Ashok Kumar and ors. Vs. Sri Kishan Dass and anr. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
(i) delhi rent control act, 1958 - section 2(1) as amended by delhi rent control (amendment act, 1976) no. 18 of 1976)--definition of 'tenant' retrospectively amended--amendment is not constitutional--amended definition does not make new classification between premises let for residential and non-residential purposes.; (ii) constitution of india - article 14--object of the rent control act is to protect the tenants--object of the amendment is to protect the heirs of the tenant, who were dependent on him or were living with him, form being rendered homeless--test of nexus with the object sought to be achieved is satisfied.; the respondent filed a suit against heirs of 'm' on the allegations that the tenancy of 'm' had been determined during his life time and consequently 'm' had become a statutory tenant. it was further alleged that one the death of 'm' his tenancy rights could not be inherited. the trial court held, inter alia, that the statutory tenancy was not inheritable and accordingly decreed the suit for possession. during the pendency of the appeal filed against the order of the trial court, section 2(1) of the delhi rent control act was amended with retrospective effect. the provision of the rent control (amendment) act, 1976 (no. 18 of 1976) came into force on 1st december 1975. by the amendment, the definition of 'tenant' was amended to include the heirs of the tenant who were ordinarily living along with the tenant up to the date of his death in the premises let to him for residential purposes. in the present case property in dispute were shops. the statement of objects and reasons to the amendment act mentioned that the amendment was due to persistence demands for conferring the rights of tenancy of certain heirs of a deceased statutory tenant. it was argued before the single judge that the amendment was discriminatory and vocative of article 14 and, thereforee, unconstitutional. on the question of constitutional validity of the amendment, the single judge referred the following questions of law for the decision of the full bench:; (i) what is the differentia for distinction between the residential and non-residential premises in its application to heritability of statutory tenancy?; (ii) is there any rational nexus between such a differentia and the object of classification and the act? and ; (iii) does the division bench judgment in sharma's case conclude the controversy raised in this appeal?; upholding the constitutional validity of the amendment to section 2(1),; 1. the amendment to the act was apparently based on the previously existing view, namely, that a tenant whose tenancy had expired and who had been given a notice to quit had only a personal right under the act which came to an end on his death, his rights not being inheritable. this would mean that in the majority of cases when the tenant died, his heirs would have to leave hearth and home and seek some other premises because they no longer had the right to remain in occupation of the house they considered their home. to alleviate the distress which would be caused to such heirs, and also to combat the problem that would be caused by such displacement, the legislature appears to have stepped in to extend the definition of 'tenant' to include certain heirs and dependents of a protected tenant, such as the spouse, son, daughter, parents etc. this extension only applied to the persons who are actually living in the premises in question along with the deceased tenant, and only for their life times. it did not apply to the heirs of such additional persons.; 2. the court can either strike down to the amendment or uphold it or strike down some portion which is unconstitutional. the court cannot strike down certain portions of the amendment so as to change the meaning of the provision and make it applicable to business premises as well as non-business premises. the court cannot amend the legislation to give a different meaning to the statute.; 3. principally, the definition (as amended) applies only to such persons as would be left without a home or would have to seek other place to live, on the roads, unless protection was given to them. the object of the act is to protect a person form being rendered homeless. such an object cannot include a business place, a shop, a factory or premises use for other purpose. it can only extend to premises or houses use as homes, as residences, and can only protect those persons who are actually residing in the premises at the time of the death of that original tenant. the protection being limited to persons actually living in the premises, there is a distinct and clear classification. the classification is also reasonable. in view of the object of the act, the classification is also based on intelligible criteria.; 4. the extended definition of tenant includes only those heirs who are actually living in the premises with the deceased tenant. they succeed only to a limited extend because they only have a personal right which is not to devolve on any of his or her heirs. this is so provided in explanationn iii to the extended definition.; 5. the history of rent control legislation as applicable to the urban area of delhi shows that the legislature has maintained a distinction between premises let for residential purposes and premises let for non-residential purposes. the intention of the legislature has always been to control evictions and not ban them. the amendment of the definition of 'tenant' is only another incidence of the already existing classification which has been judicially accepted. (h.c. sharma v. lic, 2nd 1973 (i) delhi-90).; 6. the scope of section 2(1) of the delhi rent control act (as amended) has also been the subject of the judicial interpretation. the right of continued occupation is available to respect of residential premises only to a limited number of heirs specified in clause (iii) of section 2(1) provided they fulfill the other conditions specified therein (haji mohd. din and anr. v. narain dass, 1979 (1) all india rent control journal, 129 relied on).; 7. it is settled law that to sustain a challenge under article 14 it must be shown that the classification is unreasonable and bears no rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved. applying this principle, it is clear that there is not only a reasonable classification between premises let for the residential purposes and premises let for non-residential purposes but also that the classification is in accord with the general scheme running through the rent control legislation as applicable to the urban area of delhi, that is, to control the eviction of tenants. this classification has rational and a reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved as also the object of the act. the amendment is, thereforee, constitutionally valid. (air 1953 sc 538 relied on).; 8. even otherwise, the impugned legislation must be held to be valid. there is an inherent fallacy in a tenant challenging the amendment. there is in effect repeal of old section 2(1). it cannot revive. if the amended definition is held to be invalid, the act would be unworkable in the absence of any definition of the word 'tenant'. the act is principally to protect a tenant. a tenant, thereforee, has no locus standi to challenge the definition as amended.; 9. rent acts are principally enacted for protecting the tenant and to the extent legislature in its wisdom consider fit and proper to such heirs as it may deem fit and proper. it is no right of tenant that their future generation should also have the same protection. if legislature in its wisdom consider it proper that they should also have protection, it will enact suitable restriction but merely because legislature does not give protection to the heirs of the tenant, it does not mean that the definition has no nexus with the act or object or purpose of the act.; 10. there is a basic reasonable classification between the premises let for residential purposes and the premises 'not let for' residential purposes running throughout the act, before its amendment and after its amendment and this classification is reasonable and in view of this classification there may be difference in their incidence and in their treatment. the distinction between the two types of premises may be in its applicability to heritability of statutory tenant and that there is rational nexus between this classification and purpose of the act. - - provided that if, in relation to any proceeding which had been finally disposed of before the commencement of this act, the controller is satisfied that the landlord had not recovered possession of the premises in relation to which the decree or order for eviction of the person in possession thereof was made, he shall, if such person by a written application made within ninety days from such commencement so desires, set aside such decree or order and re-open the proceeding for such eviction and decide such proceeding in accordance with the provisions of the principal act as amended by this act.d.k. kapur, j. (1) i have had the advantage of reading the judgment of dayal j., and i fully concur with the answers to the questions referred to the full bench which have been proposed by him. (2) the reference to the full bench is really the result, or consequence of the judgment of the supreme court in damadilal and others v. parashram and others, : air1976sc2229 . however, the amendment in the definition of 'tenant' which was introduced by the delhi rent control amendment act no. 18 of 1976, was apparently based on the previously existing view regarding the nature of protection given to a tenant under the delhi rent control act, 1958. at that time, the view was that a d tenant whose tenancy had expired and who had been given a notice to quit had only a personal right under the act which came to an end on his death. such a tenant, whose tenancy had expired, but who was protected from eviction by the delhi rent control act, 1958, was considered to be a merely 'statutory' tenant with a personal right to continue in possession. if was thought that the rights of such a person came to an end on his death; the right not being inheritable, this raised a question of general public importance affecting the lives of the citizens of delhi in the sense that the majority of the population are tenants whose occupation in their homes is protected only by the delhi rent control act. this would mean that in the majority of cases when the tenant died, his heirs would have to leave hearth and home and seek some other premises because they no longer had the right to remain in occupation of the house they considered their home. to alleviate the distress which would be caused to such heirs, and also to combat the problem that would be coursed by such displacement, the legislature appears to have stepped in to extend the definition of 'tenant' to include certain heirs and dependents of a protected tenant, such as the spouse, son, daughter, parents, etc. the extension only applied to the persons who are actually living in the premises in question along with the deceased tenant, and only for their life times. it did not apply to the heirs of such additional persons. '(1) 'tenant' means any person by whom or on whose account or behalf the rent of any premises is, or, but for a special contract, would be, payable, and includes (i) a sub-tenant; (ii) any person continuing in posession after the termination of his tenancy; and (iii) in the event of the death of the person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy; subject to the order of succession and conditions specified, respectively, in explanationn i and explanationn ii to this clause, such of the aforesaid person's (a) spouse, (b) son or daughter, or, where there are both son and daughter, both of them, (c) parents, (d) daughter-in-law, being the widow of his predeceased son, a as had been ordinarily living in the premises with such person as a member or members of his family up to the date of his death, but does not include, (a) any person against whom an order or decree for eviction has been made, except where such decree or order for eviction is liable to be re-opened under the proviso to section 3 of the delhi rent control (amendment) act, (6) any person to whom a license, as defined by section 52 of the indian easements act, 1882, has been granted . . . . .' '3. nothing contained in the principal act, as amended by this act, shall be deemed to authorise the re-opening of any proceeding for (a) the fixation of standard rent in relaxation to any premises to which the principal act applies; or (b) the eviction of any person from any premises to which the principal act applies; and (c) any other matter which the controller is empowered, by or under the principal to decide, if such proceeding had been fnally disposed of before the commencement of this act: provided that if, in relation to any proceeding which had been finally disposed of before the commencement of this act, the controller is satisfied that the landlord had not recovered possession of the premises in relation to which the decree or order for eviction of the person in possession thereof was made, he shall, if such person by a written application made within ninety days from such commencement so desires, set aside such decree or order and re-open the proceeding for such eviction and decide such proceeding in accordance with the provisions of the principal act as amended by this act.' '(1) 'tenant' means any person by whom or on whose account or behalf the rent of any pre- be, payable and includes a sub-tenant and also mises is, or but for a special contract: would any person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy but shall not include any person against whom any order or decree for eviction has been made.' 'there has been a persistent demand for amendments to the delhi rent control act, 1958, with a view to conferring a right to tenancy on certain heirs|successors of a deceased statutory tenant so that they may be protected from eviction by landlords and also for simplifying the procedure for eviction or tenants in case the landlord requires the premises bona fide for the person occupation. further, government decided on 9th september, 1975, that a person who owns his own house in his place of work should vacate the government accommodation allotted to him before the 31st december, 1975. government considered that in the circumstances, the act required to be amended urgently' 'that the words used in the amended definition of 'tenant' to give the limited right of inheritance to such persons 'as had been ordinarily living in the premises with such persons as members of his family up to the date of his death' have to be construed to mean that the benefit of amendment is available only when the tenancy was for residential purpose. it is only then that the heirs of the tenants could live with him in the premises at the time of his death. if the premises were not let for residential purpose then neither the tenant nor his heirs could be living in those premises.''after the death of a tenant, the right to continued occupation is available only in respect dential premises and that too to the tenant so that they may be protected from eviction by landlords and also for simplifying the procedure for eviction or tenants in case the landlord requires the premises bona fide for the person occupation. further, government decided on 9th september, 1975, that a person who owns his own house in his place of work should vacate the government accommodation allotted to him before the 31st december, 1975. government considered that in the circumstances, the act required to be amended urgently' 'that the words used in the amended definition of 'tenant' to give the limited right of inheritance to such persons 'as had been ordinarily living in the premises with such persons as members of his family up to the date of his death' have to be construed to mean that the benefit of amendment is available only when the tenancy was for residential purpose. it is only then that the heirs of the tenants could live with him in the premises at the time of his death. if the premises were not let for residential purpose then neither the tenant nor his heirs could be living in those premises.''after the death of a tenant, the right to continued occupation is available only 'in respect of residential premises and that too to number of heirs specified in clause (1) (iii) aforesaid, if they fulfill the other conditions stated therein'. (d) 'tenant' means a person who takes on rent any premises for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person dependent on him but does not include a collector of rents or any middle man who takes or has taken any premises on lease with a view to sub-letting them to another person.'