Chemical Sales Agencies Vs. Smt. Naraini Newar - Court Judgment

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arbitration and conciliation act, 1996 - sections 8 & 11--reference to arbitration--dispute arising out of terms of lease agreement containing arbitration clause--suit for possession dismissed with direction to the landlady to appoint arbitrator--relationship of landlord and tenant disputed by the party--the lease agreement being unregistered could not be considered in evidence--impugned order set aside and suit restored for decision on merit. - - the validity of a claim as well as objection regarding jurisdiction and with respect to existence or validity of arbitration agreement and the existence of dispute has to be decided by the arbitrator. ''6. the argument put forward on behalf of csa was that the learned adj was perfectly right in law in holding that the purported lease agreement dated 01.05.1992 was binding on the parties and that by virtue of clause 14 thereof read with the provisions of section 8 of the said act, the entire disputes between the parties were referable to arbitration. by doing so, the learned adj has failed and or refused to exercise the jurisdiction which was vested in him and such error is liable to be corrected by this court in exercise of its powers under articles 226 and 227 of the constitution of india. - the conditions which are required to be satisfied under sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 8 before the court can exercise its powers are: the judicial authority must also be satisfied that the document which is held out to be an arbitration agreement is one which falls within the meaning ascribed to it under section 7 of the said act. anand gajapathi raju (supra), where the pre-conditions stipulated in section 8 are satisfied and the arbitration agreement satisfies the requirements of section 7 of the said act it is, obligatory for the court to refer the parties to arbitration in terms of their arbitration agreement. 13. clearly, in the absence of the existence of a 'defined legal relationship''there is no question of there being an arbitration agreement between the parties to submit their disputes to arbitration. if the judicial authority passes an order referring the parties to arbitration without examining the provisions of section 7 of the act and without satisfying itself that the dispute pending before it forms the subject matter of an arbitration agreement as described in section 7 of the said act, then, it could be said that the judicial authority has failed to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in it and has abdicated its judicial functions to that extent. 14. there is another aspect of the matter and that is with regard to the nature of the purported lease agreement dated 01.05.1992. section 107 of the transfer of property act, 1882 clearly provides that a lease of immovable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year or reserving a yearly rent, can be made only by a registered document. however, the question is whether there is an 'arbitration agreement''and this is the first condition which has to be satisfied before the court can exercise its powers under section 8 as held by the supreme court in p. - but this part of the clause does not help the plaintiff since no remedy is available now in respect of the subject matter of the dispute under the delhi rent control act as such strictly speaking this part of the clause has become redundant''i am afraid that this is not the correct reading of the clause as well as the provisions of law. 3,000/- per month, then clearly, this provision would be applicable.badar durrez ahmed, j.1. in both the writ petitions, the judgment and/or order passed by a learned additional district judge (adj), delhi in suit no.161/2002 entitled smt naraini newar v. m/s chemical sales agencies is impugned. accordingly, this judgment shall dispose of both the writ petitions. 2. in essence, the dispute between the parties, i.e., smt naraini newar on the one side and m/s chemical sales agencies (hereinafter referred to as the 'csa') on the other side, is a dispute with regard to their landlady-tenant relationship. smt naraini newar claims to be the owner and landlady and csa is the tenant in respect of the premises being the front portion of the second floor of property no.5, lancer's road, b.d. estate, delhi-110054 (hereinafter referred to as the 'suit premises'). the aforementioned suit was filed by smt naraini newar against csa for possession of the suit premises and recovery of rs.2,04,300/- as arrears of rent (with interest). in the said proceedings before the learned adj, csa filed an application under section 8 of the arbitration and conciliation act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as 'the said act') claiming that they had entered into the suit premises as a tenant of one smt savitri devi (the predecessor-in-interest of smt naraini newar) at a monthly rent of rs.1,000/- by virtue of a document titled ''lease agreement'' purportedly made on 01.05.1992. according to csa, the said purported lease agreement was binding on smt naraini newar (being the successor-in-interest to smt savitri devi) and that clause 14 thereof specifically provided for settlement of disputes by reference to arbitration. accordingly, csa, while moving the application under section 8 of the said act before the learned adj (the said suit was pending before him), prayed that an order be passed to refer the parties to arbitration with respect to the matters in dispute in the suit. 3. by the impugned judgment and/or order dated 17.12.2002, the learned adj held that the parties should be referred to arbitration in view of clause 14 of the purported lease agreement dated 01.05.1992. he further directed that the parties may raise their claims, defense, objections before the arbitrator and that the plaintiff (smt. naraini newar) may even raise the objection with regard to the applicability of clause 14 of the lease agreement dated 01.05.1992. he directed that it was for the arbitration to decide the objection of the plaintiff (smt. naraini newar) without being influenced by any observation made in the impugned judgment. however, while allowing the application of the defendant (csa) and referring the parties to arbitration, the learned adj directed the plaintiff (smt naraini newar) to appoint the arbitrator within 10 days. both, smt naraini newar and csa are aggrieved by the impugned judgment dated 17.12.2002. csa is aggrieved, not by the reference to arbitration, because it is they who sought such a reference, but, on account of the fact that the learned adj directed the plaintiff (smt naraini newar) to appoint the arbitrator when there was no such provision for appointment of an arbitrator by one party alone in the purported arbitration clause contained in the purported lease agreement dated 01.05.1992. smt naraini newar, however, is aggrieved by the entire order itself inasmuch as it is her case that there is no arbitration agreement amongst the parties and the application under section 8 of the said act filed by csa ought to have been dismissed and the suit ought to have been proceeded with. 4. this marks out the entire scope of the present writ petition. before examining the legal issues, it would be appropriate for me to put aside certain factual matters. initially, the suit premises belonged to one smt savitri devi. csa through its partner (shri yogesh kumar aggarwal) was inducted as a tenant prior to 1994 at a monthly rent of rs.1,000/-. the said smt savitri devi sold the suit premises to one sh kailash newar by means of a registered sale deed dated 25.04.1994. the said shri kailash newar is the brother-in-law of smt naraini newar. csa attorney its tenancy in favor of the said shri kailash newar and started paying him rent. the rent was enhanced to rs.2,500/- per month and thereafter to rs.5,000/- per month although, it is the case of the tenant-csa that the rent is only rs.3,000/- per month and that the additional sum of rs.2,000/- represents electricity charges, etc.. this has been stated by csa to show that the suit would not be maintainable as the delhi rent control act, 1958 would be applicable. thereafter, on 11.09.2001, shri kailash newar gifted the suit premises to smt naraini newar by means of a registered gift deed. on 02.05.2002, an amount of rs.5,000/- was paid by csa to smt naraini newar. according to smt naraini newar, this payment was by way of rent for one month in respect of the suit premises, whereas according to csa this payment was not by way of rent and was by way of its contribution towards electricity charges, etc. in point of fact, in the written statement filed by csa, the categorical stand taken is that -- ''there is no relationship of land-lady and tenant between the parties. the plaintiff is neither the owner nor the land-lady with regard to the suit premises. the suit is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed''. prior to the institution of the suit, smt naraini newar (through her advocate) had sent a notice dated 23.07.2002 to csa, terminating the tenancy with the expiry of the tenancy month ending with the midnight of 31.08.2002 and calling upon csa, inter alia, to pay a sum of rs.1,80,800 towards arrears of rent from 01.07.1999 to 30.06.2002 and to vacate and hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the suit premises on the expiry of the tenancy month expiring on the midnight of 1.08.2002. this notice was sent by registered post. as no reply was received, nor was vacant possession of the suit premises handed over, the said smt naraini newar instituted the said suit no.161/2002 in september, 2002. thereafter, pleadings were completed by filing of the written statement and replication. csa also filed the said application under section 8 of the said act. 5. in this backdrop, the impugned judgment and/or order dated 17.12.2002 has been passed holding the purported lease agreement dated 01.05.1992 to be binding upon the parties and that by virtue of clause 14 thereof read with the provisions of section 8 of the said act, the parties ought to be referred to arbitration. the learned adj, inter alia, held as under:- ''14. having regard to the scope, object and purpose of section 8 of the new act and particularly in the light of the ratio of the decision in a case of konkan railway (supra) and kalpana kothari vs. sudha yadav (supra) and in the light of ratio of judgment in the case of j.b. dadachanji v. ravinder narain and another : 99(2002)dlt663 , i am of the opinion that on filing of an application under the said provisions, before referring the parties to arbitration, the court is not bound to adjudicate whether disputes raised fall within the ambit of the arbitration clause or not. the validity of a claim as well as objection regarding jurisdiction and with respect to existence or validity of arbitration agreement and the existence of dispute has to be decided by the arbitrator. 15. section 8 of the arbitration and conciliation act, 1996 also prescribes that the parities should be referred to arbitration and it is mandatory for a judicial authority to refer the parties to arbitration where there is an arbitration agreement between the parties which i feel prima facie is there as discussed hereinabove in para 11 of this judgment. 16. hence, in view of the above discussion, i have no hesitation to hold that the parties should be referred to arbitration in view of clause 14 of the lease agreement dated 1.5.92. the parties may raise their claim, defense, objections before the arbitrator even the plaintiff may raise objection regarding the applicability of the clause 14 of the lease agreement dated 1.5.92. the arbitrator shall decide the objection of the plaintiff, if any, without being influenced by the observation of this court hereinabove. 17. no other question or issue has been pressed by the counsel for the plaintiff. accordingly, in view of the above discussions and findings arrived at be me, the application of the defendant ought to be allowed. 18. in this analysis, the application of the defendant is allowed. the parties are referred to arbitration and the plaintiff in the interest of justice, is directed to appoint an arbitrator within 10 days. the arbitrator shall enter upon the reference consequent upon its appointment and make the award in accordance with law preferably within 4 months from the date of entering upon the reference. 19. the parties have been referred to arbitration. the suit is rendered infructuous and is dismissed, as such. however parties are left to bear their own costs. decree sheet be drawn up accordingly. file be consigned to record room.'' 6. the argument put forward on behalf of csa was that the learned adj was perfectly right in law in holding that the purported lease agreement dated 01.05.1992 was binding on the parties and that by virtue of clause 14 thereof read with the provisions of section 8 of the said act, the entire disputes between the parties were referable to arbitration. however, the learned adj erred in directing the plaintiff (smt naraini newar) to appoint the arbitrator when clause 14 did not provide for any such mode of appointment of an arbitrator. clause 14 of the purported lease agreement dated 01.05.1992 reads as under:- ''that it has also been agreed between the parties if any dispute arise on any count clarification and/or concerning matter relating to this agreement. it will be settled by the parties at the relevant time to refer the matter to the arbitrator in accordance with the provisions of arbitration act. however, the arbitration clause shall not be treated strictly binding upon the parties to this agreement and can take legal course of law according to provisions available under delhi rent control act, 1958.''according to the learned counsel for csa, the matter was to be referred to arbitration in accordance with the provisions of the arbitration act. in this case, the said act would apply and accordingly, since the number of arbitrators were not determinedly the clause, by virtue of section 10(2) of the said act, the arbitral tribunal was to consist of a sole arbitrator and it was for the parties to agree upon an arbitrator, failing which, in terms of section 11(5) of the said act it was open to either of the parties to approach the chief justice for appointing an arbitrator. that is the procedure which ought to have been followed and which the learned adj did not and, thereforee, to this extent, the impugned order needs to be corrected. 7. on behalf of smt naraini newar, on the other hand, it was argued that the judgment and/or impugned order dated 17.12.2002 be set aside in its entirety. according to the learned counsel appearing for smt naraini newar, the purported agreement dated 01.05.1992 entered into by smt savitri devi and csa cannot be looked into by the court. this is so because the purported lease agreement is neither properly stamped nor is it a registered document. thereforee, it does not create any relationship between the landlady and the tenant. the purported lease agreement dated 01.05.1992, was, in any event only for a period of five years and that, too, has expired by efflux of time. the terms of the tenancy have, in any event, been altered by virtue of the subsequent events such as sale of the suit premises by smt savitri devi to shri kailash newar and, thereafter, by virtue of the gift to smt naraini newar. the monthly rent has also been increased from rs.1,000/- to rs.5,000/-. all these facts go to show that there is no subsisting arbitration agreement between smt naraini newar and csa and, thereforee, the learned adj ought not to have passed the order referring the matter to arbitration. by doing so, the learned adj has failed and or refused to exercise the jurisdiction which was vested in him and such error is liable to be corrected by this court in exercise of its powers under articles 226 and 227 of the constitution of india. 8. let me now examine the provisions of law which would be necessary for the purpose of deciding these writ petitions. section 8 of the said act reads as under:- ''8. power to refer parties to arbitration where there is an arbitration agreement:-(1) a judicial authority before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party so applies not later than when submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute, refer the parties to arbitration. (2) the application referred to in sub-section (1) shall not be entertained unless it is accompanied by the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof. (3) notwithstanding that an application has been made under sub-section (1) and that the issue is pending before the judicial authority, an arbitration may be commenced or continued and an arbitral award made.'' 9. in p. anand gajapathi raju v. p.v.g. raju : [2000]2scr684 , the supreme court held that:- ''the conditions which are required to be satisfied under sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 8 before the court can exercise its powers are: (1) there is an arbitration agreement; (2) a party to the agreement brings an action in the court against the other party; (3) subject-matter of the action is the same as the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement; (4) the other party moves the court for referring the parties to arbitration before it submits his first statement on the substance of the dispute.'' the expression ''arbitration agreement'' is defined in section 2(b) to mean an agreement referred to in section 7. section 7 reads as under:- ''7. arbitration agreement:- (1) in this part, ''arbitration agreement'' means an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not. (2) an arbitration agreement may be in the form of an arbitration clause in a contract, or in the form of a separate agreement. (3) an arbitration agreement shall be in writing. (4) an arbitration agreement is in writing if it is contained in- (a) a document signed by the parties; (b) an exchange of letters, telex, telegrams or other means of telecommunication which provide a record of the agreement; or (c) an exchange of statements of claim and defense in which the existence of the agreement is alleged by one party and not denied by the other. (5) the reference in a contract to a document containing an arbitration clause constitutes an arbitration agreement if the contract is in writing and the reference is such as to make that arbitration clause part of the contract.'' 10. on going through the provisions of section 7 quoted above, it is abundantly clear that an arbitration agreement means an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not. the expression ''defined legal relationship'' is of some importance. for, it is only the agreement of the parties to submit to arbitration disputes with regard to this ''defined legal relationship'' which constitutes an ''arbitration agreement'' within the meaning of section 7.11. let us examine the facts of the present case in this context. it is the case of smt naraini newar that the ''legal relationship'' between her and csa is that of a landlady and tenant which has now been terminated. on the other hand, on behalf of csa it is categorically contended in their written statement that it does not recognise any such relationship with smt naraini newar inasmuch as it does not admit that smt naraini newar is the landlady or the owner in respect of the suit premises. thus, it is clear that there is no ''defined legal relationship'' between smt naraini newar and csa. when there is no defined legal relationship, there is no question of their being any agreement amongst them to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes in respect of such an undefined legal relationship. that being the case, their subsists no arbitration agreement as contemplated under section 7 of the said act. 12. the learned adj has, in his impugned order dated 17.12.2002, not considered this aspect of the matter at all. does section 8 of the said act contemplate that the moment any document purporting to be an ''agreement'' is produced before a judicial authority and it contains a purported arbitration clause, the judicial authority is left with no alternative but to straightway, on the application of a party, refer the parties to arbitration and terminate the proceedings before it? considering the ratio in p. anand gajapathi raju (supra), i do not think that this is the purport and intent of the provisions of section 8 of the said act. before a judicial authority refers the parties to arbitration in terms of section 8 of the said act, it is the duty of the judicial authority to satisfy itself that the matter before it is the subject matter of an arbitration agreement. the judicial authority must also be satisfied that the document which is held out to be an arbitration agreement is one which falls within the meaning ascribed to it under section 7 of the said act. as noted in p. anand gajapathi raju (supra), where the pre-conditions stipulated in section 8 are satisfied and the arbitration agreement satisfies the requirements of section 7 of the said act it is, obligatory for the court to refer the parties to arbitration in terms of their arbitration agreement. the agreement to submit disputes to arbitration must pertain to disputes between the parties in respect of a defined legal relationship. the purported lease agreement dated 01.05.1992 defines a purported legal relationship of landlady and tenant. this relationship insofar as the parties are concerned, is denied by csa. according to their own averments in the written statement, csa has made it clear that there is no legal relationship of tenant-landlady with smt naraini newar. 13. clearly, in the absence of the existence of a ''defined legal relationship'', there is no question of there being an arbitration agreement between the parties to submit their disputes to arbitration. the disputes which are referable to arbitration are those disputes which are in respect of a ''defined legal relationship'', whether contractual or not. it does not relate to all kinds of disputes. thereforee, it is the duty of the judicial authority, before it passes an order referring the parties to arbitration under section 8 of the said act, to satisfy itself that there exists an arbitration agreement of the nature described in section 7 of the act. if the judicial authority passes an order referring the parties to arbitration without examining the provisions of section 7 of the act and without satisfying itself that the dispute pending before it forms the subject matter of an arbitration agreement as described in section 7 of the said act, then, it could be said that the judicial authority has failed to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in it and has abdicated its judicial functions to that extent. in the present case, i find that the learned adj has not examined these aspects at all and, thereforee, the impugned judgment and/or order referring the parties to arbitration is liable to be set aside. i am mindful of the fact that while exercising powers under articles 226 and 227 of the constitution of india, this court does not sit as a court of appeal and reappreciate the findings arrived at by inferior courts or tribunals. however, when the inferior court or tribunal does not exercise a judicial power vested in it and abdicates its functions, then it is appropriate and, indeed, necessary for this court to step in and set things right, as it were. 14. there is another aspect of the matter and that is with regard to the nature of the purported lease agreement dated 01.05.1992. section 107 of the transfer of property act, 1882 clearly provides that a lease of immovable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year or reserving a yearly rent, can be made only by a registered document. it further provides that all other leases of immovable property must be either by a registered instrument or by oral agreement accompanied by deliver of possession. thus, only if there is a registered instrument or there is an oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession can it be said that a relationship of lesser and lessee is created. in the present case, i find that there is no registered instrument creating any such relationship. the purported lease agreement dated 01.05.1992 is not a registered document. it is not property stamped and by virtue of section 49 of the registration act, 1908, the said document shall not effect any immovable property nor be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property. though, such a document may be received as evidence of a co-lateral transaction not required to be effected by registered instrument. 15. the learned counsel appearing on behalf of csa relied upon the following decisions:- 1) sanjeev jain v. rita wadhwa [db]: 2003 ii ad (delhi) 785; 2) gaajra international v. food corporation of india : 96(2002)dlt581 ; 3) smt kalpana kothari v. smt sudha yadav : air2002sc404 ; 4) trans world finance and real estate co. pvt. ltd. v. union of india : 97(2002)dlt767 ; 5) hindustan petroleum corporation ltd. v. m/s pinckcity midway petroleums : air2003sc2881 . 16. the learned counsel appearing on behalf of smt naraini newar relied upon the decision in the case of r.c. aggarwal v. delhi tourism and transportation development corporation ltd : 2003(66)drj92 ; and management committee of montfort sr sec. school v. vijay kumar and others : 2002ivad(delhi)221 . 17. i now consider each of the cases relied upon by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the csa. in sanjiv sarin (supra) the only issue was whether the order passed by a designated authority for appointment of an arbitrator under the said act was an administrative order and not an adjudicatory one and that the designated authority was not competent to entertain or decide any contentious issue between the parties. as mentioned in the said decision itself, the issue is no longer res-integra and it is clear that such an order is an administrative order. however, that decision has no bearing on the facts of the present case. the decision in gaajra international (supra) pertained to the definition of ''arbitration agreement'' under section 2(a) of the arbitration act, 1940 which is entirely different from the definition of ''arbitration agreement'' contained in section 7 of the said act. furthermore, the primary question in gaajra international (supra) was whether an arbitration clause contained in an unregistered agreement could be looked into. it was held that even if the lease agreement could not be looked into, being unregistered, the arbitration agreement could still be segregated and treated as an independent agreement in writing duly signed by both the parties which is binding on the parties. this conclusion of the court is based on the definition of the ''arbitration agreement'' under the 1940 act. the said decision was not concerned with the ''arbitration agreement'' as defined under section 7 of the said act. in any event, as a proposition of law, there is no denying that an unregistered document may not be received as evidence of any transaction effecting any immovable property, yet, it may be received as evidence of a collateral transaction not required to be effected by a registered instrument. this, however, does not in any way alter the conclusion that i have arrived at in the facts and circumstances of the present case. in kalpana kothari (supra) the supreme court held that section 8 of the said act mandates that the judicial authority before which an action has been brought in respect of a matter, which is the subject matter of an arbitration agreement, shall refer the parties to arbitration if a party to such an agreement applies not later than when submitting his first statement. there is no dispute with regard to this proposition. however, the question is whether there is an ''arbitration agreement'' and this is the first condition which has to be satisfied before the court can exercise its powers under section 8 as held by the supreme court in p. anand gajapathi raju (supra). this aspect has been dealt with by me and discussed in detail hereinabove. the decision in kalpana kothari does not in any way militate against what has been discussed hereinabove. similarly, there is nothing in the decision in trans world finance and real estate co. pvt. ltd. (supra) to contradict the conclusions that i have arrived at. in fact, in this decision the definition of ''arbitration agreement'' as appearing under section 7 of the said act was not at all considered. the decision of the supreme court in hindustan petroleum corporation ltd. wherein it was held that it was mandatory for the civil court to refer the dispute to an arbitrator was a decision arrived at in a situation whether the existence of the arbitral clause in the agreement was accepted by both the parties. the supreme court had recorded this as under:- ''in the instant case the existence of an arbitral clause in the agreement is accepted by both the parties as also by the courts below but the applicability thereof is disputed by the respondent and the said dispute is accepted by the courts below. be that as it may, at the cost of repetition, we may again state that the existence of the arbitration clause is admitted. if that be so, in view of the mandatory language of section 8 of the act, the courts below ought to have referred the dispute to arbitration.''in the present case, however, the existence of the arbitration agreement is not admitted and as such the entire situation is entirely different. the decisions cited by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of smt. naraini newar need not be referred to an account of the view taken by me in the light of the discussion above. 18. finally, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of smt naraini newar submitted that even if it were admitted that the purported lease agreement dated 01.05.1992 was binding on the parties and, thereforee, clause 14 thereof would also be binding, the said clause itself provides that ''the arbitration clause shall not be treated strictly binding upon the parties to this agreement and can take legal recourse of law according to the provisions available under the delhi rent control act, 1958''. according to the learned counsel, this, in itself, permitted the parties to seek redressal from the civil courts without going in for arbitration. in this regard, the learned counsel for csa submitted that legal recourse by virtue of clause itself was only relevant insofar as the provisions under the delhi rent control act, 1958 were concerned and this, in fact, is what the learned adj has also held. in point of fact, the learned adj held as under:- ''...but this part of the clause does not help the plaintiff since no remedy is available now in respect of the subject matter of the dispute under the delhi rent control act as such strictly speaking this part of the clause has become redundant''i am afraid that this is not the correct reading of the clause as well as the provisions of law. csa in its written statement itself has submitted that the suit as filed by smt naraini newar ought to be dismissed as the tenancy was covered under the delhi rent control act, 1958 in view of their specific averment that the rent was not rs.5,000/- as alleged, but rs.3,000/-. csa cannot be allowed to approbate and reapprobate. in any event, when the lease agreement was entered into, the monthly rent reserved was rs.1,000/- and, thereforee, reference was made to the delhi rent control act, 1958. now that the rental, according to smt naraini newar has exceeded rs.3,500/- the expression ''available under the delhi rent control act, 1958'' would have to be read as ''available under the transfer of property act, 1882''. however, if the contention of csa is correct that the rental is only rs.3,000/- per month, then clearly, this provision would be applicable. in whichever manner the matter is looked at, it is clear that the suit filed by smt naraini newar could not be thrown out and the parties ought not to have been relegated to arbitration in the manner done by the learned adj by his judgment and/or order dated 17.12.2002. 19. in view of the forgoing discussion, the impugned order dated 17.12.2002 is set aside. the suit no.161/2002 is restored to the file of the concerned adj. the writ petitions are disposed of accordingly. there shall be no orders as to costs.