SooperKanoon Citation | sooperkanoon.com/707027 |
Subject | Excise |
Court | Delhi High Court |
Decided On | Jul-26-2000 |
Case Number | Civil Writ Petition Nos. 3798 and 3799 of 1998 |
Judge | Arijit Pasayat, C.J. and; D.K. Jain, J. |
Reported in | 2000(92)LC249(Delhi) |
Appellant | Usha Udyog and anr. |
Respondent | Cegat |
Cases Referred | In Nathamani Gounder v. State of Tamil Nadu
|
Excerpt:
held: stay - pre-deposit--waiver--appeal--right of--vires of cea: section 35f--plea that by dismissing its case for waiver of pre-deposit, the tribunal had infringed on the appellants' fundamental right of appeal--the right of appeal is a creation of statute. but in exercise of such right, there is no inherent or constitutional right to file an appeal. it is open to the legislature to impose an accompanying liability upon a party upon whom legal right is conferred or to prescribe conditions for exercise of right. any requirement for discharge of that liability or fulfillment of that condition, in case the party concerned seeks to avail the said right, is a valid piece of legislation and article 14 of the constitution has no application. cea: section 35f, thereforee, is not ultra vires. in deciding whether or not to waive the condition of pre-deposit under cea: section 35f, there are two main factors to be considered, viz., 'undue hardship' and 'safeguard of revenue interest'. mere existence of a prima facie case is not sufficient for waiver. on the basis of the facts on record, the petitioner's case is without any merit. tribunal order upheld. although the time allowed by the tribunal for pre-deposit has lapsed, the petitioner's appeal may be heard if the pre-deposit is made by 30.9.2000. cea: section 35f; constitution of india: article 14.;petitions dismissed - - failure to deposit the amount in question would render the appeal incompetent. there are many fiscal statutes like central excise and salt act, customs act, sales tax acts of various states and many other similar statutes, which mandate deposit of disputed amount as a condition precedent for entertaining appeal. 10. a state statute which requires that in a stock-holder's derivative action a plaintiff who owns less than 5 per cent of the defendant corporation's outstanding share or shares having market value not exceeding $ 50,000 give security for the reasonable expenses including counsel fee, incurred by the corporation and by other parties defendant and which makes the plaintiff liable for such expenses if he does not make good his claims, and subjects the amount of security to increase if the progress of the litigation reveals that it is inadequate or to decrease if it is proved to be excessive, does not violate the contract clause or the due process clause or the equal protection clause of the federal constitution. even if a statute denied right of appeal, statute cannot be said to be bad legislation. 'opinion' means something more than mere retaining of gossip or of hearsay, it means judgment of belief, that is a belief or a conviction resulting from what one thinks on a particular question, if a man is to form an opinion, and his opinion is to govern, he must form it himself on such reasons and grounds as seem good to him.orderarijit pasayat, c.j.1. common order passed by the customs, excise and gold (control) appellate tribunal, new delhi (in short, the cegat) disposing of applications for waiver of pre-deposit and stay of recovery of duty confirmed on each of the applicants for entertaining appeals filed before it is the subject matter of challenge in these two petitions. applications were filed under section 35f of the central excise act, 1944 (in short the act). our order shall govern each of the writ petitions. petitioners are manufacturing bars, rods, angles, joist channels wire rods, etc. falling under chapters 72 and 73 of the central excise tariff act, 1985 (in short, tariff act) and availing the benefit of exemption notification no. 202/88 dated 20.5.1988. penalties were imposed for contravention of the central excise rules, 1944 (in short, the rules). in case of petitioner - usha udyog - duty of rs. 74,87,767.35 and a penalty of rs. 20 lakhs was imposed. in respect of petitioner - rhl profiles duty of rs. 92,34,305/- and a penalty of rs. 25 lakhs was imposed. such impositions were levied on the basis of adjudication orders. central excise officials visited the factory premises of petitioner usha udyog and on verification of record and conducting enquiries, it was observed that the said petitioner was purchasing rolling materials from local kabulis and was clearing the goods without payment of duty while availing the benefit of exemption notification. statement of several suppliers were recorded. show cause notices were issued alleging that the benefit of exemption notification no. 202/88 dated 20.5.1988 was not applicable to the petitioner, since exemption was admissible only to the final products described in column 3 of the table to the notification. such mis-declaration constituted contravention of rules, 174, 52a, 17g and 9 of the rules. notices were issued to the petitioner to show cause as to why central excise duty from 1.8.1990 to 28.2.1994 be not demanded and penalty should not be imposed. it was indicated that extended period available under section 11-a of the act was applicable. on a consideration of the reply, commissioner confirmed the demand and imposed duty and a penalty of rs. 7487767.35 and rs. 20 lakhs respectively.2. in the case of petitioner rhl profiles ltd., similar was fact situation and duty of rs. 92,34,305.40 and penalty of rs. 25 lakhs was imposed. the said orders in respect of the two petitioners are subject matter of challenge before cegat.3. prayer was made for waiver of pre-deposit and stay of the recovery of duty on several grounds. primarily, it was submitted that the conclusions arrived at about mis-declaration and suppression run contrary to the material on record. if the materials and evidence are considered in their proper perspective, the demands would not stand. additionally, it was pleaded that financial conditions of the petitioners would not permit liquidation of even a part of the demand. cegat directed deposit of rs. 50 lakhs and rs. 60 lakhs respectively. it was observed that a prima facie case of levies was made out and plea of financial stringency was not established.4. learned counsel for petitioners reiterated their stand before the cegat. it was submitted that the ingredients requisite for grant of stay i.e. prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss existed. direction of cegat to deposit rs. 50 lakhs and rs. 60 lakhs virtually amounts to denial of forum and right of appeal. it was submitted that out of several statements recorded nothing adverse to the petitioner could be made out. even the statements recorded did not make out a case that the petitioners were purchasing scrap materials. further the officers who passed the order had no jurisdiction. it is also submitted that the amounts directed to be deposited are extremely harsh and there has been closure of business, so far as usha udyog is concerned from may, 1999.5. learned counsel for the respondent however, submits that by making mis-declaration and by suppression of material facts benefits have been availed. petitioners had declared that they were purchasing ingots bars, etc. and other rolling materials (duty paid) which are then cut into required size and rolled, but it had been found that what had actually been received was nothing but old and used scrap from worn out and old automobile and railway material parts. considering the huge suppressions detected and magnitude of mis-declarations, the amounts directed to be deposited cannot be said to be unreasonable. cegat found that it could be prima facie said that the petitioners have not furnished vital information and were not eligible for benefit of the notification. so far as the financial conditions are concerned it was observed that the same was not as bleak as was pleaded. financial statements of usha udyog for the period ending 31.3.1997 reflect sales turnover of over rs. 6.78 crores and other income of approximately rs. 15 lakhs. further, the financial statements for the year ending 31.3.1997 reflects a balance of rs. 2.30 crores brought forward from the previous years. in the case of rhl profiles, the financial statements for the same period shows a sales turnover of over rs. 24 crores and other income of approx. rs. 2.74 crores. in addition to this has been a profit brought forward from the last account. prayer for waiver of pre-deposit stipulation was not accepted in the aforesaid background.6. requirement of deposit of the amount in dispute is a condition precedent for entertaining the appeal and not for filing the appeal. failure to deposit the amount in question would render the appeal incompetent. while considering an application for grant of stay, the concerned authority has to, inter alia, consider the following aspects:a) whether there is prima facie case in favor of the assessee.b) the balance of convenience qua deposit or otherwise.c) irreparable loss, if any, to be caused in case stay is not granted.d) safeguarding of public interest.6.1. in the assistant controller central excise west bengal v. dunlop : 1985ecr4(sc) the apex court held that normally four factors for grant of stay order should be kept in view i.e. prima facie case, which by itself is not enough, balance of convenience, possibility of irreparable injury and safeguarding the public interest.7. right of appeal is a creation of statute. but in exercise of such right, there is no inherent or constitutional right to file an appeal. while granting such right, legislature can impose any condition. it was observed in anant mills co. ltd. v. state of gujarat air 1976 sc 1234 and state of bombay v. supreme general films exchange ltd. : [1960]3scr640 , that legislature can, while granting right of appeal, lay down a condition for deposit of tax as it is creation of statute. legislature can also put restriction on it so as to curtail it. there is nothing wrong if under same statute, a right of appeal is given and then some restrictions are put over it. right to appeal is a substantive right and not a mere matter of procedure. but such right is neither an absolute right nor an ingredient of natural justice. it must be conferred by statute and can be exercised only as permitted by statute. there is no fetter in imposing conditions about deposit of fees etc. there are many fiscal statutes like central excise and salt act, customs act, sales tax acts of various states and many other similar statutes, which mandate deposit of disputed amount as a condition precedent for entertaining appeal. condition of deposit of court fee in many cases merely regulates exercise of right of appeal. it is open to legislature to impose an accompanying liability upon a party upon whom legal right is conferred or to prescribe conditions for exercise of right. any requirement for discharge of that liability or fulfillment of that condition, in case the party concerned seeks to avail the said right, is a valid piece of legislation and article 14 has no application. observations in the case of hannah cohen v. beneficial industrial (1949) 377 is 541 lend some support to the view we have taken. headnote 10 which is based upon the observations in the body of the judgment reads as follows:10. a state statute which requires that in a stock-holder's derivative action a plaintiff who owns less than 5 per cent of the defendant corporation's outstanding share or shares having market value not exceeding $ 50,000 give security for the reasonable expenses including counsel fee, incurred by the corporation and by other parties defendant and which makes the plaintiff liable for such expenses if he does not make good his claims, and subjects the amount of security to increase if the progress of the litigation reveals that it is inadequate or to decrease if it is proved to be excessive, does not violate the contract clause or the due process clause or the equal protection clause of the federal constitution. 8. it has to be noted that under proviso to section 30(1) of workmen's compensation act, 1923, no appeal by an employer shall lie in respect of demand under clause (a) of said sub-section, unless memorandum of appeal is accompanied by a certificate by commissioner to the effect that appellant has deposited with him the amount payable under order appealed against. in d. narayanan nain v. union of india (1990) 2 llj 500 it was held that provision which requires deposit of fee before resorting to appeal cannot be said to be illegal and the inconvenience caused to appellant to make payment is no reason to strike down said statutory provisions. it was observed by punjab & haryana high court in piara singh v. commissioner, workmen's compensation, patiala 1987 lic 818 that simple fact that compensation awarded has to be deposited before an appeal can be entertain would not furnish ground to entertain writ petition by-passing statutory remedy for appeal. in nathamani gounder v. state of tamil nadu (1986) 2 llj 423, it was observed that if the legislature provides for no appeal in a particular case, or provides for an appeal subject to certain conditions it is a piece of proper legislation. even if a statute denied right of appeal, statute cannot be said to be bad legislation. reference to the other statutes where conditions are imposed for entertaining an appeal has been made for purpose of showing that even where apparently more onerous requirements and/or conditions have been imposed that per se has been held to be no ground for declaration of a provision ultra vires.9. it is to be noted that the prescribed authority is conferred with discretion to dispense with pre-deposit conditionally or in full or in part. such discretion is governed by a maxim 'discretion est discerner per lagan quid sit justus' (discretion consists in knowing what is just in law). discretion in general is the discernment of what is right and proper. it denotes knowledge and prudence, that discernment which enables a person to judge critically of what is correct and proper united with caution, to discern between falsity and truth, between shadow and substance, between equity and colourable glosses and pretences and not to do according to the will and private affections or ill-will. it has to be done according to the rules of reasons and justice, not according to private opinion. it has to be done according to law and not humour. it is not be arbitrary vague and fanciful but legal and regular. in the case at hand cegat made all elaborate analysis of factual stands of petitioner to the extent desirable while dealing with an application for stay. it has observed that prima facie what appears from record that nature of inputs was scrap and not any of the inputs specified in the table to the notification under consideration. further duty burden had not been discharged in respect of inputs supplied. whether this view shall finally be retained shall be adjudicated at the time of final disposal. so cegat was justified in holding that a prima facie case was not made out. as regards financial hardship. cegat's findings have been discussed above. no specific reason has been indicated as to on what account operations of usha udyog have been suspended since may, 1999 as claimed. in any event the impugned order of cegat was passed on 26.5.1998. it suffers from no inherent fallibility to warrant interference.10. section 35f of the act deals with deposit pending appeal of duty demanded or penalty levied. proviso deals with power of appellate authority to dispense with such deposit if it is of the opinion that deposit would cause undue hardship, imposing such conditions as would safeguard interest of revenue. assessed has to establish that undue hardship would be caused to it and while deciding the stay application the authority has to keep in view two aspects i.e. (a) form an opinion that deposit would cause undue hardship to the assessed and (b) safeguard interest of revenue if it considers dispensing with deposit desirable, by stipulating conditions. 'opinion' means something more than mere retaining of gossip or of hearsay, it means judgment of belief, that is a belief or a conviction resulting from what one thinks on a particular question, if a man is to form an opinion, and his opinion is to govern, he must form it himself on such reasons and grounds as seem good to him. per lord brawell in all croft v. london (bishop) 1891 rc 666. opinion is judgment of belief based on grounds short of proof. 'hardship' connotes something harsher and more severe than trifling inconvenience, and negligible loss of profit or temporary loss of a commercial opportunity. language used in section 35-f is not merely 'hardship'. it is undue hardship. for a hardship to become 'undue' it must be shown that the particular burden which is required to be observed or performed is out of proportion to the nature of the requirement itself and the benefit which the applicant would derive from compliance with it.11. on a consideration of the materials on record we do not consider this to be a fit case where any interference with the order passed by the cegat is called for. accordingly, the amounts directed to be paid by it need no modification. however, time fixed by the cegat has elapsed. in case the petitioners deposit the amounts directed to be paid by it, by the end of september, 2000, the appeals shall be entertained for disposal on merits, if they are otherwise free from defect. writ petitions are accordingly disposed of.
Judgment:ORDER
Arijit Pasayat, C.J.
1. Common order passed by the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi (in short, the CEGAT) disposing of applications for waiver of pre-deposit and stay of recovery of duty confirmed on each of the applicants for entertaining appeals filed before it is the subject matter of challenge in these two petitions. Applications were filed under Section 35F of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (in short the Act). Our order shall govern each of the writ petitions. Petitioners are manufacturing bars, rods, angles, joist channels wire rods, etc. falling under Chapters 72 and 73 of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 (in short, Tariff Act) and availing the benefit of exemption notification No. 202/88 dated 20.5.1988. Penalties were imposed for contravention of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 (in short, the Rules). In case of petitioner - Usha Udyog - duty of Rs. 74,87,767.35 and a penalty of Rs. 20 lakhs was imposed. In respect of petitioner - RHL Profiles duty of Rs. 92,34,305/- and a penalty of Rs. 25 lakhs was imposed. Such impositions were levied on the basis of adjudication orders. Central Excise officials visited the factory premises of petitioner Usha Udyog and on verification of record and conducting enquiries, it was observed that the said petitioner was purchasing rolling materials from local Kabulis and was clearing the goods without payment of duty while availing the benefit of exemption notification. Statement of several suppliers were recorded. Show cause notices were issued alleging that the benefit of exemption notification No. 202/88 dated 20.5.1988 was not applicable to the petitioner, since exemption was admissible only to the final products described in column 3 of the table to the notification. Such mis-declaration constituted contravention of Rules, 174, 52A, 17G and 9 of the Rules. Notices were issued to the petitioner to show cause as to why Central Excise Duty from 1.8.1990 to 28.2.1994 be not demanded and penalty should not be imposed. It was indicated that extended period available under Section 11-A of the Act was applicable. On a consideration of the reply, Commissioner confirmed the demand and imposed duty and a penalty of Rs. 7487767.35 and Rs. 20 lakhs respectively.
2. In the case of petitioner RHL Profiles Ltd., similar was fact situation and duty of Rs. 92,34,305.40 and penalty of Rs. 25 lakhs was imposed. The said orders in respect of the two petitioners are subject matter of challenge before CEGAT.
3. Prayer was made for waiver of pre-deposit and stay of the recovery of duty on several grounds. Primarily, it was submitted that the conclusions arrived at about mis-declaration and suppression run contrary to the material on record. If the materials and evidence are considered in their proper perspective, the demands would not stand. Additionally, it was pleaded that financial conditions of the petitioners would not permit liquidation of even a part of the demand. CEGAT directed deposit of Rs. 50 lakhs and Rs. 60 lakhs respectively. It was observed that a prima facie case of levies was made out and plea of financial stringency was not established.
4. Learned Counsel for petitioners reiterated their stand before the CEGAT. It was submitted that the ingredients requisite for grant of stay i.e. prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss existed. Direction of CEGAT to deposit Rs. 50 lakhs and Rs. 60 lakhs virtually amounts to denial of forum and right of appeal. It was submitted that out of several statements recorded nothing adverse to the petitioner could be made out. Even the statements recorded did not make out a case that the petitioners were purchasing scrap materials. Further the officers who passed the order had no jurisdiction. It is also submitted that the amounts directed to be deposited are extremely harsh and there has been closure of business, so far as Usha Udyog is concerned from May, 1999.
5. Learned Counsel for the respondent however, submits that by making mis-declaration and by suppression of material facts benefits have been availed. Petitioners had declared that they were purchasing ingots bars, etc. and other rolling materials (duty paid) which are then cut into required size and rolled, but it had been found that what had actually been received was nothing but old and used scrap from worn out and old automobile and railway material parts. Considering the huge suppressions detected and magnitude of mis-declarations, the amounts directed to be deposited cannot be said to be unreasonable. CEGAT found that it could be prima facie said that the petitioners have not furnished vital information and were not eligible for benefit of the notification. So far as the financial conditions are concerned it was observed that the same was not as bleak as was pleaded. Financial statements of Usha Udyog for the period ending 31.3.1997 reflect sales turnover of over Rs. 6.78 crores and other income of approximately Rs. 15 lakhs. Further, the financial statements for the year ending 31.3.1997 reflects a balance of Rs. 2.30 crores brought forward from the previous years. In the case of RHL Profiles, the financial statements for the same period shows a sales turnover of over Rs. 24 crores and other income of approx. Rs. 2.74 crores. In addition to this has been a profit brought forward from the last account. Prayer for waiver of pre-deposit stipulation was not accepted in the aforesaid background.
6. Requirement of deposit of the amount in dispute is a condition precedent for entertaining the appeal and not for filing the appeal. Failure to deposit the amount in question would render the appeal incompetent. While considering an application for grant of stay, the concerned authority has to, inter alia, consider the following aspects:
a) Whether there is prima facie case in favor of the assessee.
b) The balance of convenience qua deposit or otherwise.
c) Irreparable loss, if any, to be caused in case stay is not granted.
d) Safeguarding of public interest.
6.1. In the Assistant Controller Central Excise West Bengal v. Dunlop : 1985ECR4(SC) the Apex Court held that normally four factors for grant of stay order should be kept in view i.e. prima facie case, which by itself is not enough, balance of convenience, possibility of irreparable injury and safeguarding the public interest.
7. Right of Appeal is a creation of statute. But in exercise of such right, there is no inherent or constitutional right to file an appeal. While granting such right, legislature can impose any condition. It was observed in Anant Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat AIR 1976 SC 1234 and State of Bombay v. Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd. : [1960]3SCR640 , that legislature can, while granting right of appeal, lay down a condition for deposit of tax as it is creation of statute. Legislature can also put restriction on it so as to curtail it. There is nothing wrong if under same statute, a right of Appeal is given and then some restrictions are put over it. Right to appeal is a substantive right and not a mere matter of procedure. But such right is neither an absolute right nor an ingredient of natural justice. It must be conferred by statute and can be exercised only as permitted by statute. There is no fetter in imposing conditions about deposit of fees etc. There are many fiscal statutes like Central Excise and Salt Act, Customs Act, Sales tax Acts of various States and many other similar statutes, which mandate deposit of disputed amount as a condition precedent for entertaining appeal. Condition of deposit of court fee in many cases merely regulates exercise of right of appeal. It is open to legislature to impose an accompanying liability upon a party upon whom legal right is conferred or to prescribe conditions for exercise of right. Any requirement for discharge of that liability or fulfillment of that condition, in case the party concerned seeks to avail the said right, is a valid piece of legislation and Article 14 has no application. Observations in the case of Hannah Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial (1949) 377 IS 541 lend some support to the view we have taken. Headnote 10 which is based upon the observations in the body of the judgment reads as follows:
10. A state statute which requires that in a stock-holder's derivative action a Plaintiff who owns less than 5 per cent of the Defendant corporation's outstanding share or shares having market value not exceeding $ 50,000 give security for the reasonable expenses including counsel fee, incurred by the corporation and by other parties Defendant and which makes the Plaintiff liable for such expenses if he does not make good his claims, and subjects the amount of security to increase if the progress of the litigation reveals that it is inadequate or to decrease if it is proved to be excessive, does not violate the contract clause or the due process clause or the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution.
8. It has to be noted that under proviso to Section 30(1) of Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, no appeal by an employer shall lie in respect of demand under Clause (a) of said Sub-section, unless memorandum of Appeal is accompanied by a certificate by Commissioner to the effect that appellant has deposited with him the amount payable under order appealed against. In D. Narayanan Nain v. Union of India (1990) 2 LLJ 500 it was held that provision which requires deposit of fee before resorting to appeal cannot be said to be illegal and the inconvenience caused to appellant to make payment is no reason to strike down said statutory provisions. It was observed by Punjab & Haryana High Court in Piara Singh v. Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation, Patiala 1987 LIC 818 that simple fact that compensation awarded has to be deposited before an appeal can be entertain would not furnish ground to entertain writ petition by-passing statutory remedy for appeal. In Nathamani Gounder v. State of Tamil Nadu (1986) 2 LLJ 423, it was observed that if the legislature provides for no appeal in a particular case, or provides for an appeal subject to certain conditions it is a piece of proper legislation. Even if a statute denied right of appeal, statute cannot be said to be bad legislation. Reference to the other statutes where conditions are imposed for entertaining an appeal has been made for purpose of showing that even where apparently more onerous requirements and/or conditions have been imposed that per se has been held to be no ground for declaration of a provision ultra vires.
9. It is to be noted that the prescribed authority is conferred with discretion to dispense with pre-deposit conditionally or in full or in part. Such discretion is governed by a maxim 'Discretion est discerner per lagan quid sit Justus' (Discretion consists in knowing what is just in law). Discretion in general is the discernment of what is right and proper. It denotes knowledge and prudence, that discernment which enables a person to judge critically of what is correct and proper united with caution, to discern between falsity and truth, between shadow and substance, between equity and colourable glosses and pretences and not to do according to the will and private affections or ill-will. It has to be done according to the rules of reasons and justice, not according to private opinion. It has to be done according to law and not humour. It is not be arbitrary vague and fanciful but legal and regular. In the case at hand CEGAT made all elaborate analysis of factual stands of Petitioner to the extent desirable while dealing with an application for stay. It has observed that prima facie what appears from record that nature of inputs was scrap and not any of the inputs specified in the table to the notification under consideration. Further duty burden had not been discharged in respect of inputs supplied. Whether this view shall finally be retained shall be adjudicated at the time of final disposal. So CEGAT was justified in holding that a prima facie case was not made out. As regards financial hardship. CEGAT's findings have been discussed above. No specific reason has been indicated as to on what account operations of Usha Udyog have been suspended since may, 1999 as claimed. In any event the impugned order of CEGAT was passed on 26.5.1998. It suffers from no inherent fallibility to warrant interference.
10. Section 35F of the Act deals with deposit pending appeal of duty demanded or penalty levied. Proviso deals with power of appellate authority to dispense with such deposit if it is of the opinion that deposit would cause undue hardship, imposing such conditions as would safeguard interest of revenue. assessed has to establish that undue hardship would be caused to it and while deciding the stay application the authority has to keep in view two aspects i.e. (a) form an opinion that deposit would cause undue hardship to the assessed and (b) safeguard interest of revenue if it considers dispensing with deposit desirable, by stipulating conditions. 'Opinion' means something more than mere retaining of gossip or of hearsay, it means judgment of belief, that is a belief or a conviction resulting from what one thinks on a particular question, If a man is to form an opinion, and his opinion is to govern, he must form it himself on such reasons and grounds as seem good to him. Per Lord Brawell in All croft v. London (Bishop) 1891 RC 666. Opinion is judgment of belief based on grounds short of proof. 'Hardship' connotes something harsher and more severe than trifling inconvenience, and negligible loss of profit or temporary loss of a commercial opportunity. Language used in Section 35-F is not merely 'hardship'. It is undue hardship. For a hardship to become 'undue' it must be shown that the particular burden which is required to be observed or performed is out of proportion to the nature of the requirement itself and the benefit which the applicant would derive from compliance with it.
11. On a consideration of the materials on record we do not consider this to be a fit case where any interference with the order passed by the CEGAT is called for. Accordingly, the amounts directed to be paid by it need no modification. However, time fixed by the CEGAT has elapsed. In case the petitioners deposit the amounts directed to be paid by it, by the end of September, 2000, the appeals shall be entertained for disposal on merits, if they are otherwise free from defect. Writ Petitions are accordingly disposed of.