Tarsem Vs. Rajni Sikka - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
the case focused on the determination of bona fide of landlady under section 14-d of the delhi rent control act, 1958 - the tenant had not produced any evidence to prove that the requirement of the landlady was not bona fide - thereforee, it was ruled that landlady was entitled to order of eviction - - her married sons have good business at raipur rani, district ambala. (4) the case of the petitioner throughout had been that at delhi there are better business prospects of her sons. it is common knowledge that business prospects in delhi in comparison to a village are much better. hence the need of the landlady to settle at a place where business prospects are better cannot be called malafide. as regard the second, the factum of her need for better business prospects at delhi cannot be called malafide nor a mere desire. for better prospects if landlady with her sons decided to shift to a place where there are decidedly better prospects the same cannot be doubted unless the tenant places on record a prima fade evidence wherefrom it could be inferred that the desire expressed by the landlady was sham. that in her affidavit she has dearly stated that after the death of her husband her sons decided to shift to delhi for better business prospects there is nothing wrong in it, because delhi docs hold better business prospects.usha mehra, j. (1) the petitioner is a widow of late shri pritam singh. he was the owner of lig flat bearing no. 94-b (1st floor), block no. fgi, vikas puri, delhi. shri pritam singh died on 21st july, 1991. after the death of shri pritam singh the petitioner herein became the owner/landlord of the property in question. this premises was let out by her late husband for residential purposes to the respondent herein. the tenanted premises consisted of two rooms, kitchen, bath, w.c. and balcony on the first floor. the said premises was let out for residential purpose on 1st march, 1984 vide memorandum of agreement renewable later on. this petitioner required the premises in question for her residence. her family consisted of herself, her two married sons and two married daughters and one unmarried daughter. her married sons with their wives and children and the unmarried daughter all are living with her. while the married daughters with their families often visit and stay with her. during the life time of her husband, she along with her husband and children was residing in village raipur rani, district ambala. but after her husband's death her children found no future prospects in the village. she, thereforee, decided to shift along with her children and wanted to settle at delhi. she wants to live in her own house along with her children. in this background the widow filed the petition seeking eviction of the respondent/tenant. (2) respondent in order to contest the petition, applied for the leave to defend. leave was sought, inter alia, on the ground that the petitioner was not the owner of the demised premises. after the death of her husband property devolved upon all the legal heirs of pritam singh and not on her alone. the petition suffers for nonjoinder of necessary parties. that she herself never wanted to shift to delhi, thereforee, there was no question of her bonafide requirement. her married sons have good business at raipur rani, district ambala. there cannot be any justification for them to leave the business at raipur rani and start new business at delhi. moreover, accommodation at delhi being very small was not suitable for her and her family. all members of petitioner's family would not fit in this house. (3) that by the impugned order the additional rent controller (in short arc) granted leave to defend. arc found that since the petitioner was residing at raipur rani, district ambala with her married sons having lucrative business, thereforee, there was no question of her shifting to delhi. her need was not bonafide. moreover, the house at delhi being an lig flat it was impracticable for the petitioner and her two married sons along with their families to live in a lig flat. hence, relying on the decision of surjit singh kalra v. union of india, : [1991]1scr364 , granted the leave. aggrieved by the order, present appeal has been preferred. (4) the case of the petitioner throughout had been that at delhi there are better business prospects of her sons. she, thereforee, along with her married sons wants to shift to delhi. it is not a mere desire. it is common knowledge that business prospects in delhi in comparison to a village are much better. hence the need of the landlady to settle at a place where business prospects are better cannot be called malafide. after the death of her husband her sons have decided to start business at delhi. since she was living with her sons, thereforee, she too decided to shift to delhi. it was not for the court to decide as to whether the landlady would be able to live in a lig flat and whether it was impracticable for her and her sons to live in lig flat the convenience or inconvenience is the subjective satisfaction of the landlady and not of the court. hence the arc fell in grave error in concluding that it would be impracticable for the appellant to live in a lic flat. in fact para meters of the case brought under clause (e) of proviso of section 14(1) are different from those in the cases brought under special provisions of sections 14-b to 14-d of the act and that this distinction has been noted even in the case of surjit singh katra (supra) when while taking a comparative view of the provisions of section 14(1)(e) vis-a-vis, those of sections 14-b to 14-d of the act, this court observed that the provisions of section 14(l)(c) of the act were available to the landlords in general or to such landlords who were not classified landlords under sections 14-b to 14-d and that later category of landlords, namely, those treated as classified landlords had been conferred certain rights which were to be treated independent of the rights under section 14(l)(e) of the act. supreme court in the case of mr. k.l. malhotra v. parkash mehra (smt.), (1991) 4 sc 512 observed that : 'it does not appear to us as a plain reading of section 14-d itself that the benefit conferred on a widow for applying for eviction or the tenant from the premises is at par with the general benefit conferred on the landlord to seek eviction on the ground of bonafide need. admittedly, on the face of it the class on which the benefit was granted under section 14d is per se different from the class whose rights have been protected under section 4(1)(e)'.in fact under section 14-d of delhi rent control act, the petitioner has only to prove two things, (i) she is a widow; and (ii) that she wants to live in her own house. it was so held by the supreme court in the case of v. rajeshwari v. bombay tyres int. ltd., 59 (1994) dlt 494. so far as the first ingredient is concerned, it is obvious. as regard the second, the factum of her need for better business prospects at delhi cannot be called malafide nor a mere desire. the same cannot be doubted. for better prospects if landlady with her sons decided to shift to a place where there are decidedly better prospects the same cannot be doubted unless the tenant places on record a prima fade evidence wherefrom it could be inferred that the desire expressed by the landlady was sham. but that is not the case in hand. (5) not even a prima fade proof placed on record by the tenant to establish that the petitioner with ulterior motive wants him to be evicted. no proof produced on record that her landlady's sons are having lucrative business at raipur rani, district ambala. mere saying her sons have lucrative business without telling what business they are doing and whether they have separate business house or shop the allegation appears to be vague. hence cannot be relied upon. to my mind, the affidavit of the tenant in this regard does not disclose such facts which would disentitle the landlady to acquire possession of the premises. that in her affidavit she has dearly stated that after the death of her husband her sons decided to shift to delhi for better business prospects there is nothing wrong in it, because delhi docs hold better business prospects. people from far and wide come to delhi because this place give them variety of opportunities. thereforee, the need of the respondent cannot be doubted. moreover, the apprehension of the respondent that landlady would re-let the premises on higher rent, that argument is irrelevant in view of the provisions of section 19 of the act since she has sought eviction for occupation of the premises by her, for her bonafide requirement. section 19 of the act obligates the landlord in this behalf. the scheme of section 19 contemplates a specific representation by the petitioner landlord to the controller that because she wants to vacate the premises where she is residing, thereforee, she requires immediate possession for her occupation. the non-obstinate clause find a right of making recovery, creation of summary process under section 25-b and the fact of connected provision, all emphasise that the landlord who has obtained possession has to move into the house in question if the finale is reached and possession obtained, the court will not allow a period to reduce, dispossession to a mere make- belief or clever move, breaking faith with the judicial process itself. such breaking faith can be interdicted or use of the inherent power of the court, re-letting to someone else or non-occupation even after a reasonable time or without reasonable cause will be regarded as an abuse of the process of the court and at the instance of affected tenant the eviction order can be cancelled and possession restored. the right of the landlord in view of section 19 of the act is not unfattered. hence, the apprehensions of the respondent are not justified. in case the petitioner does not shift or occupy the premises in question the respondent is not remediless. with these observations, the impugned order is set aside. the eviction of the respondent/tenant under section 14-d of the act is accordingly passed.