Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment

Judgment:

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Context                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '729821',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
			'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
			'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Kerala',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 1</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Points No. 3 and 4</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
			'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '729821',
		(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '729821',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
		'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
		'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Kerala',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p>Point No. 1</p><p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p>Point No. 2</p><p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p>Points No. 3 and 4</p><p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
		'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '729821',
	(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/729821/oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:',
	(int) 2 => '<p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And',
	(int) 4 => '<p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?',
	(int) 5 => '<p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?',
	(int) 6 => '<p>Point No. 1',
	(int) 7 => '<p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Point No. 2',
	(int) 23 => '<p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Points No. 3 and 4',
	(int) 25 => '<p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p>',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 33
$i = (int) 0
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

M.N. Krishnan, J.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Context                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '729821',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
			'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
			'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Kerala',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 1</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Points No. 3 and 4</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
			'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '729821',
		(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '729821',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
		'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
		'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Kerala',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p>Point No. 1</p><p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p>Point No. 2</p><p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p>Points No. 3 and 4</p><p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
		'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '729821',
	(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/729821/oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:',
	(int) 2 => '<p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And',
	(int) 4 => '<p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?',
	(int) 5 => '<p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?',
	(int) 6 => '<p>Point No. 1',
	(int) 7 => '<p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Point No. 2',
	(int) 23 => '<p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Points No. 3 and 4',
	(int) 25 => '<p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p>',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 33
$i = (int) 1
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Context                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '729821',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
			'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
			'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Kerala',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 1</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Points No. 3 and 4</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
			'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '729821',
		(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '729821',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
		'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
		'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Kerala',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p>Point No. 1</p><p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p>Point No. 2</p><p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p>Points No. 3 and 4</p><p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
		'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '729821',
	(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/729821/oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:',
	(int) 2 => '<p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And',
	(int) 4 => '<p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?',
	(int) 5 => '<p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?',
	(int) 6 => '<p>Point No. 1',
	(int) 7 => '<p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Point No. 2',
	(int) 23 => '<p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Points No. 3 and 4',
	(int) 25 => '<p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p>',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 33
$i = (int) 2
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Context                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '729821',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
			'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
			'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Kerala',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 1</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Points No. 3 and 4</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
			'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '729821',
		(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '729821',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
		'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
		'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Kerala',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p>Point No. 1</p><p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p>Point No. 2</p><p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p>Points No. 3 and 4</p><p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
		'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '729821',
	(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/729821/oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:',
	(int) 2 => '<p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And',
	(int) 4 => '<p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?',
	(int) 5 => '<p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?',
	(int) 6 => '<p>Point No. 1',
	(int) 7 => '<p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Point No. 2',
	(int) 23 => '<p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Points No. 3 and 4',
	(int) 25 => '<p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p>',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 33
$i = (int) 3
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Context                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '729821',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
			'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
			'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Kerala',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 1</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Points No. 3 and 4</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
			'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '729821',
		(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '729821',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
		'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
		'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Kerala',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p>Point No. 1</p><p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p>Point No. 2</p><p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p>Points No. 3 and 4</p><p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
		'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '729821',
	(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/729821/oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:',
	(int) 2 => '<p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And',
	(int) 4 => '<p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?',
	(int) 5 => '<p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?',
	(int) 6 => '<p>Point No. 1',
	(int) 7 => '<p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Point No. 2',
	(int) 23 => '<p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Points No. 3 and 4',
	(int) 25 => '<p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p>',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 33
$i = (int) 4
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Context                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '729821',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
			'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
			'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Kerala',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 1</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Points No. 3 and 4</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
			'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '729821',
		(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '729821',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
		'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
		'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Kerala',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p>Point No. 1</p><p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p>Point No. 2</p><p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p>Points No. 3 and 4</p><p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
		'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '729821',
	(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/729821/oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:',
	(int) 2 => '<p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And',
	(int) 4 => '<p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?',
	(int) 5 => '<p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?',
	(int) 6 => '<p>Point No. 1',
	(int) 7 => '<p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Point No. 2',
	(int) 23 => '<p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Points No. 3 and 4',
	(int) 25 => '<p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p>',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 33
$i = (int) 5
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Context                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '729821',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
			'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
			'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Kerala',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 1</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Points No. 3 and 4</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
			'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '729821',
		(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '729821',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
		'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
		'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Kerala',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p>Point No. 1</p><p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p>Point No. 2</p><p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p>Points No. 3 and 4</p><p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
		'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '729821',
	(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/729821/oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:',
	(int) 2 => '<p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And',
	(int) 4 => '<p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?',
	(int) 5 => '<p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?',
	(int) 6 => '<p>Point No. 1',
	(int) 7 => '<p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Point No. 2',
	(int) 23 => '<p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Points No. 3 and 4',
	(int) 25 => '<p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p>',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 33
$i = (int) 6
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

Point No. 1

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Context                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '729821',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
			'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
			'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Kerala',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 1</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Points No. 3 and 4</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
			'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '729821',
		(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '729821',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
		'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
		'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Kerala',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p>Point No. 1</p><p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p>Point No. 2</p><p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p>Points No. 3 and 4</p><p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
		'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '729821',
	(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/729821/oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:',
	(int) 2 => '<p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And',
	(int) 4 => '<p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?',
	(int) 5 => '<p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?',
	(int) 6 => '<p>Point No. 1',
	(int) 7 => '<p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Point No. 2',
	(int) 23 => '<p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Points No. 3 and 4',
	(int) 25 => '<p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p>',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 33
$i = (int) 7
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Context                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '729821',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
			'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
			'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Kerala',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 1</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Points No. 3 and 4</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
			'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '729821',
		(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '729821',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
		'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
		'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Kerala',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p>Point No. 1</p><p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p>Point No. 2</p><p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p>Points No. 3 and 4</p><p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
		'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '729821',
	(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/729821/oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:',
	(int) 2 => '<p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And',
	(int) 4 => '<p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?',
	(int) 5 => '<p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?',
	(int) 6 => '<p>Point No. 1',
	(int) 7 => '<p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Point No. 2',
	(int) 23 => '<p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Points No. 3 and 4',
	(int) 25 => '<p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p>',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 33
$i = (int) 8
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Context                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '729821',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
			'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
			'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Kerala',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 1</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Points No. 3 and 4</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
			'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '729821',
		(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '729821',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
		'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
		'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Kerala',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p>Point No. 1</p><p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p>Point No. 2</p><p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p>Points No. 3 and 4</p><p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
		'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '729821',
	(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/729821/oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:',
	(int) 2 => '<p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And',
	(int) 4 => '<p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?',
	(int) 5 => '<p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?',
	(int) 6 => '<p>Point No. 1',
	(int) 7 => '<p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Point No. 2',
	(int) 23 => '<p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Points No. 3 and 4',
	(int) 25 => '<p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p>',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 33
$i = (int) 9
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Context                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '729821',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
			'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
			'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Kerala',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 1</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Points No. 3 and 4</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
			'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '729821',
		(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '729821',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
		'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
		'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Kerala',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p>Point No. 1</p><p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p>Point No. 2</p><p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p>Points No. 3 and 4</p><p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
		'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '729821',
	(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/729821/oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:',
	(int) 2 => '<p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And',
	(int) 4 => '<p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?',
	(int) 5 => '<p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?',
	(int) 6 => '<p>Point No. 1',
	(int) 7 => '<p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Point No. 2',
	(int) 23 => '<p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Points No. 3 and 4',
	(int) 25 => '<p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p>',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 33
$i = (int) 10
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Context                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '729821',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
			'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
			'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Kerala',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 1</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Points No. 3 and 4</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
			'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '729821',
		(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '729821',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
		'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
		'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Kerala',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p>Point No. 1</p><p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p>Point No. 2</p><p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p>Points No. 3 and 4</p><p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
		'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '729821',
	(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/729821/oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:',
	(int) 2 => '<p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And',
	(int) 4 => '<p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?',
	(int) 5 => '<p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?',
	(int) 6 => '<p>Point No. 1',
	(int) 7 => '<p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Point No. 2',
	(int) 23 => '<p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Points No. 3 and 4',
	(int) 25 => '<p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p>',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 33
$i = (int) 11
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Context                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '729821',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
			'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
			'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Kerala',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 1</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Points No. 3 and 4</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
			'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '729821',
		(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '729821',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
		'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
		'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Kerala',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p>Point No. 1</p><p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p>Point No. 2</p><p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p>Points No. 3 and 4</p><p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
		'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '729821',
	(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/729821/oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:',
	(int) 2 => '<p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And',
	(int) 4 => '<p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?',
	(int) 5 => '<p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?',
	(int) 6 => '<p>Point No. 1',
	(int) 7 => '<p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Point No. 2',
	(int) 23 => '<p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Points No. 3 and 4',
	(int) 25 => '<p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p>',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 33
$i = (int) 12
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Context                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '729821',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
			'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
			'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Kerala',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 1</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Points No. 3 and 4</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
			'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '729821',
		(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '729821',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
		'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
		'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Kerala',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p>Point No. 1</p><p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p>Point No. 2</p><p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p>Points No. 3 and 4</p><p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
		'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '729821',
	(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/729821/oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:',
	(int) 2 => '<p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And',
	(int) 4 => '<p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?',
	(int) 5 => '<p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?',
	(int) 6 => '<p>Point No. 1',
	(int) 7 => '<p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Point No. 2',
	(int) 23 => '<p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Points No. 3 and 4',
	(int) 25 => '<p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p>',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 33
$i = (int) 13
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Context                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '729821',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
			'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
			'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Kerala',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 1</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Points No. 3 and 4</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
			'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '729821',
		(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '729821',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
		'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
		'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Kerala',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p>Point No. 1</p><p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p>Point No. 2</p><p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p>Points No. 3 and 4</p><p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
		'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '729821',
	(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/729821/oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:',
	(int) 2 => '<p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And',
	(int) 4 => '<p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?',
	(int) 5 => '<p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?',
	(int) 6 => '<p>Point No. 1',
	(int) 7 => '<p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Point No. 2',
	(int) 23 => '<p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Points No. 3 and 4',
	(int) 25 => '<p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p>',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 33
$i = (int) 14
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Context                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '729821',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
			'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
			'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Kerala',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 1</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Points No. 3 and 4</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
			'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '729821',
		(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '729821',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
		'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
		'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Kerala',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p>Point No. 1</p><p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p>Point No. 2</p><p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p>Points No. 3 and 4</p><p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
		'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '729821',
	(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/729821/oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:',
	(int) 2 => '<p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And',
	(int) 4 => '<p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?',
	(int) 5 => '<p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?',
	(int) 6 => '<p>Point No. 1',
	(int) 7 => '<p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Point No. 2',
	(int) 23 => '<p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Points No. 3 and 4',
	(int) 25 => '<p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p>',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 33
$i = (int) 15
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Context                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '729821',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
			'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
			'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Kerala',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 1</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Points No. 3 and 4</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
			'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '729821',
		(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '729821',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
		'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
		'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Kerala',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p>Point No. 1</p><p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p>Point No. 2</p><p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p>Points No. 3 and 4</p><p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
		'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '729821',
	(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/729821/oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:',
	(int) 2 => '<p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And',
	(int) 4 => '<p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?',
	(int) 5 => '<p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?',
	(int) 6 => '<p>Point No. 1',
	(int) 7 => '<p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Point No. 2',
	(int) 23 => '<p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Points No. 3 and 4',
	(int) 25 => '<p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p>',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 33
$i = (int) 16
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Context                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '729821',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
			'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
			'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Kerala',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 1</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Points No. 3 and 4</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
			'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '729821',
		(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '729821',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
		'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
		'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Kerala',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p>Point No. 1</p><p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p>Point No. 2</p><p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p>Points No. 3 and 4</p><p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
		'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '729821',
	(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/729821/oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:',
	(int) 2 => '<p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And',
	(int) 4 => '<p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?',
	(int) 5 => '<p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?',
	(int) 6 => '<p>Point No. 1',
	(int) 7 => '<p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Point No. 2',
	(int) 23 => '<p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Points No. 3 and 4',
	(int) 25 => '<p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p>',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 33
$i = (int) 17
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Context                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '729821',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
			'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
			'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Kerala',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 1</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Points No. 3 and 4</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
			'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '729821',
		(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '729821',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
		'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
		'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Kerala',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p>Point No. 1</p><p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p>Point No. 2</p><p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p>Points No. 3 and 4</p><p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
		'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '729821',
	(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/729821/oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:',
	(int) 2 => '<p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And',
	(int) 4 => '<p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?',
	(int) 5 => '<p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?',
	(int) 6 => '<p>Point No. 1',
	(int) 7 => '<p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Point No. 2',
	(int) 23 => '<p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Points No. 3 and 4',
	(int) 25 => '<p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p>',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 33
$i = (int) 18
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Context                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '729821',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
			'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
			'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Kerala',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 1</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Points No. 3 and 4</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
			'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '729821',
		(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '729821',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
		'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
		'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Kerala',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p>Point No. 1</p><p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p>Point No. 2</p><p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p>Points No. 3 and 4</p><p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
		'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '729821',
	(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/729821/oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:',
	(int) 2 => '<p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And',
	(int) 4 => '<p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?',
	(int) 5 => '<p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?',
	(int) 6 => '<p>Point No. 1',
	(int) 7 => '<p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Point No. 2',
	(int) 23 => '<p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Points No. 3 and 4',
	(int) 25 => '<p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p>',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 33
$i = (int) 19
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Context                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '729821',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
			'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
			'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Kerala',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 1</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Points No. 3 and 4</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
			'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '729821',
		(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '729821',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
		'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
		'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Kerala',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p>Point No. 1</p><p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p>Point No. 2</p><p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p>Points No. 3 and 4</p><p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
		'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '729821',
	(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/729821/oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:',
	(int) 2 => '<p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And',
	(int) 4 => '<p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?',
	(int) 5 => '<p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?',
	(int) 6 => '<p>Point No. 1',
	(int) 7 => '<p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Point No. 2',
	(int) 23 => '<p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Points No. 3 and 4',
	(int) 25 => '<p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p>',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 33
$i = (int) 20
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Context                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '729821',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
			'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
			'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Kerala',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 1</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Points No. 3 and 4</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
			'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '729821',
		(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '729821',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
		'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
		'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Kerala',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p>Point No. 1</p><p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p>Point No. 2</p><p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p>Points No. 3 and 4</p><p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
		'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '729821',
	(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/729821/oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:',
	(int) 2 => '<p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And',
	(int) 4 => '<p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?',
	(int) 5 => '<p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?',
	(int) 6 => '<p>Point No. 1',
	(int) 7 => '<p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Point No. 2',
	(int) 23 => '<p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Points No. 3 and 4',
	(int) 25 => '<p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p>',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 33
$i = (int) 21
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Context                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '729821',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
			'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
			'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Kerala',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 1</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Points No. 3 and 4</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
			'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '729821',
		(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '729821',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
		'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
		'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Kerala',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p>Point No. 1</p><p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p>Point No. 2</p><p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p>Points No. 3 and 4</p><p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
		'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '729821',
	(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/729821/oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:',
	(int) 2 => '<p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And',
	(int) 4 => '<p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?',
	(int) 5 => '<p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?',
	(int) 6 => '<p>Point No. 1',
	(int) 7 => '<p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Point No. 2',
	(int) 23 => '<p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Points No. 3 and 4',
	(int) 25 => '<p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p>',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 33
$i = (int) 22
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

Point No. 2

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Context                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '729821',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
			'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
			'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Kerala',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 1</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Points No. 3 and 4</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
			'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '729821',
		(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '729821',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
		'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
		'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Kerala',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p>Point No. 1</p><p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p>Point No. 2</p><p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p>Points No. 3 and 4</p><p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
		'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '729821',
	(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/729821/oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:',
	(int) 2 => '<p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And',
	(int) 4 => '<p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?',
	(int) 5 => '<p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?',
	(int) 6 => '<p>Point No. 1',
	(int) 7 => '<p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Point No. 2',
	(int) 23 => '<p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Points No. 3 and 4',
	(int) 25 => '<p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p>',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 33
$i = (int) 23
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Context                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '729821',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
			'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
			'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Kerala',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 1</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Points No. 3 and 4</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
			'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '729821',
		(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '729821',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
		'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
		'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Kerala',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p>Point No. 1</p><p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p>Point No. 2</p><p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p>Points No. 3 and 4</p><p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
		'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '729821',
	(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/729821/oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:',
	(int) 2 => '<p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And',
	(int) 4 => '<p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?',
	(int) 5 => '<p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?',
	(int) 6 => '<p>Point No. 1',
	(int) 7 => '<p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Point No. 2',
	(int) 23 => '<p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Points No. 3 and 4',
	(int) 25 => '<p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p>',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 33
$i = (int) 24
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

Points No. 3 and 4

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Context                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '729821',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
			'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
			'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Kerala',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 1</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Points No. 3 and 4</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
			'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '729821',
		(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '729821',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
		'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
		'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Kerala',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p>Point No. 1</p><p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p>Point No. 2</p><p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p>Points No. 3 and 4</p><p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
		'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '729821',
	(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/729821/oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:',
	(int) 2 => '<p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And',
	(int) 4 => '<p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?',
	(int) 5 => '<p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?',
	(int) 6 => '<p>Point No. 1',
	(int) 7 => '<p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Point No. 2',
	(int) 23 => '<p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Points No. 3 and 4',
	(int) 25 => '<p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p>',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 33
$i = (int) 25
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Context                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '729821',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
			'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
			'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Kerala',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 1</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Points No. 3 and 4</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
			'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '729821',
		(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '729821',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
		'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
		'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Kerala',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p>Point No. 1</p><p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p>Point No. 2</p><p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p>Points No. 3 and 4</p><p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
		'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '729821',
	(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/729821/oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:',
	(int) 2 => '<p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And',
	(int) 4 => '<p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?',
	(int) 5 => '<p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?',
	(int) 6 => '<p>Point No. 1',
	(int) 7 => '<p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Point No. 2',
	(int) 23 => '<p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Points No. 3 and 4',
	(int) 25 => '<p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p>',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 33
$i = (int) 26
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Context                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '729821',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
			'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
			'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Kerala',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 1</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Points No. 3 and 4</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
			'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '729821',
		(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '729821',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
		'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
		'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Kerala',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p>Point No. 1</p><p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p>Point No. 2</p><p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p>Points No. 3 and 4</p><p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
		'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '729821',
	(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/729821/oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:',
	(int) 2 => '<p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And',
	(int) 4 => '<p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?',
	(int) 5 => '<p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?',
	(int) 6 => '<p>Point No. 1',
	(int) 7 => '<p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Point No. 2',
	(int) 23 => '<p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Points No. 3 and 4',
	(int) 25 => '<p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p>',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 33
$i = (int) 27
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Context                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '729821',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
			'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
			'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Kerala',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 1</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Points No. 3 and 4</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
			'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '729821',
		(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '729821',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
		'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
		'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Kerala',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p>Point No. 1</p><p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p>Point No. 2</p><p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p>Points No. 3 and 4</p><p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
		'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '729821',
	(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/729821/oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:',
	(int) 2 => '<p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And',
	(int) 4 => '<p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?',
	(int) 5 => '<p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?',
	(int) 6 => '<p>Point No. 1',
	(int) 7 => '<p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Point No. 2',
	(int) 23 => '<p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Points No. 3 and 4',
	(int) 25 => '<p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p>',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 33
$i = (int) 28
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Context                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '729821',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
			'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
			'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Kerala',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 1</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Points No. 3 and 4</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
			'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '729821',
		(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '729821',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
		'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
		'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Kerala',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p>Point No. 1</p><p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p>Point No. 2</p><p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p>Points No. 3 and 4</p><p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
		'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '729821',
	(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/729821/oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:',
	(int) 2 => '<p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And',
	(int) 4 => '<p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?',
	(int) 5 => '<p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?',
	(int) 6 => '<p>Point No. 1',
	(int) 7 => '<p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Point No. 2',
	(int) 23 => '<p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Points No. 3 and 4',
	(int) 25 => '<p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p>',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 33
$i = (int) 29
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Context                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '729821',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
			'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
			'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Kerala',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 1</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Points No. 3 and 4</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
			'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '729821',
		(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '729821',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
		'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
		'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Kerala',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p>Point No. 1</p><p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p>Point No. 2</p><p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p>Points No. 3 and 4</p><p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
		'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '729821',
	(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/729821/oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:',
	(int) 2 => '<p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And',
	(int) 4 => '<p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?',
	(int) 5 => '<p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?',
	(int) 6 => '<p>Point No. 1',
	(int) 7 => '<p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Point No. 2',
	(int) 23 => '<p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Points No. 3 and 4',
	(int) 25 => '<p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p>',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 33
$i = (int) 30
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Context                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '729821',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
			'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
			'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Kerala',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 1</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Points No. 3 and 4</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
			'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '729821',
		(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '729821',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
		'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
		'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Kerala',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p>Point No. 1</p><p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p>Point No. 2</p><p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p>Points No. 3 and 4</p><p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
		'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '729821',
	(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/729821/oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:',
	(int) 2 => '<p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And',
	(int) 4 => '<p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?',
	(int) 5 => '<p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?',
	(int) 6 => '<p>Point No. 1',
	(int) 7 => '<p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Point No. 2',
	(int) 23 => '<p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Points No. 3 and 4',
	(int) 25 => '<p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p>',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 33
$i = (int) 31
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Context                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

                                        }

                                        echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '729821',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
			'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
			'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
			'court' => 'Kerala',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 1</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Point No. 2</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Points No. 3 and 4</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
			'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '729821',
		(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Nirmala - Citation 729821 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '729821',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; <a href="/act/51348/motor-vehicles-act-1988-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1988</a> - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A',
		'appealno' => 'W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala',
		'casenote' => ' - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.[C.A. No. 5/1908]. Section 100-A [As substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002]:  [V.K. Bali, CJ, Kurian Joseph & K. Balakrishnan Nair, JJ] Applicability  Held, Section is not retrospective. All appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. But subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro Court appeals against judgment of single Judge is not maintainable. Provisions of Section 100-A, C.P.C., will prevail over the provisions contained in the Kerala High Court Act, 1959.          -  Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.',
		'court' => 'Kerala',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2006-11-23',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.</p><p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:</p><p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?</p><p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And</p><p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?</p><p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?</p><p>Point No. 1</p><p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:</p><p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.</p><p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.</p><p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:</p><p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.</p><p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.</p><p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.</p><p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:</p><p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.</p><p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.</p><p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:</p><p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.</p><p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.</p><p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.</p><p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.</p><p>Point No. 2</p><p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.</p><p>Points No. 3 and 4</p><p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.</p><p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:</p><p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.</p><p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.</p><p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.</p><p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.</p><p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Nirmala',
		'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$args = array(
	(int) 0 => '729821',
	(int) 1 => 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/729821/oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-nirmala'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>M.N. Krishnan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The first three Writ Petitions mentioned above had been referred by the learned Judge of this Court by his order dated 9th November, 2005. The scope of reference is to consider whether the dictum laid down in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 293 requires reconsideration. The contention is whether Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings of an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and other provisions bars application of Order 21 of CPC and further whether the decree holder is entitled to interest on interest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these Writ Petitions are as follows. O.P. 22527/04 is filed against the order of the Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha in E.P. 26/02 in OP(MV) 295/89. The executing Court held that the costs and interest have to be adjusted first and the contention of the judgment debtor that it has to be adjusted first towards the principal was rejected. In O.P. 22528/04 the executing Court passed a very similar order and held that the part payments made by the judgment debtor, Insurance Company has to be adjusted towards the interest and then towards principal in that order. In O.P. 17731/05 also the Court held that the same principle has to be followed. In OP(MV) 2749/95 against which W.P. No. 17446/06 is filed, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had taken the same view and arrived at a figure as per the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. So, the points that arise for determination are:',
	(int) 2 => '<p>(1) Whether Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and whether the decision, of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 would bar such an approach?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>(2) Whether the claimants are entitled to get interest on interest? And',
	(int) 4 => '<p>(3). What will be the position with respect to the interim award passed by the Tribunarand deposited by the judgment debtor?',
	(int) 5 => '<p>(4) What will be the position with respect to the amount deposited Under Section 173 of M.V. Act which is a condition precedent to prefer an appeal?',
	(int) 6 => '<p>Point No. 1',
	(int) 7 => '<p>2. This question deals with the question of applicability of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The learned Judge of this Court in the case reported in Sobha Mohankumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2002 (3) KLT 193 held as follows:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable so far as execution of awards of the Tribunals are concerned. The amount deposited by the Insurance Company has to be appropriated in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 1 CPC. Order XXI, Rule 1(1) deals with the modes of payment of decree amount. Deposit of decree amount before Court is one of the modes contemplated by Sub-rule (1)(a). Sub-rule (3)(c) says that when decree amount is deposited in Court, such deposit shall disclose the number of the original suit; name of parties, the manner in which the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e., whether towards principal or towards interest or costs etc. Hence when deposit is made, it should disclose the manner in which the deposit should be appropriated. If no such statements are there disclosing the manner in which it has to be adjusted, the amount deposited has to be appropriated towards interest and costs first and then towards principal. Since the Insurance Company has not specified the manner in which the deposits were to be appropriated when deposits were made and as the decree holder had not agreed to the same. Hence, the amount deposited will have to be appropriated first towards the interest and thereafter towards the principal. The Tribunal had appropriated the deposits towards principal and thus committed an error. The calculation of interest and the amount mentioned by the petitioner in the O.P. are not at all challenged and as such the amount mentioned in the O.P. has only to be accepted as the interest accrued on the amount. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal fixing the balance amount at Rs. 18,026/- is not correct and Ext.P4 is liable to be set aside.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>3. The learned Judge also distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 . If the decision in 2002 (2) KLT 293 is affirmed then the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the execution proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the amount has to be adjusted and appropriated as per the provisions of the said Rule. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramankutty Menon v. M.A.C.T. Ernakulam 2000 (2) KLT 211 held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 has to be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. It was a case where the question that arose for consideration was whether the amount deposited by the judgment-debtor before the Tribunal without notice to the decree holder, can interest be claimed on such deposit. This Court on analysis found that Order XXI mandates issuance of notice and the non-compliance of the same would entitle the decree holder to get interest as provided under Order 21 CPC.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>4. The Apex Court had also considered the applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 In the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Poonam Pahwa AIR 1997 SC 2951 and held that:',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Where the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act was deposited by the judgment-debtor in the Court, however, neither the Court nor the judgment-debtor informed the claimants about such deposit the order granting interest on the decretal amount from the date of deposit till the decree-holder got information of such deposit by applying Order XXI Rule 1 of CPC was legal.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>So in that case the Apex Court also found that Order XXI has been made applicable by the Rules framed by the Haryana Government.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners would contend that a reading of Rules 394 and 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 would show that Order XXI of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation. It is true that under Rule 395, Order XXI is not included but under Rule 394 which is captioned as enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal it is specifically stated 'without prejudice to this power under Section 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall, for the purpose of enforcement of this award, have all the powers of a civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit.' So, Rule 394 makes it clear that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and it has to be executed as if it is a decree of a civil Court. Therefore, it cannot be held that for execution of the decree Order XXI is not made applicable by the Rules as contended by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. The main crux of the argument by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners is that Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for granting of compensation and in addition simple interest. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that there is a specific provision and so Order XXI cannot be made applicable because this provision excludes the same The learned Counsel had argued this point in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in Prem Nath Kapur and Anr. v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. : (1996)2SCC71 wherein the Apex Court held that Order XXI Rule 1 CPC is inconsistent with the express provision contained in Sections 24 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case the Apex Court held that when amounts are awarded under specific provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorizing the same and as the provisions of Section 34 of the Act states that the interest shall be paid from the date of taking possession till the date of payment/deposit of compensation by the Collector or till the date of payment of the excess compensation into the Court there need not be any notice and interest will cease to run on payment/deposit of the compensation. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act very specifically states that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply except in so far as that are inconsistent with any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So, considering the specific provisions, the Apex Court also held that the Order XXI Rule 1 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In Land Acquisition awards each of the amounts payable under Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1-A), 28 and 34 is distinct and separate. When the deposit is made towards the specified amounts (i.e. specified under each head in the award) the decree holder is not entitled to deduct form the amount of compensation any money towards interest, costs etc. So a careful reading of the said decision would show that the Apex Court considered this position with reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 53 which excludes the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The above case was explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India 2001 (3) KLT 489 (SC) : 2001 AIR SCW 3692. In paragraph 5 it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Another three-Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. : (1996)2SCC71 , while considering the question whether an awardee is entitled to appropriate amount of compensation first towards cost of land, then towards interest etc., made the observation that 'the liability to pay interest is only on the excess amount of compensation determined under Section 23(1) and not on the amount already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 and paid to the party or deposited into the Court or determined under Section 26 or Section 54 and deposited into the Court or on solatium under Section 23(2) and the additional amount under Section 23(1A)'. But the question whether solatium is part of the compensation did not positively arise in the said decision nor has it been gone into by the learned Judges.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Thereafter, the five-member bench held that interest envisaged under Sections 23(2), 28 as well as 34 of the Land Acquisition Act is payable on the total compensation payable under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A). None of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act are inconsistent with Order XXI Rule 1 CPC. We are of the oP1nion that Rule 394 conferring all the powers of the civil court in execution of the decree provided under the CPC impliedly makes Order XXI Order 1 CPC applicable.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>7.In Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr. : AIR1996SC1819 , the Apex Court was considering the question whether under Sections 23(2) and 23(1A) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act solatium and additional benefits was retrospective or not. In that context, the Apex Court held as follows:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>13. It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of LA Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from 1.8.1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under Section 60-A to the pending cases as on 1.8.1987 to determine compensation.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>Thereafter, in that case, the Apex Court held that the award of the court in granting additional amounts for acquisition prior to the amendment was nullity and question of nullity of order can be raised at the execution stage in view of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 and the above case has no impact in the Motor Vehicles Act or application of Section 21 CPC.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>8. Now, let us consider whether there is such an exclusion clause under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules. What is contemplated under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide compensation and in addition simple interest. It is a discretionary power of the Court. The purpose of award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant persons not to delay in making payment, and to compensate the victim or his dependants at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. So is the object of the Rules, as has been held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur : AIR2004SC1581 . So, the word 'in addition to' found in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be equated to the word 'in addition to' found in the Land Acquisition Act for the reason that in addition to under the provisions of the Land Acquisition is added for the reasons that there are other enabling provisions which gives a mandate to the Court to award different amounts under different heads from the date of taking possession till actual payment is made. Section 171 only contemplates award of simple interest in addition to the compensation for the reasons that time is consumed for disposal of the cases. So from these discussions, we hold that the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners cannot come to the aid of petitioner. It is the reason why the learned Judge distinguished the decision reported in : (1996)2SCC71 . For the reasons stated above, we also agree with the same.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. It is desirable to refer to the decision reported in Meghraj v. Bayabai : [1970]1SCR523 which gives the guideline under Order XXI Rule 1. It is held in that case that 'the normal Rule 1n the case of a debt due with interest is that any payment made by the debtor is in the first instance to be applied towards satisfaction of interest and thereafter to the principal.' The Apex Court further held that 'unless the mortgagees were informed that the mortgagors had deposited the amount only towards the principal and not towards the interest, and the mortgagees agreed to withdraw the money from the Court accepting the conditional deposit, the normal Rule that the amounts deposited in Court should first be applied towards satisfaction of interest and costs and thereafter towards the principal would apply. The Apex Court had relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Meka Venkatadri Appa Roa Bahadur Semindhar Gam and Ors. v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Jamindhar 1922 P.C. 233. So, if Order XXI is made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal unless the judgment-debtor deposits the amount specifying the nature of deposit and the decree holder consents to the conditions by withdrawing amount so deposited, in all other cases the amount has to be adjusted first towards the interest and costs. From these discussions, we hold that the decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 has laid down the correct principles of law to be applied and therefore it has to be affirmed and the request of the learned Counsel of the writ petitioners to hold otherwise has to be only rejected.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Point No. 2',
	(int) 23 => '<p>10. As per Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to compensation awarded and in addition to the same, simple interest at the rate as granted by the Tribunal. So it is crystal clear that the claimants are not entitled to get interest on interest and the Tribunals have to calculate the amount only on the basis of the simple interest. The practice of calculating interest on interest is to be, therefore, discontinued.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Points No. 3 and 4',
	(int) 25 => '<p>11. Under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as condition precedent to file an appeal, one has to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded which ever is higher. The deposit of Rs. 25,000/- in compliance with the statutory requirement is not meant to be paid to the claimant and such amount cannot be deducted from the total amount of compensation and insurer would be liable to pay interest on the total amount awarded ignoring the amount of statutory deposit (2004 (1) ACC 159 (Jharkand)). The principle to be followed has been laid down in the decision of the Apex Court reported in P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar : [1968]3SCR367 . It was a case where there was a deposit of the amount and withdrawal of the amount was on condition of furnishing security. The Court held that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree holder. He can if likes take the money out in terms of the order but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security. So it does not amount to a discharge of the decree and therefore the statutory deposit made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to enable filing of an appeal cannot be considered as payment of the amount into the Court by the judgment debtor towards satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, we hold that the said deposit would not entitle the judgment debtor to escape the liability of payment of interest.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>12. The next question to be considered is regarding the award amount that is deposited under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages a situation where a person has suffered a permanent disablement, as embodied in Section 142 of the Act, that he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 25,000/- in the case of injuries mentioned therein and in fatal injury cases the legal representatives are entitled to Rs. 50,000/-. It is based on the theory of no fault liability. When a final award is passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act this amount is also included as part of the award amount and the amount is arrived at. Therefore, the award amount granted under Section 140 takes in the characteristic of a compensation awarded under the M.V. Act. Therefore, it has to be held that the total compensation awarded under Section 166 of the M.V. Act will carry interest from the date of petition or as otherwise specifically mentioned by the Tribunal. As the preliminary award amount forms part of the final award amount, the interest has to be worked out on the total amount awarded from the date of petition till the amount under Section 140 is deposited and thereafter deduct the amount awarded Under Section.140 and then calculate the interest on the balance amount till it is actually received by the claimant. Or in other words, the amount awarded under Section 140 does not carry interest after it is deposited and it has to be adjusted towards the principal. From these discussions, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as follows:',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(1) The Judgment reported in 2002 (3) KLT 293 is affirmed and it is held that Order XXI Rule 1 is applicable to the execution proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and that the amount has to be calculated and appropriated as stated in the said judgment.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(2) The motor accident victim is not entitled to claim interest on interest for the reason that only simple Interest is provided under Section 171 of the M.V. Act.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(3) The deposit of an amount as a condition precedent to file an appeal as envisaged Under Section. 173 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the judgment debtor to appropriate the same towards the principal and he is liable to pay interest for the reason that it is not paid to the decree amount but deposited as a condition precedent to file the appeal.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(4) The amount awarded Under Section. 140 of the M.V. Act takes in the final award amount and therefore interest has to be calculated on the final award amount from the date of petition till the date of deposit of amount under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and thereafter the said amount is to be deducted from the principal and interest to be calculated on the balance amount as provided by law.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>The respective Claims Tribunals wherein the execution proceedings that are under challenge is pending, are directed to dispose of the same as stated above.<p>',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 33
$i = (int) 32
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

Subject	Motor Vehicles
Court	Kerala High Court
Decided On	Nov-23-2006
Case Number	W.P. (C) No. 22527 of 2004
Judge	J.B. Koshy and; M.N. Krishnan, JJ.
Reported in	2007ACJ1810; AIR2007Ker103; 2007(1)KLT38
Acts	Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908 - Sections 21 - Order 1 - Order 21, Rule 1 and 1(1); Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1905 - Sections 47; Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rules 23(1), 23(2), 23(1A), 28, 34, 394 and 395; Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - Sections 140, 142, 166, 171, 173 and 174; Land Acquisition Act - Sections 11, 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 24, 26, 28, 34, 52, 53 and 54; Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - Sections 60A
Appellant	Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.
Respondent	Nirmala
Appellant Advocate	George Cherian and; A.R. George, Advs.
Respondent Advocate	K. Manu Raj and; C.A. Majeed, Advs.
Cases Referred	P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar

Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nirmala - Court Judgment