Malayala Manorama Co. Ltd. Vs. Asst. Commissioner - Court Judgment

K. Balakrishnan Nair, J.

1. The petitioner is a Company, registered under the Companies Act and is engaged in the business of printing and publication of a daily newspaper and other publications. It is a registered dealer, under the K.G.S.T. and C.S.T. Acts, on the files of the 1st respondent. For printing newspaper and other journals, printing ink is an essential raw material. Section 5(3) of the K.G.S.T. Act provides for a reduced rate of tax @ 3%, payable by the dealer, in respect of sale of raw materials to industrial units, for use in the production of finished products, for sale in the State. The seller to the industrial unit can claim the benefit of payment of the reduced rate of tax, subject to the condition of furnishing a declaration, duly filled and signed by the purchasing dealer, in Form 18. So, the petitioner was purchasing the printing ink, by furnishing the necessary declaration in Form 18 and therefore, the selling dealer was paying tax only at the rate of 3%.

2. While so, the first respondent issued Ext.Pl notice, in respect of the assessment year 2000-01, purportedly under Section 45A of the K.G.S.T. Act, stating that purchase of ink by the petitioner at the concessional rate of 3% tax, by furnishing the declaration in Form 18, is illegal. According to the first respondent, the ink purchased is used for printing newspapers and weeklies and there is no manufacturing process in printing the newspapers. Further, newspapers and weeklies are not taxable goods. So, the pre-conditions for availing the concessional rate of tax, are not present in the transaction. Therefore, the statutory declaration has been misused. The misuse of a statutory declaration is an offence, which should be dealt with under Section 45A of the K.G.S.T. Act. Based on the above facts, it was proposed to impose a fine of Rs. 14,66,256/-, being double the amount ot tax due on the purchase turnover. The petitioner was called upon by the said notice, to file objections, if any, to the said proposal, within seven days. Similar notices, Exts.P2, P3 and P4 were also issued to it, concerning the financial years 2001-02,2002-03 and 2003-04, by the first respondent.

3. The petitioner filed Exts.PS to P8 objections to the proposals to impose penalty on it. It was pointed out that Section 5(3) of the K.G.S.T. Act has been amended by Finance Act 2000, with effect from 01.04.2000, deleting the first proviso, which provided that the concessional rate of tax will be applicable, if only the finished products are taxable. So, with effect from 01.04.2000, Form 18 declaration can be issued by the petitioner, even though, newspapers and weeklies are not taxable goods. It was reiterated that the process of printing newspapers and weeklies, is a manufacturing process. So, Exts.Pl to P4 were issued without taking note of the amendment to the Act and also the relevant legal position. The petitioner also prayed for a chance for personal hearing, if the first respondent is not inclined to accept its contentions in the reply. But, the petitioner has been served with Exts.P9, P10 and Pll orders dated 19.01.2006, on 27.01.2006, imposing penalty under Section 45A of the K.G.S.T. Act, overruling its objections. This Writ Petition is filed, challenging Exts.P9, P10 and Pll. The petitioner submits, the impugned orders are vitiated by mala fides and they have been passed to wreak vengeance on it, which exposed the corruption in commercial tax check-posts, in public interest. The pleading of the petitioner in this regard is contained in paragraph 6 of the Writ Petition, which reads as follows:

The petitioner's newspaper Malayala Manorama is having the largest circulation among newspapers in Malay alam. The petitioner's newspaper has published reports and articles of great public interest and matters vitally affecting the rights of dealers under the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, who are subjected to harassment at the check posts by subjecting them to payment of illegal gratification. Such illegal acts and harassment were published by factual reports and photographs. Petitioner apprehend that under such circumstances, the statutory remedy of revision before the departmental officers is only an empty formality.

So, the petitioner justifies its approach to this Court directly, without invoking the statutory remedy. It further submits that the impugned orders are issued without jurisdiction and relying on non-existing statutory provisions. They have been issued in violation of the principles of natural justice also. So, even if there is a statutory remedy, the petitioner is entitled to approach this Court directly. The printing of newspapers and journals is a manufacturing process. So, the petitioner is bound to pay only the concessional rate of tax, while purchasing the raw material of printing ink. The proceedings under Section 45 A of the K.G.S.T. Act are quasi criminal. Only deliberate defiance of law or similar conduct will be visited by penalty under Section 45A of the Act. It is also contended that the impugned orders offend the fundamental rights of the petitioner, guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. So, the petitioner seeks to quash Exts.P9 to Pll.

4. The first respondent has filed a counter affidavit, denying all the allegations in the Writ Petition. According to the said respondent, even in the absence of the first proviso, the petitioner is liable to pay tax, as the products manufactured by it, are not goods, in terms of Section 2(xii) of the K.G.S.T. Act. It is also pointed out that the petitioner has got an alternative remedy of filing a revision before the competent authority and therefore, the Writ Petition is not maintainable.

5. The Writ Petition was admitted and interim stay was granted on 16.02.2006. When it came up for extension of stay on 15.03.2006, the respondents appeared and contended that the Writ Petition is not maintainable, in view of the statutory remedy available to the petitioner. So, they were directed to file a counter affidavit. After the filing of the counter affidavit, the matter was finally heard on 30.03.2006.

6. The learned Senior Counsel Shri.Pathrose Mathai met the preliminary objection raised by the respondents, relying on the various decisions of the Apex Court and also this Court. He submitted that since the impugned orders are issued without jurisdiction and also in violation of the principles of natural justice, this Court can interfere with the same. In support of the said submission, the learned Senior Counsel relied on the decision reported in Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd. v. D.P.Dube 1963 (14) STC 410, Carl Stilgmbh v. State of Bihar : [1962]2SCR81 , Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd v. Income Tax Officer : [1961]41ITR191(SC) , Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks : AIR1999SC22 , State of Himachal Pradesh v. Gujarat Ambuja Cements Ltd. 142 STC 1. The learned Senior Counsel also submitted that the existence of an alternative remedy, by way of revision, will not bar the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In support of the said submission, reliance was placed on the decisions of the Apex Court in Collector of Customs and Excise, Cochin v. A.S.Bava : 1973ECR18(SC) and Agricultural Income Tax and Sales Tax Officer v. Tata Tea Ltd. 127 STC 210. It was also submitted that the question of resorting to the alternative remedy, is a matter to be considered at the stage of admission of the Writ Petition and not after the Writ Petition is admitted and interim stay is granted, after hearing both parties. The learned Senior Counsel also canvassed the case of the petitioner on merits.

7. Shri.Raju Joseph, learned Special Government Pleader (Taxes), supported the impugned orders. He also contended that the petitioner should be turned away, to avail the statutory remedy available to it, without hearing the Writ Petition on merits.

8. As per the statutory scheme, a dealer, who is aggrieved by an order of penalty under Section 45A of the K.G.S.T. Act, is entitled to file a revision against that order, before the statutory re visional authority. So, normally, when there is a statutory remedy available to the petitioner, this Court should not invoke its extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner tried to canvass that the powers of this Court are wider than the powers of the revisional authority under the statute. Since the said point is not raised in the Writ Petition, I am not dealing with the said contention. But, the learned Senior Counsel vehemently contended that the remedy of filing a revision before the departmental officers is not efficacious, in view of the facts pleaded by the petitioner in paragraph 6 of the Writ Petition, quoted earlier. I think, it is the paramount duty of every newspaper, to bring out corruption, in public interest. Every department should welcome such exposures, as it gives the department concerned, an opportunity to set its house in order. So, I think, it is difficult to accept the contention of the petitioner that because it has published certain reports, exposing the corruption in the commercial tax check-posts, the revisional authority will be biased against it and will not consider its revision on merits. this Court is not justified in acting on the mere apprehensions voiced by the petitioner in paragraph 6 of the Writ Petition. In sales tax matters, this Court is consistently turning away the parties aggrieved by the orders issued under Section 45A, to approach the revisional authority, before invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court I think, no special ground has been made out in this case, to deviate from the above course, usually adopted by this Court.

9. But, the learned Counsel for the petitioner further pointed out that even assuming it has got a statutory remedy, it need not invoke it, when the impugned orders are passed without jurisdiction and in violation of the principles of natural justice. The impugned orders are passed, mainly on the basis of the objective assessment of the facts of the case. Therefore, hearing at the revisional stage can cure the lack of hearing at the original stage. Further, when no complicated questions of fact or law are involved, hearing need not necessarily be by words of mouth. It can be by way of a representation also. See the decision of K.S.Paripoornan, J., (as His Lordship then was) in Indian Transformers Limited v. Assistant Collector 1983 KLT 861. In this case, all the contentions raised by the petitioner have been dealt with by the first respondent. So, the lack of hearing has not, prima facie, caused any serious prejudice to the petitioner. Even assuming it has caused any prejudice, the petitioner will get a full-fledged hearing at the revisional stage.

10. The concept of jurisdiction has been drastically expanded after the decision of the House of Lords in Anisminic v. The Foreign Compensation Commission 1967(2) AER 986. Now, every error of law is a jurisdictional error. If a decisive fact is wrongly understood, even then, the decision will be outside jurisdiction. This concept is best explained by K.S.Paripoornan, J., in his Lordship's separate Judgment in Mafattal Industries v. Union of India : 1997(89)ELT247(SC) . The relevant portion of the said Judgment reads as follows:

Opinions may differ as to when it can be said that in the 'public law' domain, the entire proceeding before the appropriate authority is illegal and without jurisdiction or the defect or infirmity in the order goes to the root of the matter and makes it in law invalid or void (referred to in Illuri Subbayya Chetty case and approved in Dhulabhai case). The matter may have to be considered in the light of the provisions of the particular statute in question and the fact-situation obtaining in each case. It is difficult to visualise all situations hypothetically and provide an answer. Be that as it may, the question that frequently arises for consideration, is, in what situation/cases the non-compliance or error or mistake, committed by the statutory authority or tribunal, makes the decision rendered ultra vires or a nullity or one without jurisdiction If the decision is without jurisdiction, notwithstanding the provisions for obtaining reliefs contained in the Act and the 'ouster clauses', the jurisdiction of the ordinary court is not excluded. So, the matter assumes significance. Since the landmark decision in Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission, the legal world seems to have accepted that any 'jurisdictional error' as understood in the liberal or modern approach, laid down therein, makes a decision ultra vires or a nullity or without jurisdiction and the 'ouster clauses' are construed restrictively and such provisions whatever their stringent language be, have been held, not to prevent challenge on the ground that the decision is ultra vires and being a complete nullity, it is not a decision within the meaning of the Act. The concept of jurisdiction has acquired 'new dimensions'. The original or pure theory of jurisdiction means 'the authority to decide' and it. is determinable at the commencement and not at the conclusion of the enquiry. The said approach has been given a go by in Anisminic case as we shall see from the discussion hereinafter (See De Smith, Woolf and Jowell - Judicial Review of Administrative Action (1995 Edn.) p. 238, Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Edn.) p. 114, para 67, footnote (9). As Sir William Wade observes in his book, Administrative Law (7th Edn.), 1994, atp. 299.

The tribunal must not only have jurisdiction at the outset, but must retain it unimpaired until it has discharged its task.The decision in Animinic case has been cited with approval in a number of cases by this Court: citation of a few such cases - Union of India v. Tarachand Gupta & Bros : 1983(13)ELT1456(SC) , A.R.Antulay v. R.S.Nayak : 1988CriLJ1661 , R.B.Shreeram Durga Prasad and Fatehchand Nursing Das v. Settlement Commission (IT & WT) : [1989]176ITR169(SC) , N.Parthasarathy v. Controller of Capital Issues(l99l)Z SCC 153 atp.95,Associated Engineering Co. v. Govt. of A. P. : [1991]2SCR924 , Shiv Kumar Chadha v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi : [1993]3SCR522 . Delivering the Judgment of a two member Bench in ML. Sethi v. R.P. Kapur : [1973]1SCR697 , Mathew, J., in paras 10 and 11 of the Judgment explained the legal position after Anisminic case to the following effect:

10. The word 'jurisdiction is a verbal cast of many colours. Jurisdiction originally seems to have had the meaning which Lord Baid ascribed to it in Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission, namely, the entitlement 'to enter upon the enquiry in question. If there was an entitlement to enter upon an enquiry into the question, then, any subsequent error could only be regarded as an error within the jurisdiction. The best known formulation of this theory is that made by Lord Dennan in R. v. Bolton. He said that the question of jurisdiction is determinable at the commencement, not at the conclusion of the enquiry. In Anisminic Ltd., Lord Reid said:

But there are many cases, where, although the tribunal had jurisdiction to enter on the enquiry, it has done or failed to do something in the course of the enquiry which is of such a nature that its decision is a nullity. It may have given its decision in bad faith. It may have made a decision which it had no power to make. It may have failed in the course of the enquiry to comply with the requirements of natural justice. It may in perfect good faith, have misconstrued the provisions giving it power to act so that it failed to deal with the question remitted to it and decided some question which was not remitted to it. It may have refused to take into account something which it was required to take into account. Or it may have based its decision on some matter which, under the provisions setting it up, it had no right to take into account. I do not intend this list to be exhaustive. In the same case, Lord Pearce said:

Lack of jurisdiction may arise in various ways. There may be an absence of those formalities or things which are conditions precedent to the tribunal having any jurisdiction to embark on an enquiry. Or the tribunal may, at the end make an order that it has no jurisdiction to make. Or in the intervening stage, while engaged on a proper enquiry, the tribunal may, depart from the rules of natural justice, or it may ask itself the wrong questions; or it may take into account matters which it was not directed to take into account. Thereby, it would step outside its jurisdiction. It would turn its enquiry into something not directed by Parliament and fail to make the enquiry which Parliament did direct. Any of these things would cause its purported decision to be a nullity.

11. The dicta of the majority of the House of Lords, in the above case, would show the extent to which 'lack' and 'excess' of jurisdiction have been assimilated or, in other words, the extent to which we have moved away from the traditional concept of 'jurisdiction'. The effect of the dicta in that case is to reduce the difference between jurisdictional error and error of law within jurisdiction almost to vanishing point. The practical effect of the decision is that any error of law can be reckoned as jurisdictional. This comes perilously close to saying that there is jurisdiction if the decision is right in law but none if it is wrong. Almost any misconstruction of a statute can be represented as 'basing their decision on a matter with which they have no right to deal', 'imposing an unwarranted condition' or 'addressing themselves to a wrong question'. The majority opinion in the case leaves a court or tribunal with virtually no margin of legal error. Whether there is excess of jurisdiction or merely error within jurisdiction can be determined only by construing the empowering statute, which will give little guidance. It is really a question of how much latitude the court is prepared to allow....

In a subsequent Constitution Bench decision, Hart Prasad Mulshanker Trivedi v. V.B.Raju : [1974]1SCR548 ,deliveringthejudgmentoftheBench,Mathew,J.,inpara27 at page 2608 of the judgment, stated thus : SCC pp 423-24, para 28).

Though the dividing line between lack of jurisdiction or power and erroneous exercise of it has become thin with the decision of the House of Lords in the Anisminic case, we do not think that the distinction between the two has been completely wiped out. We are aware of the difficulty in formulating an exhaustive rule to tell when there is lack of power and when there is an erroneous exercise of it. The difficulty has arisen because the word 'jurisdiction' is an expression which is used in a variety of senses and takes its colour from its context (see per Diplock, J. at p. 394 in the Anisminic case). Whereas the 'pure' theory of jurisdiction would reduce jurisdictional control to a vanishing point, the adoption of a narrower meaning might result in a more useful legal concept even though the formal structure of law may lose something of its logical symmetry. 'At bottom, the problem of defining the concept of jurisdiction for purpose of judicial review has been one of public policy rather than one of logic'. [S.A.Smith'Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 2nd Edn., p.g8. (1968 Edn.).

The observation of the learned author (S. A.De Smith) was continued in its 3rd Edn. (1973) at p. 98 and in its 4th Edn. (1980) at p. 112 of the book. The observation aforesaid was based on the then prevailing academic opinion only as is seen from the footnotes. It should be stated that the said observation is omitted form the latest edition of the book De Smith, Woolf and Jowell -Judicial Review of Administrative Action - 5th Edn. (1995) as is evident from p. 229; probably due to later developments in the law and the academic opinion that has emerged due to the change in the perspective.

335. After 1980, the decision in Anisminic case came up for further consideration before the House of lords. Privy Council and other courts. The three leading decisions of the House of Lords wherein Anisminic principle was followed and explained, are the following: Racal Communications Ltd., In re (1981 AC374), O'Reilly v. Mackman 1983 (2) AC237, Re. v. Hull University Visitor 1993 AC 682. It should be noted that Raced, In re case, the Anisminic principle was held to be inapplicable in the case of (superior) court where the decision of the court is made final and conclusive by the statute. (The superior court referred to in this decision is the High Court) (1981 AC 374 (383,384,386,391)). In the meanwhile, the House of Lords, in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service 1985 AC 374, enunciated three broad grounds for judicial review, as 'legality', 'procedural propriety' and rationality' and this decision had its impact on the development of the law in post-Anisminic period. In the light of the above four important decisions of the House of Lords, other decisions of the court of appeal, Privy Council etc., and the later academic opinion in the matter, the entire case-law on the subject has been reviewed in leading text books. In the latest edition of De Smith on Judicial Review of Administrative Action-edited by Lord Woolf and Jowell.Q.C. (Professor of Public Law, 5 Edn. -1995) in Chapter 5, titled as 'Jurisdiction, Vires, Law and Fact' (pp-223-204), there is exhaustive analysis about the concept 'Jurisdiction' and its ramifications. The authors have discussed the pure theory of jurisdiction, the innovative decision in Anisminic case, the development of the law in the post-Anisminic period, the scope of the 'finality' Clauses (exclusion of jurisdiction of courts) in the statutes and have laid down a few propositions at pp-250-256 which could be advanced on the subject The authors have concluded the discussion thus at p. 256 :

After Anisminic virtually every emir of law is a jurisdictional error, and the only place left for non-jurisdictional error is where the components of the decision made by the inferior body included matters of fact and policy as well as law or where the error was evidential (concerning for example, the burden of proof or admission of evidence). Perhaps the most precise indication of jurisdictional error is that advanced by Lord Diplock in Raced Communications, when he suggested that a tribunal is entitled to make an error when the matter 'involves, as many do interrelated questions of law, fact and degree'. Thus, it was for the county court Judge in Pearlman, to decide whether the installation of central heating in a dwelling amounted to a 'structural alternation, extension or addition'. This was a typical question of mixed law, fact and degree which only a scholiast would think it appropriate to dissect into two separate questions, one for decision by the superior court, viz., the meaning of these words, a question which must entail considerations of degree and the other for decision by a county court viz., the application of words to the particular installation, a question which also entails considerations of degree.

It is however, doubtful whether any test of jurisdictional error will prove satisfactory. The distinction between jurisdictional and non- jurisdictional error is ultimately based upon foundations of sand. Much of the superstructure has already crumbled. What remains is likely quickly to fall away as the courts rightly insist that all administrative action should be, simply, lawful, whether or not jurisdictionally lawful.

336. The jurisdictional control exercised by superior courts over subordinate courts, tribunals or other statutory bodies and the scope and content of such power has been pithily stated in Halsbury Laws of England - 4h Edn. (Reissue), 1989 Vol. 1 (1), p. 113 to the following effect:

The inferior court or tribunal lacks jurisdiction if it has no power to enter upon an enquiry into a matter at all and it exceeds jurisdiction if it nevertheless enters upon such an enquiry or, having jurisdiction in the first place, it proceeds to arrogate an authority withheld from it by perpetrating a major error of substance, form or procedure or by making an order or taking action outside its limited area of competence. Not every error committed by an inferior court or tribunal or other body, however, goes to jurisdiction. Jurisdiction to decide a matter imports a limited power to decide that matter incorrectly.

A tribunal lacks jurisdiction if( 1) it is improperly constituted or (2) the proceedings have been improperly instituted or (3) authority to decide has been delegated to it unlawfully, or (4) it is without competence to deal with a matter by reason of the parties, the area in which the issue arose, the nature of the subject-matter, the value of that subject-matter, or the non-existence of any other prerequisite of a valid adjudication. Excess of jurisdiction is not materially distinguishable from lack of jurisdiction and the expressions may be used interchangeably.

Where the jurisdiction of tribunal is dependent on the existence of a particular state of affairs, that state of affairs may be described as preliminary to, or collateral to the merits of, the issue, or as jurisdictional.

There is a presumption in construing statutes which confer jurisdiction or discretionary powers on a body, that if that body makes an error of law while purporting to act within that jurisdiction or in exercising those powers, its decision or action will exceed the jurisdiction conferred and will be quashed. The error must be one on which the decision or action depends. An error of law going to jurisdiction may be committed by a body which fails to follow the proper procedure required by law, which takes legally irrelevant considerations into account, or which fails to take relevant considerations into account, or which asks itself and answers the wrong question.

The presumption that error of law goes to jurisdiction may be rebutted on the construction of a particular statute, so that the relevant body will not exceed its jurisdiction by going wrong in law. Previously the courts were more likely to find that errors of law were within jurisdiction; but with the modern approach errors of law will be held to fall within a body's jurisdiction only in exceptional cases. The courts will generally assume that their expertise in determining the principles of law applicable in any case has not been excluded by Parliament. (P. 120)

Errors of law include misinterpretation of statute or any other legal document or a rule of common law; asking oneself and answering the wrong question, taking irrelevant considerations into account or failing to take relevant considerations into account when purporting to apply the law to the facts; admitting inadmissible evidence or rejecting admissible and relevant evidence; exercising a discretion on the basis of incorrect legal principles; giving reasons which disclose faulty legal reasoning or which are inadequate to fulfil an express duty to give reasons and misdirecting oneself as to the burden of proof, (pp. 121-122).

337. H.W.R.Wade and C.F.Forsyth in their book-Administrative Law 7th Edn. (1994) discuss the subject regarding the jurisdiction of superior courts over subordinate courts and tribunals under the head 'jurisdiction over Fact and Law' in Chapter 9, pp. 284 to 320. The decisions before Anisminic and those in the post-Anisminic period have been discussed in detail. At pp. 319-320, the authors give the Summary of Rules thus:

Jurisdiction over fact and law: Summary

At the end of a chapter which is top-heavy with obsolescent material it may be useful to summarise the position as shortly as possible. The overall picture is of an expanding system struggling to free itself from the trammels of classical doctrines laid down in the past. It is not safe to say that the classical doctrines are wholly obsolete and that the broad and simple principles of review, which dearly now commend themselves to the judiciary, will entirely supplant them. A summary can therefore only state the long-established rules together with the simpler and broader rules which have now superseded them, much for the benefit of the law. Together they are as follows

Errors of fact

Old rule : The court would quash only if the erroneous fact was jurisdictional.

New rule : The court will quash if an erroneous and decisive fact was -

(a) jurisdictional

(b) found on the basis of no evidence ; or

(c) wrong, misunderstood or ignored.

Errors of law

Old rule : The court would quash only if the error was -

(a) jurisdictional

(b) on the face of the record

New rule : The court will quash for any decisive error, because all errors of law are now jurisdictional.

So, if an order without jurisdiction is permitted to be challenged directly before this Court, bypassing the statutory remedy, now, every order can be challenged before this Court, going by the expanded meaning given to the word 'jurisdiction'. Lack of jurisdiction is also a point, which can be urged before the revisional authority. So, this Court need not entertain matters, which, other authorities can also deal with. If the petitioner's grievance is not redressed, even after exhausting the statutory remedies, it can approach this Court. this Court's time has to be preserved to deal with such cases, where this Court alone can grant reliefs.

11. Further, the latest judicial opinion favours the view that when there is another forum to canvass the grievance of the petitioner, it is unnecessary for the High Court to waste its precious time to hear the very same matter. Though, the right to approach the Apex Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, has been held to be a fundamental right, the Apex Court has, of late, taken the view that if the petitioner can get relief from the High Court, he should be persuaded to invoke the said remedy, before approaching the Apex Court. See the decision of the Apex Court in Kanubhai Brambhatt v. State of Gujarat (1989) 2 SCC 310. The relevant portion of the said Judgment reads as follows :

If this Court takes upon itself to do everything which, even the High Court can do, this Court will not be able to do what this Court alone can do under Article 136 of the Constitution of India and other provisions conferring exclusive jurisdiction on this Court. There is no reason to assume that the concerned High Court will not do justice. Or that this Court alone can do justice. If this Court entertains writ petitions at the instance of parties who approach this Court directly instead of approaching the concerned High Court in the first instance, tens of thousands of writ petitions would in course of time be instituted in this Court directly. The inevitable result will be that the arrears pertaining to matters in respect of which this Court exercises exclusive jurisdiction under the Constitution will assume more alarming proportions. As it is, more man ten years old civil appeals and criminal appeals are sobbing for attention. It will occasion great misery and immense hardship to tens of thousands of litigants if the seriousness of this aspect is not sufficiently realised. And this is no imaginary phobia. A dismissed Government servant has to wait for nearly ten years for redress in this Court. A litigant whose appeal has been dismissed by wrongly refusing to condone delay has to wait for 14 years before his wrong is righted by this Court. The time for imposing self-discipline has already come, even if it involves shedding of some amount of institutional ego or raising of some eyebrows. Again, it is as important to do justice at this level, as to inspire confidence in the litigants that justice will be meted out to them at the High Court level and other levels. Faith must be inspired in the hierarchy of courts and the institution as a whole, not only in this Court alone. And this objective can be achieved only this Court showing trust in the High Court by directing the litigants to approach the High Court in the first instance. Besides, as a matter of fact, if matters like the present one are instituted in the High Court, there is a likelihood of the same being disposed of much more quickly and equally effectively, on account of the decentralisation of the process of administering justice. We are of the opinion that the petitioner should be directed to adopt this course and approach the High Court.

I think, the principle analogous to what is stated above, will apply in this case, where the petitioner has a statutory remedy, but it elects to approach this Court directly. In a recent decision in Union of India v. Hindalco Industries : 2003(153)ELT481(SC) , the Apex Court has held as follows :

There can be no doubt that in matters of taxation, it is inappropriate for the High Court to interfere in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution either at the stage of the show-cause notice or at the stage of assessment where alternative remedy by way of filing a reply or appeal, as the case may be, is available, but, these are the limitations imposed by the courts themselves in exercise of their jurisdiction and they are not matters of jurisdictional factors.

A Division Bench of this Court, following the above decision, has deprecated the practice of bypassing the statutory remedies and approaching this Court directly in sales tax matters, in Sales Tax Officer v. Louis Dreyfuss India Limited 2004 (1) KLT 1011 : ILR 2004 (1) Ker. 571. So, I am of the view that the petitioner should be turned away, to invoke the statutory remedy available to it. Its contention that once the Writ Petition is admitted and stay has been granted, the same should be heard on merits, cannot be accepted, as it is not an old case, but, one, filed a few weeks back. At the earliest point of time, the respondents have taken the objection, based on the alternative remedy available to the petitioner. In the result, the Writ Petition is dismissed for the reason that the petitioner has got a remedy of revision under the K.G.S.T. Act. But, this is done, without prejudice to the contentions of the petitioner regarding the merits of its case. In case the petitioner files revision petitions against the impugned orders, the period, this Writ Petition was pending before this Court, shall be excluded while computing the period of limitation.