Navneet Rai Vs. Narinder Kaur - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
delhi rent control act 1958 - section 14-d--application under-for recovery of possession-resisted on the ground that premises is put to commercial use-objection not tenable-in any case predominant use of premises was residential-eviction upheld- revision dismissed. - - in that case the rent controller may well come to the conclusion that the nature of the premises are not residential and thereforee the question of section 14d applying may not arise because the premises cannot be used for residential purpose after they have been recovered by the landlord. as stated above, though let out for commercial purposes, the premises in question, being a part of the whole house and connected therewith through intervening doors can well be used for residential pur-poses. (8) i am satisfied that the respondent living in the adjoining portion to the premises in question does require the same for her residence and there is no bar to its user as such.d.k. jain, j. (1) this revision petition under section 25b(8) of the delhi rent control act, 1958 (for short the act), is directed against the order dated 19 october 1989 passed by the rent controller dismissing petitioner-tenant's application seeking leave to contest respondent landlady's eviction petition under section 14d of the act, consequently passing the eviction order and directing the petitioner to hand over possession of the premises in question, i.e. ground floor one room in the property bearing no.19/3, prem nagar, near tilak nagar, new delhi to the respondent forthwith. (2) the respondent filed the eviction petition staling that she was the owner of the said premises; she was a widow; there were in all three rooms in the property; one room was let out to the petitioner; and two rooms were in the occupation of the respondent out of which one room was being used by the younger son of the petitioner who got married in the year 1989 and the other room was being shared by her with her second son aged about 30 years and the accommodation available with her had become insufficient as prior to the marriage of the younger son, both her sons were occupying one room and after the marriage of the younger son, the accommodation had fallen short. (3) after service of summons, an application, supported by an affidavit, was filed by the petitioner seeking leave to contest the eviction petition on the grounds that the eviction sought under section 14d in stead of section 14(1)(e) of the act was an abuse of the process of law; the tenanted premises were being used for tailoring business under the name and style of femina tailors since the inception of the tenancy and thereforee the eviction petition was not maintainable; the respondent had sufficient accommodation and in the eviction petition she had not pleaded all the ingredients of section 14(1)((e) of the act,and that the premises in question was situated in a slum area and as such the eviction petition was not maintainable. (4) the learned rent controller came to the conclusion that no permission under the slum areas (improvement & clearance) act, 1956 was required and unlike under section 14(l)(e) of the act, letting or user for commercial purposes is no inhibition for passing an order of eviction under section 14d of the act. having found that the premises in question are residential; the respondent is a widow; the premises had been let out by her and she did require it for her own residence, the rent controller consequently held that none of the grounds taken by the petitioner in his affidavit disclosed such facts which, if proved, may disentitle the respondent from seeking relief of possession of the suit premises. petitioner's application for leave to contest was thus dismissed and order of eviction of the petitioner has been passed. (5) the impugned order is assailed in the revision petition on the self same pleas, as stated in the covering affidavit to the application for leave to contest the eviction petition, which have rightly been rejected by the learned rent controller and have not been pressed here. the grounds of requirement of additional space by the respondent stated in the eviction petition, are not specifically controverter either in the affidavit of the petitioner seeking leave to contest or before me. the only point, however, to which mr. r.k. anand, the learned senior advocate appearing for the petitioner, confined his arguments was as to the maintainability of the petition under section 14d of the act on the plea that the premises in question having been built, let .out and used for commercial purposes, the eviction petition was not maintainable. in this context, learned counsel drew my attention to some documents, namely, lease and conveyance deed, rent deed, inspection note by municipal corporation officials for property tax purposes and vehemently urged that the lease/conveyance deed would show that the aforesaid residential house leased out to the landlady on 30 june 1967, then comprised only of two rooms, a kitchen, a bath room and a lavatory and that the let out premises had been constructed subsequently and let out as a distinct unit only for commercial purposes as shown in the municipal inspection note. he maintained that the premises in question open on the road, where several other such units exist, making it a commercial area and thereforee, being commercial, the same could not be available to the respondent for use as a suitable residence; application for eviction under section 14d was not maintainable; a triable issue had thus been raised and the leave to contest should have been- granted to the petitioner. reliance for it was placed by him on observations in a division bench decision of this court reported as dr.p.p.kapur vs. union of india, 1990 (2) dl 344, extracted below: '......if,on the other hand, the nature of the premises themselves is changed by the landlord from residential to commercial and then those premises are let for commercial purpose the position would be quite different. in that case the rent controller may well come to the conclusion that the nature of the premises are not residential and thereforee the question of section 14d applying may not arise because the premises cannot be used for residential purpose after they have been recovered by the landlord.' (6) the argument is fallacious. unlike section 14(l)(e) of the act,letting purpose or user of let out premises has no relevance for the eviction of a tenant under section 14d of the act. support is lent to this view by the observations of the supreme court in surjit singh kalra vs . union of india and another, : [1991]1scr364 and emc steel limited, calcutta vs . union of india and another, : [1991]1scr381 . for the purpose of section 14d what has to be seen is whether the premises in question are residential and are capable of being used as such by the landlord after he/she recovers possession thereof. it is pertinent to note that only a sentence after the above observations in p.p.kapur's case, the court goes on to observe further:- '....itmay, however, happen that even after the changes and alterations have been made the premises may still retain the character of residential purpose, thereforee, it will always be a question of fact for the rent controller to determine whether the premises are residential in character or not. if the conclusion is that the premises in question are residential and are capable of being used as such by the landlord after he recovers possession thereof then the provisions of section 14b,14c and 14d will apply even if those premises had been let out for a composite purpose or even a commercial purpose.' (7) as for the case in hand, it is not disputed, as is abundantly clear from the plan filed, that the let out premises, a room measuring approximately 8' x 17' is a part of the main house comprising of the adjoining open court yard, two rooms, a store, a kitchen and that except the let out portion of the house, the entire house is in occupation of the respondent and is being used as a residence. the predominant user of the entire house is thus, residential. merely because the premises let out and in occupation of the petitioner opens on the road on which there are other commercial premises, would not change the residential nature of the house, to make the premises in question not fit for residential purposes. it is significant to mention, as would appear from the plan,(atpage54oftherent controller's record), that the premises in question are connected on one side with the open courtyard and on the other with a room through doors on each side, both in occupation of the respondent and used for residential purposes. this would show that the premises in question is a part of the residential house and is capable of being used as such by the respondent after she recovers possession thereof. the observations in dr. p.p. kapur's case (supra) heavily relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner to the effect that if the nature of the premises themselves is changed by the landlady from residential to commercial and then are let out for commercial purposes, the provisions of section 14d of the act would not apply because the premises cannot be used for residential purposes after these have been recovered by the landlady,, would not apply to the facts of the present case. no plea was taken by the petitioner in his affidavit seeking leave to contest that the premises in question cannot be used for residential purpose. as held in p.p.kapur's case (supra) what is important is whether the premises in question after reversion to the landlady could or could not be used for residential purposes. as stated above, though let out for commercial purposes, the premises in question, being a part of the whole house and connected therewith through intervening doors can well be used for residential pur-poses. however, if the premises in question was the only space owned and sought to be got vacated and used independently for residence by the respondent it could perhaps be said that the premises in question having been built and let out for commercial purposes were not covered by section 14d of the act as the same could not be used for residential purposes after the same are vacated by the petitioner. but the present case is entirely different. it is not that after eviction of the petitioner, it is only the premises in question which will be available to the respondent for residence. she is already in occupation of the remaining adjoining connected portion of the house, under use by her as residence which, as found by the learned rent controller, is not sufficient for her residential requirement. (8) i am satisfied that the respondent living in the adjoining portion to the premises in question does require the same for her residence and there is no bar to its user as such. (9) in view of the above, i do not find any force in the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that on the facts of the case, provisions of section 14d of the act were not attracted and, thereforee, leave to contest ought to have been granted by the rent controller. (10) i do not find any illegality or material irregularity in the impugned order, which is confirmed. the revision petition is without any merit and is accordingly dismissed with costs. counsel'sfeers.2,200.00 . (11) i would direct the petitioner to put the respondent in vacant possession of the premises in question on or before 30 september 1993.