Nandu and ors. Vs. Union of India (Uoi) and ors. - Court Judgment

Swatanter Kumar, J.

1. In this petition the petitioners have raised challenge to the two notifications issued under Section 4, 6 and 17 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') dated 18th December, 87 and 14th January, 88. Vide these notifications, the appropriate Government intended to acquire an area of 2891 bighas 8 bids was of the land in the revenue estate of village Bindapur. In furtherance to these notifications, declaration under Section 6 of the Act was issued on 18th September, 84. After serving the notices under Section 9 and 10 of the Act, the claimants were heard and the Collector made an Award bearing No. 163/86-87 and acquired an area of 733 bighas and 14 biswas. The notifications were issued for acquiring the land for a public purpose namely 'Planned Development of Delhi'. It was composite notification under Section 4, 6 and 17 of the Act. As per the terms of the notifications, compliance to the provisions of Section 5A of the Act was dispensed with.

2. It is the argument on behalf of the petitioners that the entire area was not acquired or taken possession of by the authorities as it was a built up area. Secondly, before allegedly taking the possession the payment of 80% amount as contemplated under the provisions of the Act was not made, the public purpose could not be achieved as it was a built up area and lastly there was no order passed by the Lt. Governor upon proper application of mind under Section 17(4) of the Act, thus, dispensation to the compliance of the provisions of Section 5A of the Act was without any basis and as such this all vitiate the acquisition proceedings and the notifications are thus liable to be quashed.

3. It is also the contention of the petitioners that the payment of 80% in terms of Section 17 was neither paid nor tendered at any time to the petitioners. They have been in possession of land for all these years and the very purpose of acquisition of land stands frustrated, thus, the writ petition should be allowed.

4. This writ petition came up for hearing before the Court on 17th May, 88 on which date notice was issued to the respondents as well the respondents were restrained from dispossessing the petitioners till the next date of hearing. The interim order was confirmed vide order dated 16th August, 88. Since then, the writ petition remained pending and despite opportunities no counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of any of the respondents. Vide order dated 16th April, 93 even DDA was ordered to be imp leaded as a party and parties were granted further time to file counter/rejoinders. Unfortunately, nothing happened till the arguments were heard and judgment was reserved on 7th March, 2006.

5. During the course of hearing of the case, it is pointed out that the records were directed to be produced. They were produced, however, the records produced did not entirely relate to the present case. The one file which was produced shows that noting part related to the present acquisition while the correspondence side relate to other subject. This was so recorded in the order dated 6th March, 2006. Despite an opportunity being granted, no other records were produced. This certainly is a sorry state of affairs prevailing in the various departments of the Government, concerned with this acquisition. The callousness and careless attitude is writ large. No counter affidavit was filed by any of the respondents. No records except the noting relating to the present case, that too in part, was produced. This matter, of course, the Court is dealing separately, as directed in terms of the orders dated 7th March, 2006 and 31st March, 2006. The Court would be passing appropriate orders/directions on the basis of the report submitted by the concerned authorities in furtherance to these orders. We make it clear that we are of the concerned opinion that no fruitful purpose would be served by keeping this case also pending for finalisation of directions in regard to the delay, non-production of documents, organisational changes that are called for in the various departments. That aspect of the matter we would consider on the date already fixed for that purpose i.e 21st April, 2006, however, we would proceed to record the judgment on merits in the present writ petition on the basis of the records produced before us.

6. The petitioners claimed to be owners of the agricultural land measuring about 9 bighas 12 bids was forming part of Khasra Nos. 383 and 389 in the revenue estate of village Bindapur. There is no doubt that these khasra nos. measuring about 4.16 each were mentioned in the notification issued by the respondents under Section 4 of the Act on 18th July, 87. The declaration under Section 6 was issued on 14th January, 1988 which included both these khasra nos with complete measurement of each khasra measuring 4 bighas 16 biswas. Earlier the notification under Section 4 was issued on 27th January, 84 acquiring huge tract of lands in various villages. Bindapur was one of them. Section 6 declaration was issued for the land measuring about 2891 bighas 8 bids was in village Bindapur in furtherance to which the above award was passed. In the copy of the award filed by the petitioner the land of the petitioner is stated to be excluded from that award.

7. After issuance of first notification and passing of the first award, fresh notification under Section 4 was issued on 18th December, 1987 and declaration under Section 6 of the Act on 14th January, 1988. This land was acquired and it was left out of the first award and was part of the planned development of Delhi under Papankala scheme. The possession was taken of part of the land i.e. Part of Khasra No. 389 min for 2 bigha 8 biswa on 18th March, 1988 and another award being award No. 24/1989-90 dated 10th January, 1990 was made in relation to 38 bigha 3 biswa including the land of the petitioners in Khasra Nos. 383 and 389 in Village Bindapur measuring about 9 bigha 12 biswa. Despite passing of the award of the entire land, possession of the part of the land was not taken. The respondent also produced copy of the Kabza Karvayee report dated 18th March, 1988 wherein possession of Khasra No. 389 min measuring 2.8 was taken on 18th March, 1988 and on the same day, possession of the land was handed over to the DDA. The Award No. 24/1989-90 included the entire land of both the Khasras being Khasra Nos. 383 and 389 measuring about 9 bigha 12 biswa and compensation was awarded for that acquisition of land.

8. During the course of hearing it was not disputed by the respondents that the possession of Khasra no. 383 had not been taken while part of khasra no. 389 measuring about 2 bighas 8 bids was out of 4.16 bids was was taken. As far as the non-payment of 80% of the amount at the time of taking possession is concerned, according to the petitioners, the amount was never tendered or offered to them. This again, during the course of arguments, has not been admitted by the respondents. Even if, for the sake of arguments, it is taken to be correct that the possession of whatever land is taken by the respondents and they had not offered or tendered 80% payment in accordance with the provisions of Section 17, then it would be merely an irregularity and would not be an illegality. We need not discuss this issue any further as it has been squarely answered against the petitioner by this Court in the case of Ashish Paul v. Union of India and Ors. : 122(2005)DLT353 as well as by the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Satendra Prasad Jain and Ors. v. State of U.P and Ors. : AIR1993SC2517 .

9. The other argument raised by the petitioners that the public purpose stated in the notification under Section 4 in its substance is not a public purpose as 'Planned development of Delhi' would not fall in that category, is without any merit. Number of judgments by now have been pronounced by this Court as well as the Supreme Court stating that 'Planned development of Delhi' is not only a public purpose but is an urgent public purpose keeping in view the increase in population and development of Delhi and in the larger interest of the public. Reference can be made to Shanti India (P) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor and others WP(C) No. 7446/1999 decided on 3.2.2005. In view of this settled principle we reject that contention as well.

10. The principal contention which has been argued with some vehemence on the part of the petitioners is that there is no direction or order passed by the competent authority as contemplated under Section 17(4) of the Act and as such the acquisition proceedings stand vitiated and the land of the petitioners is liable to be released from acquisition.

11. We have already noticed that no counter affidavit on behalf of the respondents has been filed but we have directed them to produce the records which in part is produced. There is no doubt to the fact that there is no noting even on the noting sheet proposing that the proper authority i.e the Lt. Governor may dispense with the compliance to the provisions of Section 5A of the Act. There is no noting nor there is any order relating to Section 17(4). The respondents rely upon the following order passed by the Lt. Governor on the note of the office:

I have gone through the records and requirement of DDA as also the draft notification. I am fully satisfied that the land in question is urgently required for a valid public purpose viz PDD-Implementation of Papankala Scheme. I order that in view of the urgency of the scheme notification under Section 4, 6 and 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 be issued immediately.

12. The above order clearly shows that the Lt. Governor did not apply his mind as to whether issue or not issue any directions as required under Section 17(4) of the Act. The noting file does not indicate that there was any proposal to dispense with compliance to the provisions of Section 5(A) of the Act. It is a settled principle of law that there has to be proper application of mind independently to both the aspects i.e under Section 17(1) and under Section 17(4) separately. The Lt.Governor clearly directed that the emergent provisions of Section 17(1) be invoked but chose not to issue any direction in relation to the provisions of Section 17(4) of the Act. There is no whisper in the entire record produced before us that there was even any proposal to dispense with compliance to the provisions of Section 5(A) of the Act. This issue is again no more rest integra and has been answered by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Shanti India (P) Ltd. v. Lt.Governor and Ors. Decided on 3.2.05 in W.P. (C ) No. 7446/1999 wherein in somewhat identical circumstances the Lt. Governor had passed the similar order and the arguments of the respondents was that since direction in the notification was contained for dispensing with the provisions of Section 5(A), it was a valid and proper direction. This argument was rejected after a detailed discussion which we also follow in the present case. In view of the above, we have no hesitation in partly accepting the contention raised on behalf of the petitioners that there is no order upon application of mind passed by the Lt Governor but at the same time we are also of the considered view that this does not vitiate the acquisition proceedings in their entirety and at best the petitioners would be entitled to be heard as contemplated under the provisions of Section 5A of the Act. An application under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure was filed on behalf of the DDA being CM No. 5769/92 and that application states that the land had been acquired and handed over to DDA on 18th March, 88 and DDA is to develop the same for planned development of Delhi and as such the entire land was needed by the authority. The factum of taking over possession by the respondent has been disputed, however, it is stated that possession of 2.8 bighas out of Khasra No. 389 which was measuring 4.16 bighas had been taken. To that extent, the claim of the petitioners can hardly be disputed that they are still in possession of the property. Notification under Section 4 and 6 for the remaining land were issued in January, 1988 and before the possession could be taken by the respondents, the award on the basis of first notification was made being award No. 163/86-87. The interim stay was granted by the Court on 17th May, 88 as such the acquisition proceedings could not be completed or culminated as the petitioners were having the benefit of the injunction against dispossession. The said order of injunction has been in force till date. As already noticed that one award in relation to 38 bigha 3 biswa including the entire land of the petitioner was made but the possession of the land could not be taken by the respondent right from 1988 till date, because of the interim order passed by the Court dated 17.5.88. Thus, the respondent can issue a declaration under Section 6 after excluding the period during which the stay of dispossession was in operation as the acquisition proceedings could not have been completed in face of the injunction order granted by the Court. Nothing debars the respondents if they so desire from proceeding with the acquisition proceedings after issuance of the notification in January 1988 and hearing the objections of the petitioners as required under Section 5A of the Act. These are the decisions to be made by the respondents. The Court is of the view that the entire acquisition proceedings are not vitiated and the notification under Section 4 of the Act need not be set aside or quashed in its entirety. Even in this regard, reference can be made to the recent judgment of this Court in the case of Siva Apparels (I) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India and others (and other connected appeals) decided on 9.3.06 wherein the Court held as under:

The court in that case did no find any relevant material before the said authorities to invoke powers under Section 17(4) of the Act and came to the following conclusion:

Para 25: In the light of the aforesaid discussion, thereforee, the conclusion becomes inevitable that the action of dispensing with inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act in the present cases was not based on any real and genuine subjective satisfaction depending upon any relevant date available to the State authorities at the time when they issued the impugned notification under Section 4(1) of the Act and dispensed with Section 5-A inquiry by resorting to Section 17 sub-section (4) thereof. The first point is, thereforee, answered in the negative, in favor of the appellants and against the contesting respondents. In so far reliance on some of the cases by the respondents herein to project the theory of inference to be drawn or that urgency clause could be invoked by the very nature of purpose is concerned, it may be best to refer to paras 23 and 24 of this judgment which have given suitable answer and interpretation to those judgments which are sought to be relied by the respondents:

Para 23: It is now time for us to refer to certain latter decisions of this Court to which strong reliance was placed by Shri Mohta, learned Senior Counsel for NOIDA. In the case of A.P. Sareen v. State of U.P. : [1997]1SCR210 a two-Judge Bench of this Court consisting of Ramaswamy,J. And G.T. Nanavati, J., had to consider the question whether the need for urgent possession underlying acquisition proceedings could cease to exist only because of bureaucratic inadvertence. It was held on the facts of that case that urgency continued so long as the scheme was not initiated, action taken and process completed. It is, of course, true that while deciding this question, it is observed that it is a well-settled legal position that urgency can be said to exist when land proposed to be acquired is needed for planned development of the city or town etc. The said observation clearly shows that in appropriate cases when acquisition is needed for planned development of any city or town, the urgency provisions can be invoked. This aspect is legislatively recognised by enactment of Section 17(1-A) by the U.P. Legislature. But the said observations cannot be read to mean that in every case of planned development of city or town, necessarily and almost automatically the urgency clause has to be invoked and inquiry under Section 5-A is to be dispensed with. It will all depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The aforesaid observations cannot be held to be laying down any absolute proposition that whenever any acquisition is to take place for planned development of city or town, Section 5-A should be treated to be almost otiose or inoperative. Such is not the ratio of the aforesaid decision and nothing to that effect can even impliedly be read in the aforesaid observation which is of a general nature. It only suggests that in appropriate cases, the urgency clause can be invoked when the land is proposed to be acquired for planned development of city or town.

Para 24: Another decision to which our attention was invited by Shri Mohta, learned Senior Counsel for NOIDA, is reported in Ghaziabad Development Authority v. Jan Kalyan Samiti : [1996]1SCR307 . In that case, a Bench of two learned Judges consisting of K. Ramaswamy and G.B. Pattanaik, JJ. Examined an entirely different question as to whether notification under Section 6 could be issued simultaneously with the notification under Section 4(1) when Section 5-A was dispensed with under Section 17 sub-section (4). This decision, thereforee, cannot be of any avail to Shri Mohta. In the case of Jai Narain v. Union of India : AIR1996SC697 another Bench of two learned Judges consisting of Kuldip Singh and S. Sagir Ahmad, JJ. had to examine the question whether invocation of urgency provisions under Section 17(4) for acquiring lands for constructing a sewage treatment plant (STP) in Okhla area of this city could be said to be well justified. Upholding the said exercise by the acquiring authority, Kuldip Singh, J. in para 3 of the Report clearly noted the peculiar fact situation under which Section 5-A inquiry was dispensed with in that case. It was noted that this Court itself had issued earlier time-bound directions for procurement of land for STP in various parts of Delhi. In the aforesaid judgment, it was also observed in an earlier decision dated 24-3-1995, this Court had observed that sewage problems were of a grave nature and so far as discharge of effluent in the Yamuna was concerned, the industries were the prime contributors apart from MCD and NDMC which were also discharging sewage directly into River Yamuna and thereafter on 21-4-1995, this Court regarding the construction o STP had observed that the treatment of sewage was of utmost importance for health and for supply of pure water to the citizens of Delhi. Any delay in this respect was a health hazard and could not be tolerated. It was also observed therein that this Court had earlier directed to the authorities to take up the work of land acquisition and sewage on a war footing. In view of the directions of this Court, thereforee, the authorities were bound to apply the urgency clause and invoke urgency powers for dispensing with Section 5-A inquiry so that 'the sewage treatment plant could be established at the earliest and on a war footing. We fail to appreciate as to how the aforesaid fact situation and the direction to the State to move quickly and urgently as issued by this Court which was binding on the State authorities could be legitimately pressed into service by Shri Mohta in the facts of this case which stand on an entirely different footing, as noted earlier.

32. We may also notice that the judgment of the supreme Court in the Mukesh Hans case (supra) affirmed the view taken by this Court in that very case titled Mukesh Hans v. Union of India and Ors. (supra). In the case of Kishan Lal (supra) their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that where the properties remained with the administration for ten years the Land Acquisition Authority did not take any action even thereafter for a period of two years and then without providing opportunity to the owners who filed objections under section 5-A invocation of provisions of section 17(4) that notification under section 4 was not proper and held as under:-

A citizen's property can be acquired in accordance with law but in the absence of real and genuine urgency, it may not be appropriate to deprive an aggrieved party of a fair and just opportunity of putting forth its objections for due consideration of the acquiring authority. While applying the urgency clause, the State should indeed act with due care and responsibility. Invoking urgency clause cannot be a substitute or support for the laxity, lethargy or lack of care on the part of the State Administration. 33. Their Lordships also specifically observed that there was no material to show subjective satisfaction of the authorities in invoking the urgency clause under Section 17(4) of the Act and the notifications were quashed.

18. In view of the settled position of law as afore-indicated by us, we have no hesitation in holding that there is no order/directive passed by the Lt. Governor under Section 17(4) of the Act dispensing with the compliance of provisions of Section 5A of the Act. Once no order or directive exists on the file of the respondents under Section 17(4) of the Act, as a matter of fact, there is hardly any occasion for the court to discuss in any further detail the contention of the petitioner in regard to non-application of mind relating to last paragraph of the notification dated 18th July, 1988.

19. As a necessary corollary to the above findings now the Court has to discuss the limited relief that the petitioners may be entitled to in terms of this order but inevitable result of the above finding is that in facts and in law the authorities have not directed, in exercise of its power under Section 17(4) of the Act, that provisions of Section 5A of the Act would not be applicable. In other words, the land owners including the petitioners would be entitled to file objections under Section 5A of the Act. Those objections would be dealt with by the concerned authorities in accordance with law and then a declaration as contemplated under Section 6 of the Act may be issued by the authorities concerned.

20. We see no reason to take a view different than the one expressed by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Shanti India Private Limited (supra). In fact one would follow the view for the reason stated therein in addition to what we state hereinafter. Section 6 declaration dated 17th August, 1988 has to be quashed in its entirety as the land owners were entitled to file objections under Section 5A of the Act in the absence of any specific order/direction to the contrary under Section 17(4) of the Act. The respondent-State would be entitled to issue a fresh declaration under Section 6 of the Act after disposing of the objections under Section 5A, if any filed by the land owners, if the authorities choose to do so. The period of one year cannot be granted to the State Government afresh by this order of the Court but certainly the respondents would be entitled to exclude the period during which the proceedings were stayed by this Court as contemplated under proviso to Section 6(1) of the Act. The remaining period out of the period of one year prescribed under law would be available to respondents for issuance of such notification/declaration and after exclusion of the time during which the stay was operative. As already noticed, the notification under Section 4 was issued on 18th July, 1988, which was published on 21st July, 1988 and then notified in the official gazette on 24th September, 1988. The stay was granted by the Court vide its order dated 9th September, 1988 and the said order of stay is still in force. The respondents would be entitled to exclusion of the period from 9th September, 1988 till pronouncement of this judgment from the period of one year, to be computed from 21st July, 1988 or even for that matter 24th September, 1988 as the case may be.

21. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents while relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Padmasundara Rao (Dead) and Ors. v. State of T.N. and Ors. : [2002]255ITR147(SC) had argued that the Court has no jurisdiction to grant fresh period of limitation to the State Government for issuing any notification in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. This proposition of law can hardly be disputed. The Court is not granting fresh period of limitation to the State Government but is granting leave to the respondent-Government to act in accordance with law if they so desire, after excluding the period permissible to be excluded in accordance with the provisions of Section 6 of the Act and the judgments of the Supreme Court and this Court. The Supreme Court in paragraphs 5 to 10 of the judgment clearly enunciated the law that declaration under Section 6 has to be issued within specified time and merely because the Court has quashed the concerned notification, extended time period is not to be provided. The Explanationn appended to the section specifically deals with exclusion of period in certain specified cases but the period intended to be excluded under the Explanationn would have to be excluded. In other words, the period of limitation provided is incapable of being extended and extension of limitation is quite different and distinct from exclusion of the period from the prescribed limitation as provided in the provision. Another Division Bench of this Court in the case of Suleman v. Union of India and Ors : 123(2005)DLT206 while dealing with such a situation and where notification was issued after excluding such a period and after relying upon the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Padma Sundara Rao (supra) held as under :-

22. What remains to be seen is whether or not the declaration in the present case was issued within the stipulated period of one year after exclusion of the period during which the proceedings pursuant to the preliminary notification had remained stayed under orders of this Court. The preliminary notification was issued on 30th June, 1988. The impugned declaration was issued on 8th July, 2002, i.e., 14 years and 8 days later. From the said period, if we MOST IMMEDIATE deduct the period during which there was an interim order from this court, i.e. the period between 12th August, 1988 when the order was issued till 30th August, 2001 when the same was vacated with the disposal of the petitions, what remains is a period of 11 months and 20 days. This implies that the impugned declaration was after giving effect to Explanationn 1 to Section 6(1) issued within a period of one year of the date of preliminary notification was issued. No fault can, thereforee, be found with the said notification on that account. 22. The expression extension of period or limitation has to be understood in discern contradistinction to the expression exclusion of time. This concept can easily be traced under the provisions and scheme of the Limitation Act, 1963. Section 14 provides for exclusion of time while condensation of delay is dealt with under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. What is contemplated under proviso to Section 6(1) of the Act is exclusion of period during which acquisition proceedings were stayed by the Court. The obvious object was that the authorities should do nothing during operation of the stay order granted by the Courts but at the same time also suffer no prejudice on account of pendency of proceedings. The principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Padmasundara Rao (supra) is based on this distinction as the Courts would not be entitled to grant a fresh period of limitation of one year as contemplated under the provisions of the Act but could certainly direct exclusion of the period during which the orders of stay of the Court were in force and acquisition proceedings could not progress. Keeping in view the fact and circumstances of the case, balancing the equities between the parties, avoiding undue hardship and prejudice to the parties as a result of pendency of the proceedings before the Court and with due compliance to the legislative scheme under the provisions of the Act, it would not be necessary for the Court to quash the acquisition proceedings in every case in their entirety in the absence of appropriate order under the provisions of Section 17(4) of the Act. The petitioners have been in possession of their properties for all this period and have enjoyed benefits thereof. In exercise of its judicial discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Court could certainly direct that in the event the respondent-State desires to act in accordance with law and continue its acquisition proceedings it could do so after taking benefit of the exclusion of the period afore-referred. Thus (a) and (b) contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners are rejected while petitioners are entitled to partial relief on the arguments raised under submission (c). One of the known can one of writ jurisdiction is that the balance of equity would normally tilt in favor of public interest rather than private interest. The land has been acquired for the public purpose under the Head `Plan Development of Delhi' and it would be unfair and unjust if the respondents were to be deprived of their legitimate right to continue with acquisition proceedings in accordance with the provisions of the Act just for the reason that the cases have been pending before the Court for years together. The contention of the petitioners that the respondents would not be entitled to any benefit under the proviso Explanationn to Section 6(1) of the Act in the face of judgment of the Supreme Court in Padmasundara Rao case and the judgments of Division Benches of this Court has not merit. The plea of the respondents that the present petitions are barred by principles of rest judicata is without any merit. 20. We see no reason to take a view different than the one expressed by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Shanti India Private Limited (supra). In fact one would follow the view for the reason stated therein in addition to what we state hereinafter. Section 6 declaration dated 17th August, 1988 has to be quashed in its entirety as the land owners were entitled to file objections under Section 5A of the Act in the absence of any specific order/direction to the contrary under Section 17(4) of the Act. The respondent-State would be entitled to issue a fresh declaration under Section 6 of the Act after disposing of the objections under Section 5A, if any filed by the land owners, if the authorities choose to do so. The period of one year cannot be granted to the State Government afresh by this order of the Court but certainly the respondents would be entitled to exclude the period during which the proceedings were stayed by this Court as contemplated under proviso to Section 6(1) of the Act. The remaining period out of the period of one year prescribed under law would be available to respondents for issuance of such notification/declaration and after exclusion of the time during which the stay was operative. As already noticed, the notification under Section 4 was issued on 18th July, 1988, which was published on 21st July, 1988 and then notified in the official gazette on 24th September, 1988. The stay was granted by the Court vide its order dated 9th September, 1988 and the said order of stay is still in force. The respondents would be entitled to exclusion of the period from 9th September, 1988 till pronouncement of this judgment from the period of one year, to be computed from 21st July, 1988 or even for that matter 24th September, 1988 as the case may be.

22. The expression extension of period or limitation has to be understood in discern contradistinction to the expression exclusion of time. This concept can easily be traced under the provisions and scheme of the Limitation Act, 1963. Section 14 provides for exclusion of time while condensation of delay is dealt with under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. What is contemplated under proviso to Section 6(1) of the Act is exclusion of period during which acquisition proceedings were stayed by the Court. The obvious object was that the authorities should do nothing during operation of the stay order granted by the Courts but at the same time also suffer no prejudice on account of pendency of proceedings. The principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Padmasundara Rao (supra) is based on this distinction as the Courts would not be entitled to grant a fresh period of limitation of one year as contemplated under the provisions of the Act but could certainly direct exclusion of the period during which the orders of stay of the Court were in force and acquisition proceedings could not progress. Keeping in view the fact and circumstances of the case, balancing the equities between the parties, avoiding undue hardship and prejudice to the parties as a result of pendency of the proceedings before the Court and with due compliance to the legislative scheme under the provisions of the Act, it would not be necessary for the Court to quash the acquisition proceedings in every case in their entirety in the absence of appropriate order under the provisions of Section 17(4) of the Act. The petitioners have been in possession of their properties for all this period and have enjoyed benefits thereof. In exercise of its judicial discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Court could certainly direct that in the event the respondent-State desires to act in accordance with law and continue its acquisition proceedings it could do so after taking benefit of the exclusion of the period afore-referred. Thus (a) and (b) contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners are rejected while petitioners are entitled to partial relief on the arguments raised under submission (c). One of the known can one of writ jurisdiction is that the balance of equity would normally tilt in favor of public interest rather than private interest. The land has been acquired for the public purpose under the Head `Plan Development of Delhi' and it would be unfair and unjust if the respondents were to be deprived of their legitimate right to continue with acquisition proceedings in accordance with the provisions of the Act just for the reason that the cases have been pending before the Court for years together. The contention of the petitioners that the respondents would not be entitled to any benefit under the proviso Explanationn to Section 6(1) of the Act in the face of judgment of the Supreme Court in Padmasundara Rao case and the judgments of Division Benches of this Court has not merit. The plea of the respondents that the present petitions are barred by principles of rest judicata is without any merit. The Division Bench of this Court while pronouncing its judgment dated 25th April, 1988 passed in CWPs. 7 and 421 of 1986 had set aside the declaration issued by the respondents under Section 6 of the Act but at the same time upheld the validity of the notification under Section 4 and left the question open in relation to issuance of fresh declaration under Section 6 ,in accordance with law. The present notifications under Sections 4 as well as 6 have been issued by the respondents in furtherance to the leave granted by the Division Bench in the said judgment. Notification issued on 18th July, 1988 and declaration dated 17th August, 1988 give a fresh cause of action to the petitioners and thereforee, the present petitions cannot be said to be barred by the principles of res-judicata. However, one pertinent aspect of the case, which the Court has to take note of, is that the notification issued by the Government under Section 4 of the Act on 16th October, 1985 in relation to the same land was upheld by the Court. The Court even at that time found that the said notification does not suffer from any infirmity and upheld its validity. The present notification dated 18th July, 1988 is nothing but is a replica of the earlier notification. The validity of the subsequent notification is challenged on the same ground, which we have already rejected for the reasons stated supra.

13. In the circumstances afore-stated we allow this writ petition limited to the above stated extent and decline to quash the notification under Section 4 of the Act in relation to the land pertaining to the petitioners, with the following directions:

(a) The petitioners would be at liberty to file objections under Section 5A of the Act before the competent authority within 30 days from the date of pronouncement of this judgment.

(b) The objections shall be dealt with and disposed of by the authorities in accordance with law and after hearing the parties.

(c) The petitioners during the pendency of this petition were granted protection. Parties shall continue to maintain status quo unless any other appropriate orders are passed by the court of competent jurisdiction.

(d) The respondents shall deal with the objections and proceed with the acquisition proceedings in accordance with law as expeditiously as possible and in any case within six months from today.

14. The writ petition is disposed of in the above terms while leaving the parties to bear their own costs.