State of Kerala Vs. George Jacob - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- code of civil procedure, 1908.[c.a. no. 5/1908]. section 100-a [as substituted by c.p.c. amendment act, 2002]: [v.k. bali, cj, kurian joseph & k. balakrishnan nair, jj] applicability held, section is not retrospective. all appeals filed prior to 1.7.2002 are competent. but subsequent to 1.7.2002 intro court appeals against judgment of single judge is not maintainable. provisions of section 100-a, c.p.c., will prevail over the provisions contained in the kerala high court act, 1959. - the argument is that since the kerala stamp act deals with both compulsorily registrable documents as well as documents which do not require registration compulsorily, and in view of the fact that under section 54 of the transfer of property act, 1882, sale deeds in respect of immovable property of the value of rs. 10. however, the learned government pleader, relying on several decisions of the supreme court, would argue that the words 'unless the context otherwise requires' have a definite meaning in the context of the kerala stamp act, especially, in view of the fact that the kerala stamp act relates to both compulsorily registrable document as well as documents which do not require registration compulsorily. in our opinion, dictionary meanings, however helpful in understanding the general sense of the words cannot control where the scheme of the statute or the instrument considered as a whole clearly conveys a somewhat different shade of meaning. it is not always a safe way to construe a statute or a contract by dividing it by a process of etymological dissection and after separating words from their context to give each word some particular definition given by lexicographers and then to reconstruct the instrument upon the basis of these definitions. the commissioners were of the opinion that the instrument did not effect an exchange on 30th april and could not, therefore, attract stamp duty on 8th may when the conditions subject to which it was delivered in escrow were satisfied and assessed stamp duty in accordance with law in force on 8th may. the question which arose was whether hamda ammal is entitled to the property sold in her favour by virtue of the sale deed dated 9-9-1970, but registered subsequently on october 26,1970 or the respondent had a better claim to the property on account of an attachment before judgment made on september 17,1970 in the suit filed by him on september 30, 1970, i. now, if we read section 47 of the registration act, it clearly provides that a registered document shall operate from the time from which it would have commenced to operate if no registration thereof had been required or made and not from the time of its registration. 3. in view of the provisions of section 47 of the registration act, 1908, it is well settled that a document on subsequent registration will take effect from the time when it was executed and not from the time of its registration. when a document is executed and that document requires further formalities to be complied with, like registration for making it an enforceable document, it cannot be said that it is not a valid document, for the purpose of stamp duty. r 213. in air1969mad1 ,the madras high court held as follows at paragraphs 6 and 9: 6. the learned additional government pleader would thus appear to be perfectly justified in his contention that the document has to be considered as chargeable with stamp duty, when it is executed, which term 'executed' itself has to be interpreted in the light of the definition embodied in section 2(12). actually, there can be no question of impounding the document and recovering the proper stamp duty from the party liable, subsequent to registration and this is not disputed. clearly, what the learned judge meant was that, where the document contained recitals of disposition creating a transfer of rights, by the very force the recitals between the parties, and it has been completely executed the requirements of the law being satisfied in that respect it must be interpreted as actually transferring the rights, and hence as amounting either to a conveyance or a mortgage deed, as the case may be. in that decision, after referring to the relevant provisions of the stamp act, transfer of property act and the registration act, the court said that for the purpose of stamp act, the crucial time for determining whether an instrument is chargeable with duty and is duly stamped or not is before or at the time of its execution and no other formalities under any law need be satisfied. in other words, the definition and the terms of every section of the act indicate clearly that an instrument need not be valid in law or meet the requirements of law as a valid document before it is chargeable to stamp duty under the act. if the petitioner presents the sale deed for registration on or before 15-11-2005 and if the sub registrar is satisfied that this document was, in fact, executed before 1-4-2005, he will extend the benefit of the directions in the above writ appeals to the petitioner's case also.s. siri jagan, j.1. the above writ appeals are filed by the state and the two writ petitions are filed by an individual and an institution who seek to get their sale deed registered with the appropriate sub registrar's office. the issue involved in these cases relate to payment of stamp duty in respect of sale deeds. since the issue raised in all these cases are the same, they are being disposed of by a common judgment. the short facts required for the disposal of these cases are as follows.2. by finance act, 2005 (act 10 of 2005), with effect from 1-4-2005, the legislature amended the schedule to the kerala stamp act, 1959 enhancing the stamp duty payable on conveyance deeds. petitioners in the writ petitions from which these writ appeals arise and the petitioners in the above two writ petitions are stated to be persons who got sale deeds executed prior to 1-4-2005 and presented the same for registration before the appropriate sub registrars' office. however, the sale deeds bore stamp duty only at the rates applicable prior to the amendment of the act with effect from 1-4-2005. the concerned sub registrars took the stand that the rate of stamp duty payable on the sale deeds is as obtaining on the date of presentation of the sale deeds for registration whereas, the parties took the stand that stamp duty payable is as on the date of signing the sale deeds. since the concerned sub registrars refused to register the sale deeds unless stamp duty is paid at the enhanced rate fixed by the finance act, 2005 the writ petitioners in the above cases approached this court by filing the writ petitions.3. it may also be noted that in the writ petition from which w.a.no. 1527/2005 arose, the writ petitioner is the all kerala document writers' and scribes' association, who have approached this court to declare that the registering authority under the registration act has no right to refuse registration of a document executed prior to 1-4-2005 on the ground that no stamp duty is paid as per finance act 10 of 2005.4. the learned single judge, on the basis of the definition of the words 'executed' and 'execution' contained in section 2(f) of the stamp act as meaning 'signed' and 'signature' as also the provisions of section 17 of the kerala stamp act providing that all instruments chargeable with duty and executed by any person in the state of kerala shall be stamped before or at the time of execution, read with section 23 of the registration act, 1908 providing for four months' time for presentation of documents for registration, from the date of its execution, concluded that documents signed by the vendor before 1-4-2005 need be stamped only at the rate applicable prior to the amendment of the kerala stamp act, by kerala finance act, 2005 as per which the amendment to the kerala stamp act came into force only with effect from 1-4-2005. the said decision is under challenge in the above writ appeals. in view of the pendency of the above writ appeals, the two writ petitions filed subsequently were also directed to be posted along with the writ appeals for hearing. accordingly, the writ appeals and the writ petitions are considered together.5. the main plank on which the state has built up their case is the expression 'unless the context otherwise requires' which precedes the various definitions in section 2 of the kerala stamp act containing the definition clause in which the words 'executed' and 'execution' have also been defined. the learned government pleader would argue that in view of the said expression used at the beginning of the definition clause, the words 'executed' and 'execution' occurring in the kerala stamp act would have to be construed on the basis of the context in which the expression is used and not on the basis of the definition in section 2(f) alone. the argument is that since the kerala stamp act deals with both compulsorily registrable documents as well as documents which do not require registration compulsorily, and in view of the fact that under section 54 of the transfer of property act, 1882, sale deeds in respect of immovable property of the value of rs. 100/- and upwards can be made only by a registered instrument, the words 'executed' and 'execution' in the context of compulsorily registrable document should be construed as meaning the completion of the act required for legal validity of the documents which, according to the learned government pleader, is the registration of the document. on that reasoning the learned government pleader would submit that construing the words 'executed' and 'execution' as above, the rate of duty payable in respect of the documents presented for registration after 31-3-2005 shall be the rate as amended by finance act, 2005 (act 10 of 2005).6. the writ petitioners, on the other hand, would contend that when the kerala stamp act itself provides a definition for the words 'executed' and 'execution' to mean 'signed' and 'signature' respectively, in view of section 17 of the kerala stamp act as also section 23 of the registration act, 1908, the rate of stamp duty applicable in respect of documents actually signed by the vendors prior to 1-4-2005 is that applicable immediately prior to the date of commencement of the amendment to the kerala stamp act, namely, 1-4-2005.7. we have considered the arguments of both sides in detail as also the decisions cited at the bar. before considering the arguments, we may note the relevant sections of the kerala stamp act which have bearing on the issue in question. the relevant provisions of section 2 of the act provides as follows:'2. in this act, unless the context otherwise requires,xxx xxx xxx(b) 'chargeable' means, as applied to an instrument executed or first executed after the commencement of this act, chargeable under this act, and as applied to any other instrument chargeable under the law in force in the territories of the state of kerala when such instrument was executed, or, where several persons executed the instrument at different times first executed.xxx xxx xxx(e) 'duly stamped' as applied to an instrument means that the instrument bears an adhesive or impressed stamp of not less than the proper amount and that such stamp has been affixed or used in accordance with the law for the time being in force in the territories of the state of kerala.(f) 'executed' and 'execution' used with reference to instruments, means 'signed' and 'signature'.8. section 3 of the act provides thus:'3. instruments chargeable with duty:-- subject to the provisions of this act and the exemptions contained in the schedule, the following instruments shall be chargeable with duty of the amount indicated in that schedule as the proper duty therefor, respectively, that is to say--(a) every instrument mentioned in that schedule which, not having been previously executed by any person, is executed in the territories of the state of kerala on or after commencement of this act; and(b) every instrument mentioned in the schedule which not having been previously executed by any person, is executed out of the state of kerala on or after that day, relates to any property situate, or to any matter or thing done or to be done, in the territories of the state of kerala and is received in the territories of the state of kerala;provided that no duty shall be chargeable in respect of-(1) any instrument, executed by, or on behalf of or in favour of the central government or this or any other state government in cases where, but for this exemption, the central government or the state government, would be liable to pay the duty chargeable in respect of such instrument;(2) any instrument for sale, transfer or other disposition either absolutely or by way of mortgage or otherwise of any ship or vessel or any part, interest, share or property of or in any ship or vessel.'9. section 17 of the act relates to the point of time when the instruments chargeable with duty should be stamped, which reads as follows:'17. instruments executed in the state of kerala:--all instruments chargeable with duty and executed by any person in the state of kerala shall be stamped before or at the time of execution.'going by the above provisions and particularly the definition of the words 'executed' and 'execution', the normal conclusion possible is that the rate of duty payable on a document is that prevalent as on the date when the person executing the document signs the same.10. however, the learned government pleader, relying on several decisions of the supreme court, would argue that the words 'unless the context otherwise requires' have a definite meaning in the context of the kerala stamp act, especially, in view of the fact that the kerala stamp act relates to both compulsorily registrable document as well as documents which do not require registration compulsorily. the first of those decisions is the decision in whirl pool corporation v. registrar of trade marks, mumbay and ors. (1998) 8 scc 1. construing the words 'unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context' occurring in definition clauses of statute, in paragraph 28 of the decision, the supreme court held as follows:'28. now, the principle is that all statutory definitions have to be read subject to the qualification variously expressed in the definition clauses which created them and it may be that even where the definition is exhaustive inasmuch as the word defined is said to mean a certain thing, it is possible for the word to have a somewhat different meaning in different sections of the act depending upon the subject or context. that is why all definitions in statutes generally begin with the qualifying words, similar to the words used in the present case, namely 'unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or contest'. thus, there may be sections in the act where the meaning may have to be departed from on account of the subject or context in which the word had been used and that will be giving effect to the opening sentence in the definition section, namely 'unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context'. in view of this qualification, the court has not only to look at the words but also to look at the context, the collocation and the object of such words relating to such matter and interpret the meaning intended to be conveyed by the use of the words 'under those circumstances.' (see vanguard fire and general insurance co. ltd. v. fraserr and ross, : [1960]3scr857 ).'11. in the decision of ramesh mehta v. sanwal chand singhvi and ors., (2004) 5 scc 409, interpreting the words 'unless the context otherwise requires', the supreme court, in paragraphs 26,27,28 and 31, held as follows:'26. the interpretation clause in the said act is prefaced with the expression 'unless the context otherwise requires'.27. a definition is not to be read in isolation. it must be read in the context of the phrase which would define it. it should not be vague or ambiguous. the definition of words must be given a meaningful application, where the context makes the definition given in the interpretation clause inapplicable, the same meaning cannot be assigned.28. in state of maharashtra v. indian medical assn., : air2002sc302 , one of us (v.n. khare, c.j.) stated that the definition given in the interpretation clause having regard to the contents would not be applicable. it was stated: (scc p.598, para 8)'8. a bare perusal of section 2 of the act shows that it starts with the words 'in this act, unless the context otherwise requires...'. let us find out whether in the context of the provisions of section 64 of the act the defined meaning of the expression 'management' can be assigned to the word ' management' in section 64 of the act. in para 3 of the regulation, the essentiality certificate is required to be given by the state government and permission to establish a new medical college is to be given by the state government under section 64 of the act. if we give the defined meaning to the expression 'management' occurring in section 64 of the act, it would mean the state government is required to apply to itself for grant of permission to set up a government medical college through the university. similarly, it would also mean the state government applying to itself for grant of essentiality certificate under para 3 of the regulation. we are afraid the defined meaning of the expression 'management' cannot be assigned to the expression 'management' occurring in section 64 of the act. in the present case, the context does not permit or require to apply the defined meaning to the word 'management' occurring in section 64 of the act.'xxx xxx xxx31. a subordinate or delegated legislation must also be read in a meaningful manner so as to give effect to the provisions of the statute. in selecting the true meaning of a word regard must be had to the consequences leading thereto. if two constructions are possible to adopt, a meaning which would make the provision workable and in consonance with the statutory scheme should be preferred.'12. the learned government pleader further invited our attention to the decision of the supreme court in deputy chief controller of imports and exports, new delhi v. k.t. kosalaram and ors., : 1971crilj1081 in the context of interpretation of statutes, in paragraph 8 of the said decision at page 89, the apex court held as follows:'... in our opinion, dictionary meanings, however helpful in understanding the general sense of the words cannot control where the scheme of the statute or the instrument considered as a whole clearly conveys a somewhat different shade of meaning. it is not always a safe way to construe a statute or a contract by dividing it by a process of etymological dissection and after separating words from their context to give each word some particular definition given by lexicographers and then to reconstruct the instrument upon the basis of these definitions. what particular meaning should be attached to words and phrases in a given instrument is usually to be gathered from the context, the nature of the subject matter, the purpose or the intention of the author and the effect of giving to them one or the other permissible meaning on the object to be achieved. words are after all used merely as a vehicle to convey the idea of the speaker or the writer and the words have naturally, therefore, to be so construed as to fit in with the idea which emerges on a consideration of the entire context. each word is but a symbol which may stand for one or a number of objects. the context in which a word conveying different shades of meaning is used, is of importance in determining the precise sense which fits in with the context as intended to be conveyed by the author ....'13. of course, no body can dispute the legal propositions as laid down by the supreme court in the above said decisions. but, what is to be looked into is whether, in this particular case, in the context of compulsorily registrable documents, it requires that the words 'executed' and 'execution' occurring in the kerala stamp act, should be interpreted to mean that in respect of documents compulsorily registrable, especially sale deeds which, as per section 54 of the transfer of property act, 1882, should be by a registered instrument, the words should be given a different meaning than what is given in the said definition clause so as to mean 'registered'. in support of this contention, the learned government pleader cited before us two decisions, namely, crompton engineering co. (madras) ltd. v. chief controlling revenue authority, madras, : air1953mad764 as also the decision of the court of appeals, chancery division in terrapin international ltd. v. inland revenue commissioners, reported in (1976) 2 all.e.r. ch.d. 461. the thrust of the argument is that since section 54 of the transfer of property act enjoins that a sale deed in respect of immovable property can be made only by a registered instrument, a sale deed can be said to be executed only when it is registered. for the purpose of stamp duty payable on a sale deed, the word 'executed' occurring in the kerala stamp act should be construed to mean 'registered' in so far as unless the same is registered, the document will not have any legal validity. the government pleader also took us through the various dictionary meanings of the word 'executed' in p. ramanatha aiyar's advanced law lexicon which read as follows:'the term 'executed' is a slippery word. its use is to be avoided except when accompanied by explanation. executed consideration is also used to mean past consideration as opposed to present or future. a contract is frequently said to be executed when the document has been signed, or has been signed, sealed, and delivered. further, by executed contract is frequent meant one that has been fully performed by both parties.' william r. anson, principles of the law of contract 26.(arthurl.corbined. 3d amed. 1919.''the word 'execute', 'executed', and 'execution' when used in their proper sense, convey the meaning of carrying out some act or course of conduct to its completion. 1937 awr 115:168 ic988:9ra 691:1937 alt 437:1937 alj 161: air 1937 all. 273. the sense in which the term is used should generally be determined from the context. in each of the applications of the term (as) the execution of a deed, of a writ, or of a criminal, by an execution, and in every other application of the word, there is, when the word is used in its strict sense, the same meaning, namely, that of completing or performing what the law either requires, orders or validates. (brown l. dict.)''the word 'execution' is hardly apt when used in regard to the drafting of a letter and is only appropriate in regard to a deed or instrument, as in such cases certain formalities are insisted upon by law and they are to be followed by the executant in order to make the document effective in law. there is no question of proving the 'execution' of a letter by the signatory. alapati sivaramakrishnayya v. alapati kasiviswanathan, air 1957 ap 584,587.''to execute a document simply means to perform what is required by law to give validity to a writing as by signing and sealing it. thakar dan singh bish v. state of uttar pradesh, : air1964all128 (government of india act (1935), section 175(3).''execution is, when applied to a document, the last act or series of acts, which complete it. it might be defined as formal completion. per farranj, in bhjawji v. dev panja 19b635.638.'''execution' means the due performance of all formalities necessary to give validity to a document. rv. beck, (1985) 1 all er 571 (ca) [theft act, 1968, section 20(2)].'according to the learned government pleader, since the words are capable of different meanings depending on the context, as is clear from the above, in the case of the kerala stamp act also, the words should be given the meaning which the context demands.14. in crompton engineering company's case (supra), the madras high court was dealing with a case regarding stamp duty payable on a mortgage deed which is a compulsorily registrable document. in respect of mortgage deed also under section 59 of the transfer of property act, 'where the principal money secured is one hundred rupees or upwards, a mortgage other than a mortgage by deposit of title deeds can be effected only by a registered instrument signed by the mortgagor and attested by at least two witnesses.' in that case, the mortgage deed produced was neither attested nor registered. the question that arose for consideration was whether the said mortgage deed was liable to stamp duty as a mortgage deed as defined in section 2(17) of the indian stamp act, 1899. holding that the mortgage deed in question which was neither attested nor registered is not a mortgage deed, the madras high court held as follows at paragraph 11 of the decision:'the very difference between the definition of an instrument in section 2(14) and a mortgage deed in section 2(17) should show that the 'transfer' provided for in section 2( 17) is a transfer valid in law. to make a document liable to stamp duty as a mortgage deed, it is not enough if the document purports to effect a transfer. it must 'transfer'.'based on this decision, the learned government pleader would argue that in this case also, unless the sale deed in question is registered, the same would not become a sale deed valid in law, by the mere signing of the document as provided in section 2(f) of the kerala stamp act and, therefore, the stamp duty payable on the sale deed would be at the rate as applicable at the time of registration and not any time before.15. in terrapin international ltd. case (supra), the appellant-company entered into an agreement dated 16-4-1974 with another corporation for exchange of their respective freehold properties. the deed of exchange and the duplicate thereof were sealed and delivered in escrow by the corporation and the appellant-company respectively between 26th and 30th of april. the conditions of the corporation's escrow required that the appellant-company should pay a sum by way of equality money which was actually fulfilled only on 8th may. the appellant-company submitted the deed to the inland revenue commissioners for adjudication regarding stamp duty. the commissioners were of the opinion that the instrument did not effect an exchange on 30th april and could not, therefore, attract stamp duty on 8th may when the conditions subject to which it was delivered in escrow were satisfied and assessed stamp duty in accordance with law in force on 8th may. the same was questioned by the appellant-company, according to whom the stamp duty payable was as on the date of execution of the agreement, namely, 16-4-1974. after considering the issue in detail, the court of appeal, held that the execution of a deed was a process rather than a single event taking place at a single instant of time. the process consisted of signature, sealing and unconditional delivery, thus, an escrow was not a deed and could not take effect as a deed unless the conditions subject to which it had been delivered, had been fulfilled. until then, it could not be considered as having been delivered unconditionally and, therefore, as having been executed within the meaning of the relevant act. in that view, the court held that the deed of exchange had only been executed as a deed on the day when the conditions attached to it were fulfilled, i.e. 8th may, 1974 and, accordingly, was liable to stamp duty at the rate in force on that date.16. in respect of these two decisions, as has been done in the decision of a division bench of this court in manohar kamath v. ram mohan kamath, 1992 (1) klt 714, we propose to disagree with the madras high court judgment for reasons to be stated later. in respect of the english decision, we would straight away notice that in that decision itself, the court of appeal had held thus:'of course, at the end of the day, everything depends on the particular provisions of the stamp act, 1891....'we also note that that was a case where the document was delivered in escrow. in those circumstances, we are unable to place much reliance on that decision, especially since we have to consider the issue in the light of the context in which the words 'executed' and 'execution' are used in the kerala stamp act.17. before proceeding further, we may also note another decision of the supreme court cited by the learned government pleader, namely, ram saran lall and ors. v. mst. domini kuer and ors., reported in : [1962]2scr474 . that related to a case of exercise of right of pre-emption under the muhammadan law, which had to be exercised after the sale was completed. the sale deed was executed on 31-1-1946. the person who had the right of pre-emption exercised the right on 2-2-1946. the document was presented for registration on 7-2-1946. the documents were copied in the registrar's book on 9-2-1946. the supreme court took the view that the registration under the registration act is not completed till the document to be registered has been copied out in the records of the registration office as provided in section 61 of that act. the sale is not completed until the registration of the instrument of the sale is completed and, therefore, the pre-emption exercised before that date is not valid. we must say that this decision cannot be an authority for the purpose of deciding the rate of stamp duty applicable under the kerala stamp act in so far as it would only support the proposition that a sale is complete only when the sale deed is copied in the records of the registration office as provided in section 61 of the registration act, which proposition does not need any authority in view of the express provisions of section 54 of the transfer of property act.18. counsel for the writ petitioners would contest the argument of the learned government pleader on the basis of section 54 of the transfer of property act and would contend that although a sale deed becomes operative only when it is registered as per the provisions of the registration act, once the registration has been effected, the sale deed becomes operative retrospectively from the date of execution. in support of this proposition, they have cited before us two supreme court decisions as also a decision of a learned single judge of this court which we shall discuss presently.19. in hamda ammal v. avadiappa pathar and ors., : (1991)1scc715 , the supreme court was dealing with a somewhat similar question on that point. in that case, hamda ammal purchased the suit property by a sale deed dated 9-9-1970 which was got registered on 26-10-1970. before the registration of the sale deed, the respondent filed a suit and obtained attachment before judgment on 17-9-1970 of the property in question. the question which arose was whether hamda ammal is entitled to the property sold in her favour by virtue of the sale deed dated 9-9-1970, but registered subsequently on october 26,1970 or the respondent had a better claim to the property on account of an attachment before judgment made on september 17,1970 in the suit filed by him on september 30, 1970, i.e. prior to the date of registration of the sale deed in favour of hamda ammal. dealing with this question, the supreme court held in paragraphs 3 to 5 as follows:'3. section 64 cpc prohibits private alienation of property after attachment and reads as under:'64. where an attachment has been made, any private transfer or delivery of the property attached or of any interest therein and any payment to the judgment debtor of any debt, dividend or other monies contrary to such attachment, shall be void as against all claims enforceable under the attachment.explanation: for the purposes of this section, claims enforceable under an attachment include claims for the rate able distribution of assets.'the above provision bans or prohibits a private transfer or delivery of the property attached or of any interest therein contrary to such attachment as void as against all claims enforceable under the attachment. the order of attachment is issued on a prescribed form no. 24 in appendix e to cpc which prohibits and restrains defendant from transferring or charging the property by sale, gift or otherwise. thus, neither in section 64 cpc nor in the form prescribed for attachment there is any prohibition for submitting the document of sale for registration. the act of submitting the sale deed for registration which has already been executed prior to an attachment is not an act of transfer which is prohibited under the above provisions.4. section 54 of the act defines sale as 'a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised.' thus, after the execution of the sale deed with consideration all the ingredients of sale are fulfilled except that in case of tangible immovable property of the value of rs. 100 and upwards it can be made only by registered instrument. now, if we read section 47 of the registration act, it clearly provides that a registered document shall operate from the time from which it would have commenced to operate if no registration thereof had been required or made and not from the time of its registration. this provision makes it clear that after the registration it will relate back to the date of execution of the sale deed. the act of registration is to be performed by the registering authority. according to section 23 of the registration act, a document of the nature of sale deed shall be accepted for registration within four months from the date of its execution. thus, a statutory period of four months has been provided for presenting the sale deed for registration from the date of its execution. in case of dispute regarding the execution of the document an enquiry is permitted under section 74(a) of the registration act and that may also take some time. the legislature being alive to such situations has already provided in section 47 of the registration act that it shall operate from the time from which it would commence to operate if no registration thereof had been required or made and not from the time of its registration. thus, in our view, the vendee gets rights which will be related back on registration from the date of the execution of the sale deed and such rights are protected under order xxxviii rule 10 cpc read together with section 47 of the registration act.5. we cannot accept the contention of learned counsel for the respondent that till registration, the execution of the sale deed does not confer any rights whatsoever on the vendee. even section 49 of the registration act in its proviso inserted by section 10 of the transfer of property (amendment) supplementary act, 1929, negatives the above contention of the learned counsel. the above provision lays down that an unregistered document affecting immovable property and required by this act or by the transfer of property act, 1882, to be registered may be received as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance under chapter ii of the specific relief act, 1877, or as an evidence of part performance of a contract for the purposes of section 53-a of the transfer of property act, 1882, or as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered instrument. thus, even an unregistered document can be received as evidence for purposes mentioned in the proviso to section 49 of the registration act.'it may be noted here that this case also noted the decision of ram saran lall's case referred to above.20. in the decision of gurbax sing v. kartar singh and ors., (2002) 2 scc 611, after construing section 47 of the registration act, 1908, the supreme court held in paragraph 3 as follows:'3. in view of the provisions of section 47 of the registration act, 1908, it is well settled that a document on subsequent registration will take effect from the time when it was executed and not from the time of its registration. where two documents are executed on the same clay, the time of their execution would determine the priority irrespective of the time of their registration. the one which is executed earlier in time will prevail over the other executed subsequently....'21. we may note that a learned single judge of this court in poulose v. devassy kutty, 1990(1) klt 42, came to the same conclusion on the 'basis of construction of sections 47 and 49 of the registration act.22. we have now to see whether the words 'executed' and 'execution' admits of a meaning other than what is given to the words in the definition in section 2(f) in the context of a sale deed as indicated by the words 'unless the context otherwise requires', with which the definition clause starts. the contention of the state is that since sale is not complete until the sale deed is registered, in respect of compulsorily registrable documents, 'execution' referred to in the kerala stamp act would mean 'registration under the indian registration act'. however, we note that except in sections 45a and 45b which relate to the procedure for dealing with under valuation of documents and which was inserted in the act after the act was originally enacted in the kerala stamp act, there is no reference to the word 'registration' in any part relating to charging, determination and payment of stamp duty. section 3 of the stamp act, which can be regarded as the charging section, refers to execution of document. section 9 of the act, which relates to the power of the government to reduce, remit or compound duties also refers to execution of documents. section 17 prescribes that all instruments chargeable with duty and executed by any person in the state of kerala shall be stamped before or at the time of execution. section 27 of the act which relates to stamp duty in cases where the value of subject matter is indeterminate, also refers to ascertainment of the value at the date of its execution or first execution. section 40 prescribes the procedure whereby a person can get a document not duly stamped. a document not duly stamped can be got stamped in accordance with the stamp act by producing the same before the collector within one year from the date of its execution or first execution. section 60 of the act prescribes that any person executing or signing otherwise than as a witness in instrument chargeable with duty without the same being duly stamped shall, for every such offence, be punishable with fine. (here, the learned government pleader wanted us to note that this section used both the words 'execution' and 'signing' and argued that such use is significant in the context. but, we are of the opinion that the word 'signing' in this section qualifies the words 'otherwise than as a witness' and no such significance as sought to be made out by the learned government pleader could be attached to the same. all these sections would categorically point to the fact that the event which attracts stamp duty on a document is its execution as defined in section 2(f) and not otherwise.23. the proposition that the entire stamp law envisages a document as liable to stamp duty at the time when the instrument is executed, would appear to necessarily follow from the definition of 'chargeable' under section 2(b) from the terms of section 3(a) as also from the explicit terms of section 17 of the kerala stamp act. that appears to be the ratio of the decision of the supreme court in new central jute mills v. state of west bengal, reported in air 1963 sc 1307, although the facts of the case perhaps constitute an unique situation. that was a case where a mortgage deed was executed in uttar pradesh, though it related to property situate in west bengal, and the document was received in that state for registration. the document had been stamped in accordance with the law of west bengal, but the judgment held that when the document came up before the officers of uttar pradesh, they were bound to hold that the instrument was not duly stamped as it did not bear stamps as applicable to uttar pradesh. although the decision did not specifically consider the question of incidence of stamp duty in relation to registration and execution specifically, it authoritatively held that 'primarily the liability of an instrument to stamp duty arises on execution.' since in that case the registration was in west bengal and execution in uttar pradesh and the supreme court held that it should have borne stamp duty as applicable to uttar pradesh, the case is certainly an authority for the proposition that the charging event is 'execution' meaning signature and not registration as contended by the state in this case.24. we are also of the opinion that the provisions of the registration act also would support such a conclusion. section 23 of the registration act, 1908 reads as under:'23. time for presenting documents:-- subject to the provisions contained in sections 24, 25 and 26, no document other than a will shall be accepted for registration unless presented for that purpose to the proper officer within four months from the date of its execution:provided that a copy of a decree or order may be presented within four months from the day on which the decree or order was made, or where it is appeal able, within four months from the day on which it becomes final.'section 24 of the registration act further prescribes the mode of registration and re-registration for extension of period before which a document has to be presented for registration by a further period of four months in addition to the period prescribed under section 23 in cases where delay in presentation was unavoidable. section 32 reads thus:'32. persons to present documents for registration:-- except in the cases mentioned in sections 31, 88 and 89, every document to be registered under this act, whether such registration be compulsory or optional, shall be presented at the proper registration office,-(a) by some person executing or claiming under the same, or, in the case of a copy of a decree or order claiming under the decree or order, or(b) by the representative or assign of such person, or(c) by the agent of such person, representative or assign, duly authorised by power-of-attorney executed and authenticated in manner hereinafter mentioned.'section 34 relates to enquiry before registration by the registering officer, which requires the registering officer to satisfy himself as to whether or not the document presented for registration was executed by persons by whom it purports to have been executed. section 35 prescribes the procedure regarding admission of execution by person executing the documents as also the procedure to be followed by the registering officer in case of denial of execution by whom the document purports to be executed.25. these sections of the registration act and other sections therein categorically make a distinction between execution and registration. in this connection, it may further be noted that the registration act does not make any distinction between compulsorily registrable documents and documents registration of which are only optional, as is clear from section 32, which would further go to discredit the contention of the learned government pleader that compulsorily registrable documents stand differently in the matter of stamp duty and, therefore, by virtue of the words 'unless the context otherwise requires' occurring in section 2, the words 'executed' and 'execution' should be assigned a different meaning in the context of compulsorily registrable documents.26 . in leela dhundiraj divekar v. e.c. shinde, sub-registrar and anr., air 1970 bombay 109, the bombay high court has held that though the stamp act and registration act cannot, strictly speaking, be said to be enactments which are in pan materia, the two acts may be read together and the definition in the stamp act applies to the registration act. since the stamp act has a distinct relationship with the registration act, we are also of opinion that these two acts are essentially interconnected and complimentary to each other. that being so, for the purpose of construing the provisions of one act, the help of the other act ascertainable from its provisions can certainly be resorted to for the purpose of construction. the very fact that the words 'executed' and 'registration' have been used in two separate distinctive sense through out the registration act, would point to the definite conclusion that the registration act essentially regards the two events as distinct and separate, execution being an act prior to registration in point of time. that would further lead to the conclusion that the registration act uses the word 'execution' in the very same meaning assigned to it by the definition given to the word in section 2(f) of the kerala stamp act. construing as such, the inescapable conclusion is that for the purposes of stamp duty, the charging event is execution as defined in section 2(f) of the kerala stamp act and is unconnected with the subsequent event of registration.27. here we may note another flaw in the argument of the learned government pleader on the basis of section 54 of the transfer of property act. going by the decision of the supreme court in ram saran lall 's case (supra), the registration is complete only when the document is copied out in the records of the registration office, and consequently the requirement for validity of a sale under section 54 of transfer of property act would be complete only then. then, the question will arise as to what is the incident of stamp duty in that case. is it the date when the document is presented for registration? is it the date when the document is registered? is it the date when the document is copied out in the records of the registration office? these three acts need not be on the same date obviously. out of the three acts, over the latter two acts, the party executing the document has no control whatsoever which, therefore, cannot be made the determining event for purposes of deciding rate of stamp duty. if date of presentation is taken as the event for the purpose, then the requirement of section 54 of the transfer of property act is still not fulfilled, which would further lead to the conclusion that the words 'executed' and 'execution' cannot have a meaning connected with registration and, therefore, would have the same meaning as given by the definition under section 2(f) even in the context of compulsory registrable documents. that being so, going by section 17 of the kerala stamp act, the rate of duty applicable to a particular document whether it is compulsorily registrable or not would be the date when the person executing the document signs the same, and not the date when the document is presented for registration.28. we are supported in this view by a decision of a division bench of this court in manohar kammath v. ram mohan kammath. 1991 (2) klt 714. in paragraphs 14 and 25 of the said judgment, this court held as follows:'14. the definition of executed and execution in a way restricts and confines it to mean signed, and signature. it is possible to say that it may include the signatures of all persons, who are required by the character of the document to sign in the document. this we say because there may be cases where both parties have to sign in the document, and if one of the parties alone has signed, it will be difficult for us to hold that the document is executed. this is important because the chargeability of stamp duty depends upon execution of the document. it is also perhaps possible to hold in the context that if a document had to be signed by attesting witnesses in order to make it a valid execution of the document the signatures of the attesting witnesses are also to be necessary to treat the document as an instrument, executed falling within the definition of that category of instruments, chargeable with stamp duty. but, once a document is complete in execution in the sense that all persons required to be signed in the document have signed, then at once, the chargeability under the stamp act is attracted. a liability to stamp duty is brought down upon the instrument with reference to the relevant articles as soon as it is executed. we give emphasis to this aspect of the matter, for the reason that the liability to stamp duty is the cause for holding that the instrument is not properly stamped, and the liability commences and continues as soon as the instrument is executed. perhaps, the instrument may not be valid in law for other reasons. nevertheless, it attracts the liability for stamp duty, when the execution of its is completed.'xxx xxx xxx'25. we are of opinion, when the full bench of the andhra pradesh high court said that an instrument need not be valid in law or meet the requirements of law as a valid document, only indicates that it is not a document of a particular category or character, which is enforceable in law. we say so, because if a document is per se invalid, on account of the fact that it has not been properly executed, it cannot be said that even though it is not a valid document in law, stamp duty has to be paid. when a document is executed and that document requires further formalities to be complied with, like registration for making it an enforceable document, it cannot be said that it is not a valid document, for the purpose of stamp duty. a document can be a valid document, but it may not be an enforceable document. all valid documents at all times, may not be enforceable. nevertheless they may retain the character or be included in the category of the document in question and perhaps, continue to be a valid document. it is informative to note that in burma, formal documents written on palm leaves are by custom treated as completed documents and admitted in evidence, though not signed. but, under section 2(12) being unsigned, such documents will not be liable to stamp duty as they are not executed. thus, it has been held by a full bench of the burma chief court in in re chet po. 22 ind cas. 75 = air 1914 low bur 219 (fb) that the instrument chargeable with stamp duty on being executed is not liable to duty until it is signed, although this fact does not necessarily imply that the unsigned document is incomplete for the purpose for which it was drawn up. again in air 1936 lah. 449 (shams din v. collector, amritsar), a special bench of the lahore high court held that the intention behind the definition given under section 2(12) of the stamp act was to make it clear at what time, a document became executed so as to be chargeable with stamp duty under section 3 of the stamp act. coldstream, j. delivering the judgment of the bench said:'signature alone will not, in all cases, complete the execution of a document for the purpose of giving it legal validity, for instance a will may not be legally executed until it is duly attested by witnesses, a hundi is not executed until it is delivered (see (1895) ilr 19 bom. 635), but for the purpose of stamp act, the clause makes all documents which are chargeable soon as they are signed by the executant'.'29. while laying down the law as was done in the said decision, the division bench derived support from two decisions, one of the madras high court in chief controlling revenue authority v. canara industrial and banking syndicate ltd.. madras and ors., : air1969mad1 as also the full bench decision of the andhra pradesh high court in hazrami gangaram v. kamalabai, air 1968 a.r 213. in : air1969mad1 , the madras high court held as follows at paragraphs 6 and 9:'6. the learned additional government pleader would thus appear to be perfectly justified in his contention that the document has to be considered as chargeable with stamp duty, when it is executed, which term 'executed' itself has to be interpreted in the light of the definition embodied in section 2(12). actually, there can be no question of impounding the document and recovering the proper stamp duty from the party liable, subsequent to registration and this is not disputed....'xxx xxx xxx'... we may point out that though registration is necessary under the law, to give legal effect to the document, it is not merely a power of the executant to register the document, the party to whom the interest is conveyed can also have it compulsorily registered. obviously the category under which an instrument falls cannot be affected by the mere absence of registration, if the document is otherwise fully dispositive in character and duly executed.... if 'executed' means 'signed' and 'execution' means 'signature', it is clear that this will include the signatures of all persons who are required by the character of document to sign in the document, in order to give that document effect according to law. we have no doubt, therefore, that if a document is of such a character that both parties to the document should sign it, to constitute it a binding agreement between them, it should contain the signatures of both; similarly, if it had to be signed by two other attestors in order to make it legal, this will also be necessarily, part of the definition. but, once a document is complete in execution in sense, and the effective words of disposition are there immediately transferring rights by the very virtue of the document, the question of its subsequent registration is a distinct matter altogether and the document is certainly liable to stamp duty with reference to the relevant article of the stamp act, since execution is complete.'30. in this decision, the later full bench of the madras high court considered the earlier full bench decision reported in crompton engineering co. (madras) ltd. v. chief controlling revenue authority. air 1953 mad. 764 (fb) which is relied on by the learned government pleader. the earlier full bench decision was distinguished and explained by the later full bench in the following words:'it would be an erroneous principle of interpreting the judgment, to press into service the last few observations alone, divorced from the earlier dicta and the explicit fact that the learned judges were dealing with a document, which could not be a 'mortgage deed' at all, because it was not attested by two witnesses, as the law requires. clearly, what the learned judge meant was that, where the document contained recitals of disposition creating a transfer of rights, by the very force the recitals between the parties, and it has been completely executed the requirements of the law being satisfied in that respect it must be interpreted as actually transferring the rights, and hence as amounting either to a conveyance or a mortgage deed, as the case may be. but, where this execution is incomplete, even if the recitals purport to transfer rights, the document cannot come under the category of a 'mortgage deed' as defined in law. the learned judge explicitly observed 'leaving aside the question of registration of an insufficiently stamped document' in the earlier passage.'then, their lordships again observed thus:'the case in air 1953 mad. 764 (fb) did not go beyond this, for the learned judges of the full bench had before them an actual document which was not duly executed at all. a different interpretation of this judgment would really render the provisions of the stamp act nugatory, envisaging as they do the charging of an instrument under the relevant article of sch.i depending solely on the terms of the creation of rights and due and complete execution, since the document is necessarily executed prior to its registration....'31. in the andhra pradesh full bench decision, consisting of five judges, the court was dealing with a document which was purported to be a mortgage. in that decision, after referring to the relevant provisions of the stamp act, transfer of property act and the registration act, the court said that for the purpose of stamp act, the crucial time for determining whether an instrument is chargeable with duty and is duly stamped or not is before or at the time of its execution and no other formalities under any law need be satisfied. in considering this question, the court also held that there is no warrant for the importation of the requirements of either of the transfer of property act or the registration act for construction of document or instruments under the stamp act as the stamp act itself specifically defines the terms used therein. the andhra pradesh full bench, in that decision, specifically held as under:'to hold that an instrument must be a valid one under law before it is liable to stamp duty will be to ignore the requirements of the definition or to make them otiose. further, if the document required registration for legal validity before it can be considered whether it is liable for stamp duty or not, then the registrar cannot impound it before registration, though he is so authorised under section 33 and under section 35 unless an instrument is duly stamped, it cannot be registered or received in evidence. in other words, the definition and the terms of every section of the act indicate clearly that an instrument need not be valid in law or meet the requirements of law as a valid document before it is chargeable to stamp duty under the act.'in taking this view, the andhra pradesh high court respectfully dissented from the views expressed by the judges of the madras high court in crompton engineering company's case (supra). with great respect, we are also of the considered view that the decision in crompton engineering company's case does not lay down the correct law (notwithstanding the explanation and distinguishing attempted by the later full bench decision in air 1969 mad. 1) and we would respectfully agree with the decisions in manohar kammath 's case (supra) of this court and that of the andhra pradesh high court in hazrami gangaram's case (supra), as also the decision of the madras high court reported in : air1969mad1 . two other decisions of the allahabad and andhra pradesh high courts have also been cited before us viz. rajendra prasad garg v. chief controlling revenue authority. u.p., allahabad and ors.. air 2002 allahabad 162 and media anasuyamma and anr. v. choppela lakshmamma, : air1992ap183 . although these cases do state that the relevant date for the purpose of determining the rate of stamp duty is the date of execution, the said decisions do not appear to have considered the import of the word 'execution' specifically and whether the word 'execution' would mean anything other than what is defined in section 2(f) in the context of compulsorily registrable documents. therefore, we do not think that the said decisions are of much help to us in deciding these cases.32. in conclusion, we hold that for the purpose of determining the rate of stamp duty, the date of execution as defined in section 2(f) of the kerala stamp act is the determining date and the date of presentation for registration or registration itself would not have any bearing whatsoever on the question. it necessarily follows that in cases where sale deeds and other compulsorily registrable documents, executed prior to 1-4-2005 and presented for registration subsequent to 31-3-2005, the rate of stamp duty applicable is that existing prior to 1-4-2005 and will be unaffected by the amendment made by the finance act, 2005. needless to add, this would be circumscribed by the period of limitation prescribed by sections 23 and 25 of the registration act, 1908. in view of our above finding, there is no merit in the appeals filed by the state. accordingly, w.a.nos. 1510,1527,1530,1980,2022,2030 & 2062 of 2005 are dismissed. therefore, in respect of the documents stated to have been executed prior to 1.4.2005 and presented for registration subsequent to 31-3-2005, the concerned sub-registrars are directed to follow the procedure as directed in paragraph 6 of the judgment of the learned single judge impugned in those appeals with necessary changes regarding the date for compliance, as indicated by us hereinafter, which we extract herein below for convenience:'the documents which were signed before 01 -04-2005, shall be accepted and registered by the concerned sub registrars, if the stamp duty prevailing before 01 -04-2005 is paid. if the sub registrars entertain any doubt regarding the date of execution of the documents, the affected parties shall be put on notice and only after hearing them, a decision shall be taken. if any one is aggrieved by the decision, concerning the date of execution, he will be free to work out his remedy. all documents found to have been executed before 01-04-2005, shall be registered by the concerned sub registrars within one month from the date of production of a copy of this judgment or before the expiry of four months from 31 -03-2005, whichever is earlie:. it is made clear that the powers of the statutory authorities to proceed against the documents found to have been not properly stamped, are not affected by the directions issued above. the documents which were registered pursuant to the interim orders of this court shall be treated as having been registered regularly, provided the concerned sub registrars find that those documents were, in fact, executed before 01-04-2005.'for this purpose, the parties will re-present their respective documents for registration before the concerned sub registrars on or before 15-11-2005, on presentation of which the sub registrars will treat the same as presented within the period prescribed under section 23 of the registration act, 1908. in making this direction, we have kept in . mind the powers of the registrar under section 25 of the registration act also by which the registrar has been conferred with powers to condone the delay in presentation owing to urgent necessity and unavoidable accident for a further period of four months as also in view of the fact that the parties are stated to have presented the documents for registration within the time stipulated under section 23 and the sub registrar is stated to have refused to register the same on account of the dispute regarding the rate of stamp duty applicable.w.p(c) no. 25121 of 200533. in this writ petition, the petitioner claims to have presented the sale deed executed on 30-3-2005 before the 2nd respondent sub registrar on 2-6-2005 and paid the registration fee as per ext.p2 receipt on 2-6-2005. if the same is true, the benefit of the directions in the above writ appeals would be extended to the petitioner in this writ petition also. the writ petition is disposed of accordingly.w.p(c) no. 22637 of 200534. in this writ petition, the petitioner claims to have executed the sale deed on 31-3-2005. the petitioner also states that he presented the same for registration on 27-7-2005 and the section r.o., ernakulam refused to register the same insisting that duty should be paid at the rate prevailing on the date of registration. if the petitioner presents the sale deed for registration on or before 15-11-2005 and if the sub registrar is satisfied that this document was, in fact, executed before 1-4-2005, he will extend the benefit of the directions in the above writ appeals to the petitioner's case also. however, if the document had not been presented on 27-7-2005 for registration as claimed by the petitioner, it will be open to the sub registrar to proceed in accordance with section 25 of the registration act. the writ petition is disposed of accordingly.