Mahant Surinder Nath Thru His Attorney Shri Satish Kumar Vs. Union of India (Uoi) and ors. - Court Judgment

Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.

1. The plaintiff, claiming to be a Mahant of Kalkaji Mandir, has filed the present suit for declaration, possession and injunction through his attorney Mr.Satish Kumar. The attorney is the natural born brother of the Mahant.

2. The case of the plaintiff is that the plaintiff is the lawful owner of 50% share of Khasra No. 629 measuring 4 bigha 2 biswa, Khasra No. 630 measuring 18 bigha 9 biswa, Khasra No. 633, 633/1, 633/2 and 633/2/1 measuring 185 bigha and 1 biswa in Village Bahapur. Out of this total land, certain portions of the land were acquired by different awards by the Government of India in all the six khasra numbers. The remaining land after acquisition is stated to be 45 bigha and 10 biswa out of which the share of the plaintiff is stated to be 22 bigha and 15 biswa.

3. The plaintiff claims that after demarcation of the land which resulted in Suit No. 342/1991, the plaintiff approached the Director (Lands) DDA and asked him to restore the land occupied and fenced by the DDA which measured 22 bigha and 15 biswa as the same was never acquired. It is the case of the plaintiff that the right of such property being enjoyed by the DDA is without authority of law. The Director of DDA informed the plaintiff that the suit land was transferred to the DDA in the year 1982 by the Ministry of Rehabilitation, Government of India under a package deal in pursuance to the letter dated 4/1978-55-11 on 'as is where is basis'. This position is naturally disputed by the plaintiff and it is the case of the plaintiff that the public authority cannot enjoy and acquire land except by due process of law under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The plaint sets out the cause of action for filing the suit as having arisen in the first week of January, 1998 when the plaintiff discovered that the DDA was fencing the land and apparently raised boundary walls encompassing the said land and started developing the same into a green area by trespassing in the suit property of the plaintiff. The period of limitation being 12 years, it is claimed that the cause of action had arisen only in the first week of January, 1998 and, thus, the suit was within time.

4. The plaintiff sought a decree of declaration that the plaintiff was a lawful owner of 22 bigha and 15 biswa of land situated in village Bahapur, Delhi; a decree of possession directing the defendants (UOI as defendant No. 1, Land & Building Department of the Govt. of NCT of Delhi as defendant No. 2 and DDA as defendant No. 3) to restore possession of the suit property to the plaintiff, a decree of mandatory injunction directing defendants to remove the fencing, boundary walls, if any, as also a decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from alienating, transferring and changing character of the land and from creating any third party interest in the suit property.

5. It may be noticed that the plaint is verified on 25.2.1999 but the suit has been instituted on 25.2.2000. The verification date of 25.2.1999 appears to be a typographical error as the date in the month are filled in hand while the year of 1999 is typed out. It appears that the plaint was typed out earlier and signed subsequently as in para-13 of the plaint a reference has been made to a legal notice of the plaintiff dated 28.5.1999. Thus, one can proceed on the basis that the plaint was signed and verified on 25.2.2000.

6. The plaintiff along with the suit filed an application under the provisions of Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the CPC) seeking interim relief against the DDA from raising any boundary walls around the suit property shown in the site plan in red or from changing the nature and character of the suit as also from alienating and transferring the same to any third party. The application is dated 25.2.2000 but is supported by an affidavit which was affirmed and attested on 16.11.1999. This fact has been mentioned as also the date of attestation as it could have some bearing on the matter.

7. The DDA, defendant No. 3, filed its written statement contesting the suit. It is the case of the DDA that the suit land came within Site No. 49 in terms of the sketch of the surveyed land in Kalkaji which was handed over to the DDA vide documents dated 28.9.1983 and 29.12.1983 on payment of Rs. 30.00 crores for maintenance, development and disposal of the said land under the provisions of the Delhi Development Act. The land in question is stated to be green belt maintained by the DDA.

8. The DDA states that on verification from revenue records, some parts of Khasra Nos. 629, 630 and 633 were found to fall in Site No. 49 which were so allotted and transferred to the Ministry of Rehabilitation. The position about the land acquired and the remaining land has also been explained in the written statement but it is not necessary at this stage to deal with the same in detail. It is stated that as per the Jamabandi of the year 1908-09 of Khasra No. 630 there used to be a pond in the centre of the land and the land was enjoyed by the Pujaris of the Kalkaji Temple and Shamlat thok comprising of Bhramins and the Jogies in equal share. The said pond is stated to have dried up but has still retained its shape as depression in the land and it falls in Site No. 49. Some encroachments are alleged to have been made which have been removed by the DDA. In sum and substance, the stand of the DDA is that this land, of which the plaintiff is claiming the right, vested with the DDA for managing the same and the plaintiff had no exclusive rights over it.

9. The short affidavit filed by UOI/defendant No. 1 is almost to the same effect except that it is specifically stated that the package deal was on 'as is where is' basis vide notification dated 2.9.2982 with the physical possession being handed over on 18.11.1983.

10. In the suit even issues have not been framed when applications started coming in for impleadment as parties by the applicants who claimed interest in the said land on account of the fact that it was Shamlat thok of Brahmins and Jogies who had 50% share each in the land. It may be noticed that there is a dispute about the percentage of share of land but that aspect is also not again which has to be gone into in the present suit as a separate suit is stated to be pending in respect of the same.

11. It was deemed expedient in the given facts of the case to issue notice to the Land and Building Department of Govt. of NCT of Delhi as the position about the status of the land was not emerging clearly. This was so since it was not apparent as to how the public authority claimed possession of the land and as to whether the land had been so acquired. In pursuance to such notice, Mr.Sanjay Poddar, learned Counsel entered appearance on behalf of the Land and Building Department, Govt. of NCT of Delhi. It was explained that a notification was issued by the Government of India on 26.3.1949 under Section 3 of the Resettlement of Displaced Persons (Land Acquisition) Act, 1948 where Khasra No. 638 has been shown as the acquired land and mentioned under Village Bahapur. In respect of Khasra No. 629, 2 bigha and 1 biswa was acquired by notification dated 13.11.1959 but the balance portion in respect of which the plaintiff claims right was stated to be a road since 1908 under the Wilson survey. Khasra No. 630 consisted of 18 bighas and 14 biswa of land out of which 5 bigha had been acquired vide notification dated 13.11.1959 while the balance 18 bigha and 9 biswa was a pond (water body) and was stated to be continuing as such.

12. The aforesaid necessitated the direction for presence of both the plaintiff and his attorney and their statements were recorded under Order 10 Rule 2 CPC on 4.12.2007. It is necessary to note what has been stated by the said two persons under oath.

13. The plaintiff claimed that he was the disciple of Mahant Ram Nath Ji from about 1970 and became a Mahant in 1992 on the demise of Mahant Ram Nath Ji. He further stated that he could keep property as a Mahant though he would not inherit any property from his father and the property owned by the Mahant would be managed by the new Mahant. Mahant Prithvi Nath was stated to be the guru of Mahant Ram Nath Ji and Mahant Prithvi Nath Ji had made a Will bequeathing his estate to Mahant Ram Nath Ji. Mahant Ram Nath Ji is stated to have made a Will in favor of the plaintiff though it was conceded that such a Will was not filed in any proceedings so far including in relation to the dispute pending about his Mahantship.

14. The plaintiff Mahant stated that he was a graduate by qualification and that he was aware of the present suit filed. It was further stated that the suit land consisting of 22 bigha and 16 biswa of land had a park of the DDA though it was stated that he had not seen the site as to what else existed on the land in question. He conceded that he stayed in the Kalkaji Mandir. On a query being posed, he conceded that there was a jauhar on the land and there was a road between the jauhar and the mandir. The plaintiff has stated that the plaint was not signed and verified by him but was filed through his attorney Mr.Satish Kumar. The same was shown to the plaintiff before it was filed. Mr.Satish Kumar was stated to be the real brother by birth of the plaintiff who looked after all the affairs of the plaintiff, primarily of the properties of the Mahant.

15. The plaintiff was not able to state any reason as to why the status of the properties which existed at site was not disclosed in the plaint. He conceded that he had seen the revenue records himself sometimes for the first time in 1990s and that the jauhar was very old. He did not know as to when the road and the park was constructed but were stated to be made after 1980. He further could not state any reason as to why after becoming a Mahant in 1992 it had taken him eight years to file a suit for possession. The only reason given was that he was verifying the records. The plaintiff further conceded that half of the share of the total land lies with the plaintiff while the other half remains with the families of the Brahmins.

16. After recording the statement of the plaintiff, the statement of Mr.Satish Kumar, the attorney of the plaintiff was recorded. The attorney has stated that he was running a business of trading of herbal products and was educated up to inter class. The attorney stated that he was looking after all the land affairs of the plaintiff for which he was paid a remuneration of Rs. 10,000/- per month apart from other expenses. He again reiterated that the plaint was shown to the plaintiff and that what was stated in the plaint was correct. The attorney admitted that he had gone to the site where the land is located and the land was possessed by the DDA and there was a park and a road apart from a jauhar on the road. The demarcation stated to have been carried out in the year 1989 when he was the attorney. Even at that time he was looking after the lands on behalf of the previous Guruji. The park and the road were stated to be already in existence in 1986. It was conceded that from 1986 to the year 2000 no steps were taken to seek possession of the land though they kept on approaching the revenue authorities.

17. The attorney has stated that he has no personal right in the land but for the first time disclosed that he had entered into agreements in respect of the suit land with the third parties and even executed sale deeds which had not been filed in Court. He categorically stated that the plaintiff was duly informed of all the transactions and that he did not inform his advocate about the same. The sale was stated to be on 'as is where is' basis and the agreement was at the rate of one lakh per bigha and on the land getting cleared, the plaintiff was to get a minimum of Rs. 500/- and the maximum amount of Rs. 1,000/- per square yard. The sale deed was stated to have been executed as attorney and the money was still lying with the attorney. The name of the purchasers was given as Mr.Mahender Pal, Mr.Akhilesh Singh and Ms.Anita Yogi with all the original documents being in the possession of the attorney. The whole land was stated to have been sold and the sale deeds duly registered. The attorney further stated that he had seen the Khasra Girdwari and Jama Bandi and the land was registered in the name of the Mahant and he obtained the documents from the revenue authorities which were filed with the plaint.

18. In view of the said statement, the plaintiff was examined again and on being asked stated that he did not know that the land had been sold. He, however, stated that the land of the Mahant could be sold in case of necessity or need. The plaintiff claimed that it is only on 3.12.2007 that he had been informed about the sale of the land and no money had been credited to his account. He further stated that he had not specifically asked his attorney to sell the land though the land could have been sold for some charitable purposes or activities connected with the temple but not for profit motive.

19. In view of the contradictions between what was stated by the plaintiff and the attorney, it was observed that the matter required a deeper examination. The plaintiff was stating that he had no knowledge of the sale while his attorney stated that he was fully informed of the same. A direction was issued that all documents be filed in this Court which have since been so filed.

20. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff today states that the suit as framed is not maintainable as without seeking partition of the land in which the plaintiff claims 50% share, the possession could not have been asked for. There is no division of land by metes and bounds and, thus, without first seeking such division, the suit or possession could not have been filed. A prayer has been made that the suit be permitted to be withdrawn with liberty to file a proper suit.

21. The aforesaid plea is opposed not only by the defendants but also by the applicants who seek to be imp leaded in the suit. The sum and substance of the opposition is that though the plaintiff may be permitted to withdraw the suit, no leave ought to be granted to file any fresh suit in view of the conduct of the plaintiff who has come with unclean hands before the Court and has failed to disclose the material aspects. Interestingly a new counsel, Mr.M.Mirza, also appeared for the plaintiff today who sought to plead that the plaintiff was not fully aware of what he had stated and had actually never even read the plaint properly nor did he authorise the transfer of the land. It was stated that the authorisation in favor of the attorney had, in fact, been withdrawn though no registered document in that behalf had been executed.

22. A further plea of the learned Counsel for the defendants is that the suit, being an abuse of the process of the Court, exemplary costs ought to be imposed on the plaintiff while dismissing the suit. It is further pleaded that the present case is a fit one where proceedings must be initiated against the plaintiff and his attorney under Section 340(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Cr.P.C.). It is further prayed that an FIR should be registered not only against the plaintiff and the attorney, but also against the prospective purchasers for the reasons which have been discussed hereinafter. It is within the conspectus of these aspects that the present case has to be examined.

23. The original sale deeds have been filed on record which number seven. All the sale deeds have been executed on 26.10.1999 for different portions of land. Three sale deeds have been executed in favor of Mr.Mahender Pal, two sale deeds in favor of Smt.Anita Yogi and two sale deeds in favor of Mr.Akhilesh Singh. Mr.Mahender Pal is another brother of the plaintiff (and thus also brother of the attorney) while Smt.Anita Yogi is the wife of Mr.Mahender Pal. Mr.Akhilesh Singh is the brother of Smt.Anita Yogi. Mr.Mahender Pal and Smt.Anita Yogi are residents of Bhairon Mandir, Kalkaji while Mr.Akhilesh Singh is a resident of Rohini.

24. The common thread which runs through all the sale deeds is that they have been executed through Mr.Satish Kumar, the attorney. Mr.Satish Kumar has a registered power of attorney so registered on 7.10.1998 and executed by the plaintiff Mahant. The sale deeds state that the vendor is the owner and 'in possession' of the land in question and the land is being sold for the bona fide needs and requirements of the vendor. The sale deeds also state that the vendor has handed over the physical possession of the land to the vendee in execution of the sale deed and that the vendor is left with no title or interest in the suit property. The land is claimed to be the exclusive property of the vendor and that the principal was alive and had not cancelled or revoked the attorney.

25. A copy of the power of attorney, which is the basis for execution of the sale deeds is also on record. The said registered power of attorney is irrevocable and has been made specifically for the purposes of sale of the property in question and for obtaining necessary permissions for the same. Apart from this, authority has also been given for construction on the land obtaining, obtaining water and electricity connection, instituting legal proceedings, collecting compensation or taking allotment of alternative plot. The attorney further authorises appointment of other attorneys by the attorney so appointed.

26. An appreciation of the aforesaid facts show that the suit is replete with the concealment of material facts. The plaint is laid on the basis of an endeavor by the public authorities to improperly dispossess the plaintiff from the land owned by the plaintiff which had not been acquired by due process of law. The attorney of the plaintiff, who is the natural born brother, was the attorney even of the earlier Mahant. The complete nature and status of the property was thus not only known to the plaintiff but even to the attorney. In the statements recorded of the plaintiff and the attorney under Order 10 Rule 2 CPC it has clearly come to light that the plaintiff and the attorney were fully aware of the fact that the land in question had a road, jauhar and a park while the case presented in the plaint was as if recently an endeavor in 1998 had been made by the DDA to fence the park. The statements of these parties also show that even prior to 1986 all these things already existed on the land and, thus, the introduction of the date of 1998 was made only to bring the suit within the ambit of limitation by stating that the period of limitation was 12 years and should be counted from 1998. The plaintiff and the attorney had, at least, knowledge of the status of the defendant authorities and their possession in the land from 1986 onwards, if not earlier.

27. The documents of sale have been executed on 26.10.1999 by the attorney. There is not a whisper of this fact in the suit. In fact, the suit would not have been entertained in such a case where rightly or wrongly the land had been sold. The affidavit in support of the application for interim relief has been affirmed on 16.11.1999 though the application and the plaint have been verified on 25.2.2000.

28. The attorney has, thus, come with uncleaned hands giving misdisclosures and false statement in the plaint. Not only that, the attorney has executed sale deeds claiming to have possession of the land and further claiming to transfer the possession to the vendees who were his brother, sister-in-law and sister-in-law's brother. The sale deeds are also, thus, replete with incorrect statements being made.

29. The plaintiff also cannot be really absolved of the responsibility by merely stating that he was unaware of the execution of the sale deeds. The plaintiff himself had as late as on 7.10.1998 executed an irrevocable GPA in favor of the attorney, his natural brother, for sale of the property and it was in pursuance to the said attorney that the sale deeds have been executed on 26.10.1999.

30. It cannot be lost sight of that the land in question was being maintained by the DDA as green belt. The land is stated to be enjoyed by the pujaries of the Kalkaji Temple and Shamlat thok comprising of Bhramins and the Jogies in equal share, except the land which had been acquired. The duty of the plaintiff becomes even more onerous as he claims to be the Mahant of the Kalkaji Temple and is the head of the religious institution. He is to be above the greed's of the world. In fact, in his deposition he has stated that his relationship with his family ceases once he becomes a Mahant. The land of the Temple which even according to the Mahant could have been sold only for the requirement of the improvements of the Temple and for public purpose has been sold for his private benefit, as stated in the sale deeds, albeit through his attorney. Nothing has been brought on record to show that the authority in favor of the attorney had been ever withdrawn.

31. It is not possible to accept the submission of learned Counsel for the plaintiff advanced today that the statement made by the plaintiff earlier was under any misconception or that he was unaware of what was happening. The plaintiff is a graduate by qualification and looking after the affairs of the Temple. It can hardly be accepted that such a man would be unaware of what is happening.

32. In such a situation, there can hardly be a case for grant of leave to file a fresh suit on withdrawal of the present suit. The leave to withdraw the suit is prayed apparently because on 4.12.2007 itself this Court had put the parties to notice that it would hear the parties on the issue of perjury arising from the contradictory statements of the plaintiff and his attorney. The Supreme Court in Dy. General Manager, Redesignated as Dy. Director, ISB and Ors. v. Sudarshal Kumari and Ors. (1996) 4 SCC 763 has dealt with grant of leave to file fresh suits and held that in such cases as there is no occasion for compassion as liberties granted were being abused. I am, thus, of the view that the plaintiff be permitted to withdraw the suit, there can be no question of grant of any liberty to file any fresh civil suit. The suit is thus, dismissed as withdrawn, without any leave being granted to file any fresh suit.

33. The second question arises whether the plaintiff is liable to be imposed with any exemplary damages on account of the improper conduct. The plaintiff was fully conscious of the fate of the suit once the truth had emerged from this Court. In fact, this Court would have been well within its right to dismiss the suit summarily without trial where there is such gross abuse of the process of the Court. The Supreme Court in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (Dead) by LRs. v. Jagannath (Dead) by LRs. and Ors. : AIR1994SC853 had dealt with into the principle of 'finality of litigation' and came to the conclusion that such a principle cannot be pressed to the extent of an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants. The courts of law were held to be for imparting justice between the parties and, thus, one who comes to the court, must come with clean hands. It was further held that a person who's case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the court and could be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation. This was so since a judgment or decree obtained by playing fraud on the court is a nullity and non est in the eyes of law and could be challenged in any court even in collateral proceedings. A fraud was held to be an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another. It is a deception and in order to gain by another's loss and cheating intended to get advantage. Thus, a litigant who approaches the Court is bound to produce all documents executed by him which were relevant for litigation and if he withheld any vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side, then he would be guilty of playing fraud on the court as well as on the opposite party.

34. The aforesaid observations fit perfectly in the facts of the case where there is not a whisper of the sale deeds till the directions were passed by this Court after recording of the statements of the plaintiff and the attorney. The proceedings initiated by the plaintiff are clearly a fraud on the Court. The valuable time of this Court has been utilized for the last seven years dragging the defendants into unnecessary litigation. Such a litigant cannot be permitted to get away by merely withdrawing the suit.

35. In Goel MG Gases Private Limited v. Air Liquid Deutschland GMBH and Ors. : 138(2007)DLT62 Geeta Mittal, J. has succinctly set out the problems arising from such misconceived litigation. It has been held that vexatious and frivolous litigations poses a number of threats to efficient operation of any civil justice system and such proceedings not only oppress and harass the adversary which are scarce, but are extremely damaging to public interest causing loss of valuable judicial resources which are scarce. Thus, a party which succeeds is liable to be compensated by award of costs in such matters. The legislature has recognized need for imposition of costs and, thus, enacted Section 35 of the said Code. In Salem Advocates Bar Association v. Union of India 6 SCC 344 a judicial notice was taken of the fact that many unscrupulous parties take advantage of the fact that either the costs are not awarded or nominal costs are awarded against the unsuccessful party. Even where costs are awarded, ordinarily the same may not be realistic or are nominal. Thus, emphasis has been laid on costs being awarded which are realistic specially keeping in mind the provisions of Section 35(2) of the CPC.

36. I, thus, deem it appropriate to impose costs of Rs. 1,50,000/- on the plaintiff, out of which Rs. 1,20,000/- would be deposited with the Delhi Legal Services Committee and out of the remaining Rs. 30,000/-, Rs. 10,000/- each would be paid to the three defendants authorities, being the Delhi Development Authority, Union of India, Land & Building Department of the Govt. of NCT of Delhi. The costs be deposited within 15 days.

37. The last aspect to be examined arises from the plea advanced that the two plaintiffs be prosecuted for perjury under Section 340(1) of the Cr.P.C. In this behalf learned Counsel has drawn the attention of this Court on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Re: Suo Motu Proceedings against R. Karuppan, Advocate : 2001CriLJ2611 . It has been held that giving false evidence has become a general practice and Courts should take stern and effective action against such offence and stop taking evasive recourse. It would be useful to reproduce the observations made by the Supreme Court in Paras 13 to 17, which are as under:

13. Courts are entrusted with the powers of dispensation and adjudication of justice of the rival claims of the parties besides determining the criminal liability of the offenders for offences committed against the society. The courts are further expected to do justice quickly and impartially not being biased by any extraneous considerations. Justice dispensation system would be wrecked if statutory restrictions are not imposed upon the litigants, who attempt to mislead the court by filing and relying upon false evidence particularly in cases, the adjudication of which is dependent upon the statement of facts. If the result of the proceedings are to be respected, these issues before the courts must be resolved to the extent possible in accordance with the truth. The purity of proceedings of the court cannot be permitted to be sullied by a party on frivolous, vexatious or insufficient grounds or relying upon false evidence inspired by extraneous considerations or revengeful desire to harass or spite his opponent. Sanctity of the affidavits has to be preserved and protected discouraging the filing of irresponsible statements, without any regard to accuracy.

14. At common law courts took action against a person who was shown to have made a statement, material in the proceedings, which he knew to be false or did not believe to be true. The offence committed by him is known as perjury. Dealing with the history of the offence, Stanford H. Kadish in Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice (Vol. 3) observed:

History of the offense

Before witnesses had any formal role in trials, there was no need for a perjury law. In the Middle Ages, when the English common law was developing, trial by battle was used to test a sworn accusation. Similarly, for the sworn denial of a serious charge based on mere suspicion, an ordeal administered by a priest was the predominant mode of trial until it was abolished in 1215 as superstitious. Finally, at least until the Assize of Clarendon (1166), less serious accusations could be successfully answered by 'compurgation', that is, by obtaining a sufficient number of 'oath helpers' to support the defendant's credibility.

Trials in the modern sense began to develop only in the thirteenth century. Little is reliably known about the conduct of jury trials prior to the sixteenth century, but in civil cases, it seems that genuine witnesses were permitted to give their accounts, although they could not be compelled to appear. In early criminal cases, the jury seems always to have included some who, aware of the commission of a crime in their community, brought the suspect before a Judge. Those witnesses who did attend these early trials were perceived as part of the jury and retired with them to deliberate, often to make their disclosures in secret. It was the verdict, not the testimony, that was perceived as either true or false; the only remedy for falsehood remotely akin to a perjury prosecution was a seldom-invoked procedure called 'the writ of attaint', created in 1202 and not abolished formally until 1825. Through attaint, the jury would be punished for a 'false' verdict and the verdict itself overturned.

Witnesses first testified under oath in criminal cases on behalf of the Crown in the sixteenth century. No witnesses for the defense were permitted until the mid-seventeenth century, since they would have been witnesses against the Crown, and not until 1702 were defense witnesses permitted to be sworn [1 Anne, St. 2, c. 9, St. 3 (1701) (England) (repealed)]. By the late seventeenth century the jury had lost all its testimonial functions, and witnesses thus became the sole means of bringing facts to the J udge's and jury's attention.

Since the early common law had no established mechanism for dealing with false swearing by witnesses, the Court of Star Chamber assumed for itself the power to punish perjury. This authority was confirmed by statute in 1487 [Star Chamber Act, 3 Hen. 5, c. 1 (1487) (England) (repealed)]. The first detailed statute against false swearing was enacted in 1562 [5 Eliz. 1, c. 9 (1562) (England) (repealed)]. When the Star Chamber was abolished in 1640, its judicially defined offense of perjury passed into English common law, reaching any cases of false testimony not covered by the terms of the statute.

Edward Coke, whose views strongly influenced early American law, wrote in his Third Institute , published in 1641, that perjury was committed when, after a 'lawful oath' was administered in a 'judicial proceeding', a person swore 'absolutely and falsely' concerning a point 'material' to the issue in question (*164). In this form, the law remained unchanged into the twentieth century.

15. In India, law relating to the offence of perjury is given a statutory definition under Section 191 and Chapter XI of the Indian Penal Code, incorporated to deal with the offences relating to giving false evidence against public justice. The offences incorporated under this Chapter are based upon recognition of the decline of moral values and erosion of sanctity of oath. Unscrupulous litigants are found daily resorting to utter blatant falsehood in the courts which has, to some extent, resulted in polluting the judicial system. It is a fact, though unfortunate, that a general impression is created that most of the witnesses coming in the courts despite taking oath make false statements to suit the interests of the parties calling them. Effective and stern action is required to be taken for preventing the evil of perjury, concededly let loose by vested interest and professional litigants. The mere existence of the penal provisions to deal with perjury would be a cruel joke with the society unless the courts stop to take an evasive recourse despite proof of the commission of the offence under Chapter XI of the Indian Penal Code. If the system is to survive, effective action is the need of the time. The present case is no exception to the general practice being followed by many of the litigants in the country.

16. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of this case, the record of proceedings in Suo Motu Contempt Petition (Criminal) No. 5 of 2000 and Writ Petition No. 77 of 2001, we are prima facie satisfied that the respondent herein, in his affidavit filed in support of the writ petition (for the purposes of being used in the judicial proceedings i.e. writ petition), has wrongly made a statement that the age of Dr Justice A.S. Anand has not been determined by the President of India in terms of Article 217 of the Constitution. We are satisfied that such a statement supported by an affidavit of the respondent was known to him to be false, which he believed to be false and/or at least did not believe to be true. It is not disputed that an affidavit is evidence within the meaning of Section 191 of the Indian Penal Code and a person swearing to a false affidavit is guilty of perjury punishable under Section 193 IPC. The respondent herein, being legally bound by an oath to state the truth in his affidavit accompanying the petition is prima facie held to have made a false statement which constitutes an offence of giving false evidence as defined under Section 191 IPC, punishable under Section 193 IPC.

17. With the object of eradicating the evil of perjury, we empower the Registrar General of this Court to depute an officer of the rank of Deputy Registrar or above of the Court to file a complaint under Section 193 of the Indian Penal Code against the respondent herein, before a Magistrate of competent jurisdiction at Delhi. Such officer is directed to file such complaint and take all steps necessary for prosecuting the complaint.

38. The aforesaid observations have sketched out the history of the law on perjury which is meant to charge litigants with offences where unscrupulous litigants are found to be resorting to falsehood in courts polluting the stream of justice delivery system. Learned Counsel for defendant No. 3 has also drawn the attention of this Court to Goswamy Brij Kumar Jee v. UOI and Ors. WP(C) No. 3042/00 and CM No. 15976/05, decided on 3.7.2007 where also an inquiry was directed to be made in respect of the offences under Section 340 Cr.P.C. by authorising the Registrar General to take necessary action.

39. In order to appreciate the aforesaid aspect, I deem it necessary to reproduce the relevant provisions of the Cr.P.C.:

340. Procedure in cases mentioned in Section 195.

(1) When upon an application made to it in this behalf or otherwise any court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice that an inquiry should be made into any offence referred to in Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 195, which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that court or, as the case may be, in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in that court, such court may, after such preliminary inquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary,-

(a) Record a finding to that effect;

(b) Make a complaint thereof in writing;

(c) Send it to a Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction;

(d) Take sufficient security for the appearance for the accused before such Magistrate, or if the alleged offence is non-bailable and the court thinks it necessary so to do send the accused in custody to such Magistrate; and

(e) Bind over any person to appear and give evidence before such Magistrate

...195. Prosecution for contempt of lawful authority of public servants, for offences against public justice and for offences relating to documents given in evidence.

(1) No court shall take cognizance-.

(b) (i) Of any offence punishable under any of the following sections of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), namely, Sections 193 to 196 (both inclusive), 199, 200, 205 to 211 (both inclusive) and 228, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any court, or

(ii) Of any offence described in Section 463, or punishable under Section 471, Section 475 or Section 476, of the said Code, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court, or

(iii) Of any criminal conspiracy to commit, or attempt to commit, or the abetment of, any offence specified in sub-clause (i) or sub-clause (ii), except on the complaint in writing of that court, or of some other court to which that court is subordinate.

40. In the conspectus of the aforesaid provisions, if the relevant provisions of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the IPC) are perused, it does appear that the provisions of Sections 193, 199, 200 and 209 are attracted. The said provisions read as under:

Section 193. Punishment for false evidence

Whoever intentionally gives false evidence in any stage of a judicial proceeding, or fabricates false evidence for the purpose of being used in any stage of a judicial proceeding, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine; and whoever intentionally gives or fabricates false evidence in any other case, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine.

Explanationn 1-A trial before a Court-martial; [* * *] is a judicial proceeding.

Explanation 2-An investigation directed by law preliminary to a proceeding before a Court of Justice, is a stage of a judicial proceeding, though that investigation may not take place before a Court of Justice.

Section 199. False statement made in declaration which is by law receivable as evidence

Whoever, in any declaration made or subscribed by him, which declaration any Court of Justice, or any public servant or other person, is bound or authorized by law to receive as evidence of any fact, makes any statement which is false, and which he either knows or believes to be false or does not believe to be true, touching any point material to the object for which the declaration is made or used, shall be punished in the same manner as if he gave false evidence.

Section 200. Using as true such declaration knowing it to be false

Whoever corruptly uses or attempts to use as true any such declaration, knowing the same to be false in any material point, shall be punished in the same manner as if he gave false evidence. Explanationn-A declaration which is inadmissible merely upon the ground of some informality, is a declaration within the meaning of Sections 199 to 200.....

Section 209. Dishonestly making false claim in Court

Whoever fraudulently or dishonestly, or with intent to injure or any person, makes in a Court of Justice any claim which he knows to be false, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, and shall also be liable to fine.

41. I, thus, deem it appropriate to direct that the Registrar General should appoint a Registrar/Joint Registrar of this Court to take necessary action for initiation of proceedings under Section 340(1) Cr.P.C. keeping in mind the aforesaid provisions of the IPC.

42. It also cannot be lost sight of that the execution of the sale deeds prima facie appears to be a collusive act not only of the plaintiffs but of three other persons, Mr.Mahender Pal, Smt.Anita Yogi and Mr.Akhilesh Singh, who are closely related to the plaintiff, being the natural brother, the wife of the brother and the brother of such a wife. These vendees are not before the Court. A further inquiry into the execution of sale deeds is necessary. I, thus, deem it appropriate to direct that the Economic Offence Wing of the Delhi Police shall register an FIR against all the five persons and carry out investigation in accordance with law and if offences are made out, to take suitable action thereafter. This direction is necessary as the sale deeds are documents in rem and would give authority to the vendees to mislead the public of the prospect of purchase of land which could never have been sold.

43. In view of the sale deeds having been prima facie fraudulently registered, it is necessary to direct that the Registrar General of Documents and Assurance-cum-Secretary Revenue should hold an inquiry in respect of the execution of the sale deeds and take action in accordance with law including for cancellation of the sale deeds.

44. The suit is accordingly dismissed with the aforesaid directions with the hope that the authorities concerned would follow-up the matter in a proper perspective to see that the ends of justice are met.

45. A copy of the judgment of sent expeditiously to the Economic Offence Wing of the Delhi Police and the Registrar General of Documents and Assurance-cum-Secretary Revenue. A copy of the judgment be also placed before the Registrar General, Delhi High Court for necessary action.

CM Nos. 11020/07 (Order 1 Rule 10(2) CPC), 11021/06 (Order 6 Rule 17 CPC), 13855/07 (Order 1 Rule 10 CPC), 13923/07 (Order 1, Rule 10 CPC), 14294/07 (Order 1 Rule 10(2) CPC) AND 14295/07 (Order 1 Rule 10 CPC)

46. The applications are not maintainable in view of the suit having been withdrawn and are accordingly disposed of.