Subhash Chand Barjatya Vs. the State and anr. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
negotiable instruments act, 1888section 138 - criminal procedure code, 1973--sections 91 and 311--application for summoning of cheque returned register from the bank and to recall the complainant for cross-examination about the date of receipt of information of dishonour of cheque--impugned order set aside and the petitioner's application allowed. - - the complainant in her pre-summoning evidence deposed with regard to the issuance of the debit slip as well as the notice issued on her behalf on 25-3-1999, but posted on 6-4-1999, but did not indicate as to when she received information from the bank. secondly, he submitted, the petitioner did not object to the veracity of cw1/4 which was clearly mentioned in the affidavit by way of evidence of cw1. even otherwise, the accused can very well prove in his defense evidence by summoning any bank official of syndicate bank branch dhaula kuan to produce the cheque return register if any for the month of march, 1999. however, at this stage i.orderbadar durrez ahmed, j.1. the counsel for the parties agree that this matter can be disposed of at the first instance itself. the learned counsel for the respondent appears on advance notice and says that this matter could be disposed of on the first hearing without issuance of a formal notice or any reply being filed on behalf of the respondent.2. the petitioner is aggrieved by the order dated 25-3-2006 passed by the learned metropolitan magistrate whereby the petitioner's applications under sections 91 and 311 of the criminal procedure code, 1973 were rejected. the application under section 91 was for the summoning of the cheque returning register for the month of march. 1999 from the syndicate bank, dhaula kuan. the application under section 311, cr. p.c. was for the purpose of recalling the complainant (cw 1) rita saim for further cross examination.3. the brief facts which gave rise to the said applications and ultimately, the impugned order dated 25-3-2006 pertain to the complaint filed by the said complainant (rita saim) with regard to the alleged dishonour of cheque no. 371055 dated 1-1-1999 for rs. 15 lacs which was issued by the petitioner in favor of the complainant. the cheque was deposited by the complainant on 11/12-3-1999 with its bankers for realisation. on 17-3-1999, the syndicate bank is said to have issued a debit slip in favor of the complainant indicating the return of the said cheque for the reason 'stop payment'. thereafter, a legal notice was issued on behalf of the complainant on 25-3-1999 which was posted on 6-4-1999. since the amount had remained unpaid, the complaint was filed and pre-summoning evidence was led. the complainant in her pre-summoning evidence deposed with regard to the issuance of the debit slip as well as the notice issued on her behalf on 25-3-1999, but posted on 6-4-1999, but did not indicate as to when she received information from the bank. although, in the complaint, the complainant has mentioned that she was informed by virtue of the said debit slip issued on 17-3-1999, she had not indicated as to when the debit slip was handed over to her by the bank. the notice of 25-3-1999 also does not disclose as to when the debit slip was handed over to the complainant by the bank. it is in this background that the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that at the pre-summoning stage although it was indicated that the petitioner was informed by virtue of the debit slip issued on 17-3-1999 it was not disclosed by the complainant as to when she actually received the debit slip.4. he further submitted that after summoning, an affidavit by way of evidence was filed by the complainant and in paragraph 3 thereof the debit slip/return memo was referred to. the same has been exhibited as exhibit cw 1/3. the document as exhibited at that stage along with the affidavit by way of evidence was a one sided document and was blank on the reverse. in paragraph 3 of the said affidavit, the complainant, for the first time, stated that she received the debit advice from her banker on 23-3-1999. she also referred to the certificate issued by the banker of the complainant which was exhibited as exhibit cw 1/4. the said certificate is dated 13-8-2002.5. according to mr. nigam, the learned counsel who appears on behalf of the petitioner, the factum of receipt of the debit slip is of material significance for the purposes of the case against the petitioner. this is so because the returning memo/debit slip is admittedly dated 17-3-1999. the notice that was sent on behalf of the complainant, although dated 25-3-1999, was admittedly posted on 6-4-1999. thereforee, according to mr. nigam, if only these two dates are taken into account then the notice was issued beyond the period of 15 days stipulated under section 138(c) of the negotiable instruments act, 1881. on the other hand, he submitted that if it is established that the complainant received the information by virtue of the handing over of the debit slip on 23-3-1999, then the posting of the notice dated 6-4-1999 would be within the 15 days' period. according to mr. nigam, initially when the complaint was filed and throughout the pre-summoning stage, there was no mention of receipt of debit slip on 23-3-1999 and this date was introduced subsequently, after summoning.6. he further submitted that the barker's certificate which has been exhibited as exhibit cw 1/4 is of 13-8-2002 and it indicates that the debit advice was collected by the complainant personally on 23-3-1999. he submits that this certificate was not available at the pre-summoning stage but has been introduced subsequently. he then referred to the testimony of one mr. s. k. malhotra, who was working as a clerk in the syndicate bank, dhaula kuan. the said mr. malhotra was examined as cw 2. mr. nigam pointed out the contradictory statements made by mr. malhotra (cw 2) in his cross examination on two different dates i.e. on 5-3-2005 and 20-10-2005. on 5-3-2005 the said witness (cw 2} stated that the debit slip is issued only after verifying from the cheque return record. however, on 20-10-2005 when the said witness was further cross-examined, he stated that the bank did not maintain any cheque return register and on that day he introduced the so called original debit slip (exhibit cw 2/d 2). this debit slip was the same as exhibit cw 1/3 which had been introduced by the complainant at the post-summoning stage. the only difference being that exhibit cw 1/3 was only a one sided document which did not have any endorsement on the reverse whereas this document i.e., exhibit cw 2/ d2 had two sides to it and the reverse had the endorsement showing the alleged receipt of the debit advice along with the cheque and the same having been signed by the complainant on 23-3-1999. exhibit cw 1/ 3 is the carbon copy whereas exhibit cw 2/d 2 is purportedly the original which was available with the bank and obviously the endorsement was only on; the original.7. it is in the context of these facts that the petitioner had moved the two applications under sections 91 and 311, cr. p. c. for summoning of the cheque return register from the bank and for recalling the complainant for further cross examination with regard to the endorsement contained on the reverse of exhibit cw 2/d 2. the first application for summoning of the cheque return register was necessary because of the contradictory statements made by cw2 (the bank official). the recalling of the complainant for further cross examination was necessitated, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, because of the subsequent developments, namely, the statement made by the cw 2 and the introduction of exhibit cw2/d2 by him.8. the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent supported the order passed by the learned metropolitan magistrate rejecting both the applications. insofar as the summoning of cheque return register was concerned, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the petitioner would have full opportunity to have the documents summoned at the stage when he leads his evidence. secondly, he submitted, the petitioner did not object to the veracity of cw1/4 which was clearly mentioned in the affidavit by way of evidence of cw1. in fact, according to the learned counsel for the respondent no questions whatsoever were put to cw1 with regard to exhibit cw 1/4. he submitted that the document i.e., exhibit cw1/4 is the certificate dated 13-8-2002 and is self-explanatory. the bank had certified that the debit advice relating to the return of the said cheque was collected personally by the complainant on 23-3-1999 along with the relative cheque by giving acknowledgment on the debit slip pertaining to the transaction. it is in this context that the learned counsel for the respondent also submitted that it would be an exercise in futility to recall the complainant inasmuch as this document, in any event, established that the debit slip was handed over to the complainant on 23-3-1999 and that this debit slip exhibit cw1/4 was not challenged by the petitioner.9. the learned metropolitan magistrate rejected the two applications of the petitioner by holding as under:6. under section 91 cr. p. c. this court has power to summon any document from any person in an enquiry or trial if the production of such document is essential. in the present case cw 2 has deposed on oath that no cheque return register has been maintained by them in their bank. once the witness has deposed to this effect a prayer should have been made by the counsel for accused for summoning of cheque return register if he was having any doubt regarding non-maintaining of the cheque return register during the cross-examination of cw 2. however, no such request was made at that point of time and it can be, safely presumed that accused accepted the testimony of cw 2 regarding the non-maintaining, of cheque return register. by making the present application the only motive of the accused is just to delay the trial. even otherwise, the accused can very well prove in his defense evidence by summoning any bank official of syndicate bank branch dhaula kuan to produce the cheque return register if any for the month of march, 1999. however, at this stage i.e., at the stage of examination of accused under section 313, cr. p. c. there is no justification in directing the syndicate bank branch dhaula kuan to produce the cheque return register if any in the light of categorical deposition made by cw 2 who was a witness from the said bank and no request having being made by the counsel for accused during his cross-examination for its production. accordingly, the application under section 91, cr. p. c. is dismissed.xxx xxx xxx xxx11. the contention put forward by counsel for accused is not acceptable as the complainant while deposing in chief by affidavit has categorically stated that she got the information from her bank on 23-3-1999 and she has also deposed regarding certificate issued by the bank which is ex. cw1/4. the counsel for accused has not cross-examined regarding this deposition made by complainant and has not challenged the document ex. cw1/4. since no suggestion has been given by accused's counsel regarding the deposition made by complainant on the point of receipt of information from her bank on 23-3-1999 and the document ex. cw1/ 4 thereforee, for all intents and purpose this fact stands admitted by accused as they have chosen not to cross-examine the complainant on this fact. further record also reflects that cw 1 was exhaustively cross-examined by the accused on 5-3-2005. no purpose will be served by recalling cw1 for the purpose of confronting ex. cw2/d2 to her, as the fact that the information was received from the bank on 23-3-1999 and the document ex. cw1/4 has not been challenged by the accused in the cross-examination of complainant.10. considering the submissions made by the counsel for the parties, i find that the question of summoning of the cheque return register is linked up with the question of recalling of the complainant for further cross-examination. the learned metropolitan magistrate has rejected the applications of the petitioner under section 91, cr. p. c. on the premises that as the cw 2 has deposed on. oath that there is no cheque return register then there would be no purpose for summoning the bank record with respect to this. i am not in agreement with this view because it is not as if the witness (cw 2) had categorically stated that there is no cheque return register being maintained by the bank and the said witness having maintained this stand. what had happened is that, first of all, the said witness deposed that the debit slip is issued after verification from the cheque return register implying thereby that there does exist a cheque return register. on subsequent and further cross examination, the said witness (cw 2) has changed his stand and has stated that the bank did not maintain any cheque return register. thereforee, there is an element of doubt as to whether the bank does or does not maintain a cheque return register which can only be dispelled by summoning of the said document from the bank. thereforee, the finding of the learned metropolitan magistrate with regard to the application under section 91, cr. p. c. is not tenable and is liable to be set aside.11. as regards the rejection of the application under section 311, cr. p. c. for recall of cw1 is concerned, it appears that the learned metropolitan magistrate was impressed by the fact that exhibit cw1/4 had been mentioned in the evidence of the complainant but no suggestion was made or question put with regard to the said exhibit and, thereforee, the exhibit being self-explanatory, it would not be necessary to recall cw1 for further cross examination on this aspect. i am afraid, i am unable to agree with this line of reasoning. with regard to the ex. cw2/d2. the counsel for the petitioner has definitely raised questions with regard to the veracity as would be clear from the deposition of cw2 on 5-3-2005. thereforee, it cannot be said that for all intents and purposes the factum of the document exhibit cw1/4 stands admitted by the accused as recorded in paragraph 11. the learned metropolitan magistrate has not considered the aspect that exhibit cw1/4 is the very same document which is referred to as cw2/d2 in the deposition of bank official (cw2) wherein specific questions with regard to it have been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. thereforee, it cannot be concluded that for all intents and purposes, this fact stands admitted by the accused as they have not chosen to cross examine the complainant's witnesses. apart from this, there is the added circumstance that the document exhibit dw1/3 (debit slip) which was introduced by the complainant along with her affidavit by way of evidence is a carbon copy and did not bear the endorsement which is shown in exhibit cw2/d2 which is the purported original debit slip which was introduced by the witness (cw 2). when cw 1 was examined and cross examined, this document (cw2/d2) was not within the knowledge of the petitioner and obviously no question could have been put by the petitioner to the cw1 with regard to the endorsement on the reverse. thereforee, i am not in agreement with the conclusion of the learned metropolitan magistrate that no purpose would be served by recalling cw1 for the purpose of confronting exhibit cw2/02 to her.12. accordingly, the impugned order la set aside. the petitioner's two applications under sections 91 and 311, cr. p. c. are allowed.13. it is made clear that the trial has gone out for over 7 years and, thereforee, only one opportunity should be allowed to the petitioner to have the cheque return register, if any, summoned from the manager, syndicate bank, dhaula kaun. insofar as the recall of the complainant for further cross examination is concerned, her recall would be limited to the endorsement made on exhibit cw2/d2 and related questions. it would be also appropriate if the trial court expedites the disposal of this matter and concludes the trial at an early date, preferably within six months.

Judgment:
ORDER

Badar Durrez Ahmed, J.

1. The counsel for the parties agree that this matter can be disposed of at the first instance itself. The learned Counsel for the respondent appears on advance notice and says that this matter could be disposed of on the first hearing without Issuance of a formal notice or any reply being filed on behalf of the respondent.

2. The petitioner is aggrieved by the order dated 25-3-2006 passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate whereby the petitioner's applications under Sections 91 and 311 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 were rejected. The application under Section 91 was for the summoning of the Cheque Returning Register for the month of March. 1999 from the Syndicate Bank, Dhaula Kuan. The application under Section 311, Cr. P.C. was for the purpose of recalling the complainant (CW 1) Rita Saim for further cross examination.

3. The brief facts which gave rise to the said applications and ultimately, the impugned order dated 25-3-2006 pertain to the complaint filed by the said complainant (Rita Saim) with regard to the alleged dishonour of cheque No. 371055 dated 1-1-1999 for Rs. 15 lacs which was issued by the petitioner in favor of the complainant. The cheque was deposited by the complainant on 11/12-3-1999 with its bankers for realisation. On 17-3-1999, the Syndicate Bank is said to have issued a Debit Slip in favor of the complainant indicating the return of the said cheque for the reason 'Stop Payment'. Thereafter, a legal notice was issued on behalf of the complainant on 25-3-1999 which was posted on 6-4-1999. Since the amount had remained unpaid, the complaint was filed and pre-summoning evidence was led. The complainant in her pre-summoning evidence deposed with regard to the issuance of the debit slip as well as the notice issued on her behalf on 25-3-1999, but posted on 6-4-1999, but did not indicate as to when she received Information from the bank. Although, in the complaint, the complainant has mentioned that she was informed by virtue of the said debit slip issued on 17-3-1999, she had not indicated as to when the debit slip was handed over to her by the bank. The notice of 25-3-1999 also does not disclose as to when the debit slip was handed over to the complainant by the bank. It is in this background that the learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that at the pre-summoning stage although it was indicated that the petitioner was informed by virtue of the debit slip issued on 17-3-1999 it was not disclosed by the complainant as to when she actually received the debit slip.

4. He further submitted that after summoning, an affidavit by way of evidence was filed by the complainant and in paragraph 3 thereof the debit slip/return memo was referred to. The same has been exhibited as Exhibit CW 1/3. The document as exhibited at that stage along with the affidavit by way of evidence was a one sided document and was blank on the reverse. In paragraph 3 of the said affidavit, the complainant, for the first time, stated that she received the debit advice from her banker on 23-3-1999. She also referred to the certificate issued by the banker of the complainant which was exhibited as Exhibit CW 1/4. The said certificate is dated 13-8-2002.

5. According to Mr. Nigam, the learned Counsel who appears on behalf of the petitioner, the factum of receipt of the debit slip is of material significance for the purposes of the case against the petitioner. This is so because the returning memo/debit slip is admittedly dated 17-3-1999. The notice that was sent on behalf of the complainant, although dated 25-3-1999, was admittedly posted on 6-4-1999. thereforee, according to Mr. Nigam, if only these two dates are taken into account then the notice was issued beyond the period of 15 days stipulated under Section 138(c) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. On the other hand, he submitted that if it is established that the complainant received the information by virtue of the handing over of the debit slip on 23-3-1999, then the posting of the notice dated 6-4-1999 would be within the 15 days' period. According to Mr. Nigam, initially when the complaint was filed and throughout the pre-summoning stage, there was no mention of receipt of debit slip on 23-3-1999 and this date was introduced subsequently, after summoning.

6. He further submitted that the barker's certificate which has been exhibited as exhibit CW 1/4 is of 13-8-2002 and it indicates that the debit advice was collected by the complainant personally on 23-3-1999. He submits that this certificate was not available at the pre-summoning stage but has been introduced subsequently. He then referred to the testimony of one Mr. S. K. Malhotra, who was working as a clerk in the Syndicate Bank, Dhaula Kuan. The said Mr. Malhotra was examined as CW 2. Mr. Nigam pointed out the contradictory statements made by Mr. Malhotra (CW 2) in his cross examination on two different dates i.e. on 5-3-2005 and 20-10-2005. On 5-3-2005 the said witness (CW 2} stated that the debit slip is issued only after verifying from the Cheque Return Record. However, on 20-10-2005 when the said witness was further cross-examined, he stated that the bank did not maintain any Cheque Return Register and on that day he introduced the so called original debit slip (Exhibit CW 2/D 2). This debit slip was the same as Exhibit CW 1/3 which had been introduced by the complainant at the post-summoning stage. The only difference being that Exhibit CW 1/3 was only a one sided document which did not have any endorsement on the reverse whereas this document i.e., Exhibit CW 2/ D2 had two sides to it and the reverse had the endorsement showing the alleged receipt of the debit advice along with the cheque and the same having been signed by the complainant on 23-3-1999. Exhibit CW 1/ 3 is the carbon copy whereas Exhibit CW 2/D 2 is purportedly the original which was available with the bank and obviously the endorsement was only on; the original.

7. It is in the context of these facts that the petitioner had moved the two applications under Sections 91 and 311, Cr. P. C. for summoning of the Cheque Return Register from the Bank and for recalling the complainant for further cross examination with regard to the endorsement contained on the reverse of Exhibit CW 2/D 2. The first application for summoning of the Cheque Return Register was necessary because of the contradictory statements made by CW2 (the bank official). The recalling of the complainant for further cross examination was necessitated, according to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, because of the subsequent developments, namely, the statement made by the CW 2 and the introduction of Exhibit CW2/D2 by him.

8. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent supported the order passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate rejecting both the applications. Insofar as the summoning of Cheque Return Register was concerned, the learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that the petitioner would have full opportunity to have the documents summoned at the stage when he leads his evidence. Secondly, he submitted, the petitioner did not object to the veracity of CW1/4 which was clearly mentioned in the affidavit by way of evidence of CW1. In fact, according to the learned Counsel for the respondent no questions whatsoever were put to CW1 with regard to Exhibit CW 1/4. He submitted that the document i.e., Exhibit CW1/4 is the certificate dated 13-8-2002 and is self-explanatory. The bank had certified that the debit advice relating to the return of the said cheque was collected personally by the complainant on 23-3-1999 along with the relative cheque by giving acknowledgment on the debit slip pertaining to the transaction. It is in this context that the learned Counsel for the respondent also submitted that it would be an exercise in futility to recall the complainant inasmuch as this document, in any event, established that the debit slip was handed over to the complainant on 23-3-1999 and that this debit slip Exhibit CW1/4 was not challenged by the petitioner.

9. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate rejected the two applications of the petitioner by holding as under:

6. Under Section 91 Cr. P. C. this Court has power to summon any document from any person in an enquiry or trial if the production of such document is essential. In the present case CW 2 has deposed on oath that no cheque return register has been maintained by them in their bank. Once the witness has deposed to this effect a prayer should have been made by the counsel for accused for summoning of cheque return register if he was having any doubt regarding non-maintaining of the cheque return register during the cross-examination of CW 2. However, no such request was made at that point of time and it can be, safely presumed that accused accepted the testimony of CW 2 regarding the non-maintaining, of cheque return register. By making the present application the only motive of the accused is just to delay the trial. Even otherwise, the accused can very well prove in his defense evidence by summoning any bank official of Syndicate Bank Branch Dhaula Kuan to produce the cheque return register if any for the month of March, 1999. However, at this stage i.e., at the stage of examination of accused under Section 313, Cr. P. C. there is no Justification in directing the Syndicate Bank branch Dhaula Kuan to produce the cheque return register if any in the light of categorical deposition made by CW 2 who was a witness from the said bank and no request having being made by the counsel for accused during his cross-examination for its production. Accordingly, the application under Section 91, Cr. P. C. is dismissed.

xxx xxx xxx xxx11. The contention put forward by counsel for accused is not acceptable as the complainant while deposing in chief by affidavit has categorically stated that she got the information from her bank on 23-3-1999 and she has also deposed regarding certificate issued by the bank which is Ex. CW1/4. The counsel for accused has not cross-examined regarding this deposition made by complainant and has not challenged the document Ex. CW1/4. Since no suggestion has been given by accused's counsel regarding the deposition made by complainant on the point of receipt of Information from her bank on 23-3-1999 and the document Ex. CW1/ 4 thereforee, for all Intents and purpose this fact stands admitted by accused as they have chosen not to cross-examine the complainant on this fact. Further record also reflects that CW 1 was exhaustively cross-examined by the accused on 5-3-2005. No purpose will be served by recalling CW1 for the purpose of confronting Ex. CW2/D2 to her, as the fact that the information was received from the bank on 23-3-1999 and the document Ex. CW1/4 has not been challenged by the accused in the cross-examination of complainant.

10. Considering the submissions made by the counsel for the parties, I find that the question of summoning of the Cheque Return Register is linked up with the question of recalling of the complainant for further cross-examination. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate has rejected the applications of the petitioner under Section 91, Cr. P. C. on the premises that as the CW 2 has deposed on. oath that there is no Cheque Return Register then there would be no purpose for summoning the bank record with respect to this. I am not in agreement with this view because it is not as if the witness (CW 2) had categorically stated that there is no Cheque Return Register being maintained by the bank and the said witness having maintained this stand. What had happened is that, first of all, the said witness deposed that the debit slip is issued after verification from the Cheque Return Register implying thereby that there does exist a Cheque Return Register. On subsequent and further cross examination, the said witness (CW 2) has changed his stand and has stated that the bank did not maintain any Cheque Return Register. thereforee, there is an element of doubt as to whether the bank does or does not maintain a Cheque Return Register which can only be dispelled by summoning of the said document from the Bank. thereforee, the finding of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate with regard to the application under Section 91, Cr. P. C. is not tenable and is liable to be set aside.

11. As regards the rejection of the application under Section 311, Cr. P. C. for recall of CW1 is concerned, it appears that the learned Metropolitan Magistrate was impressed by the fact that Exhibit CW1/4 had been mentioned in the evidence of the complainant but no suggestion was made or question put with regard to the said Exhibit and, thereforee, the Exhibit being self-explanatory, it would not be necessary to recall CW1 for further cross examination on this aspect. I am afraid, I am unable to agree with this line of reasoning. With regard to the Ex. CW2/D2. the counsel for the petitioner has definitely raised questions with regard to the veracity as would be clear from the deposition of CW2 on 5-3-2005. thereforee, it cannot be said that for all intents and purposes the factum of the document Exhibit CW1/4 stands admitted by the accused as recorded in paragraph 11. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate has not considered the aspect that Exhibit CW1/4 is the very same document which is referred to as CW2/D2 in the deposition of bank official (CW2) wherein specific questions with regard to it have been raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. thereforee, it cannot be concluded that for all intents and purposes, this fact stands admitted by the accused as they have not chosen to cross examine the complainant's witnesses. Apart from this, there is the added circumstance that the document Exhibit DW1/3 (debit slip) which was introduced by the complainant along with her affidavit by way of evidence is a carbon copy and did not bear the endorsement which is shown in Exhibit CW2/D2 which is the purported original debit slip which was introduced by the witness (CW 2). When CW 1 was examined and cross examined, this document (CW2/D2) was not within the knowledge of the petitioner and obviously no question could have been put by the petitioner to the CW1 with regard to the endorsement on the reverse. thereforee, I am not in agreement with the conclusion of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate that no purpose would be served by recalling CW1 for the purpose of confronting Exhibit CW2/02 to her.

12. Accordingly, the Impugned order la set aside. The petitioner's two applications under Sections 91 and 311, Cr. P. C. are allowed.

13. It is made clear that the trial has gone out for over 7 years and, thereforee, only one opportunity should be allowed to the petitioner to have the Cheque Return Register, if any, summoned from the Manager, Syndicate Bank, Dhaula Kaun. Insofar as the recall of the complainant for further cross examination is concerned, her recall would be limited to the endorsement made on Exhibit CW2/D2 and related questions. It would be also appropriate if the trial Court expedites the disposal of this matter and concludes the trial at an early date, preferably within six months.