Suresh. C. Vs. the State of Kerala, - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citationsooperkanoon.com/728148
SubjectCivil
CourtKerala High Court
Decided OnJul-15-2009
Case NumberWA. No. 903 of 2009
Judge S.R. Bannurmath, C.J. and; Kurian Joseph, J.
Reported in2009(2)KLJ876
ActsKerala Stamp Act, 1959 - Sections 69; Kerala Manufacture and Sale of Stamp Rules, 1960 - Rules 35(7), 35(8), 35(14), 35(16) and 35(22); Kerala Manufacture and Sale of Stamp (Amendment) Rules, 2007 - Rule 35(22)
AppellantSuresh. C.
RespondentThe State of Kerala, ;inspector General of Registration, ;The Director of Treasuries and the Distric
Appellant Advocate G. Sreekumar (Chelur), Adv.
Respondent AdvocateNo Appearance
DispositionAppeal dismissed
Cases Referred and Hindustan Aeronautics v. Radhika Thirumalai
Excerpt:
- labour & services appointment: [v.k. bali, ch, p.r. raman & s. siri jagan, jj] post of pharmacist in homeopathy subordinate service - special rules for kerala homeopathy subordinate service rules, 1999 introducing new qualifications vacancy arising subsequent to coming into force of the said special rules held, vacancies have to be filled up only in accordance with special rules, 1999. unfilled vacancy that had arisen prior to amendment cannot be filled up by candidate not possessing amended qualifications prescribed by special rules. state government has the power to frame or amend the special rules with or without retrospective effect. mohanan k.r. & anr vs director of homeopathy, kerala homeopathy services, trivandrum & ors. - 5. what is the principle or policy that would best serve the object and purpose of the act is for the legislature or its delegate to decide. that is a well settled principle. it is also a well settled position that the unreasonableness that invalidates a subordinate legislation is not the antonym of reasonableness as understood in common parlance. the grounds of challenging the validity of subordinate legislation are well known. it is also well recognised that a subordinate legislation can be challenged under any of the following grounds: (d) failure to conform to the statute under which it is made or exceeding the limits of authority conferred by the enabling act. (f) manifest arbitrariness/unreasonableness (to an extent where the court might well say that the legislature never intended to give authority to make such rules). 16. the court considering the validity of a subordinate legislation, will have to consider the nature, object and scheme of the enabling act, and also the area over which power has been delegated under the act and then decide whether the subordinate legislation conforms to the parent statute. 13. the learned government pleader would contend that dying in harness being the concept in providing preference, the classification now made by the government under the amended rules in not giving preference to those licensees who died after crossing the age of 65 is perfectly just and reasonable even in the ordinary sense of the term.kurian joseph, j.1. the validity of recently introduced rule 35(22) of the kerala manufacture and sale of stamp rules, 1960 is under challenge in these cases. the said rule reads as follows:35 (22) in the event of the death of a licensed stamp vendor, the district treasury officer shall take immediate steps for filling up the vacancy: provided that, if the death occurs before attaining the age of 65 years, a legal heir duly authorized by the other legal heirs, if any, may be appointed as the licensed vendor in the vacancy if he is otherwise qualified to be appointed and makes out an application before the district treasury officer within three months from the date of death. 2. appellant is the writ petitioner. the writ petition was filed mainly with the following prayer:declare that the sub-rule 22 of rule 35 of the kerala manufacture and sale of stamp (amendment) rules, 2007 will work out prospectively in so far as it is applicable only to those vendors who will attain 65 years of age after the date of coming into force of the act. 3. the learned single judge declined to grant the relief. it was held that any claim for appointment by a legal heir made subsequent to the introduction of ext.p1 rules has to be dealt with in the light of the amended rules. in that case the original licensee expired on 11.12.2008, after crossing the age of 65 years. therefore, the application filed by the petitioner in his capacity as legal heir was rejected. it was further held by the learned single judge that the sub-rule (22) quoted above has been introduced as a concession extended to the legal heirs of the licensee who had not attained the age of 65 and therefore, it is for the government to fix such a condition.4. in w.p.(c) no. 33615 of 2007 the licensed stamp vendor died on 3.9.2007 at the age of 87 and, therefore, the application filed by the petitioner as the legal heir was not considered. in the said writ petition also the challenge is to the validity of the rules on the ground of discrimination on the basis of age.5. what is the principle or policy that would best serve the object and purpose of the act is for the legislature or its delegate to decide. that is a well settled principle. the courts will not be justified in sitting in judgment over the wisdom of the policy maker and striking down a regulation on the only ground that in the view of the court a provision is not reasonable. it is also a well settled position that the unreasonableness that invalidates a subordinate legislation is not the antonym of reasonableness as understood in common parlance. that unreasonableness which invalidates a subordinate legislation is manifest arbitrariness or injustice to the extent of holding inevitably that the legislature never intended to give authority to the rule maker to make such a rule. in mixnam's properties ltd. v. chertsey urban district council 1964 (1) q.b.214 at 237, lord diplock has succinctly analyzed the true sense of unreasonableness in legal parlance. the relevant portion of the judgment reads as follows:the various special grounds upon which subordinate legislation has sometimes been said to be void - for example, because it is unreasonable; because it is uncertain; because it is repugnant to the general law or to some other statute - can, i think, today be properly regarded as being particular application of the general rule that subordinate legislation, to be valid, must be shown to be within the powers conferred by the statute. thus, the kind of unreasonableness which invalidates a by-law is not the antonym of 'unreasonableness' in the sense of which that expression is used in the common law, but such manifest arbitrariness, injustice or partiality that a court would say: 'parliament never intended to give authority to make such rules; they are unreasonable and ultra vires. 6. in indian express newspapers (bombay) private ltd. and ors. v. union of india and ors. the supreme court held that a subordinate legislation can be challenged on the ground that it is unreasonable, 'unreasonable not in the sense of not being reasonable, but in the sense that it is manifestly arbitrary'. in a still earlier decision in state of u.p. v. hindustan aluminium corporation : [1979]3scr709 , the supreme court while considering the ground for challenging the validity of the subordinate legislation held as follows:the grounds of challenging the validity of subordinate legislation are well known. the challenge may be on the ground that the power to make the law could not have been exercised in the circumstances which were prevailing at the time when it was made, or that a condition precedent to the making of the legislation did not exist, or that the authority which made the order was not competent to do so, or that the order was not made according to the procedure prescribed by law, or that its provisions were outside the scope of the enabling power in the parent act or were otherwise violative of its provisions or of any other existing statute. 7. in pankajakshy and ors. v. george mathew and ors. 1987 (2) klt 723, a division bench of this court has beautifully summarised with lucidity the grounds for challenging a subordinate legislation in paragraph 12 of the judgment which reads as follows:12.thus, the rule made under a statute by an authority delegated for the purpose can be challenged on the ground (1) that it is ultra vires of the act; (2) it is opposed to the fundamental rights; (3) it is opposed to other plenary laws. to ascertain whether a rule is ultra vires of the act, the court can go into the question (a) whether it contravenes expressly or impliedly any of the provisions of the statute; (b) whether it achieves the intent and object of the act; and (c) whether it is 'unreasonable' to be manifestly arbitrary, unjust or partial implying thereby want of authority to make such rules. 8. there is a presumption in favour of constitutionality or validity of a subordinate legislation. it has been held so while stating the principles in that regard in the decision reported in state of t.n. and anr. v. p.krishnamurthy and ors. : air2006sc1622 . paragraphs 15 and 16 of the said judgment reads as follows:15. there is a presumption in favour of constitutionality or validity of a subordinate legislation and the burden is upon him whom attacks it to show that it is invalid. it is also well recognised that a subordinate legislation can be challenged under any of the following grounds: (a) lack of legislative competence to make the subordinate legislation. (b) violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under the constitution of india. (c) violation of any provision of the constitution of india. (d) failure to conform to the statute under which it is made or exceeding the limits of authority conferred by the enabling act. (e) repugnancy to the laws of the land, that is, any enactment. (f) manifest arbitrariness/unreasonableness (to an extent where the court might well say that the legislature never intended to give authority to make such rules). 16. the court considering the validity of a subordinate legislation, will have to consider the nature, object and scheme of the enabling act, and also the area over which power has been delegated under the act and then decide whether the subordinate legislation conforms to the parent statute. where a rule is directly inconsistent with a mandatory provision of the statute, then, of course, the task of the court is simple and easy. but where the contention is that the inconsistency or non-conformity of the rule is not with reference to any specific provision of the enabling act, but with the object and scheme of the parent act, the court should proceed with caution before declaring invalidity.in that case, after following the decision of a constitution bench in shri sitaram sugar co. ltd. v. union of india : [1990]1scr909 it was held in paragraph 27 of the judgment as follows:27. a delegated legislation, though legislative in character, will be invalid, on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice, if the enabling act under which the delegated legislation is made, specifically requires observance of the principles of natural justice for doing the act. 9. in vasu dev singh v. union of india (2006) 12 scc 753; state of kerala v. unni : air2007sc819 ; j.k.industries ltd. v. union of india (2007) 13 scc 673 and hinsa virodhak sangh v. mirzapur moti kuresh jamat : air2008sc1892 , the above referred principles have been more elaborately reiterated and followed. the supreme court in h.c.suman and anr. v. rehabilitation ministry employees' cooperative house building society ltd., new delhi and ors. : [1991]3scr839 , after quoting kruse v. johnson (1898) 2 qb 91, held that 'in determining validity of bye-law made by public representative bodies the court ought to be slow to hold that a bye-law is void for unreasonabeleness. a bye-law so made ought to be supported unless it is manifestly partial and unequal in its operation between different classes, or unjust, or made in bad faith, or clearly involving an unjustifiable interference with the liberty of those subject to it.'10. the challenge to the rules in the present cases has to be analyzed in the light of the settled position of law as discussed above. there is no case that the impugned rules contravenes any of the provisions of the statute. then the question is whether the provision achieves the intent and object of the act. the kerala stamp act, 1959 was enacted to consolidate and amend the law relating to stamps in the state of kerala, particularly in the matter of rate of stamp duty. section 69 of the said act empowers the government to frame rules for the supply and sale of stamps and stamp papers, prescribing the persons by whom alone such sale has to be conducted, the duties and remuneration of such persons and the fine for breach of any rule. the rule as it originally introduced in the year 1960 did not have any provision at all providing for a right to the legal heir to obtain a licence. in fact, it was specifically provided under rule 35(8) of the old rules that the stamp vendor's licence issued shall be valid only for a period of 3 years and after the expiry of the said period the licensee shall apply for licence afresh. it is true that the government had issued a circular dated 18.4.1980 in the matter of issuance of licence giving preference to dependents of stamp vendors who died in harness. that circular was issued on a memorandum submitted by the north kerala licensed stamp vendors association. the operative portion of the circular reads as follows:government have examined the above request in all its aspects and are pleased to direct that in future while considering the issue of a vendors licence that has arisen consequent on the demise of stamp vendor preference will be given to the dependant of the deceased stamp vendor provided he/she submits an application in time for the purpose and is otherwise qualified for holding a stamp vendors licence. dependants for this purpose may be in the order as given below. widow, son/daughter, brother/sister and father/mother, son daughter includes adopted son/adopted daughter for this purpose. 11. the circular dated 18.4.1980 was replaced by another circular dated 19.11.1983 substituting the term dependant as legal heir. there also it is clear that the government was considering the request for preference to dependants of stamp vendors who died in harness. it is significant to note that the rules provide that a person shall not be eligible to apply for licence in case he has crossed 60 years of age. under the amended rules, there is a provision for renewal of the licence in rule 35(14) which reads as follows:a license issued under these rules shall be valid for a period of three years and shall be renewable, for a period not exceeding three years at a time and a licensee who intends to renew the license shall, at least before one month of the date of expiry of the license, apply for the renewal of the license to the district treasury officer by remitting a renewal fee of rupees 1,500 (rupees one thousand and five hundred only) for the three years or rupees 750 (rupees seven hundred and fifty only) for one year, as the case may be. 12. in view of the prescription of 60 years under sub-rule (7) for new licence and since under sub-rule (14) the renewal is only for a period of three years, the maximum a person can continue as a licensee is only upto 63 years. if that be so, there is no question of a licensed stamp vendor dying at the age of 65 and hence the issue may not arise at all. however, we may take that for renewal there is no age limit and the age limit of 60 years is only for fresh applications. but there is nothing to show that the amended rule does not serve the intent and object of the act. then the only question is whether the provision is unreasonable in the sense that it is manifestly arbitrary and unjust or whether the authority lacks power to frame the rules. there is no challenge on want of authority. therefore, the consideration need be limited only to the question as to whether the provision is manifestly arbitrary or unjust.13. the learned government pleader would contend that dying in harness being the concept in providing preference, the classification now made by the government under the amended rules in not giving preference to those licensees who died after crossing the age of 65 is perfectly just and reasonable even in the ordinary sense of the term. normally, before that age a man would have settled himself in life and settled his dependents also. in this context, it is significant to note that an option is given to a licensee for voluntary retirement before attaining the age of 55 and in that case the legal heir is entitled for preference in appointment. the law relating to grants is always against perpetuity. the option under sub-rule (16) for voluntary retirement is in fact a very major exemption against the general rule by way of lenient concession.14. the contention regarding fixation of age as 65 also has no relevance. when a new legislation is introduced, there has to be a prescription either of age or of a date in the matter of grant. from what we have discussed above, it cannot be said that the prescription of age as 65 for the purpose of granting the concession of preferential consideration for appointment of the legal heir is certainly not discriminatory. the classification is not unreasonable also. on the contrary, it is just, fair, proper and reasonable.15. yet another contention is regarding the prospective operation of the rule. the date of death of the licensee, father of the writ petitioner in w.p.(c) no. 7263 of 2009, is 11.12.2008. the amendment came into force on 13.7.2007 on which date the licensee had crossed the age of 65. as rightly held by the learned single judge, the government introduced a concession in the case of those who died before attaining the age of 65, giving a preferential treatment to their legal heirs. as noted by the government in the circular referred to above, the essential purpose of such concession is to help the members of the family of those who died in harness. dying after settling oneself in life and settling the dependents at the age of 65, it cannot be said that there is dying in harness. in that view of the matter also, we do not find any justification to hold that the rule should operate only prospectively. it is the date of death and not the date of application that is relevant and not the age of the licensee as on the date of introduction of the rule that is relevant.16. the impugned rule 35(22) essentially confers a privilege for the otherwise qualified legal heir of a deceased stamp vendor. accrual of right of a legal heir under the rule has nothing to do with the completion of age by the stamp vendor but is dependent only on the factum of death before the age of 65. eligibility under the rule as on the date of application is the only relevant criteria. being an appointment on compassionate grounds, it should be strictly viewed within the limits of the scheme/rule as there is no vested rights for the claimant as held in v. shivamurthy v. state of u.p. (2008) 13 scc 730; apsrtc v. kaiser begum : air1998sc3213 and hindustan aeronautics v. radhika thirumalai : (1997)illj492sc . on this count also there is no justification for the argument that the rule is only prospective in application.for all the above reasons the writ appeal and the writ petition are dismissed.
Judgment:

Kurian Joseph, J.

1. The validity of recently introduced Rule 35(22) of the Kerala Manufacture and Sale of Stamp Rules, 1960 is under challenge in these cases. The said Rule reads as follows:

35 (22) In the event of the death of a licensed stamp vendor, the District Treasury Officer shall take immediate steps for filling up the vacancy: Provided that, if the death occurs before attaining the age of 65 years, a legal heir duly authorized by the other legal heirs, if any, may be appointed as the licensed vendor in the vacancy if he is otherwise qualified to be appointed and makes out an application before the District Treasury Officer within three months from the date of death.

2. Appellant is the writ petitioner. The writ petition was filed mainly with the following prayer:

Declare that the Sub-rule 22 of Rule 35 of the Kerala Manufacture and Sale of Stamp (Amendment) Rules, 2007 will work out prospectively in so far as it is applicable only to those vendors who will attain 65 years of age after the date of coming into force of the Act.

3. The learned Single Judge declined to grant the relief. It was held that any claim for appointment by a legal heir made subsequent to the introduction of Ext.P1 Rules has to be dealt with in the light of the amended Rules. In that case the original licensee expired on 11.12.2008, after crossing the age of 65 years. Therefore, the application filed by the petitioner in his capacity as legal heir was rejected. It was further held by the learned Single Judge that the Sub-rule (22) quoted above has been introduced as a concession extended to the legal heirs of the licensee who had not attained the age of 65 and therefore, it is for the Government to fix such a condition.

4. In W.P.(C) No. 33615 of 2007 the licensed stamp vendor died on 3.9.2007 at the age of 87 and, therefore, the application filed by the petitioner as the legal heir was not considered. In the said writ petition also the challenge is to the validity of the Rules on the ground of discrimination on the basis of age.

5. What is the principle or policy that would best serve the object and purpose of the Act is for the Legislature or its delegate to decide. That is a well settled principle. The courts will not be justified in sitting in judgment over the wisdom of the policy maker and striking down a regulation on the only ground that in the view of the court a provision is not reasonable. It is also a well settled position that the unreasonableness that invalidates a subordinate legislation is not the antonym of reasonableness as understood in common parlance. That unreasonableness which invalidates a subordinate legislation is manifest arbitrariness or injustice to the extent of holding inevitably that the Legislature never intended to give authority to the rule maker to make such a Rule. In Mixnam's Properties Ltd. v. Chertsey Urban District Council 1964 (1) Q.B.214 at 237, Lord Diplock has succinctly analyzed the true sense of unreasonableness in legal parlance. The relevant portion of the judgment reads as follows:

The various special grounds upon which subordinate legislation has sometimes been said to be void - for example, because it is unreasonable; because it is uncertain; because it is repugnant to the general law or to some other statute - can, I think, today be properly regarded as being particular application of the general rule that subordinate legislation, to be valid, must be shown to be within the powers conferred by the statute. Thus, the kind of unreasonableness which invalidates a by-law is not the antonym of 'unreasonableness' in the sense of which that expression is used in the common law, but such manifest arbitrariness, injustice or partiality that a court would say: 'Parliament never intended to give authority to make such rules; they are unreasonable and ultra vires.

6. In Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Private Ltd. and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. the Supreme Court held that a subordinate legislation can be challenged on the ground that it is unreasonable, 'unreasonable not in the sense of not being reasonable, but in the sense that it is manifestly arbitrary'. In a still earlier decision in State of U.P. v. Hindustan Aluminium Corporation : [1979]3SCR709 , the Supreme Court while considering the ground for challenging the validity of the subordinate legislation held as follows:

The grounds of challenging the validity of subordinate legislation are well known. The challenge may be on the ground that the power to make the law could not have been exercised in the circumstances which were prevailing at the time when it was made, or that a condition precedent to the making of the legislation did not exist, or that the authority which made the order was not competent to do so, or that the order was not made according to the procedure prescribed by law, or that its provisions were outside the scope of the enabling power in the parent Act or were otherwise violative of its provisions or of any other existing statute.

7. In Pankajakshy and Ors. v. George Mathew and Ors. 1987 (2) KLT 723, a Division Bench of this Court has beautifully summarised with lucidity the grounds for challenging a subordinate legislation in paragraph 12 of the judgment which reads as follows:

12.Thus, the rule made under a statute by an authority delegated for the purpose can be challenged on the ground (1) that it is ultra vires of the Act; (2) it is opposed to the Fundamental rights; (3) it is opposed to other plenary laws. To ascertain whether a rule is ultra vires of the Act, the Court can go into the question (a) whether it contravenes expressly or impliedly any of the provisions of the statute; (b) whether it achieves the intent and object of the Act; and (c) whether it is 'unreasonable' to be manifestly arbitrary, unjust or partial implying thereby want of authority to make such rules.

8. There is a presumption in favour of constitutionality or validity of a subordinate legislation. It has been held so while stating the principles in that regard in the decision reported in State of T.N. and Anr. v. P.Krishnamurthy and Ors. : AIR2006SC1622 . Paragraphs 15 and 16 of the said judgment reads as follows:

15. There is a presumption in favour of constitutionality or validity of a subordinate legislation and the burden is upon him whom attacks it to show that it is invalid. It is also well recognised that a subordinate legislation can be challenged under any of the following grounds:

(a) Lack of legislative competence to make the subordinate legislation.

(b) Violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India.

(c) Violation of any provision of the Constitution of India.

(d) Failure to conform to the statute under which it is made or exceeding the limits of authority conferred by the enabling Act.

(e) Repugnancy to the laws of the land, that is, any enactment.

(f) Manifest arbitrariness/unreasonableness (to an extent where the court might well say that the legislature never intended to give authority to make such rules).

16. The court considering the validity of a subordinate legislation, will have to consider the nature, object and scheme of the enabling Act, and also the area over which power has been delegated under the Act and then decide whether the subordinate legislation conforms to the parent statute. Where a rule is directly inconsistent with a mandatory provision of the statute, then, of course, the task of the court is simple and easy. But where the contention is that the inconsistency or non-conformity of the rule is not with reference to any specific provision of the enabling Act, but with the object and scheme of the parent Act, the court should proceed with caution before declaring invalidity.

In that case, after following the decision of a Constitution Bench in Shri Sitaram Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Union of India : [1990]1SCR909 it was held in paragraph 27 of the judgment as follows:

27. A delegated legislation, though legislative in character, will be invalid, on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice, if the enabling Act under which the delegated legislation is made, specifically requires observance of the principles of natural justice for doing the act.

9. In Vasu Dev Singh v. Union of India (2006) 12 SCC 753; State of Kerala v. Unni : AIR2007SC819 ; J.K.Industries Ltd. v. Union of India (2007) 13 SCC 673 and Hinsa Virodhak Sangh v. Mirzapur Moti Kuresh Jamat : AIR2008SC1892 , the above referred principles have been more elaborately reiterated and followed. The Supreme Court in H.C.Suman and Anr. v. Rehabilitation Ministry Employees' Cooperative House Building Society Ltd., New Delhi and Ors. : [1991]3SCR839 , after quoting Kruse v. Johnson (1898) 2 QB 91, held that 'in determining validity of bye-law made by public representative bodies the court ought to be slow to hold that a bye-law is void for unreasonabeleness. A bye-law so made ought to be supported unless it is manifestly partial and unequal in its operation between different classes, or unjust, or made in bad faith, or clearly involving an unjustifiable interference with the liberty of those subject to it.'

10. The challenge to the Rules in the present cases has to be analyzed in the light of the settled position of law as discussed above. There is no case that the impugned Rules contravenes any of the provisions of the statute. Then the question is whether the provision achieves the intent and object of the Act. The Kerala Stamp Act, 1959 was enacted to consolidate and amend the law relating to Stamps in the State of Kerala, particularly in the matter of rate of stamp duty. Section 69 of the said Act empowers the Government to frame Rules for the supply and sale of stamps and stamp papers, prescribing the persons by whom alone such sale has to be conducted, the duties and remuneration of such persons and the fine for breach of any rule. The Rule as it originally introduced in the year 1960 did not have any provision at all providing for a right to the legal heir to obtain a licence. In fact, it was specifically provided under Rule 35(8) of the old Rules that the Stamp Vendor's Licence issued shall be valid only for a period of 3 years and after the expiry of the said period the licensee shall apply for licence afresh. It is true that the Government had issued a circular dated 18.4.1980 in the matter of issuance of licence giving preference to dependents of stamp vendors who died in harness. That circular was issued on a memorandum submitted by the North Kerala Licensed Stamp Vendors Association. The operative portion of the circular reads as follows:

Government have examined the above request in all its aspects and are pleased to direct that in future while considering the issue of a vendors licence that has arisen consequent on the demise of stamp vendor preference will be given to the dependant of the deceased stamp vendor provided he/she submits an application in time for the purpose and is otherwise qualified for holding a stamp vendors licence. Dependants for this purpose may be in the order as given below. Widow, Son/daughter, brother/sister and father/mother, son daughter includes adopted son/adopted daughter for this purpose.

11. The circular dated 18.4.1980 was replaced by another circular dated 19.11.1983 substituting the term dependant as legal heir. There also it is clear that the Government was considering the request for preference to dependants of stamp vendors who died in harness. It is significant to note that the Rules provide that a person shall not be eligible to apply for licence in case he has crossed 60 years of age. Under the amended Rules, there is a provision for renewal of the licence in Rule 35(14) which reads as follows:

A license issued under these Rules shall be valid for a period of three years and shall be renewable, for a period not exceeding three years at a time and a licensee who intends to renew the license shall, at least before one month of the date of expiry of the license, apply for the renewal of the license to the District Treasury Officer by remitting a renewal fee of Rupees 1,500 (Rupees one thousand and five hundred only) for the three years or Rupees 750 (Rupees seven hundred and fifty only) for one year, as the case may be.

12. In view of the prescription of 60 years under Sub-rule (7) for new licence and since under Sub-rule (14) the renewal is only for a period of three years, the maximum a person can continue as a licensee is only upto 63 years. If that be so, there is no question of a licensed stamp vendor dying at the age of 65 and hence the issue may not arise at all. However, we may take that for renewal there is no age limit and the age limit of 60 years is only for fresh applications. But there is nothing to show that the amended Rule does not serve the intent and object of the Act. Then the only question is whether the provision is unreasonable in the sense that it is manifestly arbitrary and unjust or whether the authority lacks power to frame the Rules. There is no challenge on want of authority. Therefore, the consideration need be limited only to the question as to whether the provision is manifestly arbitrary or unjust.

13. The learned Government Pleader would contend that dying in harness being the concept in providing preference, the classification now made by the Government under the amended Rules in not giving preference to those licensees who died after crossing the age of 65 is perfectly just and reasonable even in the ordinary sense of the term. Normally, before that age a man would have settled himself in life and settled his dependents also. In this context, it is significant to note that an option is given to a licensee for voluntary retirement before attaining the age of 55 and in that case the legal heir is entitled for preference in appointment. The law relating to grants is always against perpetuity. The option under Sub-rule (16) for voluntary retirement is in fact a very major exemption against the general Rule by way of lenient concession.

14. The contention regarding fixation of age as 65 also has no relevance. When a new legislation is introduced, there has to be a prescription either of age or of a date in the matter of grant. From what we have discussed above, it cannot be said that the prescription of age as 65 for the purpose of granting the concession of preferential consideration for appointment of the legal heir is certainly not discriminatory. The classification is not unreasonable also. On the contrary, it is just, fair, proper and reasonable.

15. Yet another contention is regarding the prospective operation of the Rule. The date of death of the licensee, father of the writ petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 7263 of 2009, is 11.12.2008. The amendment came into force on 13.7.2007 on which date the licensee had crossed the age of 65. As rightly held by the learned Single Judge, the Government introduced a concession in the case of those who died before attaining the age of 65, giving a preferential treatment to their legal heirs. As noted by the Government in the circular referred to above, the essential purpose of such concession is to help the members of the family of those who died in harness. Dying after settling oneself in life and settling the dependents at the age of 65, it cannot be said that there is dying in harness. In that view of the matter also, we do not find any justification to hold that the Rule should operate only prospectively. It is the date of death and not the date of application that is relevant and not the age of the licensee as on the date of introduction of the Rule that is relevant.

16. The impugned Rule 35(22) essentially confers a privilege for the otherwise qualified legal heir of a deceased stamp vendor. Accrual of right of a legal heir under the Rule has nothing to do with the completion of age by the stamp vendor but is dependent only on the factum of death before the age of 65. Eligibility under the Rule as on the date of application is the only relevant criteria. Being an appointment on compassionate grounds, it should be strictly viewed within the limits of the Scheme/Rule as there is no vested rights for the claimant as held in V. Shivamurthy v. State of U.P. (2008) 13 SCC 730; APSRTC v. Kaiser Begum : AIR1998SC3213 and Hindustan Aeronautics v. Radhika Thirumalai : (1997)ILLJ492SC . On this count also there is no justification for the argument that the rule is only prospective in application.

For all the above reasons the writ appeal and the writ petition are dismissed.