Delhi Development Authority Vs. Sh. B.P. Sharma and anr. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
limitation act, 1963 - section 5--condensation of delay--delay in filing appeal--submission that procedural delay in the office of dda--dismissed by trial court--petition--proposition that negligence or indolence on the part of the petitioner or file pusher officers should be condoned merely because the appellant is a state is difficult to accept--if sufficient cause has not been shown, the application for condensation of delay has to be dismissed--trial court rightly dismissed the application.;it is felt that in such matters a holistic approach is desirable on considering the merit of the matter along with delay in filing an appeal etc. individual interest has to give way to the larger public interest to protect the public property and to ensure substantial justice. but at the same time carte blanche cannot be given to authorities as has been sought by the petitioner by blandly pleading 'procedural delay' without giving any facts, prima facie establish 'sufficient cause'. applying the above said principle it is apparent that though the appellate court. did not consider the matter from the other objective, but in view of the admissions made, it would be evident hereinafter that the end result is that the learned trial court has done substantial justice in between the parties. - - no purpose is going to be served just by allowing the application to convert it into a regular second appeal for the name sake and ultimately finding that there is no substance either in the petition under article 227 or in the regular second appeal even if the application is allowed and the delay in filing the appeal before the appellate court as well as this court is condoned.order xii admissions'[6. judgment on admission -- (1) where admissions of fact have been made either in the pleading or otherwise, whether orally or in writing, the court may at any stage of the suit, either on the application of any party or of its own motion and without waiting for the determination of any other question between the parties, make such order or give such judgment as it may think fit, having regard to such admission.'13. this order does not depend only on the admissions made in the pleadings, for the admission need not always be made only in the pleadings, for they could be made otherwise, whether orally or in writing. the question, which should be seen, is whether there was any admission made 'otherwise whether orally or in writing.' the demarcation took place under the orders of the court. the property in question was found situated in khasras numbers different than those khasra numbers which were involved in the earlier suit. the premises were found to be situated in terms of the report of the local commissioner on those khasra which were claimed by the respondent. the counsel for respondent no.2/dda did appear in court and submitted that appropriate orders could be made in view of the report of the local commissioner. in view of this statement and the fact that dda does not claim to have acquired the land in question in khasra no.478/20/2/2 and khasra no.479/20/2/2. it does not appear possible to say that no order could not have been passed under order 12 rule 6 cpc.14. it may be mentioned that it is not the case that the khasras which have been pointed out by the local commissioner were acquired by the state and their possession has been taken over and delivered to dda. unconsciously the learned trial court has done substantial justice in between the parties.15. in such circumstances, even if the petition under article 227 in converted into a regular second appeal, as prayed and it is deemed that appeal could be field, the question of fact stands decided on the basis of admission made by the counsel for the dda before the learned trial court. there was no substance in the appeal before the appellate court, nor even after ignoring the delay in filing the appeal. by just converting this petition into regular second appeal, no life can be injected in a dead horse. consequently, no relief can be granted ultimately. no purpose is going to be served just by allowing the application to convert it into a regular second appeal for the name sake and ultimately finding that there is no substance either in the petition under article 227 or in the regular second appeal even if the application is allowed and the delay in filing the appeal before the appellate court as well as this court is condoned.16. for the forgoing reasons, the petition is dismissed accordingly along with all the applications. however, parties are left to bear their own costs.

Judgment:
ORDER

XII

ADMISSIONS

'[6. Judgment on admission -- (1) Where admissions of fact have been made either in the pleading or otherwise, Whether orally or in Writing, the Court may at any stage of the suit, either on the application of any party or of its own motion and without waiting for the determination of any other question between the parties, make such order or give such judgment as it may think fit, having regard to such admission.'

13. This order does not depend only on the admissions made in the pleadings, for the admission need not always be made only in the pleadings, for they could be made otherwise, whether orally or in writing. The question, which should be seen, is whether there was any admission made 'otherwise whether orally or in writing.' The demarcation took place under the orders of the Court. The property in question was found situated in Khasras numbers different than those Khasra numbers which were involved in the earlier suit. The premises were found to be situated in terms of the report of the Local Commissioner on those Khasra which were claimed by the respondent. The counsel for respondent No.2/DDA did appear in Court and submitted that appropriate orders could be made in view of the report of the Local Commissioner. In view of this statement and the fact that DDA does not claim to have acquired the land in question in Khasra No.478/20/2/2 and Khasra No.479/20/2/2. It does not appear possible to say that no order could not have been passed under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC.

14. It may be mentioned that it is not the case that the Khasras which have been pointed out by the Local Commissioner were acquired by the State and their possession has been taken over and delivered to DDA. Unconsciously the learned trial Court has done substantial justice in between the parties.

15. In such circumstances, even if the petition under Article 227 in converted into a Regular Second Appeal, as prayed and it is deemed that appeal could be field, the question of fact stands decided on the basis of admission made by the counsel for the DDA before the learned trial Court. There was no substance in the appeal before the Appellate Court, nor even after ignoring the delay in filing the appeal. By just converting this petition into Regular Second Appeal, no life can be injected in a dead horse. Consequently, no relief can be granted ultimately. No purpose is going to be served just by allowing the application to convert it into a Regular Second Appeal for the name sake and ultimately finding that there is no substance either in the petition under Article 227 or in the Regular Second Appeal even if the application is allowed and the delay in filing the appeal before the Appellate Court as well as this Court is condoned.

16. For the forgoing reasons, the petition is dismissed accordingly along with all the applications. However, parties are left to bear their own costs.