one year provided in Section 36(2). Ext. P1 was filed only on 1.8.2001. Applying strict rule of limitation contained in Section 36(2) of the Act, Ext. P1 petition ought to have been dismissed upholding the preliminary objection rather than rejecting it as per Ext. P4.</p><p>3. It is contended by the 1st respondent that the administration of medicine was in January 2000 as averred in Para 5 of Ext. P1 petition. The medicine had been consumed by him bonafide believing that it had been prescribed by the doctor to cure his ailment. This cannot be taken as the dates for the purpose of limitation. No symptoms were noticed by mere administration of the medicine on the said dates. Symptoms arose when adverse reactions were noticed. According to him as averred in para 6 of the Ext. P1. he experienced foreign body sensation in throat on 14.1.2000 and thereafter he was subjected to laryngoscopy and biopsy and the result disclosed that a further tumour had developed. According to him it was developed after injuctingthese chemicals as averred in para 6 of Ext. P1. New tumour was noticed after14.1.2000, It developed because of administration of the medicine, he submits. Ofcourse that is a matter which shall be left to be strictly proved by him. There is clearallegation that he experienced alleged adverse effect of administration of the medicine,on 14.1.2000. That is the date of knowledge, so far as he is concerned, about theadversity he is alleged to be suffering. Therefore, that shall be taken as the startingperiod of limitation, the 1st respondent submits.</p><p>4. It is worthwhile to refer the decision in (AIR 1961 SC 1500) Harish Chandra v. Deputy L.A. Officer in connection with the period of limitation provided in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It was held that the period of limitation in the statute shall be construed from the date of knowledge of the order of the administrative authority concerned.. Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act provided a period of limitation of six weeks from the date of Collector's award to seek reference to the Civil Court, The Apex Court held as follows:</p><p>'The knowledge of the party affected by the award either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice the expression 'the date of the award' used in the proviso must mean that date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructing. In our opinion, therefore, it would be unreasonable to construe the words 'from the date of Collector's award' used in the proviso to Section 18 in a literal or mechanical way.'</p><p>The date of knowledge is taken as relevant criterion to count the period of limitation.</p><p>5. In this case also mere administration of medicine, allegedly chemical, on the 1st respondent, prescribed by competent doctors in the reputed institution cannot be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. The date of experience of adverse effects on a subsequent date of administration, alone can be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. On the basis of the averment in para 6 of Ext. P1 the 1st respondent experienced a new foreign body sensation on 14.1.2000 and the pathology-report was suggestive, according to him, of a new tumour. Therefore, that shall be me date of knowledge of the difficulty experienced by him, which according to him was because of the alleged administration of the medicine-chemical. So, counting the period of one year from 14.1.2000, it cannot be taken that Ext. P1 is beyond the period of limitation. Therefore, Ext. P4 can be sustained on the aforesaid reasoning. But whether the formation of the new tumour is because of the administration of G4N and M4N or because of the delayed surgery is a matter to be strictly proved by the 1st respondent while prosecuting Ext. P1 claim. Original Petition is closed as above.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Challenge is against Ext. P4 order passed by the Kerala State Human Rights Commission. The first respondent filed Ext. P1 petition before the said Commission alleging human rights violation consequently on an alleged act by the petitioners herein, during his treatment at the hospital of the 1st petitioner. The 2nd petitioner is the Director of the hospital. The petitioners objected on the grounds of limitation. Section 36(2) the <a>Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993</a> provides that 'State Commission shall not enquire into any matter after expiry of one year from the date on which the act constituting violation of human rights alleged to have been committed'. Therefore, Ext. P1 petition was filed belatedly beyond the said period from the date of alleged-human rights violation namely, administration of certain chemicals on 13.1.2000, 14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000. Even according to the 1st respondent on 13.1.2000,14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000 he was given M4N and G4N injections and on 18.1.2000 he was subjected to asurgery. Ext. P1 petition was filed on 1.8.2001. This is beyond the period provided for objection in Section 36(2), the petitioners submits. But this contention was tried as preliminary issue was overruled in Ext. P4, finding that the effect of 'Act' may still continue and in such circumstances by no stretch of reasoning it can be said that the petition was barred by limitation under Section 36(2). This finding was entered into relying on Page No. 36 of the Law Laxicon edited by Y.V. Chandrachood, Former Chief Justice of India.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Assailing Ext. P1 it is contended by the petitioners that period of limitation prescribed in the said statute is to be strictly construed. The court cannot stretch the period of limitation beyond the period made mentioned of in the statute concerned. The decisions, in (AIR 1999 SC 3101) Lachhman Das Arora v. Ganeshi Led and others and (AIR 1999 SC 1351) Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. & another have been cited in support of this contention. As held in the former case 'the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party, but it has to be applied with all its vigour when the statute so prescribes. The court cannot extend the period of limitation on equitable ground more particular in the matter of filing of election petitions under the Act.' This was on a question of limitation in terms of Representation of Peoples' Act. The period of limitation prescribed in this case is also in terms of special statute namely Protection of Human Rights Act. Dealing with converse situation in the latter case, the Supreme Court held that when the statute does not prescribe any period of limitation the court cannot throw out a petition on the ground of limitation. Going by the pleadings contained in Ext. P1 and the dates of administration of the alleged chemical or medicines as the case may be, during January 2000, the petition was filed beyond the period of limitation of one year provided in Section 36(2). Ext. P1 was filed only on 1.8.2001. Applying strict rule of limitation contained in Section 36(2) of the Act, Ext. P1 petition ought to have been dismissed upholding the preliminary objection rather than rejecting it as per Ext. P4.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. It is contended by the 1st respondent that the administration of medicine was in January 2000 as averred in Para 5 of Ext. P1 petition. The medicine had been consumed by him bonafide believing that it had been prescribed by the doctor to cure his ailment. This cannot be taken as the dates for the purpose of limitation. No symptoms were noticed by mere administration of the medicine on the said dates. Symptoms arose when adverse reactions were noticed. According to him as averred in para 6 of the Ext. P1. he experienced foreign body sensation in throat on 14.1.2000 and thereafter he was subjected to laryngoscopy and biopsy and the result disclosed that a further tumour had developed. According to him it was developed after injuctingthese chemicals as averred in para 6 of Ext. P1. New tumour was noticed after14.1.2000, It developed because of administration of the medicine, he submits. Ofcourse that is a matter which shall be left to be strictly proved by him. There is clearallegation that he experienced alleged adverse effect of administration of the medicine,on 14.1.2000. That is the date of knowledge, so far as he is concerned, about theadversity he is alleged to be suffering. Therefore, that shall be taken as the startingperiod of limitation, the 1st respondent submits.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. It is worthwhile to refer the decision in (AIR 1961 SC 1500) Harish Chandra v. Deputy L.A. Officer in connection with the period of limitation provided in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It was held that the period of limitation in the statute shall be construed from the date of knowledge of the order of the administrative authority concerned.. Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act provided a period of limitation of six weeks from the date of Collector's award to seek reference to the Civil Court, The Apex Court held as follows:',
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	(int) 6 => '<p>The date of knowledge is taken as relevant criterion to count the period of limitation.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. In this case also mere administration of medicine, allegedly chemical, on the 1st respondent, prescribed by competent doctors in the reputed institution cannot be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. The date of experience of adverse effects on a subsequent date of administration, alone can be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. On the basis of the averment in para 6 of Ext. P1 the 1st respondent experienced a new foreign body sensation on 14.1.2000 and the pathology-report was suggestive, according to him, of a new tumour. Therefore, that shall be me date of knowledge of the difficulty experienced by him, which according to him was because of the alleged administration of the medicine-chemical. So, counting the period of one year from 14.1.2000, it cannot be taken that Ext. P1 is beyond the period of limitation. Therefore, Ext. P4 can be sustained on the aforesaid reasoning. But whether the formation of the new tumour is because of the administration of G4N and M4N or because of the delayed surgery is a matter to be strictly proved by the 1st respondent while prosecuting Ext. P1 claim. Original Petition is closed as above.<p>',
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1. Challenge is against Ext. P4 order passed by the Kerala State Human Rights Commission. The first respondent filed Ext. P1 petition before the said Commission alleging human rights violation consequently on an alleged act by the petitioners herein, during his treatment at the hospital of the 1st petitioner. The 2nd petitioner is the Director of the hospital. The petitioners objected on the grounds of limitation. Section 36(2) the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 provides that 'State Commission shall not enquire into any matter after expiry of one year from the date on which the act constituting violation of human rights alleged to have been committed'. Therefore, Ext. P1 petition was filed belatedly beyond the said period from the date of alleged-human rights violation namely, administration of certain chemicals on 13.1.2000, 14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000. Even according to the 1st respondent on 13.1.2000,14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000 he was given M4N and G4N injections and on 18.1.2000 he was subjected to asurgery. Ext. P1 petition was filed on 1.8.2001. This is beyond the period provided for objection in Section 36(2), the petitioners submits. But this contention was tried as preliminary issue was overruled in Ext. P4, finding that the effect of 'Act' may still continue and in such circumstances by no stretch of reasoning it can be said that the petition was barred by limitation under Section 36(2). This finding was entered into relying on Page No. 36 of the Law Laxicon edited by Y.V. Chandrachood, Former Chief Justice of India.

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			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51674/protection-of-human-rights-act-1993-complete-act">Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993</a> - Sections 36(2)',
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			'appellant' => 'Regional Cancer Centre',
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			'casename' => 'Regional Cancer Centre Vs. Gopalan',
			'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.         ',
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			'casesref' => 'Harish Chandra v. Deputy L.A. Officer;',
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			'counselplain' => ' N.N. Sugunapalan, Adv.',
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			'judge' => ' K.A. Abdul Gafoor, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.A. Abdul Gafoor, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Challenge is against Ext. P4 order passed by the Kerala State Human Rights Commission. The first respondent filed Ext. P1 petition before the said Commission alleging human rights violation consequently on an alleged act by the petitioners herein, during his treatment at the hospital of the 1st petitioner. The 2nd petitioner is the Director of the hospital. The petitioners objected on the grounds of limitation. Section 36(2) the <a href="/act/51674/protection-of-human-rights-act-1993-complete-act">Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993</a> provides that 'State Commission shall not enquire into any matter after expiry of one year from the date on which the act constituting violation of human rights alleged to have been committed'. Therefore, Ext. P1 petition was filed belatedly beyond the said period from the date of alleged-human rights violation namely, administration of certain chemicals on 13.1.2000, 14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000. Even according to the 1st respondent on 13.1.2000,14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000 he was given M4N and G4N injections and on 18.1.2000 he was subjected to asurgery. Ext. P1 petition was filed on 1.8.2001. This is beyond the period provided for objection in Section 36(2), the petitioners submits. But this contention was tried as preliminary issue was overruled in Ext. P4, finding that the effect of 'Act' may still continue and in such circumstances by no stretch of reasoning it can be said that the petition was barred by limitation under Section 36(2). This finding was entered into relying on Page No. 36 of the Law Laxicon edited by Y.V. Chandrachood, Former Chief Justice of India.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Assailing Ext. P1 it is contended by the petitioners that period of limitation prescribed in the said statute is to be strictly construed. The court cannot stretch the period of limitation beyond the period made mentioned of in the statute concerned. The decisions, in (AIR 1999 SC 3101) Lachhman Das Arora v. Ganeshi Led and others and (AIR 1999 SC 1351) Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. & another have been cited in support of this contention. As held in the former case 'the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party, but it has to be applied with all its vigour when the statute so prescribes. The court cannot extend the period of limitation on equitable ground more particular in the matter of filing of election petitions under the Act.' This was on a question of limitation in terms of Representation of Peoples' Act. The period of limitation prescribed in this case is also in terms of special statute namely Protection of Human Rights Act. Dealing with converse situation in the latter case, the Supreme Court held that when the statute does not prescribe any period of limitation the court cannot throw out a petition on the ground of limitation. Going by the pleadings contained in Ext. P1 and the dates of administration of the alleged chemical or medicines as the case may be, during January 2000, the petition was filed beyond the period of limitation of one year provided in Section 36(2). Ext. P1 was filed only on 1.8.2001. Applying strict rule of limitation contained in Section 36(2) of the Act, Ext. P1 petition ought to have been dismissed upholding the preliminary objection rather than rejecting it as per Ext. P4.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. It is contended by the 1st respondent that the administration of medicine was in January 2000 as averred in Para 5 of Ext. P1 petition. The medicine had been consumed by him bonafide believing that it had been prescribed by the doctor to cure his ailment. This cannot be taken as the dates for the purpose of limitation. No symptoms were noticed by mere administration of the medicine on the said dates. Symptoms arose when adverse reactions were noticed. According to him as averred in para 6 of the Ext. P1. he experienced foreign body sensation in throat on 14.1.2000 and thereafter he was subjected to laryngoscopy and biopsy and the result disclosed that a further tumour had developed. According to him it was developed after injuctingthese chemicals as averred in para 6 of Ext. P1. New tumour was noticed after14.1.2000, It developed because of administration of the medicine, he submits. Ofcourse that is a matter which shall be left to be strictly proved by him. There is clearallegation that he experienced alleged adverse effect of administration of the medicine,on 14.1.2000. That is the date of knowledge, so far as he is concerned, about theadversity he is alleged to be suffering. Therefore, that shall be taken as the startingperiod of limitation, the 1st respondent submits.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is worthwhile to refer the decision in (AIR 1961 SC 1500) Harish Chandra v. Deputy L.A. Officer in connection with the period of limitation provided in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It was held that the period of limitation in the statute shall be construed from the date of knowledge of the order of the administrative authority concerned.. Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act provided a period of limitation of six weeks from the date of Collector's award to seek reference to the Civil Court, The Apex Court held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The knowledge of the party affected by the award either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice the expression 'the date of the award' used in the proviso must mean that date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructing. In our opinion, therefore, it would be unreasonable to construe the words 'from the date of Collector's award' used in the proviso to Section 18 in a literal or mechanical way.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The date of knowledge is taken as relevant criterion to count the period of limitation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. In this case also mere administration of medicine, allegedly chemical, on the 1st respondent, prescribed by competent doctors in the reputed institution cannot be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. The date of experience of adverse effects on a subsequent date of administration, alone can be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. On the basis of the averment in para 6 of Ext. P1 the 1st respondent experienced a new foreign body sensation on 14.1.2000 and the pathology-report was suggestive, according to him, of a new tumour. Therefore, that shall be me date of knowledge of the difficulty experienced by him, which according to him was because of the alleged administration of the medicine-chemical. So, counting the period of one year from 14.1.2000, it cannot be taken that Ext. P1 is beyond the period of limitation. Therefore, Ext. P4 can be sustained on the aforesaid reasoning. But whether the formation of the new tumour is because of the administration of G4N and M4N or because of the delayed surgery is a matter to be strictly proved by the 1st respondent while prosecuting Ext. P1 claim. Original Petition is closed as above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'judgement' => '<p>K.A. Abdul Gafoor, J. </p><p>1. Challenge is against Ext. P4 order passed by the Kerala State Human Rights Commission. The first respondent filed Ext. P1 petition before the said Commission alleging human rights violation consequently on an alleged act by the petitioners herein, during his treatment at the hospital of the 1st petitioner. The 2nd petitioner is the Director of the hospital. The petitioners objected on the grounds of limitation. Section 36(2) the <a>Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993</a> provides that 'State Commission shall not enquire into any matter after expiry of one year from the date on which the act constituting violation of human rights alleged to have been committed'. Therefore, Ext. P1 petition was filed belatedly beyond the said period from the date of alleged-human rights violation namely, administration of certain chemicals on 13.1.2000, 14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000. Even according to the 1st respondent on 13.1.2000,14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000 he was given M4N and G4N injections and on 18.1.2000 he was subjected to asurgery. Ext. P1 petition was filed on 1.8.2001. This is beyond the period provided for objection in Section 36(2), the petitioners submits. But this contention was tried as preliminary issue was overruled in Ext. P4, finding that the effect of 'Act' may still continue and in such circumstances by no stretch of reasoning it can be said that the petition was barred by limitation under Section 36(2). This finding was entered into relying on Page No. 36 of the Law Laxicon edited by Y.V. Chandrachood, Former Chief Justice of India.</p><p>2. Assailing Ext. P1 it is contended by the petitioners that period of limitation prescribed in the said statute is to be strictly construed. The court cannot stretch the period of limitation beyond the period made mentioned of in the statute concerned. The decisions, in (AIR 1999 SC 3101) Lachhman Das Arora v. Ganeshi Led and others and (AIR 1999 SC 1351) Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. & another have been cited in support of this contention. As held in the former case 'the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party, but it has to be applied with all its vigour when the statute so prescribes. The court cannot extend the period of limitation on equitable ground more particular in the matter of filing of election petitions under the Act.' This was on a question of limitation in terms of Representation of Peoples' Act. The period of limitation prescribed in this case is also in terms of special statute namely Protection of Human Rights Act. Dealing with converse situation in the latter case, the Supreme Court held that when the statute does not prescribe any period of limitation the court cannot throw out a petition on the ground of limitation. Going by the pleadings contained in Ext. P1 and the dates of administration of the alleged chemical or medicines as the case may be, during January 2000, the petition was filed beyond the period of limitation of one year provided in Section 36(2). Ext. P1 was filed only on 1.8.2001. Applying strict rule of limitation contained in Section 36(2) of the Act, Ext. P1 petition ought to have been dismissed upholding the preliminary objection rather than rejecting it as per Ext. P4.</p><p>3. It is contended by the 1st respondent that the administration of medicine was in January 2000 as averred in Para 5 of Ext. P1 petition. The medicine had been consumed by him bonafide believing that it had been prescribed by the doctor to cure his ailment. This cannot be taken as the dates for the purpose of limitation. No symptoms were noticed by mere administration of the medicine on the said dates. Symptoms arose when adverse reactions were noticed. According to him as averred in para 6 of the Ext. P1. he experienced foreign body sensation in throat on 14.1.2000 and thereafter he was subjected to laryngoscopy and biopsy and the result disclosed that a further tumour had developed. According to him it was developed after injuctingthese chemicals as averred in para 6 of Ext. P1. New tumour was noticed after14.1.2000, It developed because of administration of the medicine, he submits. Ofcourse that is a matter which shall be left to be strictly proved by him. There is clearallegation that he experienced alleged adverse effect of administration of the medicine,on 14.1.2000. That is the date of knowledge, so far as he is concerned, about theadversity he is alleged to be suffering. Therefore, that shall be taken as the startingperiod of limitation, the 1st respondent submits.</p><p>4. It is worthwhile to refer the decision in (AIR 1961 SC 1500) Harish Chandra v. Deputy L.A. Officer in connection with the period of limitation provided in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It was held that the period of limitation in the statute shall be construed from the date of knowledge of the order of the administrative authority concerned.. Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act provided a period of limitation of six weeks from the date of Collector's award to seek reference to the Civil Court, The Apex Court held as follows:</p><p>'The knowledge of the party affected by the award either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice the expression 'the date of the award' used in the proviso must mean that date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructing. In our opinion, therefore, it would be unreasonable to construe the words 'from the date of Collector's award' used in the proviso to Section 18 in a literal or mechanical way.'</p><p>The date of knowledge is taken as relevant criterion to count the period of limitation.</p><p>5. In this case also mere administration of medicine, allegedly chemical, on the 1st respondent, prescribed by competent doctors in the reputed institution cannot be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. The date of experience of adverse effects on a subsequent date of administration, alone can be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. On the basis of the averment in para 6 of Ext. P1 the 1st respondent experienced a new foreign body sensation on 14.1.2000 and the pathology-report was suggestive, according to him, of a new tumour. Therefore, that shall be me date of knowledge of the difficulty experienced by him, which according to him was because of the alleged administration of the medicine-chemical. So, counting the period of one year from 14.1.2000, it cannot be taken that Ext. P1 is beyond the period of limitation. Therefore, Ext. P4 can be sustained on the aforesaid reasoning. But whether the formation of the new tumour is because of the administration of G4N and M4N or because of the delayed surgery is a matter to be strictly proved by the 1st respondent while prosecuting Ext. P1 claim. Original Petition is closed as above.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>K.A. Abdul Gafoor, J. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Challenge is against Ext. P4 order passed by the Kerala State Human Rights Commission. The first respondent filed Ext. P1 petition before the said Commission alleging human rights violation consequently on an alleged act by the petitioners herein, during his treatment at the hospital of the 1st petitioner. The 2nd petitioner is the Director of the hospital. The petitioners objected on the grounds of limitation. Section 36(2) the <a>Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993</a> provides that 'State Commission shall not enquire into any matter after expiry of one year from the date on which the act constituting violation of human rights alleged to have been committed'. Therefore, Ext. P1 petition was filed belatedly beyond the said period from the date of alleged-human rights violation namely, administration of certain chemicals on 13.1.2000, 14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000. Even according to the 1st respondent on 13.1.2000,14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000 he was given M4N and G4N injections and on 18.1.2000 he was subjected to asurgery. Ext. P1 petition was filed on 1.8.2001. This is beyond the period provided for objection in Section 36(2), the petitioners submits. But this contention was tried as preliminary issue was overruled in Ext. P4, finding that the effect of 'Act' may still continue and in such circumstances by no stretch of reasoning it can be said that the petition was barred by limitation under Section 36(2). This finding was entered into relying on Page No. 36 of the Law Laxicon edited by Y.V. Chandrachood, Former Chief Justice of India.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Assailing Ext. P1 it is contended by the petitioners that period of limitation prescribed in the said statute is to be strictly construed. The court cannot stretch the period of limitation beyond the period made mentioned of in the statute concerned. The decisions, in (AIR 1999 SC 3101) Lachhman Das Arora v. Ganeshi Led and others and (AIR 1999 SC 1351) Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. & another have been cited in support of this contention. As held in the former case 'the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party, but it has to be applied with all its vigour when the statute so prescribes. The court cannot extend the period of limitation on equitable ground more particular in the matter of filing of election petitions under the Act.' This was on a question of limitation in terms of Representation of Peoples' Act. The period of limitation prescribed in this case is also in terms of special statute namely Protection of Human Rights Act. Dealing with converse situation in the latter case, the Supreme Court held that when the statute does not prescribe any period of limitation the court cannot throw out a petition on the ground of limitation. Going by the pleadings contained in Ext. P1 and the dates of administration of the alleged chemical or medicines as the case may be, during January 2000, the petition was filed beyond the period of limitation of one year provided in Section 36(2). Ext. P1 was filed only on 1.8.2001. Applying strict rule of limitation contained in Section 36(2) of the Act, Ext. P1 petition ought to have been dismissed upholding the preliminary objection rather than rejecting it as per Ext. P4.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. It is contended by the 1st respondent that the administration of medicine was in January 2000 as averred in Para 5 of Ext. P1 petition. The medicine had been consumed by him bonafide believing that it had been prescribed by the doctor to cure his ailment. This cannot be taken as the dates for the purpose of limitation. No symptoms were noticed by mere administration of the medicine on the said dates. Symptoms arose when adverse reactions were noticed. According to him as averred in para 6 of the Ext. P1. he experienced foreign body sensation in throat on 14.1.2000 and thereafter he was subjected to laryngoscopy and biopsy and the result disclosed that a further tumour had developed. According to him it was developed after injuctingthese chemicals as averred in para 6 of Ext. P1. New tumour was noticed after14.1.2000, It developed because of administration of the medicine, he submits. Ofcourse that is a matter which shall be left to be strictly proved by him. There is clearallegation that he experienced alleged adverse effect of administration of the medicine,on 14.1.2000. That is the date of knowledge, so far as he is concerned, about theadversity he is alleged to be suffering. Therefore, that shall be taken as the startingperiod of limitation, the 1st respondent submits.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. It is worthwhile to refer the decision in (AIR 1961 SC 1500) Harish Chandra v. Deputy L.A. Officer in connection with the period of limitation provided in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It was held that the period of limitation in the statute shall be construed from the date of knowledge of the order of the administrative authority concerned.. Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act provided a period of limitation of six weeks from the date of Collector's award to seek reference to the Civil Court, The Apex Court held as follows:',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'The knowledge of the party affected by the award either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice the expression 'the date of the award' used in the proviso must mean that date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructing. In our opinion, therefore, it would be unreasonable to construe the words 'from the date of Collector's award' used in the proviso to Section 18 in a literal or mechanical way.'',
	(int) 6 => '<p>The date of knowledge is taken as relevant criterion to count the period of limitation.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. In this case also mere administration of medicine, allegedly chemical, on the 1st respondent, prescribed by competent doctors in the reputed institution cannot be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. The date of experience of adverse effects on a subsequent date of administration, alone can be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. On the basis of the averment in para 6 of Ext. P1 the 1st respondent experienced a new foreign body sensation on 14.1.2000 and the pathology-report was suggestive, according to him, of a new tumour. Therefore, that shall be me date of knowledge of the difficulty experienced by him, which according to him was because of the alleged administration of the medicine-chemical. So, counting the period of one year from 14.1.2000, it cannot be taken that Ext. P1 is beyond the period of limitation. Therefore, Ext. P4 can be sustained on the aforesaid reasoning. But whether the formation of the new tumour is because of the administration of G4N and M4N or because of the delayed surgery is a matter to be strictly proved by the 1st respondent while prosecuting Ext. P1 claim. Original Petition is closed as above.<p>',
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2. Assailing Ext. P1 it is contended by the petitioners that period of limitation prescribed in the said statute is to be strictly construed. The court cannot stretch the period of limitation beyond the period made mentioned of in the statute concerned. The decisions, in (AIR 1999 SC 3101) Lachhman Das Arora v. Ganeshi Led and others and (AIR 1999 SC 1351) Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. & another have been cited in support of this contention. As held in the former case 'the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party, but it has to be applied with all its vigour when the statute so prescribes. The court cannot extend the period of limitation on equitable ground more particular in the matter of filing of election petitions under the Act.' This was on a question of limitation in terms of Representation of Peoples' Act. The period of limitation prescribed in this case is also in terms of special statute namely Protection of Human Rights Act. Dealing with converse situation in the latter case, the Supreme Court held that when the statute does not prescribe any period of limitation the court cannot throw out a petition on the ground of limitation. Going by the pleadings contained in Ext. P1 and the dates of administration of the alleged chemical or medicines as the case may be, during January 2000, the petition was filed beyond the period of limitation of one year provided in Section 36(2). Ext. P1 was filed only on 1.8.2001. Applying strict rule of limitation contained in Section 36(2) of the Act, Ext. P1 petition ought to have been dismissed upholding the preliminary objection rather than rejecting it as per Ext. P4.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Regional Cancer Centre Vs Gopalan - Citation 729830 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '729830',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51674/protection-of-human-rights-act-1993-complete-act">Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993</a> - Sections 36(2)',
			'appealno' => 'O.P. No. 10174 of 2002',
			'appellant' => 'Regional Cancer Centre',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Regional Cancer Centre Vs. Gopalan',
			'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.         ',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Harish Chandra v. Deputy L.A. Officer;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' N.N. Sugunapalan, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' P.S. Sreedharan Pillai,; S. Sreekumar,; M.A. Firoz,;',
			'court' => 'Kerala',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2002-08-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
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			'judge' => ' K.A. Abdul Gafoor, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.A. Abdul Gafoor, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Challenge is against Ext. P4 order passed by the Kerala State Human Rights Commission. The first respondent filed Ext. P1 petition before the said Commission alleging human rights violation consequently on an alleged act by the petitioners herein, during his treatment at the hospital of the 1st petitioner. The 2nd petitioner is the Director of the hospital. The petitioners objected on the grounds of limitation. Section 36(2) the <a href="/act/51674/protection-of-human-rights-act-1993-complete-act">Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993</a> provides that 'State Commission shall not enquire into any matter after expiry of one year from the date on which the act constituting violation of human rights alleged to have been committed'. Therefore, Ext. P1 petition was filed belatedly beyond the said period from the date of alleged-human rights violation namely, administration of certain chemicals on 13.1.2000, 14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000. Even according to the 1st respondent on 13.1.2000,14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000 he was given M4N and G4N injections and on 18.1.2000 he was subjected to asurgery. Ext. P1 petition was filed on 1.8.2001. This is beyond the period provided for objection in Section 36(2), the petitioners submits. But this contention was tried as preliminary issue was overruled in Ext. P4, finding that the effect of 'Act' may still continue and in such circumstances by no stretch of reasoning it can be said that the petition was barred by limitation under Section 36(2). This finding was entered into relying on Page No. 36 of the Law Laxicon edited by Y.V. Chandrachood, Former Chief Justice of India.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Assailing Ext. P1 it is contended by the petitioners that period of limitation prescribed in the said statute is to be strictly construed. The court cannot stretch the period of limitation beyond the period made mentioned of in the statute concerned. The decisions, in (AIR 1999 SC 3101) Lachhman Das Arora v. Ganeshi Led and others and (AIR 1999 SC 1351) Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. & another have been cited in support of this contention. As held in the former case 'the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party, but it has to be applied with all its vigour when the statute so prescribes. The court cannot extend the period of limitation on equitable ground more particular in the matter of filing of election petitions under the Act.' This was on a question of limitation in terms of Representation of Peoples' Act. The period of limitation prescribed in this case is also in terms of special statute namely Protection of Human Rights Act. Dealing with converse situation in the latter case, the Supreme Court held that when the statute does not prescribe any period of limitation the court cannot throw out a petition on the ground of limitation. Going by the pleadings contained in Ext. P1 and the dates of administration of the alleged chemical or medicines as the case may be, during January 2000, the petition was filed beyond the period of limitation of one year provided in Section 36(2). Ext. P1 was filed only on 1.8.2001. Applying strict rule of limitation contained in Section 36(2) of the Act, Ext. P1 petition ought to have been dismissed upholding the preliminary objection rather than rejecting it as per Ext. P4.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. It is contended by the 1st respondent that the administration of medicine was in January 2000 as averred in Para 5 of Ext. P1 petition. The medicine had been consumed by him bonafide believing that it had been prescribed by the doctor to cure his ailment. This cannot be taken as the dates for the purpose of limitation. No symptoms were noticed by mere administration of the medicine on the said dates. Symptoms arose when adverse reactions were noticed. According to him as averred in para 6 of the Ext. P1. he experienced foreign body sensation in throat on 14.1.2000 and thereafter he was subjected to laryngoscopy and biopsy and the result disclosed that a further tumour had developed. According to him it was developed after injuctingthese chemicals as averred in para 6 of Ext. P1. New tumour was noticed after14.1.2000, It developed because of administration of the medicine, he submits. Ofcourse that is a matter which shall be left to be strictly proved by him. There is clearallegation that he experienced alleged adverse effect of administration of the medicine,on 14.1.2000. That is the date of knowledge, so far as he is concerned, about theadversity he is alleged to be suffering. Therefore, that shall be taken as the startingperiod of limitation, the 1st respondent submits.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is worthwhile to refer the decision in (AIR 1961 SC 1500) Harish Chandra v. Deputy L.A. Officer in connection with the period of limitation provided in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It was held that the period of limitation in the statute shall be construed from the date of knowledge of the order of the administrative authority concerned.. Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act provided a period of limitation of six weeks from the date of Collector's award to seek reference to the Civil Court, The Apex Court held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The knowledge of the party affected by the award either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice the expression 'the date of the award' used in the proviso must mean that date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructing. In our opinion, therefore, it would be unreasonable to construe the words 'from the date of Collector's award' used in the proviso to Section 18 in a literal or mechanical way.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The date of knowledge is taken as relevant criterion to count the period of limitation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. In this case also mere administration of medicine, allegedly chemical, on the 1st respondent, prescribed by competent doctors in the reputed institution cannot be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. The date of experience of adverse effects on a subsequent date of administration, alone can be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. On the basis of the averment in para 6 of Ext. P1 the 1st respondent experienced a new foreign body sensation on 14.1.2000 and the pathology-report was suggestive, according to him, of a new tumour. Therefore, that shall be me date of knowledge of the difficulty experienced by him, which according to him was because of the alleged administration of the medicine-chemical. So, counting the period of one year from 14.1.2000, it cannot be taken that Ext. P1 is beyond the period of limitation. Therefore, Ext. P4 can be sustained on the aforesaid reasoning. But whether the formation of the new tumour is because of the administration of G4N and M4N or because of the delayed surgery is a matter to be strictly proved by the 1st respondent while prosecuting Ext. P1 claim. Original Petition is closed as above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casename' => 'Regional Cancer Centre Vs. Gopalan',
		'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.         ',
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		'casesref' => 'Harish Chandra v. Deputy L.A. Officer;',
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		'counselplain' => ' N.N. Sugunapalan, Adv.',
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		'decidedon' => '2002-08-28',
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		'judge' => ' K.A. Abdul Gafoor, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.A. Abdul Gafoor, J. </p><p>1. Challenge is against Ext. P4 order passed by the Kerala State Human Rights Commission. The first respondent filed Ext. P1 petition before the said Commission alleging human rights violation consequently on an alleged act by the petitioners herein, during his treatment at the hospital of the 1st petitioner. The 2nd petitioner is the Director of the hospital. The petitioners objected on the grounds of limitation. Section 36(2) the <a>Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993</a> provides that 'State Commission shall not enquire into any matter after expiry of one year from the date on which the act constituting violation of human rights alleged to have been committed'. Therefore, Ext. P1 petition was filed belatedly beyond the said period from the date of alleged-human rights violation namely, administration of certain chemicals on 13.1.2000, 14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000. Even according to the 1st respondent on 13.1.2000,14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000 he was given M4N and G4N injections and on 18.1.2000 he was subjected to asurgery. Ext. P1 petition was filed on 1.8.2001. This is beyond the period provided for objection in Section 36(2), the petitioners submits. But this contention was tried as preliminary issue was overruled in Ext. P4, finding that the effect of 'Act' may still continue and in such circumstances by no stretch of reasoning it can be said that the petition was barred by limitation under Section 36(2). This finding was entered into relying on Page No. 36 of the Law Laxicon edited by Y.V. Chandrachood, Former Chief Justice of India.</p><p>2. Assailing Ext. P1 it is contended by the petitioners that period of limitation prescribed in the said statute is to be strictly construed. The court cannot stretch the period of limitation beyond the period made mentioned of in the statute concerned. The decisions, in (AIR 1999 SC 3101) Lachhman Das Arora v. Ganeshi Led and others and (AIR 1999 SC 1351) Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. & another have been cited in support of this contention. As held in the former case 'the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party, but it has to be applied with all its vigour when the statute so prescribes. The court cannot extend the period of limitation on equitable ground more particular in the matter of filing of election petitions under the Act.' This was on a question of limitation in terms of Representation of Peoples' Act. The period of limitation prescribed in this case is also in terms of special statute namely Protection of Human Rights Act. Dealing with converse situation in the latter case, the Supreme Court held that when the statute does not prescribe any period of limitation the court cannot throw out a petition on the ground of limitation. Going by the pleadings contained in Ext. P1 and the dates of administration of the alleged chemical or medicines as the case may be, during January 2000, the petition was filed beyond the period of limitation of one year provided in Section 36(2). Ext. P1 was filed only on 1.8.2001. Applying strict rule of limitation contained in Section 36(2) of the Act, Ext. P1 petition ought to have been dismissed upholding the preliminary objection rather than rejecting it as per Ext. P4.</p><p>3. It is contended by the 1st respondent that the administration of medicine was in January 2000 as averred in Para 5 of Ext. P1 petition. The medicine had been consumed by him bonafide believing that it had been prescribed by the doctor to cure his ailment. This cannot be taken as the dates for the purpose of limitation. No symptoms were noticed by mere administration of the medicine on the said dates. Symptoms arose when adverse reactions were noticed. According to him as averred in para 6 of the Ext. P1. he experienced foreign body sensation in throat on 14.1.2000 and thereafter he was subjected to laryngoscopy and biopsy and the result disclosed that a further tumour had developed. According to him it was developed after injuctingthese chemicals as averred in para 6 of Ext. P1. New tumour was noticed after14.1.2000, It developed because of administration of the medicine, he submits. Ofcourse that is a matter which shall be left to be strictly proved by him. There is clearallegation that he experienced alleged adverse effect of administration of the medicine,on 14.1.2000. That is the date of knowledge, so far as he is concerned, about theadversity he is alleged to be suffering. Therefore, that shall be taken as the startingperiod of limitation, the 1st respondent submits.</p><p>4. It is worthwhile to refer the decision in (AIR 1961 SC 1500) Harish Chandra v. Deputy L.A. Officer in connection with the period of limitation provided in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It was held that the period of limitation in the statute shall be construed from the date of knowledge of the order of the administrative authority concerned.. Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act provided a period of limitation of six weeks from the date of Collector's award to seek reference to the Civil Court, The Apex Court held as follows:</p><p>'The knowledge of the party affected by the award either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice the expression 'the date of the award' used in the proviso must mean that date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructing. In our opinion, therefore, it would be unreasonable to construe the words 'from the date of Collector's award' used in the proviso to Section 18 in a literal or mechanical way.'</p><p>The date of knowledge is taken as relevant criterion to count the period of limitation.</p><p>5. In this case also mere administration of medicine, allegedly chemical, on the 1st respondent, prescribed by competent doctors in the reputed institution cannot be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. The date of experience of adverse effects on a subsequent date of administration, alone can be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. On the basis of the averment in para 6 of Ext. P1 the 1st respondent experienced a new foreign body sensation on 14.1.2000 and the pathology-report was suggestive, according to him, of a new tumour. Therefore, that shall be me date of knowledge of the difficulty experienced by him, which according to him was because of the alleged administration of the medicine-chemical. So, counting the period of one year from 14.1.2000, it cannot be taken that Ext. P1 is beyond the period of limitation. Therefore, Ext. P4 can be sustained on the aforesaid reasoning. But whether the formation of the new tumour is because of the administration of G4N and M4N or because of the delayed surgery is a matter to be strictly proved by the 1st respondent while prosecuting Ext. P1 claim. Original Petition is closed as above.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Challenge is against Ext. P4 order passed by the Kerala State Human Rights Commission. The first respondent filed Ext. P1 petition before the said Commission alleging human rights violation consequently on an alleged act by the petitioners herein, during his treatment at the hospital of the 1st petitioner. The 2nd petitioner is the Director of the hospital. The petitioners objected on the grounds of limitation. Section 36(2) the <a>Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993</a> provides that 'State Commission shall not enquire into any matter after expiry of one year from the date on which the act constituting violation of human rights alleged to have been committed'. Therefore, Ext. P1 petition was filed belatedly beyond the said period from the date of alleged-human rights violation namely, administration of certain chemicals on 13.1.2000, 14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000. Even according to the 1st respondent on 13.1.2000,14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000 he was given M4N and G4N injections and on 18.1.2000 he was subjected to asurgery. Ext. P1 petition was filed on 1.8.2001. This is beyond the period provided for objection in Section 36(2), the petitioners submits. But this contention was tried as preliminary issue was overruled in Ext. P4, finding that the effect of 'Act' may still continue and in such circumstances by no stretch of reasoning it can be said that the petition was barred by limitation under Section 36(2). This finding was entered into relying on Page No. 36 of the Law Laxicon edited by Y.V. Chandrachood, Former Chief Justice of India.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Assailing Ext. P1 it is contended by the petitioners that period of limitation prescribed in the said statute is to be strictly construed. The court cannot stretch the period of limitation beyond the period made mentioned of in the statute concerned. The decisions, in (AIR 1999 SC 3101) Lachhman Das Arora v. Ganeshi Led and others and (AIR 1999 SC 1351) Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. & another have been cited in support of this contention. As held in the former case 'the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party, but it has to be applied with all its vigour when the statute so prescribes. The court cannot extend the period of limitation on equitable ground more particular in the matter of filing of election petitions under the Act.' This was on a question of limitation in terms of Representation of Peoples' Act. The period of limitation prescribed in this case is also in terms of special statute namely Protection of Human Rights Act. Dealing with converse situation in the latter case, the Supreme Court held that when the statute does not prescribe any period of limitation the court cannot throw out a petition on the ground of limitation. Going by the pleadings contained in Ext. P1 and the dates of administration of the alleged chemical or medicines as the case may be, during January 2000, the petition was filed beyond the period of limitation of one year provided in Section 36(2). Ext. P1 was filed only on 1.8.2001. Applying strict rule of limitation contained in Section 36(2) of the Act, Ext. P1 petition ought to have been dismissed upholding the preliminary objection rather than rejecting it as per Ext. P4.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. It is contended by the 1st respondent that the administration of medicine was in January 2000 as averred in Para 5 of Ext. P1 petition. The medicine had been consumed by him bonafide believing that it had been prescribed by the doctor to cure his ailment. This cannot be taken as the dates for the purpose of limitation. No symptoms were noticed by mere administration of the medicine on the said dates. Symptoms arose when adverse reactions were noticed. According to him as averred in para 6 of the Ext. P1. he experienced foreign body sensation in throat on 14.1.2000 and thereafter he was subjected to laryngoscopy and biopsy and the result disclosed that a further tumour had developed. According to him it was developed after injuctingthese chemicals as averred in para 6 of Ext. P1. New tumour was noticed after14.1.2000, It developed because of administration of the medicine, he submits. Ofcourse that is a matter which shall be left to be strictly proved by him. There is clearallegation that he experienced alleged adverse effect of administration of the medicine,on 14.1.2000. That is the date of knowledge, so far as he is concerned, about theadversity he is alleged to be suffering. Therefore, that shall be taken as the startingperiod of limitation, the 1st respondent submits.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. It is worthwhile to refer the decision in (AIR 1961 SC 1500) Harish Chandra v. Deputy L.A. Officer in connection with the period of limitation provided in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It was held that the period of limitation in the statute shall be construed from the date of knowledge of the order of the administrative authority concerned.. Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act provided a period of limitation of six weeks from the date of Collector's award to seek reference to the Civil Court, The Apex Court held as follows:',
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	(int) 6 => '<p>The date of knowledge is taken as relevant criterion to count the period of limitation.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. In this case also mere administration of medicine, allegedly chemical, on the 1st respondent, prescribed by competent doctors in the reputed institution cannot be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. The date of experience of adverse effects on a subsequent date of administration, alone can be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. On the basis of the averment in para 6 of Ext. P1 the 1st respondent experienced a new foreign body sensation on 14.1.2000 and the pathology-report was suggestive, according to him, of a new tumour. Therefore, that shall be me date of knowledge of the difficulty experienced by him, which according to him was because of the alleged administration of the medicine-chemical. So, counting the period of one year from 14.1.2000, it cannot be taken that Ext. P1 is beyond the period of limitation. Therefore, Ext. P4 can be sustained on the aforesaid reasoning. But whether the formation of the new tumour is because of the administration of G4N and M4N or because of the delayed surgery is a matter to be strictly proved by the 1st respondent while prosecuting Ext. P1 claim. Original Petition is closed as above.<p>',
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3. It is contended by the 1st respondent that the administration of medicine was in January 2000 as averred in Para 5 of Ext. P1 petition. The medicine had been consumed by him bonafide believing that it had been prescribed by the doctor to cure his ailment. This cannot be taken as the dates for the purpose of limitation. No symptoms were noticed by mere administration of the medicine on the said dates. Symptoms arose when adverse reactions were noticed. According to him as averred in para 6 of the Ext. P1. he experienced foreign body sensation in throat on 14.1.2000 and thereafter he was subjected to laryngoscopy and biopsy and the result disclosed that a further tumour had developed. According to him it was developed after injuctingthese chemicals as averred in para 6 of Ext. P1. New tumour was noticed after14.1.2000, It developed because of administration of the medicine, he submits. Ofcourse that is a matter which shall be left to be strictly proved by him. There is clearallegation that he experienced alleged adverse effect of administration of the medicine,on 14.1.2000. That is the date of knowledge, so far as he is concerned, about theadversity he is alleged to be suffering. Therefore, that shall be taken as the startingperiod of limitation, the 1st respondent submits.

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			'id' => '729830',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51674/protection-of-human-rights-act-1993-complete-act">Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993</a> - Sections 36(2)',
			'appealno' => 'O.P. No. 10174 of 2002',
			'appellant' => 'Regional Cancer Centre',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Regional Cancer Centre Vs. Gopalan',
			'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.         ',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Harish Chandra v. Deputy L.A. Officer;',
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			'counselplain' => ' N.N. Sugunapalan, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' P.S. Sreedharan Pillai,; S. Sreekumar,; M.A. Firoz,;',
			'court' => 'Kerala',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2002-08-28',
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			'favorof' => null,
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			'judge' => ' K.A. Abdul Gafoor, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.A. Abdul Gafoor, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Challenge is against Ext. P4 order passed by the Kerala State Human Rights Commission. The first respondent filed Ext. P1 petition before the said Commission alleging human rights violation consequently on an alleged act by the petitioners herein, during his treatment at the hospital of the 1st petitioner. The 2nd petitioner is the Director of the hospital. The petitioners objected on the grounds of limitation. Section 36(2) the <a href="/act/51674/protection-of-human-rights-act-1993-complete-act">Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993</a> provides that 'State Commission shall not enquire into any matter after expiry of one year from the date on which the act constituting violation of human rights alleged to have been committed'. Therefore, Ext. P1 petition was filed belatedly beyond the said period from the date of alleged-human rights violation namely, administration of certain chemicals on 13.1.2000, 14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000. Even according to the 1st respondent on 13.1.2000,14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000 he was given M4N and G4N injections and on 18.1.2000 he was subjected to asurgery. Ext. P1 petition was filed on 1.8.2001. This is beyond the period provided for objection in Section 36(2), the petitioners submits. But this contention was tried as preliminary issue was overruled in Ext. P4, finding that the effect of 'Act' may still continue and in such circumstances by no stretch of reasoning it can be said that the petition was barred by limitation under Section 36(2). This finding was entered into relying on Page No. 36 of the Law Laxicon edited by Y.V. Chandrachood, Former Chief Justice of India.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Assailing Ext. P1 it is contended by the petitioners that period of limitation prescribed in the said statute is to be strictly construed. The court cannot stretch the period of limitation beyond the period made mentioned of in the statute concerned. The decisions, in (AIR 1999 SC 3101) Lachhman Das Arora v. Ganeshi Led and others and (AIR 1999 SC 1351) Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. & another have been cited in support of this contention. As held in the former case 'the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party, but it has to be applied with all its vigour when the statute so prescribes. The court cannot extend the period of limitation on equitable ground more particular in the matter of filing of election petitions under the Act.' This was on a question of limitation in terms of Representation of Peoples' Act. The period of limitation prescribed in this case is also in terms of special statute namely Protection of Human Rights Act. Dealing with converse situation in the latter case, the Supreme Court held that when the statute does not prescribe any period of limitation the court cannot throw out a petition on the ground of limitation. Going by the pleadings contained in Ext. P1 and the dates of administration of the alleged chemical or medicines as the case may be, during January 2000, the petition was filed beyond the period of limitation of one year provided in Section 36(2). Ext. P1 was filed only on 1.8.2001. Applying strict rule of limitation contained in Section 36(2) of the Act, Ext. P1 petition ought to have been dismissed upholding the preliminary objection rather than rejecting it as per Ext. P4.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. It is contended by the 1st respondent that the administration of medicine was in January 2000 as averred in Para 5 of Ext. P1 petition. The medicine had been consumed by him bonafide believing that it had been prescribed by the doctor to cure his ailment. This cannot be taken as the dates for the purpose of limitation. No symptoms were noticed by mere administration of the medicine on the said dates. Symptoms arose when adverse reactions were noticed. According to him as averred in para 6 of the Ext. P1. he experienced foreign body sensation in throat on 14.1.2000 and thereafter he was subjected to laryngoscopy and biopsy and the result disclosed that a further tumour had developed. According to him it was developed after injuctingthese chemicals as averred in para 6 of Ext. P1. New tumour was noticed after14.1.2000, It developed because of administration of the medicine, he submits. Ofcourse that is a matter which shall be left to be strictly proved by him. There is clearallegation that he experienced alleged adverse effect of administration of the medicine,on 14.1.2000. That is the date of knowledge, so far as he is concerned, about theadversity he is alleged to be suffering. Therefore, that shall be taken as the startingperiod of limitation, the 1st respondent submits.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is worthwhile to refer the decision in (AIR 1961 SC 1500) Harish Chandra v. Deputy L.A. Officer in connection with the period of limitation provided in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It was held that the period of limitation in the statute shall be construed from the date of knowledge of the order of the administrative authority concerned.. Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act provided a period of limitation of six weeks from the date of Collector's award to seek reference to the Civil Court, The Apex Court held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The knowledge of the party affected by the award either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice the expression 'the date of the award' used in the proviso must mean that date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructing. In our opinion, therefore, it would be unreasonable to construe the words 'from the date of Collector's award' used in the proviso to Section 18 in a literal or mechanical way.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The date of knowledge is taken as relevant criterion to count the period of limitation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. In this case also mere administration of medicine, allegedly chemical, on the 1st respondent, prescribed by competent doctors in the reputed institution cannot be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. The date of experience of adverse effects on a subsequent date of administration, alone can be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. On the basis of the averment in para 6 of Ext. P1 the 1st respondent experienced a new foreign body sensation on 14.1.2000 and the pathology-report was suggestive, according to him, of a new tumour. Therefore, that shall be me date of knowledge of the difficulty experienced by him, which according to him was because of the alleged administration of the medicine-chemical. So, counting the period of one year from 14.1.2000, it cannot be taken that Ext. P1 is beyond the period of limitation. Therefore, Ext. P4 can be sustained on the aforesaid reasoning. But whether the formation of the new tumour is because of the administration of G4N and M4N or because of the delayed surgery is a matter to be strictly proved by the 1st respondent while prosecuting Ext. P1 claim. Original Petition is closed as above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.         ',
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		'judge' => ' K.A. Abdul Gafoor, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.A. Abdul Gafoor, J. </p><p>1. Challenge is against Ext. P4 order passed by the Kerala State Human Rights Commission. The first respondent filed Ext. P1 petition before the said Commission alleging human rights violation consequently on an alleged act by the petitioners herein, during his treatment at the hospital of the 1st petitioner. The 2nd petitioner is the Director of the hospital. The petitioners objected on the grounds of limitation. Section 36(2) the <a>Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993</a> provides that 'State Commission shall not enquire into any matter after expiry of one year from the date on which the act constituting violation of human rights alleged to have been committed'. Therefore, Ext. P1 petition was filed belatedly beyond the said period from the date of alleged-human rights violation namely, administration of certain chemicals on 13.1.2000, 14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000. Even according to the 1st respondent on 13.1.2000,14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000 he was given M4N and G4N injections and on 18.1.2000 he was subjected to asurgery. Ext. P1 petition was filed on 1.8.2001. This is beyond the period provided for objection in Section 36(2), the petitioners submits. But this contention was tried as preliminary issue was overruled in Ext. P4, finding that the effect of 'Act' may still continue and in such circumstances by no stretch of reasoning it can be said that the petition was barred by limitation under Section 36(2). This finding was entered into relying on Page No. 36 of the Law Laxicon edited by Y.V. Chandrachood, Former Chief Justice of India.</p><p>2. Assailing Ext. P1 it is contended by the petitioners that period of limitation prescribed in the said statute is to be strictly construed. The court cannot stretch the period of limitation beyond the period made mentioned of in the statute concerned. The decisions, in (AIR 1999 SC 3101) Lachhman Das Arora v. Ganeshi Led and others and (AIR 1999 SC 1351) Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. & another have been cited in support of this contention. As held in the former case 'the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party, but it has to be applied with all its vigour when the statute so prescribes. The court cannot extend the period of limitation on equitable ground more particular in the matter of filing of election petitions under the Act.' This was on a question of limitation in terms of Representation of Peoples' Act. The period of limitation prescribed in this case is also in terms of special statute namely Protection of Human Rights Act. Dealing with converse situation in the latter case, the Supreme Court held that when the statute does not prescribe any period of limitation the court cannot throw out a petition on the ground of limitation. Going by the pleadings contained in Ext. P1 and the dates of administration of the alleged chemical or medicines as the case may be, during January 2000, the petition was filed beyond the period of limitation of one year provided in Section 36(2). Ext. P1 was filed only on 1.8.2001. Applying strict rule of limitation contained in Section 36(2) of the Act, Ext. P1 petition ought to have been dismissed upholding the preliminary objection rather than rejecting it as per Ext. P4.</p><p>3. It is contended by the 1st respondent that the administration of medicine was in January 2000 as averred in Para 5 of Ext. P1 petition. The medicine had been consumed by him bonafide believing that it had been prescribed by the doctor to cure his ailment. This cannot be taken as the dates for the purpose of limitation. No symptoms were noticed by mere administration of the medicine on the said dates. Symptoms arose when adverse reactions were noticed. According to him as averred in para 6 of the Ext. P1. he experienced foreign body sensation in throat on 14.1.2000 and thereafter he was subjected to laryngoscopy and biopsy and the result disclosed that a further tumour had developed. According to him it was developed after injuctingthese chemicals as averred in para 6 of Ext. P1. New tumour was noticed after14.1.2000, It developed because of administration of the medicine, he submits. Ofcourse that is a matter which shall be left to be strictly proved by him. There is clearallegation that he experienced alleged adverse effect of administration of the medicine,on 14.1.2000. That is the date of knowledge, so far as he is concerned, about theadversity he is alleged to be suffering. Therefore, that shall be taken as the startingperiod of limitation, the 1st respondent submits.</p><p>4. It is worthwhile to refer the decision in (AIR 1961 SC 1500) Harish Chandra v. Deputy L.A. Officer in connection with the period of limitation provided in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It was held that the period of limitation in the statute shall be construed from the date of knowledge of the order of the administrative authority concerned.. Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act provided a period of limitation of six weeks from the date of Collector's award to seek reference to the Civil Court, The Apex Court held as follows:</p><p>'The knowledge of the party affected by the award either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice the expression 'the date of the award' used in the proviso must mean that date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructing. In our opinion, therefore, it would be unreasonable to construe the words 'from the date of Collector's award' used in the proviso to Section 18 in a literal or mechanical way.'</p><p>The date of knowledge is taken as relevant criterion to count the period of limitation.</p><p>5. In this case also mere administration of medicine, allegedly chemical, on the 1st respondent, prescribed by competent doctors in the reputed institution cannot be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. The date of experience of adverse effects on a subsequent date of administration, alone can be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. On the basis of the averment in para 6 of Ext. P1 the 1st respondent experienced a new foreign body sensation on 14.1.2000 and the pathology-report was suggestive, according to him, of a new tumour. Therefore, that shall be me date of knowledge of the difficulty experienced by him, which according to him was because of the alleged administration of the medicine-chemical. So, counting the period of one year from 14.1.2000, it cannot be taken that Ext. P1 is beyond the period of limitation. Therefore, Ext. P4 can be sustained on the aforesaid reasoning. But whether the formation of the new tumour is because of the administration of G4N and M4N or because of the delayed surgery is a matter to be strictly proved by the 1st respondent while prosecuting Ext. P1 claim. Original Petition is closed as above.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Challenge is against Ext. P4 order passed by the Kerala State Human Rights Commission. The first respondent filed Ext. P1 petition before the said Commission alleging human rights violation consequently on an alleged act by the petitioners herein, during his treatment at the hospital of the 1st petitioner. The 2nd petitioner is the Director of the hospital. The petitioners objected on the grounds of limitation. Section 36(2) the <a>Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993</a> provides that 'State Commission shall not enquire into any matter after expiry of one year from the date on which the act constituting violation of human rights alleged to have been committed'. Therefore, Ext. P1 petition was filed belatedly beyond the said period from the date of alleged-human rights violation namely, administration of certain chemicals on 13.1.2000, 14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000. Even according to the 1st respondent on 13.1.2000,14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000 he was given M4N and G4N injections and on 18.1.2000 he was subjected to asurgery. Ext. P1 petition was filed on 1.8.2001. This is beyond the period provided for objection in Section 36(2), the petitioners submits. But this contention was tried as preliminary issue was overruled in Ext. P4, finding that the effect of 'Act' may still continue and in such circumstances by no stretch of reasoning it can be said that the petition was barred by limitation under Section 36(2). This finding was entered into relying on Page No. 36 of the Law Laxicon edited by Y.V. Chandrachood, Former Chief Justice of India.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Assailing Ext. P1 it is contended by the petitioners that period of limitation prescribed in the said statute is to be strictly construed. The court cannot stretch the period of limitation beyond the period made mentioned of in the statute concerned. The decisions, in (AIR 1999 SC 3101) Lachhman Das Arora v. Ganeshi Led and others and (AIR 1999 SC 1351) Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. & another have been cited in support of this contention. As held in the former case 'the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party, but it has to be applied with all its vigour when the statute so prescribes. The court cannot extend the period of limitation on equitable ground more particular in the matter of filing of election petitions under the Act.' This was on a question of limitation in terms of Representation of Peoples' Act. The period of limitation prescribed in this case is also in terms of special statute namely Protection of Human Rights Act. Dealing with converse situation in the latter case, the Supreme Court held that when the statute does not prescribe any period of limitation the court cannot throw out a petition on the ground of limitation. Going by the pleadings contained in Ext. P1 and the dates of administration of the alleged chemical or medicines as the case may be, during January 2000, the petition was filed beyond the period of limitation of one year provided in Section 36(2). Ext. P1 was filed only on 1.8.2001. Applying strict rule of limitation contained in Section 36(2) of the Act, Ext. P1 petition ought to have been dismissed upholding the preliminary objection rather than rejecting it as per Ext. P4.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. It is contended by the 1st respondent that the administration of medicine was in January 2000 as averred in Para 5 of Ext. P1 petition. The medicine had been consumed by him bonafide believing that it had been prescribed by the doctor to cure his ailment. This cannot be taken as the dates for the purpose of limitation. No symptoms were noticed by mere administration of the medicine on the said dates. Symptoms arose when adverse reactions were noticed. According to him as averred in para 6 of the Ext. P1. he experienced foreign body sensation in throat on 14.1.2000 and thereafter he was subjected to laryngoscopy and biopsy and the result disclosed that a further tumour had developed. According to him it was developed after injuctingthese chemicals as averred in para 6 of Ext. P1. New tumour was noticed after14.1.2000, It developed because of administration of the medicine, he submits. Ofcourse that is a matter which shall be left to be strictly proved by him. There is clearallegation that he experienced alleged adverse effect of administration of the medicine,on 14.1.2000. That is the date of knowledge, so far as he is concerned, about theadversity he is alleged to be suffering. Therefore, that shall be taken as the startingperiod of limitation, the 1st respondent submits.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. It is worthwhile to refer the decision in (AIR 1961 SC 1500) Harish Chandra v. Deputy L.A. Officer in connection with the period of limitation provided in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It was held that the period of limitation in the statute shall be construed from the date of knowledge of the order of the administrative authority concerned.. Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act provided a period of limitation of six weeks from the date of Collector's award to seek reference to the Civil Court, The Apex Court held as follows:',
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	(int) 6 => '<p>The date of knowledge is taken as relevant criterion to count the period of limitation.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. In this case also mere administration of medicine, allegedly chemical, on the 1st respondent, prescribed by competent doctors in the reputed institution cannot be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. The date of experience of adverse effects on a subsequent date of administration, alone can be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. On the basis of the averment in para 6 of Ext. P1 the 1st respondent experienced a new foreign body sensation on 14.1.2000 and the pathology-report was suggestive, according to him, of a new tumour. Therefore, that shall be me date of knowledge of the difficulty experienced by him, which according to him was because of the alleged administration of the medicine-chemical. So, counting the period of one year from 14.1.2000, it cannot be taken that Ext. P1 is beyond the period of limitation. Therefore, Ext. P4 can be sustained on the aforesaid reasoning. But whether the formation of the new tumour is because of the administration of G4N and M4N or because of the delayed surgery is a matter to be strictly proved by the 1st respondent while prosecuting Ext. P1 claim. Original Petition is closed as above.<p>',
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4. It is worthwhile to refer the decision in (AIR 1961 SC 1500) Harish Chandra v. Deputy L.A. Officer in connection with the period of limitation provided in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It was held that the period of limitation in the statute shall be construed from the date of knowledge of the order of the administrative authority concerned.. Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act provided a period of limitation of six weeks from the date of Collector's award to seek reference to the Civil Court, The Apex Court held as follows:

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Regional Cancer Centre Vs Gopalan - Citation 729830 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51674/protection-of-human-rights-act-1993-complete-act">Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993</a> - Sections 36(2)',
			'appealno' => 'O.P. No. 10174 of 2002',
			'appellant' => 'Regional Cancer Centre',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Regional Cancer Centre Vs. Gopalan',
			'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.         ',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'counselplain' => ' N.N. Sugunapalan, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' P.S. Sreedharan Pillai,; S. Sreekumar,; M.A. Firoz,;',
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			'judge' => ' K.A. Abdul Gafoor, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.A. Abdul Gafoor, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Challenge is against Ext. P4 order passed by the Kerala State Human Rights Commission. The first respondent filed Ext. P1 petition before the said Commission alleging human rights violation consequently on an alleged act by the petitioners herein, during his treatment at the hospital of the 1st petitioner. The 2nd petitioner is the Director of the hospital. The petitioners objected on the grounds of limitation. Section 36(2) the <a href="/act/51674/protection-of-human-rights-act-1993-complete-act">Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993</a> provides that 'State Commission shall not enquire into any matter after expiry of one year from the date on which the act constituting violation of human rights alleged to have been committed'. Therefore, Ext. P1 petition was filed belatedly beyond the said period from the date of alleged-human rights violation namely, administration of certain chemicals on 13.1.2000, 14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000. Even according to the 1st respondent on 13.1.2000,14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000 he was given M4N and G4N injections and on 18.1.2000 he was subjected to asurgery. Ext. P1 petition was filed on 1.8.2001. This is beyond the period provided for objection in Section 36(2), the petitioners submits. But this contention was tried as preliminary issue was overruled in Ext. P4, finding that the effect of 'Act' may still continue and in such circumstances by no stretch of reasoning it can be said that the petition was barred by limitation under Section 36(2). This finding was entered into relying on Page No. 36 of the Law Laxicon edited by Y.V. Chandrachood, Former Chief Justice of India.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Assailing Ext. P1 it is contended by the petitioners that period of limitation prescribed in the said statute is to be strictly construed. The court cannot stretch the period of limitation beyond the period made mentioned of in the statute concerned. The decisions, in (AIR 1999 SC 3101) Lachhman Das Arora v. Ganeshi Led and others and (AIR 1999 SC 1351) Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. & another have been cited in support of this contention. As held in the former case 'the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party, but it has to be applied with all its vigour when the statute so prescribes. The court cannot extend the period of limitation on equitable ground more particular in the matter of filing of election petitions under the Act.' This was on a question of limitation in terms of Representation of Peoples' Act. The period of limitation prescribed in this case is also in terms of special statute namely Protection of Human Rights Act. Dealing with converse situation in the latter case, the Supreme Court held that when the statute does not prescribe any period of limitation the court cannot throw out a petition on the ground of limitation. Going by the pleadings contained in Ext. P1 and the dates of administration of the alleged chemical or medicines as the case may be, during January 2000, the petition was filed beyond the period of limitation of one year provided in Section 36(2). Ext. P1 was filed only on 1.8.2001. Applying strict rule of limitation contained in Section 36(2) of the Act, Ext. P1 petition ought to have been dismissed upholding the preliminary objection rather than rejecting it as per Ext. P4.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. It is contended by the 1st respondent that the administration of medicine was in January 2000 as averred in Para 5 of Ext. P1 petition. The medicine had been consumed by him bonafide believing that it had been prescribed by the doctor to cure his ailment. This cannot be taken as the dates for the purpose of limitation. No symptoms were noticed by mere administration of the medicine on the said dates. Symptoms arose when adverse reactions were noticed. According to him as averred in para 6 of the Ext. P1. he experienced foreign body sensation in throat on 14.1.2000 and thereafter he was subjected to laryngoscopy and biopsy and the result disclosed that a further tumour had developed. According to him it was developed after injuctingthese chemicals as averred in para 6 of Ext. P1. New tumour was noticed after14.1.2000, It developed because of administration of the medicine, he submits. Ofcourse that is a matter which shall be left to be strictly proved by him. There is clearallegation that he experienced alleged adverse effect of administration of the medicine,on 14.1.2000. That is the date of knowledge, so far as he is concerned, about theadversity he is alleged to be suffering. Therefore, that shall be taken as the startingperiod of limitation, the 1st respondent submits.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is worthwhile to refer the decision in (AIR 1961 SC 1500) Harish Chandra v. Deputy L.A. Officer in connection with the period of limitation provided in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It was held that the period of limitation in the statute shall be construed from the date of knowledge of the order of the administrative authority concerned.. Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act provided a period of limitation of six weeks from the date of Collector's award to seek reference to the Civil Court, The Apex Court held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The knowledge of the party affected by the award either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice the expression 'the date of the award' used in the proviso must mean that date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructing. In our opinion, therefore, it would be unreasonable to construe the words 'from the date of Collector's award' used in the proviso to Section 18 in a literal or mechanical way.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The date of knowledge is taken as relevant criterion to count the period of limitation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. In this case also mere administration of medicine, allegedly chemical, on the 1st respondent, prescribed by competent doctors in the reputed institution cannot be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. The date of experience of adverse effects on a subsequent date of administration, alone can be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. On the basis of the averment in para 6 of Ext. P1 the 1st respondent experienced a new foreign body sensation on 14.1.2000 and the pathology-report was suggestive, according to him, of a new tumour. Therefore, that shall be me date of knowledge of the difficulty experienced by him, which according to him was because of the alleged administration of the medicine-chemical. So, counting the period of one year from 14.1.2000, it cannot be taken that Ext. P1 is beyond the period of limitation. Therefore, Ext. P4 can be sustained on the aforesaid reasoning. But whether the formation of the new tumour is because of the administration of G4N and M4N or because of the delayed surgery is a matter to be strictly proved by the 1st respondent while prosecuting Ext. P1 claim. Original Petition is closed as above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'judgement' => '<p>K.A. Abdul Gafoor, J. </p><p>1. Challenge is against Ext. P4 order passed by the Kerala State Human Rights Commission. The first respondent filed Ext. P1 petition before the said Commission alleging human rights violation consequently on an alleged act by the petitioners herein, during his treatment at the hospital of the 1st petitioner. The 2nd petitioner is the Director of the hospital. The petitioners objected on the grounds of limitation. Section 36(2) the <a>Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993</a> provides that 'State Commission shall not enquire into any matter after expiry of one year from the date on which the act constituting violation of human rights alleged to have been committed'. Therefore, Ext. P1 petition was filed belatedly beyond the said period from the date of alleged-human rights violation namely, administration of certain chemicals on 13.1.2000, 14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000. Even according to the 1st respondent on 13.1.2000,14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000 he was given M4N and G4N injections and on 18.1.2000 he was subjected to asurgery. Ext. P1 petition was filed on 1.8.2001. This is beyond the period provided for objection in Section 36(2), the petitioners submits. But this contention was tried as preliminary issue was overruled in Ext. P4, finding that the effect of 'Act' may still continue and in such circumstances by no stretch of reasoning it can be said that the petition was barred by limitation under Section 36(2). This finding was entered into relying on Page No. 36 of the Law Laxicon edited by Y.V. Chandrachood, Former Chief Justice of India.</p><p>2. Assailing Ext. P1 it is contended by the petitioners that period of limitation prescribed in the said statute is to be strictly construed. The court cannot stretch the period of limitation beyond the period made mentioned of in the statute concerned. The decisions, in (AIR 1999 SC 3101) Lachhman Das Arora v. Ganeshi Led and others and (AIR 1999 SC 1351) Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. & another have been cited in support of this contention. As held in the former case 'the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party, but it has to be applied with all its vigour when the statute so prescribes. The court cannot extend the period of limitation on equitable ground more particular in the matter of filing of election petitions under the Act.' This was on a question of limitation in terms of Representation of Peoples' Act. The period of limitation prescribed in this case is also in terms of special statute namely Protection of Human Rights Act. Dealing with converse situation in the latter case, the Supreme Court held that when the statute does not prescribe any period of limitation the court cannot throw out a petition on the ground of limitation. Going by the pleadings contained in Ext. P1 and the dates of administration of the alleged chemical or medicines as the case may be, during January 2000, the petition was filed beyond the period of limitation of one year provided in Section 36(2). Ext. P1 was filed only on 1.8.2001. Applying strict rule of limitation contained in Section 36(2) of the Act, Ext. P1 petition ought to have been dismissed upholding the preliminary objection rather than rejecting it as per Ext. P4.</p><p>3. It is contended by the 1st respondent that the administration of medicine was in January 2000 as averred in Para 5 of Ext. P1 petition. The medicine had been consumed by him bonafide believing that it had been prescribed by the doctor to cure his ailment. This cannot be taken as the dates for the purpose of limitation. No symptoms were noticed by mere administration of the medicine on the said dates. Symptoms arose when adverse reactions were noticed. According to him as averred in para 6 of the Ext. P1. he experienced foreign body sensation in throat on 14.1.2000 and thereafter he was subjected to laryngoscopy and biopsy and the result disclosed that a further tumour had developed. According to him it was developed after injuctingthese chemicals as averred in para 6 of Ext. P1. New tumour was noticed after14.1.2000, It developed because of administration of the medicine, he submits. Ofcourse that is a matter which shall be left to be strictly proved by him. There is clearallegation that he experienced alleged adverse effect of administration of the medicine,on 14.1.2000. That is the date of knowledge, so far as he is concerned, about theadversity he is alleged to be suffering. Therefore, that shall be taken as the startingperiod of limitation, the 1st respondent submits.</p><p>4. It is worthwhile to refer the decision in (AIR 1961 SC 1500) Harish Chandra v. Deputy L.A. Officer in connection with the period of limitation provided in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It was held that the period of limitation in the statute shall be construed from the date of knowledge of the order of the administrative authority concerned.. Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act provided a period of limitation of six weeks from the date of Collector's award to seek reference to the Civil Court, The Apex Court held as follows:</p><p>'The knowledge of the party affected by the award either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice the expression 'the date of the award' used in the proviso must mean that date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructing. In our opinion, therefore, it would be unreasonable to construe the words 'from the date of Collector's award' used in the proviso to Section 18 in a literal or mechanical way.'</p><p>The date of knowledge is taken as relevant criterion to count the period of limitation.</p><p>5. In this case also mere administration of medicine, allegedly chemical, on the 1st respondent, prescribed by competent doctors in the reputed institution cannot be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. The date of experience of adverse effects on a subsequent date of administration, alone can be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. On the basis of the averment in para 6 of Ext. P1 the 1st respondent experienced a new foreign body sensation on 14.1.2000 and the pathology-report was suggestive, according to him, of a new tumour. Therefore, that shall be me date of knowledge of the difficulty experienced by him, which according to him was because of the alleged administration of the medicine-chemical. So, counting the period of one year from 14.1.2000, it cannot be taken that Ext. P1 is beyond the period of limitation. Therefore, Ext. P4 can be sustained on the aforesaid reasoning. But whether the formation of the new tumour is because of the administration of G4N and M4N or because of the delayed surgery is a matter to be strictly proved by the 1st respondent while prosecuting Ext. P1 claim. Original Petition is closed as above.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Challenge is against Ext. P4 order passed by the Kerala State Human Rights Commission. The first respondent filed Ext. P1 petition before the said Commission alleging human rights violation consequently on an alleged act by the petitioners herein, during his treatment at the hospital of the 1st petitioner. The 2nd petitioner is the Director of the hospital. The petitioners objected on the grounds of limitation. Section 36(2) the <a>Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993</a> provides that 'State Commission shall not enquire into any matter after expiry of one year from the date on which the act constituting violation of human rights alleged to have been committed'. Therefore, Ext. P1 petition was filed belatedly beyond the said period from the date of alleged-human rights violation namely, administration of certain chemicals on 13.1.2000, 14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000. Even according to the 1st respondent on 13.1.2000,14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000 he was given M4N and G4N injections and on 18.1.2000 he was subjected to asurgery. Ext. P1 petition was filed on 1.8.2001. This is beyond the period provided for objection in Section 36(2), the petitioners submits. But this contention was tried as preliminary issue was overruled in Ext. P4, finding that the effect of 'Act' may still continue and in such circumstances by no stretch of reasoning it can be said that the petition was barred by limitation under Section 36(2). This finding was entered into relying on Page No. 36 of the Law Laxicon edited by Y.V. Chandrachood, Former Chief Justice of India.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Assailing Ext. P1 it is contended by the petitioners that period of limitation prescribed in the said statute is to be strictly construed. The court cannot stretch the period of limitation beyond the period made mentioned of in the statute concerned. The decisions, in (AIR 1999 SC 3101) Lachhman Das Arora v. Ganeshi Led and others and (AIR 1999 SC 1351) Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. & another have been cited in support of this contention. As held in the former case 'the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party, but it has to be applied with all its vigour when the statute so prescribes. The court cannot extend the period of limitation on equitable ground more particular in the matter of filing of election petitions under the Act.' This was on a question of limitation in terms of Representation of Peoples' Act. The period of limitation prescribed in this case is also in terms of special statute namely Protection of Human Rights Act. Dealing with converse situation in the latter case, the Supreme Court held that when the statute does not prescribe any period of limitation the court cannot throw out a petition on the ground of limitation. Going by the pleadings contained in Ext. P1 and the dates of administration of the alleged chemical or medicines as the case may be, during January 2000, the petition was filed beyond the period of limitation of one year provided in Section 36(2). Ext. P1 was filed only on 1.8.2001. Applying strict rule of limitation contained in Section 36(2) of the Act, Ext. P1 petition ought to have been dismissed upholding the preliminary objection rather than rejecting it as per Ext. P4.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. It is contended by the 1st respondent that the administration of medicine was in January 2000 as averred in Para 5 of Ext. P1 petition. The medicine had been consumed by him bonafide believing that it had been prescribed by the doctor to cure his ailment. This cannot be taken as the dates for the purpose of limitation. No symptoms were noticed by mere administration of the medicine on the said dates. Symptoms arose when adverse reactions were noticed. According to him as averred in para 6 of the Ext. P1. he experienced foreign body sensation in throat on 14.1.2000 and thereafter he was subjected to laryngoscopy and biopsy and the result disclosed that a further tumour had developed. According to him it was developed after injuctingthese chemicals as averred in para 6 of Ext. P1. New tumour was noticed after14.1.2000, It developed because of administration of the medicine, he submits. Ofcourse that is a matter which shall be left to be strictly proved by him. There is clearallegation that he experienced alleged adverse effect of administration of the medicine,on 14.1.2000. That is the date of knowledge, so far as he is concerned, about theadversity he is alleged to be suffering. Therefore, that shall be taken as the startingperiod of limitation, the 1st respondent submits.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. It is worthwhile to refer the decision in (AIR 1961 SC 1500) Harish Chandra v. Deputy L.A. Officer in connection with the period of limitation provided in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It was held that the period of limitation in the statute shall be construed from the date of knowledge of the order of the administrative authority concerned.. Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act provided a period of limitation of six weeks from the date of Collector's award to seek reference to the Civil Court, The Apex Court held as follows:',
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	(int) 6 => '<p>The date of knowledge is taken as relevant criterion to count the period of limitation.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. In this case also mere administration of medicine, allegedly chemical, on the 1st respondent, prescribed by competent doctors in the reputed institution cannot be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. The date of experience of adverse effects on a subsequent date of administration, alone can be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. On the basis of the averment in para 6 of Ext. P1 the 1st respondent experienced a new foreign body sensation on 14.1.2000 and the pathology-report was suggestive, according to him, of a new tumour. Therefore, that shall be me date of knowledge of the difficulty experienced by him, which according to him was because of the alleged administration of the medicine-chemical. So, counting the period of one year from 14.1.2000, it cannot be taken that Ext. P1 is beyond the period of limitation. Therefore, Ext. P4 can be sustained on the aforesaid reasoning. But whether the formation of the new tumour is because of the administration of G4N and M4N or because of the delayed surgery is a matter to be strictly proved by the 1st respondent while prosecuting Ext. P1 claim. Original Petition is closed as above.<p>',
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'The knowledge of the party affected by the award either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice the expression 'the date of the award' used in the proviso must mean that date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructing. In our opinion, therefore, it would be unreasonable to construe the words 'from the date of Collector's award' used in the proviso to Section 18 in a literal or mechanical way.'

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			'judge' => ' K.A. Abdul Gafoor, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.A. Abdul Gafoor, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Challenge is against Ext. P4 order passed by the Kerala State Human Rights Commission. The first respondent filed Ext. P1 petition before the said Commission alleging human rights violation consequently on an alleged act by the petitioners herein, during his treatment at the hospital of the 1st petitioner. The 2nd petitioner is the Director of the hospital. The petitioners objected on the grounds of limitation. Section 36(2) the <a href="/act/51674/protection-of-human-rights-act-1993-complete-act">Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993</a> provides that 'State Commission shall not enquire into any matter after expiry of one year from the date on which the act constituting violation of human rights alleged to have been committed'. Therefore, Ext. P1 petition was filed belatedly beyond the said period from the date of alleged-human rights violation namely, administration of certain chemicals on 13.1.2000, 14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000. Even according to the 1st respondent on 13.1.2000,14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000 he was given M4N and G4N injections and on 18.1.2000 he was subjected to asurgery. Ext. P1 petition was filed on 1.8.2001. This is beyond the period provided for objection in Section 36(2), the petitioners submits. But this contention was tried as preliminary issue was overruled in Ext. P4, finding that the effect of 'Act' may still continue and in such circumstances by no stretch of reasoning it can be said that the petition was barred by limitation under Section 36(2). This finding was entered into relying on Page No. 36 of the Law Laxicon edited by Y.V. Chandrachood, Former Chief Justice of India.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Assailing Ext. P1 it is contended by the petitioners that period of limitation prescribed in the said statute is to be strictly construed. The court cannot stretch the period of limitation beyond the period made mentioned of in the statute concerned. The decisions, in (AIR 1999 SC 3101) Lachhman Das Arora v. Ganeshi Led and others and (AIR 1999 SC 1351) Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. & another have been cited in support of this contention. As held in the former case 'the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party, but it has to be applied with all its vigour when the statute so prescribes. The court cannot extend the period of limitation on equitable ground more particular in the matter of filing of election petitions under the Act.' This was on a question of limitation in terms of Representation of Peoples' Act. The period of limitation prescribed in this case is also in terms of special statute namely Protection of Human Rights Act. Dealing with converse situation in the latter case, the Supreme Court held that when the statute does not prescribe any period of limitation the court cannot throw out a petition on the ground of limitation. Going by the pleadings contained in Ext. P1 and the dates of administration of the alleged chemical or medicines as the case may be, during January 2000, the petition was filed beyond the period of limitation of one year provided in Section 36(2). Ext. P1 was filed only on 1.8.2001. Applying strict rule of limitation contained in Section 36(2) of the Act, Ext. P1 petition ought to have been dismissed upholding the preliminary objection rather than rejecting it as per Ext. P4.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. It is contended by the 1st respondent that the administration of medicine was in January 2000 as averred in Para 5 of Ext. P1 petition. The medicine had been consumed by him bonafide believing that it had been prescribed by the doctor to cure his ailment. This cannot be taken as the dates for the purpose of limitation. No symptoms were noticed by mere administration of the medicine on the said dates. Symptoms arose when adverse reactions were noticed. According to him as averred in para 6 of the Ext. P1. he experienced foreign body sensation in throat on 14.1.2000 and thereafter he was subjected to laryngoscopy and biopsy and the result disclosed that a further tumour had developed. According to him it was developed after injuctingthese chemicals as averred in para 6 of Ext. P1. New tumour was noticed after14.1.2000, It developed because of administration of the medicine, he submits. Ofcourse that is a matter which shall be left to be strictly proved by him. There is clearallegation that he experienced alleged adverse effect of administration of the medicine,on 14.1.2000. That is the date of knowledge, so far as he is concerned, about theadversity he is alleged to be suffering. Therefore, that shall be taken as the startingperiod of limitation, the 1st respondent submits.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is worthwhile to refer the decision in (AIR 1961 SC 1500) Harish Chandra v. Deputy L.A. Officer in connection with the period of limitation provided in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It was held that the period of limitation in the statute shall be construed from the date of knowledge of the order of the administrative authority concerned.. Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act provided a period of limitation of six weeks from the date of Collector's award to seek reference to the Civil Court, The Apex Court held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The knowledge of the party affected by the award either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice the expression 'the date of the award' used in the proviso must mean that date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructing. In our opinion, therefore, it would be unreasonable to construe the words 'from the date of Collector's award' used in the proviso to Section 18 in a literal or mechanical way.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The date of knowledge is taken as relevant criterion to count the period of limitation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. In this case also mere administration of medicine, allegedly chemical, on the 1st respondent, prescribed by competent doctors in the reputed institution cannot be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. The date of experience of adverse effects on a subsequent date of administration, alone can be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. On the basis of the averment in para 6 of Ext. P1 the 1st respondent experienced a new foreign body sensation on 14.1.2000 and the pathology-report was suggestive, according to him, of a new tumour. Therefore, that shall be me date of knowledge of the difficulty experienced by him, which according to him was because of the alleged administration of the medicine-chemical. So, counting the period of one year from 14.1.2000, it cannot be taken that Ext. P1 is beyond the period of limitation. Therefore, Ext. P4 can be sustained on the aforesaid reasoning. But whether the formation of the new tumour is because of the administration of G4N and M4N or because of the delayed surgery is a matter to be strictly proved by the 1st respondent while prosecuting Ext. P1 claim. Original Petition is closed as above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'appealno' => 'O.P. No. 10174 of 2002',
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		'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.         ',
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		'casesref' => 'Harish Chandra v. Deputy L.A. Officer;',
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		'counselplain' => ' N.N. Sugunapalan, Adv.',
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		'judgement' => '<p>K.A. Abdul Gafoor, J. </p><p>1. Challenge is against Ext. P4 order passed by the Kerala State Human Rights Commission. The first respondent filed Ext. P1 petition before the said Commission alleging human rights violation consequently on an alleged act by the petitioners herein, during his treatment at the hospital of the 1st petitioner. The 2nd petitioner is the Director of the hospital. The petitioners objected on the grounds of limitation. Section 36(2) the <a>Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993</a> provides that 'State Commission shall not enquire into any matter after expiry of one year from the date on which the act constituting violation of human rights alleged to have been committed'. Therefore, Ext. P1 petition was filed belatedly beyond the said period from the date of alleged-human rights violation namely, administration of certain chemicals on 13.1.2000, 14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000. Even according to the 1st respondent on 13.1.2000,14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000 he was given M4N and G4N injections and on 18.1.2000 he was subjected to asurgery. Ext. P1 petition was filed on 1.8.2001. This is beyond the period provided for objection in Section 36(2), the petitioners submits. But this contention was tried as preliminary issue was overruled in Ext. P4, finding that the effect of 'Act' may still continue and in such circumstances by no stretch of reasoning it can be said that the petition was barred by limitation under Section 36(2). This finding was entered into relying on Page No. 36 of the Law Laxicon edited by Y.V. Chandrachood, Former Chief Justice of India.</p><p>2. Assailing Ext. P1 it is contended by the petitioners that period of limitation prescribed in the said statute is to be strictly construed. The court cannot stretch the period of limitation beyond the period made mentioned of in the statute concerned. The decisions, in (AIR 1999 SC 3101) Lachhman Das Arora v. Ganeshi Led and others and (AIR 1999 SC 1351) Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. & another have been cited in support of this contention. As held in the former case 'the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party, but it has to be applied with all its vigour when the statute so prescribes. The court cannot extend the period of limitation on equitable ground more particular in the matter of filing of election petitions under the Act.' This was on a question of limitation in terms of Representation of Peoples' Act. The period of limitation prescribed in this case is also in terms of special statute namely Protection of Human Rights Act. Dealing with converse situation in the latter case, the Supreme Court held that when the statute does not prescribe any period of limitation the court cannot throw out a petition on the ground of limitation. Going by the pleadings contained in Ext. P1 and the dates of administration of the alleged chemical or medicines as the case may be, during January 2000, the petition was filed beyond the period of limitation of one year provided in Section 36(2). Ext. P1 was filed only on 1.8.2001. Applying strict rule of limitation contained in Section 36(2) of the Act, Ext. P1 petition ought to have been dismissed upholding the preliminary objection rather than rejecting it as per Ext. P4.</p><p>3. It is contended by the 1st respondent that the administration of medicine was in January 2000 as averred in Para 5 of Ext. P1 petition. The medicine had been consumed by him bonafide believing that it had been prescribed by the doctor to cure his ailment. This cannot be taken as the dates for the purpose of limitation. No symptoms were noticed by mere administration of the medicine on the said dates. Symptoms arose when adverse reactions were noticed. According to him as averred in para 6 of the Ext. P1. he experienced foreign body sensation in throat on 14.1.2000 and thereafter he was subjected to laryngoscopy and biopsy and the result disclosed that a further tumour had developed. According to him it was developed after injuctingthese chemicals as averred in para 6 of Ext. P1. New tumour was noticed after14.1.2000, It developed because of administration of the medicine, he submits. Ofcourse that is a matter which shall be left to be strictly proved by him. There is clearallegation that he experienced alleged adverse effect of administration of the medicine,on 14.1.2000. That is the date of knowledge, so far as he is concerned, about theadversity he is alleged to be suffering. Therefore, that shall be taken as the startingperiod of limitation, the 1st respondent submits.</p><p>4. It is worthwhile to refer the decision in (AIR 1961 SC 1500) Harish Chandra v. Deputy L.A. Officer in connection with the period of limitation provided in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It was held that the period of limitation in the statute shall be construed from the date of knowledge of the order of the administrative authority concerned.. Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act provided a period of limitation of six weeks from the date of Collector's award to seek reference to the Civil Court, The Apex Court held as follows:</p><p>'The knowledge of the party affected by the award either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice the expression 'the date of the award' used in the proviso must mean that date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructing. In our opinion, therefore, it would be unreasonable to construe the words 'from the date of Collector's award' used in the proviso to Section 18 in a literal or mechanical way.'</p><p>The date of knowledge is taken as relevant criterion to count the period of limitation.</p><p>5. In this case also mere administration of medicine, allegedly chemical, on the 1st respondent, prescribed by competent doctors in the reputed institution cannot be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. The date of experience of adverse effects on a subsequent date of administration, alone can be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. On the basis of the averment in para 6 of Ext. P1 the 1st respondent experienced a new foreign body sensation on 14.1.2000 and the pathology-report was suggestive, according to him, of a new tumour. Therefore, that shall be me date of knowledge of the difficulty experienced by him, which according to him was because of the alleged administration of the medicine-chemical. So, counting the period of one year from 14.1.2000, it cannot be taken that Ext. P1 is beyond the period of limitation. Therefore, Ext. P4 can be sustained on the aforesaid reasoning. But whether the formation of the new tumour is because of the administration of G4N and M4N or because of the delayed surgery is a matter to be strictly proved by the 1st respondent while prosecuting Ext. P1 claim. Original Petition is closed as above.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Challenge is against Ext. P4 order passed by the Kerala State Human Rights Commission. The first respondent filed Ext. P1 petition before the said Commission alleging human rights violation consequently on an alleged act by the petitioners herein, during his treatment at the hospital of the 1st petitioner. The 2nd petitioner is the Director of the hospital. The petitioners objected on the grounds of limitation. Section 36(2) the <a>Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993</a> provides that 'State Commission shall not enquire into any matter after expiry of one year from the date on which the act constituting violation of human rights alleged to have been committed'. Therefore, Ext. P1 petition was filed belatedly beyond the said period from the date of alleged-human rights violation namely, administration of certain chemicals on 13.1.2000, 14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000. Even according to the 1st respondent on 13.1.2000,14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000 he was given M4N and G4N injections and on 18.1.2000 he was subjected to asurgery. Ext. P1 petition was filed on 1.8.2001. This is beyond the period provided for objection in Section 36(2), the petitioners submits. But this contention was tried as preliminary issue was overruled in Ext. P4, finding that the effect of 'Act' may still continue and in such circumstances by no stretch of reasoning it can be said that the petition was barred by limitation under Section 36(2). This finding was entered into relying on Page No. 36 of the Law Laxicon edited by Y.V. Chandrachood, Former Chief Justice of India.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Assailing Ext. P1 it is contended by the petitioners that period of limitation prescribed in the said statute is to be strictly construed. The court cannot stretch the period of limitation beyond the period made mentioned of in the statute concerned. The decisions, in (AIR 1999 SC 3101) Lachhman Das Arora v. Ganeshi Led and others and (AIR 1999 SC 1351) Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. & another have been cited in support of this contention. As held in the former case 'the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party, but it has to be applied with all its vigour when the statute so prescribes. The court cannot extend the period of limitation on equitable ground more particular in the matter of filing of election petitions under the Act.' This was on a question of limitation in terms of Representation of Peoples' Act. The period of limitation prescribed in this case is also in terms of special statute namely Protection of Human Rights Act. Dealing with converse situation in the latter case, the Supreme Court held that when the statute does not prescribe any period of limitation the court cannot throw out a petition on the ground of limitation. Going by the pleadings contained in Ext. P1 and the dates of administration of the alleged chemical or medicines as the case may be, during January 2000, the petition was filed beyond the period of limitation of one year provided in Section 36(2). Ext. P1 was filed only on 1.8.2001. Applying strict rule of limitation contained in Section 36(2) of the Act, Ext. P1 petition ought to have been dismissed upholding the preliminary objection rather than rejecting it as per Ext. P4.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. It is contended by the 1st respondent that the administration of medicine was in January 2000 as averred in Para 5 of Ext. P1 petition. The medicine had been consumed by him bonafide believing that it had been prescribed by the doctor to cure his ailment. This cannot be taken as the dates for the purpose of limitation. No symptoms were noticed by mere administration of the medicine on the said dates. Symptoms arose when adverse reactions were noticed. According to him as averred in para 6 of the Ext. P1. he experienced foreign body sensation in throat on 14.1.2000 and thereafter he was subjected to laryngoscopy and biopsy and the result disclosed that a further tumour had developed. According to him it was developed after injuctingthese chemicals as averred in para 6 of Ext. P1. New tumour was noticed after14.1.2000, It developed because of administration of the medicine, he submits. Ofcourse that is a matter which shall be left to be strictly proved by him. There is clearallegation that he experienced alleged adverse effect of administration of the medicine,on 14.1.2000. That is the date of knowledge, so far as he is concerned, about theadversity he is alleged to be suffering. Therefore, that shall be taken as the startingperiod of limitation, the 1st respondent submits.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. It is worthwhile to refer the decision in (AIR 1961 SC 1500) Harish Chandra v. Deputy L.A. Officer in connection with the period of limitation provided in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It was held that the period of limitation in the statute shall be construed from the date of knowledge of the order of the administrative authority concerned.. Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act provided a period of limitation of six weeks from the date of Collector's award to seek reference to the Civil Court, The Apex Court held as follows:',
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	(int) 6 => '<p>The date of knowledge is taken as relevant criterion to count the period of limitation.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. In this case also mere administration of medicine, allegedly chemical, on the 1st respondent, prescribed by competent doctors in the reputed institution cannot be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. The date of experience of adverse effects on a subsequent date of administration, alone can be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. On the basis of the averment in para 6 of Ext. P1 the 1st respondent experienced a new foreign body sensation on 14.1.2000 and the pathology-report was suggestive, according to him, of a new tumour. Therefore, that shall be me date of knowledge of the difficulty experienced by him, which according to him was because of the alleged administration of the medicine-chemical. So, counting the period of one year from 14.1.2000, it cannot be taken that Ext. P1 is beyond the period of limitation. Therefore, Ext. P4 can be sustained on the aforesaid reasoning. But whether the formation of the new tumour is because of the administration of G4N and M4N or because of the delayed surgery is a matter to be strictly proved by the 1st respondent while prosecuting Ext. P1 claim. Original Petition is closed as above.<p>',
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			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51674/protection-of-human-rights-act-1993-complete-act">Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993</a> - Sections 36(2)',
			'appealno' => 'O.P. No. 10174 of 2002',
			'appellant' => 'Regional Cancer Centre',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Regional Cancer Centre Vs. Gopalan',
			'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.         ',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Harish Chandra v. Deputy L.A. Officer;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' N.N. Sugunapalan, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' P.S. Sreedharan Pillai,; S. Sreekumar,; M.A. Firoz,;',
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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.A. Abdul Gafoor, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Challenge is against Ext. P4 order passed by the Kerala State Human Rights Commission. The first respondent filed Ext. P1 petition before the said Commission alleging human rights violation consequently on an alleged act by the petitioners herein, during his treatment at the hospital of the 1st petitioner. The 2nd petitioner is the Director of the hospital. The petitioners objected on the grounds of limitation. Section 36(2) the <a href="/act/51674/protection-of-human-rights-act-1993-complete-act">Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993</a> provides that 'State Commission shall not enquire into any matter after expiry of one year from the date on which the act constituting violation of human rights alleged to have been committed'. Therefore, Ext. P1 petition was filed belatedly beyond the said period from the date of alleged-human rights violation namely, administration of certain chemicals on 13.1.2000, 14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000. Even according to the 1st respondent on 13.1.2000,14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000 he was given M4N and G4N injections and on 18.1.2000 he was subjected to asurgery. Ext. P1 petition was filed on 1.8.2001. This is beyond the period provided for objection in Section 36(2), the petitioners submits. But this contention was tried as preliminary issue was overruled in Ext. P4, finding that the effect of 'Act' may still continue and in such circumstances by no stretch of reasoning it can be said that the petition was barred by limitation under Section 36(2). This finding was entered into relying on Page No. 36 of the Law Laxicon edited by Y.V. Chandrachood, Former Chief Justice of India.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Assailing Ext. P1 it is contended by the petitioners that period of limitation prescribed in the said statute is to be strictly construed. The court cannot stretch the period of limitation beyond the period made mentioned of in the statute concerned. The decisions, in (AIR 1999 SC 3101) Lachhman Das Arora v. Ganeshi Led and others and (AIR 1999 SC 1351) Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. & another have been cited in support of this contention. As held in the former case 'the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party, but it has to be applied with all its vigour when the statute so prescribes. The court cannot extend the period of limitation on equitable ground more particular in the matter of filing of election petitions under the Act.' This was on a question of limitation in terms of Representation of Peoples' Act. The period of limitation prescribed in this case is also in terms of special statute namely Protection of Human Rights Act. Dealing with converse situation in the latter case, the Supreme Court held that when the statute does not prescribe any period of limitation the court cannot throw out a petition on the ground of limitation. Going by the pleadings contained in Ext. P1 and the dates of administration of the alleged chemical or medicines as the case may be, during January 2000, the petition was filed beyond the period of limitation of one year provided in Section 36(2). Ext. P1 was filed only on 1.8.2001. Applying strict rule of limitation contained in Section 36(2) of the Act, Ext. P1 petition ought to have been dismissed upholding the preliminary objection rather than rejecting it as per Ext. P4.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. It is contended by the 1st respondent that the administration of medicine was in January 2000 as averred in Para 5 of Ext. P1 petition. The medicine had been consumed by him bonafide believing that it had been prescribed by the doctor to cure his ailment. This cannot be taken as the dates for the purpose of limitation. No symptoms were noticed by mere administration of the medicine on the said dates. Symptoms arose when adverse reactions were noticed. According to him as averred in para 6 of the Ext. P1. he experienced foreign body sensation in throat on 14.1.2000 and thereafter he was subjected to laryngoscopy and biopsy and the result disclosed that a further tumour had developed. According to him it was developed after injuctingthese chemicals as averred in para 6 of Ext. P1. New tumour was noticed after14.1.2000, It developed because of administration of the medicine, he submits. Ofcourse that is a matter which shall be left to be strictly proved by him. There is clearallegation that he experienced alleged adverse effect of administration of the medicine,on 14.1.2000. That is the date of knowledge, so far as he is concerned, about theadversity he is alleged to be suffering. Therefore, that shall be taken as the startingperiod of limitation, the 1st respondent submits.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is worthwhile to refer the decision in (AIR 1961 SC 1500) Harish Chandra v. Deputy L.A. Officer in connection with the period of limitation provided in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It was held that the period of limitation in the statute shall be construed from the date of knowledge of the order of the administrative authority concerned.. Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act provided a period of limitation of six weeks from the date of Collector's award to seek reference to the Civil Court, The Apex Court held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The knowledge of the party affected by the award either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice the expression 'the date of the award' used in the proviso must mean that date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructing. In our opinion, therefore, it would be unreasonable to construe the words 'from the date of Collector's award' used in the proviso to Section 18 in a literal or mechanical way.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The date of knowledge is taken as relevant criterion to count the period of limitation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. In this case also mere administration of medicine, allegedly chemical, on the 1st respondent, prescribed by competent doctors in the reputed institution cannot be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. The date of experience of adverse effects on a subsequent date of administration, alone can be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. On the basis of the averment in para 6 of Ext. P1 the 1st respondent experienced a new foreign body sensation on 14.1.2000 and the pathology-report was suggestive, according to him, of a new tumour. Therefore, that shall be me date of knowledge of the difficulty experienced by him, which according to him was because of the alleged administration of the medicine-chemical. So, counting the period of one year from 14.1.2000, it cannot be taken that Ext. P1 is beyond the period of limitation. Therefore, Ext. P4 can be sustained on the aforesaid reasoning. But whether the formation of the new tumour is because of the administration of G4N and M4N or because of the delayed surgery is a matter to be strictly proved by the 1st respondent while prosecuting Ext. P1 claim. Original Petition is closed as above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'judgement' => '<p>K.A. Abdul Gafoor, J. </p><p>1. Challenge is against Ext. P4 order passed by the Kerala State Human Rights Commission. The first respondent filed Ext. P1 petition before the said Commission alleging human rights violation consequently on an alleged act by the petitioners herein, during his treatment at the hospital of the 1st petitioner. The 2nd petitioner is the Director of the hospital. The petitioners objected on the grounds of limitation. Section 36(2) the <a>Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993</a> provides that 'State Commission shall not enquire into any matter after expiry of one year from the date on which the act constituting violation of human rights alleged to have been committed'. Therefore, Ext. P1 petition was filed belatedly beyond the said period from the date of alleged-human rights violation namely, administration of certain chemicals on 13.1.2000, 14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000. Even according to the 1st respondent on 13.1.2000,14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000 he was given M4N and G4N injections and on 18.1.2000 he was subjected to asurgery. Ext. P1 petition was filed on 1.8.2001. This is beyond the period provided for objection in Section 36(2), the petitioners submits. But this contention was tried as preliminary issue was overruled in Ext. P4, finding that the effect of 'Act' may still continue and in such circumstances by no stretch of reasoning it can be said that the petition was barred by limitation under Section 36(2). This finding was entered into relying on Page No. 36 of the Law Laxicon edited by Y.V. Chandrachood, Former Chief Justice of India.</p><p>2. Assailing Ext. P1 it is contended by the petitioners that period of limitation prescribed in the said statute is to be strictly construed. The court cannot stretch the period of limitation beyond the period made mentioned of in the statute concerned. The decisions, in (AIR 1999 SC 3101) Lachhman Das Arora v. Ganeshi Led and others and (AIR 1999 SC 1351) Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. & another have been cited in support of this contention. As held in the former case 'the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party, but it has to be applied with all its vigour when the statute so prescribes. The court cannot extend the period of limitation on equitable ground more particular in the matter of filing of election petitions under the Act.' This was on a question of limitation in terms of Representation of Peoples' Act. The period of limitation prescribed in this case is also in terms of special statute namely Protection of Human Rights Act. Dealing with converse situation in the latter case, the Supreme Court held that when the statute does not prescribe any period of limitation the court cannot throw out a petition on the ground of limitation. Going by the pleadings contained in Ext. P1 and the dates of administration of the alleged chemical or medicines as the case may be, during January 2000, the petition was filed beyond the period of limitation of one year provided in Section 36(2). Ext. P1 was filed only on 1.8.2001. Applying strict rule of limitation contained in Section 36(2) of the Act, Ext. P1 petition ought to have been dismissed upholding the preliminary objection rather than rejecting it as per Ext. P4.</p><p>3. It is contended by the 1st respondent that the administration of medicine was in January 2000 as averred in Para 5 of Ext. P1 petition. The medicine had been consumed by him bonafide believing that it had been prescribed by the doctor to cure his ailment. This cannot be taken as the dates for the purpose of limitation. No symptoms were noticed by mere administration of the medicine on the said dates. Symptoms arose when adverse reactions were noticed. According to him as averred in para 6 of the Ext. P1. he experienced foreign body sensation in throat on 14.1.2000 and thereafter he was subjected to laryngoscopy and biopsy and the result disclosed that a further tumour had developed. According to him it was developed after injuctingthese chemicals as averred in para 6 of Ext. P1. New tumour was noticed after14.1.2000, It developed because of administration of the medicine, he submits. Ofcourse that is a matter which shall be left to be strictly proved by him. There is clearallegation that he experienced alleged adverse effect of administration of the medicine,on 14.1.2000. That is the date of knowledge, so far as he is concerned, about theadversity he is alleged to be suffering. Therefore, that shall be taken as the startingperiod of limitation, the 1st respondent submits.</p><p>4. It is worthwhile to refer the decision in (AIR 1961 SC 1500) Harish Chandra v. Deputy L.A. Officer in connection with the period of limitation provided in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It was held that the period of limitation in the statute shall be construed from the date of knowledge of the order of the administrative authority concerned.. Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act provided a period of limitation of six weeks from the date of Collector's award to seek reference to the Civil Court, The Apex Court held as follows:</p><p>'The knowledge of the party affected by the award either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice the expression 'the date of the award' used in the proviso must mean that date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructing. In our opinion, therefore, it would be unreasonable to construe the words 'from the date of Collector's award' used in the proviso to Section 18 in a literal or mechanical way.'</p><p>The date of knowledge is taken as relevant criterion to count the period of limitation.</p><p>5. In this case also mere administration of medicine, allegedly chemical, on the 1st respondent, prescribed by competent doctors in the reputed institution cannot be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. The date of experience of adverse effects on a subsequent date of administration, alone can be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. On the basis of the averment in para 6 of Ext. P1 the 1st respondent experienced a new foreign body sensation on 14.1.2000 and the pathology-report was suggestive, according to him, of a new tumour. Therefore, that shall be me date of knowledge of the difficulty experienced by him, which according to him was because of the alleged administration of the medicine-chemical. So, counting the period of one year from 14.1.2000, it cannot be taken that Ext. P1 is beyond the period of limitation. Therefore, Ext. P4 can be sustained on the aforesaid reasoning. But whether the formation of the new tumour is because of the administration of G4N and M4N or because of the delayed surgery is a matter to be strictly proved by the 1st respondent while prosecuting Ext. P1 claim. Original Petition is closed as above.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Challenge is against Ext. P4 order passed by the Kerala State Human Rights Commission. The first respondent filed Ext. P1 petition before the said Commission alleging human rights violation consequently on an alleged act by the petitioners herein, during his treatment at the hospital of the 1st petitioner. The 2nd petitioner is the Director of the hospital. The petitioners objected on the grounds of limitation. Section 36(2) the <a>Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993</a> provides that 'State Commission shall not enquire into any matter after expiry of one year from the date on which the act constituting violation of human rights alleged to have been committed'. Therefore, Ext. P1 petition was filed belatedly beyond the said period from the date of alleged-human rights violation namely, administration of certain chemicals on 13.1.2000, 14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000. Even according to the 1st respondent on 13.1.2000,14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000 he was given M4N and G4N injections and on 18.1.2000 he was subjected to asurgery. Ext. P1 petition was filed on 1.8.2001. This is beyond the period provided for objection in Section 36(2), the petitioners submits. But this contention was tried as preliminary issue was overruled in Ext. P4, finding that the effect of 'Act' may still continue and in such circumstances by no stretch of reasoning it can be said that the petition was barred by limitation under Section 36(2). This finding was entered into relying on Page No. 36 of the Law Laxicon edited by Y.V. Chandrachood, Former Chief Justice of India.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Assailing Ext. P1 it is contended by the petitioners that period of limitation prescribed in the said statute is to be strictly construed. The court cannot stretch the period of limitation beyond the period made mentioned of in the statute concerned. The decisions, in (AIR 1999 SC 3101) Lachhman Das Arora v. Ganeshi Led and others and (AIR 1999 SC 1351) Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. & another have been cited in support of this contention. As held in the former case 'the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party, but it has to be applied with all its vigour when the statute so prescribes. The court cannot extend the period of limitation on equitable ground more particular in the matter of filing of election petitions under the Act.' This was on a question of limitation in terms of Representation of Peoples' Act. The period of limitation prescribed in this case is also in terms of special statute namely Protection of Human Rights Act. Dealing with converse situation in the latter case, the Supreme Court held that when the statute does not prescribe any period of limitation the court cannot throw out a petition on the ground of limitation. Going by the pleadings contained in Ext. P1 and the dates of administration of the alleged chemical or medicines as the case may be, during January 2000, the petition was filed beyond the period of limitation of one year provided in Section 36(2). Ext. P1 was filed only on 1.8.2001. Applying strict rule of limitation contained in Section 36(2) of the Act, Ext. P1 petition ought to have been dismissed upholding the preliminary objection rather than rejecting it as per Ext. P4.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. It is contended by the 1st respondent that the administration of medicine was in January 2000 as averred in Para 5 of Ext. P1 petition. The medicine had been consumed by him bonafide believing that it had been prescribed by the doctor to cure his ailment. This cannot be taken as the dates for the purpose of limitation. No symptoms were noticed by mere administration of the medicine on the said dates. Symptoms arose when adverse reactions were noticed. According to him as averred in para 6 of the Ext. P1. he experienced foreign body sensation in throat on 14.1.2000 and thereafter he was subjected to laryngoscopy and biopsy and the result disclosed that a further tumour had developed. According to him it was developed after injuctingthese chemicals as averred in para 6 of Ext. P1. New tumour was noticed after14.1.2000, It developed because of administration of the medicine, he submits. Ofcourse that is a matter which shall be left to be strictly proved by him. There is clearallegation that he experienced alleged adverse effect of administration of the medicine,on 14.1.2000. That is the date of knowledge, so far as he is concerned, about theadversity he is alleged to be suffering. Therefore, that shall be taken as the startingperiod of limitation, the 1st respondent submits.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. It is worthwhile to refer the decision in (AIR 1961 SC 1500) Harish Chandra v. Deputy L.A. Officer in connection with the period of limitation provided in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It was held that the period of limitation in the statute shall be construed from the date of knowledge of the order of the administrative authority concerned.. Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act provided a period of limitation of six weeks from the date of Collector's award to seek reference to the Civil Court, The Apex Court held as follows:',
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	(int) 6 => '<p>The date of knowledge is taken as relevant criterion to count the period of limitation.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. In this case also mere administration of medicine, allegedly chemical, on the 1st respondent, prescribed by competent doctors in the reputed institution cannot be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. The date of experience of adverse effects on a subsequent date of administration, alone can be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. On the basis of the averment in para 6 of Ext. P1 the 1st respondent experienced a new foreign body sensation on 14.1.2000 and the pathology-report was suggestive, according to him, of a new tumour. Therefore, that shall be me date of knowledge of the difficulty experienced by him, which according to him was because of the alleged administration of the medicine-chemical. So, counting the period of one year from 14.1.2000, it cannot be taken that Ext. P1 is beyond the period of limitation. Therefore, Ext. P4 can be sustained on the aforesaid reasoning. But whether the formation of the new tumour is because of the administration of G4N and M4N or because of the delayed surgery is a matter to be strictly proved by the 1st respondent while prosecuting Ext. P1 claim. Original Petition is closed as above.<p>',
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5. In this case also mere administration of medicine, allegedly chemical, on the 1st respondent, prescribed by competent doctors in the reputed institution cannot be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. The date of experience of adverse effects on a subsequent date of administration, alone can be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. On the basis of the averment in para 6 of Ext. P1 the 1st respondent experienced a new foreign body sensation on 14.1.2000 and the pathology-report was suggestive, according to him, of a new tumour. Therefore, that shall be me date of knowledge of the difficulty experienced by him, which according to him was because of the alleged administration of the medicine-chemical. So, counting the period of one year from 14.1.2000, it cannot be taken that Ext. P1 is beyond the period of limitation. Therefore, Ext. P4 can be sustained on the aforesaid reasoning. But whether the formation of the new tumour is because of the administration of G4N and M4N or because of the delayed surgery is a matter to be strictly proved by the 1st respondent while prosecuting Ext. P1 claim. Original Petition is closed as above.

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			'appealno' => 'O.P. No. 10174 of 2002',
			'appellant' => 'Regional Cancer Centre',
			'authreffered' => '',
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			'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.         ',
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			'judge' => ' K.A. Abdul Gafoor, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.A. Abdul Gafoor, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Challenge is against Ext. P4 order passed by the Kerala State Human Rights Commission. The first respondent filed Ext. P1 petition before the said Commission alleging human rights violation consequently on an alleged act by the petitioners herein, during his treatment at the hospital of the 1st petitioner. The 2nd petitioner is the Director of the hospital. The petitioners objected on the grounds of limitation. Section 36(2) the <a href="/act/51674/protection-of-human-rights-act-1993-complete-act">Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993</a> provides that 'State Commission shall not enquire into any matter after expiry of one year from the date on which the act constituting violation of human rights alleged to have been committed'. Therefore, Ext. P1 petition was filed belatedly beyond the said period from the date of alleged-human rights violation namely, administration of certain chemicals on 13.1.2000, 14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000. Even according to the 1st respondent on 13.1.2000,14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000 he was given M4N and G4N injections and on 18.1.2000 he was subjected to asurgery. Ext. P1 petition was filed on 1.8.2001. This is beyond the period provided for objection in Section 36(2), the petitioners submits. But this contention was tried as preliminary issue was overruled in Ext. P4, finding that the effect of 'Act' may still continue and in such circumstances by no stretch of reasoning it can be said that the petition was barred by limitation under Section 36(2). This finding was entered into relying on Page No. 36 of the Law Laxicon edited by Y.V. Chandrachood, Former Chief Justice of India.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Assailing Ext. P1 it is contended by the petitioners that period of limitation prescribed in the said statute is to be strictly construed. The court cannot stretch the period of limitation beyond the period made mentioned of in the statute concerned. The decisions, in (AIR 1999 SC 3101) Lachhman Das Arora v. Ganeshi Led and others and (AIR 1999 SC 1351) Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. & another have been cited in support of this contention. As held in the former case 'the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party, but it has to be applied with all its vigour when the statute so prescribes. The court cannot extend the period of limitation on equitable ground more particular in the matter of filing of election petitions under the Act.' This was on a question of limitation in terms of Representation of Peoples' Act. The period of limitation prescribed in this case is also in terms of special statute namely Protection of Human Rights Act. Dealing with converse situation in the latter case, the Supreme Court held that when the statute does not prescribe any period of limitation the court cannot throw out a petition on the ground of limitation. Going by the pleadings contained in Ext. P1 and the dates of administration of the alleged chemical or medicines as the case may be, during January 2000, the petition was filed beyond the period of limitation of one year provided in Section 36(2). Ext. P1 was filed only on 1.8.2001. Applying strict rule of limitation contained in Section 36(2) of the Act, Ext. P1 petition ought to have been dismissed upholding the preliminary objection rather than rejecting it as per Ext. P4.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. It is contended by the 1st respondent that the administration of medicine was in January 2000 as averred in Para 5 of Ext. P1 petition. The medicine had been consumed by him bonafide believing that it had been prescribed by the doctor to cure his ailment. This cannot be taken as the dates for the purpose of limitation. No symptoms were noticed by mere administration of the medicine on the said dates. Symptoms arose when adverse reactions were noticed. According to him as averred in para 6 of the Ext. P1. he experienced foreign body sensation in throat on 14.1.2000 and thereafter he was subjected to laryngoscopy and biopsy and the result disclosed that a further tumour had developed. According to him it was developed after injuctingthese chemicals as averred in para 6 of Ext. P1. New tumour was noticed after14.1.2000, It developed because of administration of the medicine, he submits. Ofcourse that is a matter which shall be left to be strictly proved by him. There is clearallegation that he experienced alleged adverse effect of administration of the medicine,on 14.1.2000. That is the date of knowledge, so far as he is concerned, about theadversity he is alleged to be suffering. Therefore, that shall be taken as the startingperiod of limitation, the 1st respondent submits.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is worthwhile to refer the decision in (AIR 1961 SC 1500) Harish Chandra v. Deputy L.A. Officer in connection with the period of limitation provided in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It was held that the period of limitation in the statute shall be construed from the date of knowledge of the order of the administrative authority concerned.. Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act provided a period of limitation of six weeks from the date of Collector's award to seek reference to the Civil Court, The Apex Court held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The knowledge of the party affected by the award either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice the expression 'the date of the award' used in the proviso must mean that date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructing. In our opinion, therefore, it would be unreasonable to construe the words 'from the date of Collector's award' used in the proviso to Section 18 in a literal or mechanical way.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The date of knowledge is taken as relevant criterion to count the period of limitation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. In this case also mere administration of medicine, allegedly chemical, on the 1st respondent, prescribed by competent doctors in the reputed institution cannot be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. The date of experience of adverse effects on a subsequent date of administration, alone can be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. On the basis of the averment in para 6 of Ext. P1 the 1st respondent experienced a new foreign body sensation on 14.1.2000 and the pathology-report was suggestive, according to him, of a new tumour. Therefore, that shall be me date of knowledge of the difficulty experienced by him, which according to him was because of the alleged administration of the medicine-chemical. So, counting the period of one year from 14.1.2000, it cannot be taken that Ext. P1 is beyond the period of limitation. Therefore, Ext. P4 can be sustained on the aforesaid reasoning. But whether the formation of the new tumour is because of the administration of G4N and M4N or because of the delayed surgery is a matter to be strictly proved by the 1st respondent while prosecuting Ext. P1 claim. Original Petition is closed as above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'court' => 'Kerala',
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		'decidedon' => '2002-08-28',
		'deposition' => '',
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		'judge' => ' K.A. Abdul Gafoor, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.A. Abdul Gafoor, J. </p><p>1. Challenge is against Ext. P4 order passed by the Kerala State Human Rights Commission. The first respondent filed Ext. P1 petition before the said Commission alleging human rights violation consequently on an alleged act by the petitioners herein, during his treatment at the hospital of the 1st petitioner. The 2nd petitioner is the Director of the hospital. The petitioners objected on the grounds of limitation. Section 36(2) the <a>Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993</a> provides that 'State Commission shall not enquire into any matter after expiry of one year from the date on which the act constituting violation of human rights alleged to have been committed'. Therefore, Ext. P1 petition was filed belatedly beyond the said period from the date of alleged-human rights violation namely, administration of certain chemicals on 13.1.2000, 14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000. Even according to the 1st respondent on 13.1.2000,14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000 he was given M4N and G4N injections and on 18.1.2000 he was subjected to asurgery. Ext. P1 petition was filed on 1.8.2001. This is beyond the period provided for objection in Section 36(2), the petitioners submits. But this contention was tried as preliminary issue was overruled in Ext. P4, finding that the effect of 'Act' may still continue and in such circumstances by no stretch of reasoning it can be said that the petition was barred by limitation under Section 36(2). This finding was entered into relying on Page No. 36 of the Law Laxicon edited by Y.V. Chandrachood, Former Chief Justice of India.</p><p>2. Assailing Ext. P1 it is contended by the petitioners that period of limitation prescribed in the said statute is to be strictly construed. The court cannot stretch the period of limitation beyond the period made mentioned of in the statute concerned. The decisions, in (AIR 1999 SC 3101) Lachhman Das Arora v. Ganeshi Led and others and (AIR 1999 SC 1351) Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. & another have been cited in support of this contention. As held in the former case 'the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party, but it has to be applied with all its vigour when the statute so prescribes. The court cannot extend the period of limitation on equitable ground more particular in the matter of filing of election petitions under the Act.' This was on a question of limitation in terms of Representation of Peoples' Act. The period of limitation prescribed in this case is also in terms of special statute namely Protection of Human Rights Act. Dealing with converse situation in the latter case, the Supreme Court held that when the statute does not prescribe any period of limitation the court cannot throw out a petition on the ground of limitation. Going by the pleadings contained in Ext. P1 and the dates of administration of the alleged chemical or medicines as the case may be, during January 2000, the petition was filed beyond the period of limitation of one year provided in Section 36(2). Ext. P1 was filed only on 1.8.2001. Applying strict rule of limitation contained in Section 36(2) of the Act, Ext. P1 petition ought to have been dismissed upholding the preliminary objection rather than rejecting it as per Ext. P4.</p><p>3. It is contended by the 1st respondent that the administration of medicine was in January 2000 as averred in Para 5 of Ext. P1 petition. The medicine had been consumed by him bonafide believing that it had been prescribed by the doctor to cure his ailment. This cannot be taken as the dates for the purpose of limitation. No symptoms were noticed by mere administration of the medicine on the said dates. Symptoms arose when adverse reactions were noticed. According to him as averred in para 6 of the Ext. P1. he experienced foreign body sensation in throat on 14.1.2000 and thereafter he was subjected to laryngoscopy and biopsy and the result disclosed that a further tumour had developed. According to him it was developed after injuctingthese chemicals as averred in para 6 of Ext. P1. New tumour was noticed after14.1.2000, It developed because of administration of the medicine, he submits. Ofcourse that is a matter which shall be left to be strictly proved by him. There is clearallegation that he experienced alleged adverse effect of administration of the medicine,on 14.1.2000. That is the date of knowledge, so far as he is concerned, about theadversity he is alleged to be suffering. Therefore, that shall be taken as the startingperiod of limitation, the 1st respondent submits.</p><p>4. It is worthwhile to refer the decision in (AIR 1961 SC 1500) Harish Chandra v. Deputy L.A. Officer in connection with the period of limitation provided in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It was held that the period of limitation in the statute shall be construed from the date of knowledge of the order of the administrative authority concerned.. Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act provided a period of limitation of six weeks from the date of Collector's award to seek reference to the Civil Court, The Apex Court held as follows:</p><p>'The knowledge of the party affected by the award either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice the expression 'the date of the award' used in the proviso must mean that date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructing. In our opinion, therefore, it would be unreasonable to construe the words 'from the date of Collector's award' used in the proviso to Section 18 in a literal or mechanical way.'</p><p>The date of knowledge is taken as relevant criterion to count the period of limitation.</p><p>5. In this case also mere administration of medicine, allegedly chemical, on the 1st respondent, prescribed by competent doctors in the reputed institution cannot be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. The date of experience of adverse effects on a subsequent date of administration, alone can be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. On the basis of the averment in para 6 of Ext. P1 the 1st respondent experienced a new foreign body sensation on 14.1.2000 and the pathology-report was suggestive, according to him, of a new tumour. Therefore, that shall be me date of knowledge of the difficulty experienced by him, which according to him was because of the alleged administration of the medicine-chemical. So, counting the period of one year from 14.1.2000, it cannot be taken that Ext. P1 is beyond the period of limitation. Therefore, Ext. P4 can be sustained on the aforesaid reasoning. But whether the formation of the new tumour is because of the administration of G4N and M4N or because of the delayed surgery is a matter to be strictly proved by the 1st respondent while prosecuting Ext. P1 claim. Original Petition is closed as above.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => '2003(3)KLT982',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Gopalan',
		'sub' => 'Civil',
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		'circuit' => null
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	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Challenge is against Ext. P4 order passed by the Kerala State Human Rights Commission. The first respondent filed Ext. P1 petition before the said Commission alleging human rights violation consequently on an alleged act by the petitioners herein, during his treatment at the hospital of the 1st petitioner. The 2nd petitioner is the Director of the hospital. The petitioners objected on the grounds of limitation. Section 36(2) the <a>Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993</a> provides that 'State Commission shall not enquire into any matter after expiry of one year from the date on which the act constituting violation of human rights alleged to have been committed'. Therefore, Ext. P1 petition was filed belatedly beyond the said period from the date of alleged-human rights violation namely, administration of certain chemicals on 13.1.2000, 14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000. Even according to the 1st respondent on 13.1.2000,14.1.2000 and 15.1.2000 he was given M4N and G4N injections and on 18.1.2000 he was subjected to asurgery. Ext. P1 petition was filed on 1.8.2001. This is beyond the period provided for objection in Section 36(2), the petitioners submits. But this contention was tried as preliminary issue was overruled in Ext. P4, finding that the effect of 'Act' may still continue and in such circumstances by no stretch of reasoning it can be said that the petition was barred by limitation under Section 36(2). This finding was entered into relying on Page No. 36 of the Law Laxicon edited by Y.V. Chandrachood, Former Chief Justice of India.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Assailing Ext. P1 it is contended by the petitioners that period of limitation prescribed in the said statute is to be strictly construed. The court cannot stretch the period of limitation beyond the period made mentioned of in the statute concerned. The decisions, in (AIR 1999 SC 3101) Lachhman Das Arora v. Ganeshi Led and others and (AIR 1999 SC 1351) Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. & another have been cited in support of this contention. As held in the former case 'the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party, but it has to be applied with all its vigour when the statute so prescribes. The court cannot extend the period of limitation on equitable ground more particular in the matter of filing of election petitions under the Act.' This was on a question of limitation in terms of Representation of Peoples' Act. The period of limitation prescribed in this case is also in terms of special statute namely Protection of Human Rights Act. Dealing with converse situation in the latter case, the Supreme Court held that when the statute does not prescribe any period of limitation the court cannot throw out a petition on the ground of limitation. Going by the pleadings contained in Ext. P1 and the dates of administration of the alleged chemical or medicines as the case may be, during January 2000, the petition was filed beyond the period of limitation of one year provided in Section 36(2). Ext. P1 was filed only on 1.8.2001. Applying strict rule of limitation contained in Section 36(2) of the Act, Ext. P1 petition ought to have been dismissed upholding the preliminary objection rather than rejecting it as per Ext. P4.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. It is contended by the 1st respondent that the administration of medicine was in January 2000 as averred in Para 5 of Ext. P1 petition. The medicine had been consumed by him bonafide believing that it had been prescribed by the doctor to cure his ailment. This cannot be taken as the dates for the purpose of limitation. No symptoms were noticed by mere administration of the medicine on the said dates. Symptoms arose when adverse reactions were noticed. According to him as averred in para 6 of the Ext. P1. he experienced foreign body sensation in throat on 14.1.2000 and thereafter he was subjected to laryngoscopy and biopsy and the result disclosed that a further tumour had developed. According to him it was developed after injuctingthese chemicals as averred in para 6 of Ext. P1. New tumour was noticed after14.1.2000, It developed because of administration of the medicine, he submits. Ofcourse that is a matter which shall be left to be strictly proved by him. There is clearallegation that he experienced alleged adverse effect of administration of the medicine,on 14.1.2000. That is the date of knowledge, so far as he is concerned, about theadversity he is alleged to be suffering. Therefore, that shall be taken as the startingperiod of limitation, the 1st respondent submits.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. It is worthwhile to refer the decision in (AIR 1961 SC 1500) Harish Chandra v. Deputy L.A. Officer in connection with the period of limitation provided in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It was held that the period of limitation in the statute shall be construed from the date of knowledge of the order of the administrative authority concerned.. Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act provided a period of limitation of six weeks from the date of Collector's award to seek reference to the Civil Court, The Apex Court held as follows:',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'The knowledge of the party affected by the award either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice the expression 'the date of the award' used in the proviso must mean that date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructing. In our opinion, therefore, it would be unreasonable to construe the words 'from the date of Collector's award' used in the proviso to Section 18 in a literal or mechanical way.'',
	(int) 6 => '<p>The date of knowledge is taken as relevant criterion to count the period of limitation.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. In this case also mere administration of medicine, allegedly chemical, on the 1st respondent, prescribed by competent doctors in the reputed institution cannot be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. The date of experience of adverse effects on a subsequent date of administration, alone can be taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation. On the basis of the averment in para 6 of Ext. P1 the 1st respondent experienced a new foreign body sensation on 14.1.2000 and the pathology-report was suggestive, according to him, of a new tumour. Therefore, that shall be me date of knowledge of the difficulty experienced by him, which according to him was because of the alleged administration of the medicine-chemical. So, counting the period of one year from 14.1.2000, it cannot be taken that Ext. P1 is beyond the period of limitation. Therefore, Ext. P4 can be sustained on the aforesaid reasoning. But whether the formation of the new tumour is because of the administration of G4N and M4N or because of the delayed surgery is a matter to be strictly proved by the 1st respondent while prosecuting Ext. P1 claim. Original Petition is closed as above.<p>',
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Subject	Civil
Court	Kerala High Court
Decided On	Aug-28-2002
Case Number	O.P. No. 10174 of 2002
Judge	K.A. Abdul Gafoor, J.
Reported in	2003(3)KLT982
Acts	Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 - Sections 36(2)
Appellant	Regional Cancer Centre
Respondent	Gopalan
Appellant Advocate	N.N. Sugunapalan, Adv.
Respondent Advocate	P.S. Sreedharan Pillai,; S. Sreekumar,; M.A. Firoz,;
Cases Referred	Harish Chandra v. Deputy L.A. Officer

Regional Cancer Centre Vs. Gopalan - Court Judgment