The State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. Vs. New Delhi Municipal Council - Court Judgment

Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.

1. The age-old saying that fools build houses and wise men live in them has been taken to heart by the respondent Council compelling a number of petitioners to approach this Court for redressal of the grievances.

2. The petitioners before this Court are owners of properties located in the jurisdiction of New Delhi Municipal Council (NDMC) and are governed by the provisions of The New Delhi Municipal Council Act, 1994 (hereinafter to be referred as, 'the said Act'). There are both residential and commercial properties.

3. In order to appreciate the contours of the disputes, which have arisen in these various petitions, it was found appropriate to hear the Counsels representing different parties on all the aspects and to pronounce a common order in the present writ petition dealing with these aspects. Thereafter individual directions can be passed in each of the writ petition including any further directions as may be required in the particular facts and circumstances of each case.

4. Chapter VIII of the said Act deals with the provision of taxation and in terms of Section 63 of the said Act, the rateable value of the property is to be the annual rent at which such land or building may be reasonably expected to be let. This is subject to the proviso that in case of any property for which the standard rent has been fixed under The Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter to be referred as, 'the Rent Act'), the rateable value shall not exceed the annual amount of the standard rent so fixed. Thus, the concept is of annual rent, which can be reasonably realised from the property in question.

5. The word 'rate' in respect of property tax was considered by the Supreme Court in Patel Gordhandas Hargovindas v. Municipal Commissioner, Ahmedabad, : [1964]2SCR608 and the Supreme Court held that the said word had acquired a special meaning and the annual value could be arrived at by taking any of the three modes of actual rent when the building was let out, hypothetical tenancy where there was no renting out and valuation based on capital value. The Supreme Court observed as under:

'The word 'rate' had acquired a special meaning in English legislative history and practice and also in Indian legislation where that word was used and it meant a tax for local purposes imposed by local authorities. The basis of the tax was the annual value of the lands or buildings on or in connection with which it was imposed, arrived at in one of the three ways, namely, (1) actual rent fetched by land or building where it is actually let, (2) where it is not let, rent based on hypothetical tenancy, particularly in the case of buildings, and (3) where either of these two modes is not available, by valuation based on capital value from which annual value has to be found by applying a suitable percentage, which may not be the same for lands and buildings.'

6. The concept of the property tax and the valuation based on the fair rent was initially considered in the case of The Guntur Municipal Council v. The Guntur Town Rate Payers' Association, Etc., : [1971]2SCR423 . Such consideration became necessary in view of the fact that there were rent control legislations brought into force, which restricted the rights of the landlords to evict the tenant as also to fix the rent to be realised from such property. Since the rent legislations provided for fixation of standard rent, the same became the ceiling for the rent, which could be realised by the landlord. This aspect was further extended to include self-occupied properties and it was observed in the said judgment in para 4, 'Logically such buildings or premises as are not let out to a tenant and are in the self-occupation of the landlords would also fall within the same principle if no fair rent has even been fixed in respect of them.'

7. It is not necessary to refer to all the judgments dealing with the aforesaid aspect, but the Supreme Court considered the ramification of the Rent Act and The Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (hereinafter to be referred as, 'the DMC Act') and the said Act so far fixation of the annual rateable value of the property was concerned in Dr. Balbir Singh and Ors. v. MCD and Ors., : [1985]152ITR388(SC) . The concept of hypothetical tenant was brought into force, who would not pay more than the standard rent fixed under the Rent Act. It was held that the standard rent taken in accordance with the Rent Act would serve as the upper limit. The same concept of fiction was extended even to self-occupied properties. Thus, the properties which may not have been actually let out, but were in self-occupation of the landlords, were to be governed by the same principles.

8. It may be noticed that the NDMC area was governed by the provisions of Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 till the enactment of the said Act.

9. The aforesaid interpretations for a time period settled the controversy in question. However, the subsequent developments whereby the provisions of the Rent Act were amended gave rise to fresh problems.

10. The rent control legislations had been in force for a number of years and in order to encourage construction activity as also renting out of vacant properties, it was considered appropriate to amend the Rent Act and carve out the exceptions. This became necessary in view of the fact that the landlords were hesitant to rent out the properties and kept them vacant in view of the protection granted by the Rent Act; The relevant amendment was made in the year 1988 and came into force with effect from 1.12.1988. Section 3 of the Rent Act was appropriately amended and Clauses (c) and (d) were added. The said section is as tinder:

'3. Act not to apply to certain premises--Nothing in this Act shall apply;

(a) to any premises belonging to the Government;

(b) to any tenancy or other like relationship created by a grant from the Government in respect of the premises taken on lease, or requisitioned, by the Government:

Provided that where any premises belonging to Government have been or are lawfully let by any person by virtue of an agreement with the Government or otherwise, then, notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any Court or other authority, the provisions of this Act shall apply to such tenancy.

(c) to any premises, whether residential or not, whose monthly rentexceeds three thousand and five hundred rupees; or

(d) to any premises constructed on or after the commencement of the DelhiRent Control (Amendment) Act, 1988 for a period often years from thedate of completion of such construction.'

11. It may also be noted that the Rent Act extends to the areas included within the limits of New Delhi Municipal Council, Delhi Cantonment Board and such urban areas within the limits of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi as are specified in terms of Sub-section (2) of Section 1 of the Rent Act.

12. The effect of the amendment was that premises, whether residential or not, whose monthly rent exceeded Rs. 3,500/- were taken outside the purview of the protection of the Rent Act. The same was the position in respect of the premises constructed on or after commencement of The Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 1988 (hereinafter to be referred as 'the Amendment Act') for a period of 10 years from the date of completion of such construction. These clauses were, thus, incorporated to encourage construction and letting out of the premises, which would have been kept vacant in view of the apprehension of the landlords of the protection granted to the tenant under the Rent Act.

13. A Division Bench of this Court in Delhi Paints And Chemicals v. New Delhi Municipal Committee and Anr., : 50(1993)DLT207 had the occasion to consider ramification of the amendment to the Rent Act on the rateable value to be fixed under the said Act. It may, however, be noticed that the aspect specifically dealt with was the inclusion of Clause (c) of Section 3 of the Rent Act. The Division Bench took the view that when there was no letting, the question of monthly rent exceeding Rs. 3,500/- would not arise and, thus, the principles laid down in Dr. Balbir Singh's case (supra) as also in the case of Dewan Daulat Rai Kapoor, etc. v. New Delhi Municipal Committee and Anr., : [1980]122ITR700(SC) should continue to apply. It was observed in para 7 as under:

'7. We are concerned here with addition of Clause (c).--Thus, nothing in the DRC Act shall apply to any premises, whether residential or not, whose monthly rent exceeds three thousand and five hundred rupees. This Clause (c) envisages actual letting and DRC Act would not apply to the premises which have been let out for a monthly rent exceeding Rs. 3,500/-. This clause does not talk of any notional monthly rent. It has to be actual monthly rent when there is letting. When there is no letting the question of monthly rent exceeding Rs. 3,500/-would not arise. In that case provisions of Sections 6, 7 and 9(4) of the DRC Act would continue to apply, and so as the principles laid down in the aforesaid two decisions of the Supreme Court in Daulat Rai Kapoor and Dr. Balbir Singh cases. Section 6-A was inserted in the DRC Act by the Amendment Act of 1988. This Section 6-A is as under:

'Revision of rent--Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the standard rent, or, where no standard rent is fixed under the provisions of this Act in respect of any premises, the rent agreed upon between the landlord and the tenant, may be increased by ten per cent every three years.'

This Section 6-A will also not apply where there has been no letting. Where premises which are self-occupied concept of any monthly rent cannot be introduced and for arriving at annual value as defined in the Act one has to fall back on the provisions of the DRC Act as amended and the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court Where, however, there is actual letting those premises are taken out of the purview of the DRC Act as in present case.'

The Special Leave Petition filed against the said judgment was dismissed and, thus, even this issue stood settled. Thus, the properties, which were self-occupied, were to continue to be governed by the principles laid down in the aforesaid two judgments of the Supreme Court and the rateable value had to be calculated in terms of Section 6 of the Rent Act.

14. There, however, does not seem to be an end to the possibilities of problems arising from the aspect of determination of rateable values. The respondent Council started following the judgment in Delhi Paints and Chemical's case (supra), but in respect of properties, which were constructed prior to the Amendment Act of 1988 and were self-occupied. A distinction was sought to be made in respect of the properties, which may have been constructed prior to the Amendment Act of 1988, but which were let out at a rent exceeding Rs. 3,500/- and again self-occupied. There is no dispute that once the property was let out, during the period of letting, it would be the actual rental realised, which would form the basis of determination of the rateable value. However, there were cases where the person let out a property and then re-occupied it. The same was the position in certain cases where the predecessor in interest may have let out the property, but the successor in interest self-occupied the property. In such a case, the respondent took the view that once the property had been let out and the rateable value determined on the basis of the said actual letting, there would be no question of determination of rateable value following the principles laid down in Dewan Daulat Rai Kapoor's case (supra) and Dr. Balbir Singh's case (supra) relying on the provisions of Section 6 of the Rent Act. The result was that even after self-occupation of the property, the person would continue to pay property tax on the basis of the rateable value determined on the principles of rent realisation when the property had been so let out.

15. In order to appreciate this aspect, it is necessary to see the effect of the provisions of Section 3(c) of the Rent Act. Section 1(2) of the said Act makes the Rent Act applicable to the complete area of NDMC. Sections carves out the exception and one of the exceptions is under Section 3(c) of the Rent Act. Such exception is carved out both for residential and/or commercial use. However, the wordings are very clear. The Act shall not apply to any premises whose monthly rent exceeds Rs. 3,500/-. Thus, in order for a premises not to be covered by the Rent Act, the monthly rent should exceed Rs. 3,500/-. This implies that there has to be a realisation of rent exceeding Rs. 3,500/-.

16. The Division Bench of this Court in Sir Sobha Singh & Sons Pvt. Ltd. v. New Delhi Municipal Council, 62 (1996) DLT 99 : 1996 IV AD 56 also held that it is only premises which are actually occupied by tenant and where actual rent is paid or payable exceeding Rs. 3,500/- would be outside the purview of the Rent Act and, thus, the principles of standard rent would not govern the rateable value.

17. Further, the Supreme Court in Government Servant Cooperative House Building Society Ltd. and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., : [1998]3SCR996 considered the issue as to how the actual rent at which a property is let out is liable to be arrived at when the rent of the property is not controlled under the Rent Act or any other rent control legislation specially taking into consideration the provisions of Section 116 of the DMC Act. It was held that where there is no artificial control on the rent which is charged, there is a bargain between a willing Lesser and a willing lessee uninfluenced by any extraneous circumstances and reliance was placed on the judgment of Dewan Daulat Rai Kapoor's case (supra). Thus, this case also really dealt with the situation of rented properties where rent is of such a value that there is no protection available under the Rent Act.

18. In none of the cases it was held that the concept of determination of rateable value on the principles of standard rent under Section 6 of the Rent Act will not apply where the property is self-occupied.

19. Learned Senior Counsel for the respondent placed strong reliance on the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in C.R. No. 447 of 1996 with other connected matters titled New Delhi Municipal Council v. M/s. New Delhi Hotels Ltd. decided on 10.12.2001. It may be noticed that the judgment was rendered in the absence of the Counsel for the assessed. In the said judgment also the effect of the amendment of the Rent Act was considered where the building is not subject to any rent control legislation. However, therein a statement was made by the Counsel for MCD that in case of self-occupied properties, MCD continued to fix the rateable value on the basis that the property is governed by the Delhi Rent Control Act. In that judgment, the New Delhi Municipal Council House Tax Bye-Laws, 1982 have also been referred to. It may, however, be relevant to state that though these Bye-laws are of 1982, the same were never pointed out at the time of the decision in Delhi Paints and Chemical's case (supra). Further, the Bye-laws itself state that they shall come into force from the date fixed by the State Government. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that no such date was ever fixed and, thus, the Bye-laws were never brought into force. This is disputed by the learned Counsel for the respondent but no material was brought on record, despite the matter being adjourned on this account to show the date being specified from which the Bye-laws came into force. The only contention is that they have been implemented for a considerable period of time.

20. Be that as it may, in my considered view, the same would not really have an impact on the decision of the present case in view of the fact what is stated hereinafter and the view taken that in self-occupied property, the determination has to be on the principles of standard rent.

21. It cannot be the intent and, in my considered view, it is not the intent of the said enactment and amendment to exclude for all times to come, the property in question even when the same is self-occupied. To test the proposition, if an example is taken of a property whose rent exceeds Rs. 3,500/-, but subsequently the rentals fall and in a subsequent letting, the rental is for less than a sum of Rs. 3/500/-, can it be said that the property is outside the purview of the Rent Act? The tenant in such a case would seek the protection of the Rent Act since the rent he is paying is less than Rs. 3,500/-.

22. There is no doubt that the Rent Act is for the protection of tenants. The original concept was not to cover self-occupied properties. However for purposes of calculation of rateable value, the Supreme Court in terms of the aforesaid judgments applied the principles of standard rent also to self-occupied properties. It is by this principle in fiction that self-occupied properties continue to be governed and the rateable value determined in terms of Section 6 of the Rent Act. The mere fact that for some period of time the property is outside the purview of the Rent Act will not give a license to the respondent to determine the rateable value for all times to come on the same principle of actual rental. The moment the property ceases to be a tenanted property and is self-occupied, it comes back to the original position where it was before the property was so rented out. In such a situation, thus, the principles laid down in Dr. Balbir Singh 's case (supra), Dewan Daulat Rai Kapoor's case (supra) and as interpreted and incorporated in Delhi Paints and Chemicals' case (supra) would once again become applicable to the property in question and the rateable value would be liable to be determined on the basis of the principles contained in Section 6 of the Rent Act. This would equally apply whether the letting out is by the owner or by the predecessor in interest of the owner.

23. It is further clarified that in case of part letting out of the property and part self-occupation, the same principles as aforesaid would apply to the portion, which is self-occupied. The let out portion would be governed on the basis of the actual rent. The aforesaid principles would equally apply to residential as well as commercial properties.

24. Learned Counsel for the respondent Council have raised the issue of a property, which is let out continuously, but for intermediate period may remain vacant. In such a case, vacancy remission is granted. However, it is clarified that if the property is self-occupied, then it has to be treated in terms of the aforesaid principles. The vacancy remission is a remission granted by the respondent under Section 110 of the said Act on account of the property being unproductive of rent for 60 days or more consecutively. This is the additional benefit granted on account of the fact that the property, which is capable of being let out, is lying vacant and unoccupied.

25. In my considered view, the apprehension of the respondent is misplaced since the concept of vacancy remission and self-occupation are two different concepts. This aspect has to be examined in the facts of each case. The concept of self-occupation is when a property is in self-use of the owner. This period may be short or long, but that is not material. The concept of vacancy remission is when the property remains vacant and unproductive of rent. In such a case vacancy remission is granted as a benefit on account of the property being unproductive of rent. The two concepts cannot be mixed or interposed and are not inter-dependent.

26. The matter does not, however, rest at this. There is another category of cases, which is of the properties constructed after 1988. There is no dispute that if these properties are let out, it is the rental value, which would form the basis. However, the dispute arises in cases where such properties are self-occupied. In terms of Section 3(d) of the Rent Act for a period of 10 years from completion of such construction of the premises, constructed after the commencement of the Amendment Act the premises does not fall within the purview of the Rent Act. Thus, for this specific period of time of 10 years, the premises are taken outside the purview of the Rent Act.

27. The contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent is that applying the same principles, which this Court was inclined to follow and mentioned as aforesaid in interpreting the provisions of Section 3(c), it is the comparable rent, which should form the basis of determination of the rateable value. In this behalf, reference was made to the fact that in Delhi Paints and Chemicals' case (supra) where though both Clauses (c) and (d) of Section 3 were noticed, the issue relating to Clause (d) was not decided, but the decision was restricted to Clause (c) thereof.

28. Learned Counsel for the petitioner, on the other hand, contends that the object of excluding for some period the property from the purview of the Rent Act has been considered by the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Punjab Tin Supply Co., Chandigarh, etc. v. Central Government and Ors., : [1984]1SCR428 . It was observed in para 12 as under:

'12. The preamble and the provisions of a statute no doubt assist the Court in finding out its object and policy but its object and policy need not always be strictly confined to its preamble and the provisions contained therein. The object and policy of the Act which is now before us appears to be slightly wider than some of the key provisions of the Act namely fixation of fair rent and prevention of unreasonable eviction of tenants. The acute problem of shortage of urban housing as we all know has become a permanent feature throughout India. It is on account of the shortage of the number of houses in urban areas, the landlords get an opportunity to exploit tenants who are in need of housing accommodation by compelling them to enter into unconscionable bargains. The Act is passed as one of the measures taken to mitigate the hardship caused to the tenants. The policy and the object of the Act generally is mitigation of the hardship of tenants. Such mitigation can be attained by several measures, one of them being creation of incentive to persons with capital who are otherwise reluctant to invest in the construction of new buildings in view of the chilling effect of the rent control laws. As a part of the said scheme in order to persuade them to invest in the construction of new buildings exemption is granted to them from the operation of the Act for a short period of five years so that whatever may be the hardship for the time being to the tenants of the new buildings, the new buildings so constructed may after the expiry of the period of exemption be available for the pool of housing accommodation controlled by the Act. The impugned notification is not, thereforee, ultra virus Section 3 of the Act as in its true effect, it advances the scheme, object and purposes of the Act which are articulated in the preamble and the substantive provisions of the Act. 'Moreover the classification of buildings into exempted buildings and unexempted buildings brought about by the notification bears a just and reasonable nexus to the object to be achieved namely the creation of additional housing accommodation to meet the growing needs of persons who have no accommodation to reside or to carry on business and it cannot be considered as discriminatory or arbitrary or unreasonable in view of the shortness of the period of exemption available in the case of each exempted buildings. The exemption granted for a period of five years only serves as an incentive as stated above and does not create a class of landlords who are forever kept outside the scope of the Act. The notification tries to balance the interests of the landlords on the one hand and of the tenants on the other in a reasonable way. We do not, thereforee, agree with the submission that the notification either falls outside the object and policy of the statute or is discriminatory.'

It is, thus, submitted that it is the same very object which has formed the basis of inclusion of Clause (d) of Section 3 of the Rent Act, which was to encourage renting out of the property and construction activity. If the property is rented out, there is no problem, but in such a situation a person self-occupies the property, it is contended, the property should be treated as no different from a property constructed prior to 1988. This contention is sought to be reinforced on the basis of the principles laid down in Dr. Balbir Singh's case (supra), Dewan Daulat Rai Kapoor's case (supra) and Delhi Paints And Chemicals' case (supra) whereby the concept of calculation of rateable value on the basis of the provisions of standard rent were superimposed and incorporated for self-occupied property even though, strictly speaking, these properties are not ones to which the Rent Act applies since they were not let out.

29. I am of the considered view that the object of amendment to Section 3 of the Rent Act cannot be ignored while interpreting even Clause (d) of Section 3. The object was to encourage construction and renting out. The renting out may not have occurred in a case where the premises are in self-occupation, but construction is carried out. Though such property would fall outside the purview of the Rent Act, the same would be the position, strictly speaking, even the properties which were self-occupied and constructed prior to 1988 and the rateable value of which is determined on the basis of Section 6 of the Rent Act. This concept of applying the said principles to self-occupied properties is now well settled in terms of the judgment in Dr. Balbir Singh's case (supra) and Dewan Daulat Rai Kapoor's case (supra). The effect of the amendment has been considered in Delhi Paints and Chemicals' case (supra). I see no reason while interpreting Clause (d), why a different interpretation should be given and the extension should not be made of the same principles to self-occupied properties even if they are constructed after 1988. Such properties may be either residential or commercial. Thus, I am of the considered view that the principles laid down in Delhi Paints and Chemicals' case (supra) affirmed by the Supreme Court for determination of the rateable value of self-occupied properties even after the amending provisions of Clause 3(d) have been brought into force should be equally made applicable to self-occupied properties constructed after 1988. Thus, even for the properties which are under self-occupation and constructed after the Amendment Act of 1988, the rateable value is liable to be determined in terms of the provisions of Section 6 of the Rent Act.

30. The result of the aforesaid is that all properties, residential or commercial, constructed pre-1988 or post-1988, whether rented out for some period or not, which are in self-occupation, will have the rateable value determined in accordance with the provisions of Section 6 of the Rent Act.

31. It may also be noticed that the principles of parity have always to be kept in mind while determining the rateable value and this would apply equally to MCD and NDMC. The Supreme Court in Lt. Colonel P.R. Chaudhary (Retd.), etc. v. MCD and Ors., : (2000)4SCC577 has held that there is no manner of doubt that the said principles of parity would apply, especially in view of the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Dr. Balbir Singh's case (supra). It may be noticed that MCD framed its own Bye-laws in the year 1994 and issue arose when after the Bye-laws have been brought into force, the said principles of parity would apply or that only the Bye-laws would govern. It was held by this Court in MCD v. Dhunishaw Framroz Daruwala, : 100(2002)DLT679 that the principles of parity would continue to apply pre or post amendment of Bye-laws.

32. Learned Senior Counsel for the respondent referred to the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Raghunandan Saran Ashok Saran (HUF) v. Union of India and Ors., : 95(2002)DLT508 whereby certain provisions of the Rent Act including Section 6 have been held to be ultra virus to the Constitution of India. No further submissions were advanced in this behalf, but it has been stated that a Special Leave Petition against the same is pending consideration before the Supreme Court.

33. Be that as it may, the determination of house-tax for self-occupied properties is to be calculated on the basis of the provisions of Section 6 of the Rent Act by applying a fiction as has been done in the past in pursuance to the judgments of the Supreme Court and not that provision of the Rent Act would apply as a self-occupied property is not a rented property to which the Rent Act applies. Thus, this will not make a difference to the method of calculation of the rateable value for self-occupied properties.

34. In the particular case in question, one further issue arises for consideration, which is on account of payment of 25% charges by the petitioner to the Union of India, which is the perpetual Lesser of the property in question. The petitioner is a public sector enterprises. In terms of the clause of the perpetual lease deed, the property was to be in self-occupation. However, the property could be rented out after taking permission of the perpetual Lesser, but 25% of the rent has to be paid to the perpetual Lesser. The agreement of lease contains the following clause :

'The intended lessee shall not sub-let or give on rent any part of the said land or building constructed on the demised piece of land without prior permission of the lesser. In case of such permission the State Trading Corporation will pay to the Government 25% of the gross rent fetched in respect of such accommodation as is hired out by the corporation to organisations other than that of the State Trading Corporation and its subsidiaries including Central Cottage Industries Emporium.'

It is, thus, the contention of the petitioner that though it is described as a misuse charges, the same is actually an amount to be remitted to the Government out of the gross rent and only the net rent remains with the petitioner.

35. In my considered view the same cannot really be called misuse charges on account of the fact that it is not a result of misuse of the property in question, that charge is being levied. If it has been a misuse charge, then the same would have no impact on the determination of the rateable value. However, this is a permissible activity after obtaining permission from the perpetual Lesser on payment of certain percentage of the rent, which is 25%. This is, of course, subject to actual payment by the petitioner and submission of proof of the same to the respondent. It is the net value, in case such amount is remitted to the Government of India, which should be the rent realised for the property in question and, thus, the rateable value would be liable to be determined after discounting the rental realisation to the extent of the amount remitted to the Government of India.

36. None of the parties are pressing or raising the contention in support of the applicability of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act 1971.

37. Before parting with this judgment, I must express my anguish at the fact that though Delhi is one city, different parameters are being followed by Municipal authorities in the same town. It is only for purposes of convenience that jurisdiction have been divided among NDMC, MCD and Delhi Cantonment Board. The least that is expected is that all these Municipal authorities should act at tandem and follow similar principles in determination of rateable value. Merely because the house of one person falls in one area or the other, which may even be adjacent, and a different Municipal authority is dealing with the issue of determination of rateable value, should not imply totally different concepts in determination of such rateable value. It is appropriate that all the Municipal authorities must meet and consider this aspect to bring a uniformity in the system of determination of the rateable value in parts of Delhi when they fall within one jurisdiction or the other. This is more so as the provisions under said Act and the DMC Act are para materia. The MCD, in fact, now proposed to apply a different concept of a unit method of taxation, but so far, the NDMC has not finalised any proposal in the same terms.

38. The consequence is that the matters are liable to be remanded back to the assessing authority to redetermine the rateable value in accordance with the aforesaid principles with the hope that at least now it will bring an end to this unending litigation.

39. The writ petitions filed by the assessed are allowed and the writ petitions filed by the NDMC are dismissed with the aforesaid directions leaving the parties to bear their own costs.