Lal Chand Goel Vs. Delhi Development Authority - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
service - dismissal - section 53 b of delhi development act, 1957 and regulation 13 (1) and 14 of delhi development (salaries, allowances and conditions of service) regulation, 1961- petitioner challenged dismissal on ground of being illegal, arbitrary and against principles of natural justice - petitioner aware of charge labelled against him - penalty of dismissal imposed after holding inquiry - petitioner availed right to appeal - principles of natural justice not violated as inquiry properly held - penalty of dismissal valid. - - he failed in both the courts below (the trial court as well as the first appellate court) in the suit seeking principally the relief of his reinstatement as a clerk in the office of the defendant, the delhi development authority (for short the dda). thed. he also complained that he was illegally reverted as l. opp 3.whether the suit is bad in the absence of notice u/s 53-b of the delhi development act? and dismissed the appeal by his judgment and decree dated 2.1.1981. the present appeal was admitted for determining the following questions of law :(i)whether the lower appellate court failed to appreciate that the appellant had been found guilty of a matter with which he was not charged ? (ii)whether the finding of the appointing authority, which resulted in the dismissal of the appellant, was arrived at in violation of the principles of natural justice or is otherwise untenable inlaw? by the impugned order the learned additional district judge directed that court fee payable in the appeal as well as on theplaint be realised from the plaintiff. d-20) informed the plaintiff that he bad not been reverted as ldc as a result of any departmental proceedings. the suit of the plaintiff quite relief of reversion is, thereforee, clearly barred by limitation. it clearly stated that the plaintiff was an employee of the d. the witness added that provisional appointment was just like a temporary appointment. gupta that findings by the inquiry officer as well as the disciplinary authority were perverse. he said the plaintiff could at best be charged with negligence in the facts and circumstances of the case but then there was no charge of negligence. gupta contended that it was a case where principles of natural justice had been violated and the plaintiff was condemned unheard. the disciplinary authority was also of the view that since form-f was not in possession of the damage collector at the time of grant of rebate and he had failed to make an entry regarding the date of service in his register, he should have personally verified the date of service of the form before allowing the rebate. the authority was, thereforee, of the view that these factors constituted strong circumstantial evidence to prove that tampering and interpolation has been done by the plaintiff himself and if at all by someone else, then that was with the connivance and knowledge of the plaintiff. the disciplinary authority observed that while the plaintiff as damage collector was repeatedly receiving payments for damages from inder singh, there was no valid reason why form-f could not have been served on inder singh during the months february 196 6/08/1966. the interpolated date of form-f relating to inder singh was 11 8 66.this is yet another factor in the case of inder singh all these were taken into account by the disciplinary authority to come to the conclusion that these constituted strong circumstantial evidence to prove that tampering and interpolation was done by the plaintiff himself and if at all by someone else then with the connivance and knowledge of the plaintiff. penalty of 'dismissal was imposed on him after holding an inquiry under regulation 16 of the regulations and the plaintiff also availed of his right of appeal under regulation 22 as well. since the matter has been pending in court all this period, i will not like to burden the appellant with costs.d.p. wadhwa, j.(1) this is the plaintiff's second appeal. he failed in both the courts below (the trial court as well as the first appellate court) in the suit seeking principally the relief of his reinstatement as a clerk in the office of the defendant, the delhi development authority (for short the dda). thed.d-a. is a statutory corporation and was constituted under the delhi development act, 1957. service conditions of its employees are governed by the delhi development authority (salaries, allowances and conditions of service) regulations, 1961 (for short the regulations) framed under the aforesaid act. under section 53-b of the act, no suit can be instituted against the d.d.a. in respect of any act done or purporting to have been done in pursuance of this act or any rule or regulation made there under until the expiration of two months after notice in writing has been left at its office and unless such notice states explicitly the cause of action, the nature of relief sought, the amount of compensation claimed and the name and place of residence of the intending plaintiff and unless the plaint contains statement that such notice has been so left at the office of the d.d.a. no such suit is to be instituted after the expiry of six months from the date on which the cause of action arises. there is an exception by which notice can be waived, but that is not applicable in the present case.(2) the plaintiff was employed as a lower division clerk (l.d.c.)in thed.d.a. on 12.4.1961 (exhibit d-l). while so working, he, by letter dated2.11.1962 (exhibit d-3), requested the vice-chairman, d.d.a., to work asdamages collector 'in the vacancy caused shri d.n. verma who has since been relieved'. the plaintiff, offered to deposit the necessary security. he was thereafter appointed damages collector and by reference of his letter dated20.11.1962 (exhibit d-4), he pledged 12 years national plan certificate in favor of the d.d.a. on 14.9.1962, the plaintiff was transferred from the general administration section to the land section (exhibit d-ll). he was declared quasi permanent as from 1.7.1964 (exhibit d-5) while working in the damages section. he was appointed to officiate as upper division clerk(u.d.c.) on provisional basis by office order dated 5.10.1966 (exhibit d-6).the plaintiff was still shown to be working in the damages section. by the office order effective from 1.5.1967 (exhibit d-7),) various l.d.cs. were appointed to officiate as u.d.cs. but in the case of the plaintiff he was directed to be reverted as l.dc. earlier, by order dated 12.4.1967 (exhibit d-2), the plaintiff was placed under suspension with immediate effect by the vice-chairman, d.l).a., in exercise powers conferred upon him by regulation 13(1) of the regulations. it was mentioned that disciplinary proceedings were contemplated against the plaintiff. by letter dated 22.5.1967 (exhibit p-2),the plaintiff was informed that it was proposed to hold an inquiry against, him under regulation 16 of the regulations. he was served with statement of articles of charge (exhibit p-2/a), statement of imputations of misconduct ormis behavior in support of articles of charges (exhibit p-2/b), list of documents (exhibit p-2/c) and list of witnesses (exhibit p-2/d). it will be appropriate to reproduce the statement of articles of charges framed against the plaintiff at this stage itself : 'article-itamperingwith papers i.e. unauthorised alteration in the dates of service of forms 'f' in respect of s/shri hoshiar singh and inder singh by shri l.c. goyal while working as damages collector with a motive to provide undue benefit to the assesseds.article-iigrant of irregular rebate amounting to rs. 290.38-by shril.c. goyal while working as damages collector on the basis of alteration in the dates of the records mentioned in article-i.article-iiiloss of rs. 290.38 to the d.d.a. on account of misconduct of the said shri l.c. 'goyal.'mr. kaushal kishore, lands sales officer, conducted the inquiry and submitted his report dated 14 12 1967 (exhibit p-6/a). he held article i as not having been proved beyond reasonable doubt. he however, held that the second and third articles of charge stood proved against the plaintiff. vice chairman,d.d.a. agreed with the findings of the inquiry officer regarding articles second and iii of the charge, but he disagreed with his finding relating to article iof the articles of charge. the vice-chairman held that article i also stoodproved. a memorandum dated 3/127.1968 (exhibit p-3) was served on the plaintiff by the vice-chairman. he was given a copy of the inquiry report.he was also informed that in respect of article of charge i, the vice-chairman also held .that the same was also proved and further that the vice-chairman had provisionally come .to the conclusion that the plaintiff was not a fit person to be retained in service and that it was proposed to impose on him the penalty, of dismissal from service. the plaintiff was given an opportunity of making a representation on the penalty proposed. the plaintiff submitted his representations and was also granted a personal hearing. by order dated8.11.1968 (exhibit p-5), the plaintiff was dismissed from the service of thed.d.a. under rule l4(g) read with rule 15(1) of the regulations with immediate effect the plaintiff appealed to the chairman, d.d.a. his appeal was rejected and the order of rejection was communicated to the plaintiff by letter dated 20.5.1969 (exhibit p-7) of the secretary, d.d.a. (3) the plaintiff sent a notice dated 11.6.1969 (exhibit p-9) addressed to the chairman, d.d.a. through an advocate and described it as 'notice under section 80 of the civil procedure code'. by this notice, the plaintiff called upon the d d.a. to reinstate him to his u.d.c's posts as was held by-the plaintiff at the time he was suspended from service and to pay to him damages equal to his full salary of his service ..during the relevant period. the plaintiff, in this notice, referred to the inquiry held against him and said that though in the inquiry case was not proved against him he was still dismissed from service against law and the rules of natural justice. he said, his' appeal was also dismissed without providing him any opportunity for his defense.he also complained that he was illegally reverted as l.d.c. during his suspension which was also in violation of the provisions of law and the rules governing his service. he termed his dismissal from service as illegal, ultravires and arbitrary. since there was no response to his notice, the plaintiff filed the present suit. it was filed on 26.8.1969, and, in the first instance,it was a suit for declaration with consequential relief he sought a declaration that his dismissal was illegal and that he was entitled to be reinstated asu.d.c. with full salary from the date of his suspension. he also sought a declaration that his reversion 'to the post of l.d.c. by order dated 29.4.1967was also illegal. during the pendency of the case, the plaintiff got his plaintamended, and by this amendment he also wanted a decree for rs. 4.460.00 being the amount of emoluments to which be was entitled from the dale of his suspension to the date of filing of the suit, as udc.(4) i need not refer to the pleadings in detail at this stage except to note that in the written statement filed by the d.d.a. it was stated that the plaintiff was reverted back to the post of l.d.c, not on account of any departmental proceedings against him, but as he was found unsuitable for the post of u.d.c. by the departmental promotion committee.(5) on the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed ; 1. whether the dismissal of plaintiff from service is illegal and unauthorised and malafide as alleged? opp 2.whether the reversion of the plaintiff to l.d.c. was illegal and without jurisdiction and against the principle of natural justice? opp 3.whether the suit is bad in the absence of notice u/s 53-b of the delhi development act? 4.whether and if so to what amount the plaintiff is entitled as arrears of salary? opp 5.relief.'thereafter, on the application of the d.d a., the following additional issue was framed: '1a.whether the suit is not within time? opd.'the trial court held all the issues in favor of the plaintiff except issue no. 3holding that the suit was not maintainable in the absence of notice under section 53-b of the act and dismissed the suit by judgment and decree dated15.5.1979. the plaintiff appealed. the learned additional district judge held all the issues against the plaintiff.and dismissed the appeal by his judgment and decree dated 2.1.1981. the present appeal was admitted for determining the following questions of law :. '(i)whether the lower appellate court failed to appreciate that the appellant had been found guilty of a matter with which he was not charged ? (ii)whether the finding of the appointing authority, which resulted in the dismissal of the appellant, was arrived at in violation of the principles of natural justice or is otherwise untenable inlaw? (iii)whether the lower appellate court ought to have held that the allegation in the plaint regarding the sending of a notice under section 80, civil procedure code, should be read as also having reference to a notice under section 53-b of the delhi development act? (iv)whether the lower appellate court was right in holding that the suit of the appellant was barred by time?'(6) when the plaintiff filed the suit he did not pray for a decree for arrears of salary. he only wanted declarations that (1) his dismissal wasillegal; (2) he was entitled to be reinstated as udc with full salary from thedate of suspension and; (3) the order reverting him to ldc was illegal.subsequently he was allowed to amend his plaint. he alleged that he was illegally reverted from udc and was entitled to emoluments as udc for the suspension period and from the date of dismissal to the date of institution of the suit, which he calculated at rs. 4,460.00. on the prayer of the plaintiff he was allowed to sue as an indigent person as regards his relief for arrears of salary amounting to rs. 4,460.00. it appears plaintiff filed his first appeal also as an.indigent person. by the impugned order the learned additional district judge directed that court fee payable in the appeal as well as on theplaint be realised from the plaintiff. in this second appeal the plaintiff has given the value for the purpose of jurisdiction as rs. 4.790.00 and for the purpose of court fee as rs. 330.00. a court fee of rs. 32.50 has been paid in the appeal. it would, thereforee, appear that the plaintiff has not paid any court fee on the relief towards arrears of salary amounting to rs. 4,460.00otherwise, he was required to pay court fee on that amount (section 4 of the court fees act 1870) or he should have preferred the appeal as an indigent person (order 44 of the code) under rule 3 of order 44 of the code wherethe plaintiff has been allowed to sue or appeal as an indigent person in the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred, no further enquiry in respect of the question whether or not he is an indigent person shall be necessary if the appellant has made an affidavit staling that he has not ceased to be anindigent' person since the date of the decree appealed from. no such affidavit has been filed. in the circumstances, thereforee, the appeal as regards relief for rs. 4,460.00cannot be maintained.(7) the principal reliefs claimed in the suit pertained to the dismissal of the plaintiff from service and also his reversion to the post of ldc. these are two separate reliefs. defendant has contended that reversion of the plaintiff to ldc had nothing to do with the disciplinary proceedings taken againsthim. when the plaintiff was reverted he objected and by letter (ex. d-8) he wanted the order or reversion to be cancelled or withdrawn. he. also threatened that if it was not done he would seek redress in a court of law. in this the plaintiff also pointed out that reversion was one of the major penalties mentioned in regulation 14 and this penalty could not be imposed against him without following the procedure prescribed. plaintiff also imputed motives to the defendant in reverting him. the defendant in its reply dated 14.6.67(ex. d-20) informed the plaintiff that he bad not been reverted as ldc as a result of any departmental proceedings. his request to withdraw or cancel the order of reversion was declined. the matter rested at that as far as defendant was concerned. the plaintiff took no further action and ultimately after the conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings against him when he was dismissed from service on 8.11.68, he filed an appeal dated 2.1.69 under regulation 22. he also referred to his reversion as ldc which he termed asillegal. under regulation 24 an appeal is to be filed within three months from the date on which the appellant receives a copy of the order appealed against.on sufficient cause being shown the appellate authority can entertain the appeal even after the expiry of the period of three months. it would, thus, be seen that against the order of reversion if it was to be termed as one under regulation 14, as contended by the plaintiff, he was to file appeal within three months of the order which is dated 29.4.67. no appeal was filed within thisperiod. under sub-section (2) of section 53b of the act a suit challenging a reversion could not be instituted by the plaintiff after the expiry of six months from the date on which the cause of action arose. it is a different matter if plaintiff could file a suit without exhausting his remedy of appeal under regulation 22. that question i need not consider. the suit of the plaintiff quite relief of reversion is, thereforee, clearly barred by limitation.(8) in the impugned judgment it has been held that the suit as regards relief for declaration against dismissal of the plaintiff was also barred by limitation. the court held that cause of action arose on 8.11.68 when the plaintiff was dismissed and suit should have been filed within six months from that date.i do not think that is a correct view to take. regulations have been framed under section 57 of the act and they are statutory in nature. these provide for an appeal against the order imposing penalty on an employee of the dda.it is a statutory remedy. it has been repeatedly held that appeal is a continuation of the original proceedings. in the present case cause of action would arise only after the plaintiff was communicated the order dismissing his appeal.in this connection reference may be made to a decision of the supreme court in raghubir jha v. state of bihar and others : air1986sc508 , in this case the plaintiff had filed a suit for declaration that the order of his discharge from service was illegal. he was discharged from service on 27.7.61. he filed an appeal before the commissioner, bhagalpur division which was dismissed and another appeal to the board of revenue also met the similar fate. the plaintiff thereafter filed a revision before the state government which the state government rejected on 5.8.65. the order rejecting the revision was communicated to the plaintiff on 19.12.65. he filed the suit on 7.8.68. the supreme court held that period of limitation is to be computed from 19.12.65,the date of communication of the order of the state government and the suit was thereforee within time.(9) both the courts held that the percent suit was not maintainable in the absence of notice under section 53-b of the act. i think both the courts adopted rather an extreme technical approach. and their reasonings appear to be erroneous. the plaintiff did serve a notice (ex. p-9) before filing the suit.period of notice has to be excluded while computing the limitation. in this notice the plaintiff referred to his dismissal which he termed as illegal. he also said that his appeal was dismissed without providing any opportunity for his defense. he said his dismissal was arbitrary, illegal and against the principles of natural justice. he called upon the d.d.a. to reinstate him asudc) a puts held by him before he was suspended, and to pay to him damages equal to his full salary of his service during that period. he said if this was not done he would file a suit for declaration for the purpose. this notice was sent by the plaintiff through his advocate and gave the name of the plaintiff and also referred to the departmental proceedings against him. it clearly stated that the plaintiff was an employee of the d.d.a. and was working as udc in the land sales account section, vikas bhawan, new delhi.(10) in the plaint the plaintiff stated that he had served a legal notice under section 80 of the code calling upon the defendant to reinstate, him to his post of udc but that no reply had been received till the time of filing of the suit. he had referred to the cause of action having arisen firstly on 8.11.68when he was served with the dismissal order and again on 20.5.6 9 when his appeal was finally rejected and then on 14.8.69 after the expiry of the period of the notice. there was also reference to the reversion of the plaintiff as ldc.then by seeking amendment of the plaint the plaintiff also claimed arrears of his salary. he calculated this amount at rs. 4,460.00 claiming difference between the subs pension allowance as a udc and ldc and then salary for the period from 9.11.68, to 238.69, that is from the date of dismissal to the institution of the suit. the plaintiff thus fully complied with the provisions of subsection (1) of section 53-b of the act. the notice in question explicitly stated the cause of action and the nature of relief sought and the name and place of residence of the plaintiff. the plaint also in effect contained a statement that notice as required had been left at the office of the defendant.the amount of compensation claimed was notice specifically given but then it is merely a question of arithmetic calculation. no fault can be found in the notice on that account. provisions of sub-section (1) of section 53-b are similar to section 80 of the code except that where in section 80 cause of action has to be stated, in section 53b(l) cause of action has to be stated 'explicitly.' i don't think the word 'explicitly' makes much difference,though in the present case i have held that notice did explicitly state the nature of cause of action it is not the case of the defendant that any prejudice was caused to it on the plaintiff's terming the notice as one under section 80 of the code or that the defendant was misled on that account. mentioning of a wrong section or non-mentioning of a section in the notice under which it is sent is not material unless any prejudice is shown to have been caused on that account. a bare reading of the notice in the present case shows that the defendant was left in no doubt as to who the plaintiff was and what he was claiming. notice has to be seen as a whole and so also the plaint.in the state of madras v. c.p. agencies and another : air1960sc1309 the supreme court following its earlier decision, in dhian singh sobha singh v.union of india : [1958]1scr781 on the interpretation of section 80 of the code observed that though the terms of that section should be strictly complied with but that did not mean that the terms of the notice should be scrutinized in a pedantic manner or in a manner completely divorced from commonsense. the court further observed as under :- 'the object of s. 80 is manifestly to give the government or the public officer sufficient notice of the case which is proposed to be brought against it or him so that it or he may consider the position and decide for itself or himself whether the claim of the plaintiff should be accepted or resisted. in order to enable the government or the public officer to arrive at a decision it is necessary that it or he should be informed of the nature of the suit proposed to be filed against it or him and the facts on which the claim is founded and the precise reliefs asked for.'(11) i, thereforee, do not find any fault in the notice and in my view it meets the requirements of sub-section (1) of section 53-b of the act(12) at this stage i may note that in the suit filed the plaintiff did not challenge the order in appeal dated 20.5.69, though in the body of the plain the did mention that the appeal was dismissed without giving any reasonable ground for the same. the plaintiff even mentioned that cause of action also arose on the rejection of the appeal. in the present appeal by an order dated19.11.84 goswamy, j. allowed the plaintiff to amend.his plaint to challenge both the orders of dismissal dated 8.11.68 and the order in appeal dated20.5.69. if reference is made to the plaint, this is how the plaintiff stated his challenge to the aforesaid two orders. '6.that the plaintiff had, categorically, pleaded not guilty upon which an enquiry was held and nothing was found against the plaintiff. however, the enquiry officer found the plaintiff guilty of carelessness by overlooking the alterations in the relevant dated and had suggested penalty but the same was also done minor prejudicially and without any reasons whatsoever. 7.that after the above said enquiry the plaintiff was served with a show cause notice dated 12/07/1968 by the vice chairman with new allegations which were held by the enquiry officer as not proved against the plaintiff of which the plaintiff had submitted a very satisfactory reply but of no avail. 8.that the plaintiff was served with dismissal orders dated 8/11/1968 by the vice chariman, delhi development authority surpassing all the bounds of justice and thus the plaintiff was dismissed from his services miserably without any reasonble ground and thus penalised him with the highest penalty provided in the law for the offence which the plaintiff never committed. 9.that the above said orders of the vice chairman are illegal ultra virus and without jurisdiction against the natural justice infringing the fundamental rights of the plaintiff enshrined in the constitution of india. 10.that the plaintiff filed an appeal against the above said illegal orders but the same was also dismissed without giving any reasonable ground for the same.'in the written statement the defendant denied all these allegations. it stated that show cause notice dated 12.7.68, as provided in the regulations,was issued by the vice chairman who was the competent authority and reply of the plaintiff dated 15.7.68 was duly considered and rightly rejected. it was then stated that orderofdismissalwasperfectlylegal,validandjustified. as regards appeal it was stated that it was rightly dismissed by the chairman of the defendant. in the replication the plaintiff added that in the inquiry made against him the penalty suggested by the inquiry officer was minor, though the same was also wrong, the defendant removed the plaintiff on the basis of findings of the inquiry which was beyond the limitations' of the inquiry report and no separate reasons were given whatsoever for the removal of the plaintiff from the service. (13) it will be thus seen that the plaintiff did not.state material facts and gave no particulars in the plaint. it is not that the inquiry was held in breach of the regulations or the procedure prescribed. the penalty was imposed after affording opportunity to the plaintiff of being heard. in the inquiry he cross examined the witnesses and also produced 3 witness in his defense. he fully participated in the inquiry proceedings. before imposing the penalty of dismissal the plaintiff was again heard. there are no grounds to suggest that the inquiry was motivated or the order imposing the penalty on him in any way malafide.it was also not stated that there was no evidence to bring charges home to the plaintiff or even that the evidence brought on record in the inquiry proceedings was not sufficient for the purpose of the charges against the plaintiff. this led mr. m.l. bhargava, learned counsel for the d.d.a. to contend that the plaintiff cannot travel beyond his pleadings and he cannot be heard on the points not stated in the pleadings. in short mr. bhargava said that the plaintiff could not make a new case outside the pleadings.(14) evidence in the suit primarily consists of documents. plaintiff examined himself only as a witness and the defendant also examined only onewitness, namely, mr. g.c. jain who was working at the relevant lime as administrative officer in dd.a. he merely stated that the promotion from ldc to udc was made first on temporary basis and if the work was found satisfactory and a permanent ost was available in the udc cadre, then case for permanent appointment was considered. the witness added that provisional appointment was just like a temporary appointment. the plaintiff in his statement proved various documents principally the show cause notice including articles of charge, report of the inquiry officer, order of dismissal,his appeal to the chairman, d.d.a. and the order rejecting his appeal. he was stated that he was never communicated any adverse remarks against him and that promotion to udc from ldc was on the basis of seniority unfitness and that his promotion as udc was not provisional. he also stated that his dismissal was wrong and that the department was prejudiced against him and that was why be was turned out. he also said that mr. c.l. sharma was earlier the auditor and that he had given a report against the plaintiff which was filed. there is no other evidence. the plaintiff did no bring on record the evidence recorded before the inquiry officer.(15) mr. g.d.gupta, learned counsel for the plaintiff, submitted that there was no evidence in-support of the first charge. he said no amount of suspicion could take the place of positive proof and that the authority could not action mere surmises and conjectures. he said that there was no evidence either direct or circumstantial to prove that it was the plaintiff who tampered with the papers. mr. gupta said that if charge (1) fell, other to charges which were inter-connected with the first charge also fell. it was also the contention ofmr. gupta that findings by the inquiry officer as well as the disciplinary authority were perverse. he said the plaintiff could at best be charged with negligence in the facts and circumstances of the case but then there was no charge of negligence. mr. gupta.also said that the entire attention of the plaintiff during the course of the inquiry was diverted to the first charge. he referred to the report of the inquiry officer (p-6/a) wherein he said that charges 2 and 3 were related and depended on the findings in respect of the first charge and for that reason the inquiry officer had dealt with all the three charges together in his report. mr. gupta contended that it was a case where principles of natural justice had been violated and the plaintiff was condemned unheard. mr. gupta also referred to a few reported decisions in support of his submissions.(16) i have set out the articles of charge above. under the public premises (eviction of unauthorised occupants) act, 1958d.d.a. assesses damages for unauthorised occupation of public premises. this order under sub-section (2) of section 7 of the aforesaid act is served on the person concerned in form-f. by resolution no. 202 the d.d.a. modified its earlier resolution and now allowed rebate of 10% on the amount paid by the encroacher who. made full payment of damages within sixty days from thedate of assessment or thirty days from the date of service of the assessmentorder, whichever was later. the duties of damage collector comprised of (i)service of form-f through the process server (ii) maintenance of assessment and recovery register, and (iii) realisation of damages after allowing rebate wherever due in the case of hosbiar singh form-f was handed over to the plaintiff by the assessment clerk on 29.4.66 who in turn gave it to dharampal, peon for service. service was effected on hoshiarsingion3.5.66dharampal handed over the form-f after service to the plaintiff on 11.5.66. the date 3.5.66 was subsequently changed to 23.6.66.plaintiff returned form-f to the assessment clerk on 30.5.66. it was thereforee,contended that the date. 23.6.66. was substituted after over by the plaintiff to the assessment clerk and he was, thereforee, not responsible for the interpolation. on the basis of form-f having been served on hoshiar singh on 23.6.66 the plaintiff allowed him rebate under resolution202 of the d.d.a. hoshiar singh made payment of rs. 790-97 on 14.7.66and was allowed rebate of rs. 87-88. the plaintiff came up with the plea that he got the date of service of form-f on hoshiar singh from the assessment clerk and he himself did not see form-f and it was for the assessment clerk to have pointed out ther interpolation in the date of service of form-f which was apparent even to a -naked eye. the disciplinary authority held that the date when form-f was graven to dharampal for service and the date on which it was returned after service to the plaintiff should have been noted by him in his register. the disciplinary authority was also of the view that since form-f was not in possession of the damage collector at the time of grant of rebate and he had failed to make an entry regarding the date of service in his register, he should have personally verified the date of service of the form before allowing the rebate. the damage collector should have also consulted the process server's register to ascertain the correct date of service. the authority was, thereforee, of the view that these factors constituted strong circumstantial evidence to prove that tampering and interpolation has been done by the plaintiff himself and if at all by someone else, then that was with the connivance and knowledge of the plaintiff. this, disciplinary authority held, was done in order to allow undue benefit to the assessed in the form of rebate. the disciplinary authority also observed that only the damage collector came in direct contact with the assessed when the latter makes the payment and the alteration in the date of service could not serve any motive of any other person forging the form. only the damage collector was to allow the rebate, in the case of the second assessed inder singh form-f was handed over the plaintiff by the assessment clerk on 5.2.66. he gave it to chote ram, process server for service. the service on inder singh was effected on 11.2.66. thereafter, the process server returned the form-f to the plaintiff. the date of service on this form was changed to 11.8.66. rebate of rs. 202-50 was allowed to inder singh by the plaintiff under resolution 202 of the d d.a. to which inder singh otherwise would not have been entitled if he was served of form-f on 11.2.66. after the date of service, i.e.,11.2.66, inder singh made the following payments which were received by the damage collector, i.e., the plaintiff :- date amount (rs.) 16.3.66200-00 19.5.66200-0030.6.66200-0023.8.66200-0026.8.66400-0026.8.66122-50 form-f relating to inder singh was returned to the assessment clerk on26.10,66, there was no reason why form-f should have remained with the plaintiff for all this period after service on inder singh. the explanationn of the plaintiff for having allowed rebate to inder sir.gh was the same as that in the case of hoshiar singh. the disciplinary authority observed that while the plaintiff as damage collector was repeatedly receiving payments for damages from inder singh, there was no valid reason why form-f could not have been served on inder singh during the months february 196 6/08/1966. the interpolated date of form-f relating to inder singh was 11 8 66.this is yet another factor in the case of inder singh all these were taken into account by the disciplinary authority to come to the conclusion that these constituted strong circumstantial evidence to prove that tampering and interpolation was done by the plaintiff himself and if at all by someone else then with the connivance and knowledge of the plaintiff. (17) i do not find any fault in the reasoning of the disciplinary authority for me to hold that findings are based on no legal evidence or that conclusion is one to which no reasonable man would come. the plaintiff, to my mind,was quite aware of what he was charged and what case he had to meet.penalty of 'dismissal was imposed on him after holding an inquiry under regulation 16 of the regulations and the plaintiff also availed of his right of appeal under regulation 22 as well. in the ground of appeal to the chairman,d.d.a., the plaintiff did not say that he was in any way misled or prejudiced in his case. his plea that date of service of form-f were given to him by the assessment clerk was obviously an after thought. no principles of natural justice have been violated in the present case and none have been alleged in the plaint to have been violated. to say in the plaint that principles of natural justice were violated without more is not enough. mr. bhargava is correct in his submission that there is no proper plea and no evidence to hold that the plaintiff had been found guilty of a matter of which he was not charged or that the order of his dismissal was arrived at in violation of principles of natural justice or was otherwise untenable in law. the court has to go by the pleadings and evidence on record. to my mind the inquiry has been properly held. the departmental authorities are the sole judges of facts and as observed by the supreme court in state of andhra pradesh v. sreerama rao : (1964)iillj150sc 'if there become legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is nota matter which can be permitted to be canvassed be fore the high court in a proceeding for a writ under article 226 of the constitution.'i may also refer to another decision of the supreme court in r.c. sharma v. union of india and others : air1976sc2037 . this .appeal had arisen out of a suit filed by the appellant challenging his reversion from the post of an income-tax officer to that of income-tax inspector. one of the arguments was that the evidence before the inquiring officer did not support the charges leveled against the.appellant. it was also contended that the appellant was not given a reasonable opportunity to lead evidence and to be heard. the court observed that this was largely a question of fact and it was only when an opportunity denied was of such a nature that contravened a mandatory provision of law ora rule of natural justice that the denial it could vitiate the whole departmentaltrial. prejudice to the government servant resulting from an alleged violation of a rule must be proved. the court also observed that unless the exclusion of evidence of a kind which amounted to a denial of natural justice or would have affected the final decision it could not be said to be material. the court then observed as under :- 'a suit challenging the validity of departmental proceedings cannot be treated as an appeal from the findings in the departmental proceedings or the punishment inflicted upon the govt. servant even if these are erroneous. a question which could affect the result in a civil suit has to be of such a nature that it goes to the root of the jurisdiction and the conduct of the departmental trial and vitiates the result. it is only if the departmental proceeding is null and void that a plaintiff in such a suit could obtain .the reliefs he has askedfor. we are unable to see what point had been raised by the appellant which could have had that effect upon the departmentalproceedings.'(18) in the present case there is no pleading and no evidence thereon to hold that the impugned order is null and void. regulation 16 prescribes detailed procedure for holding of an inquiry against a delinquent officer. it isnot necessary to set out the regulation which contains various sub-rules. buti would say that it incorporates all the relevant principles of natural justice.it is not the case of the plaintiff that any of the rules pertaining to the inquiry has been contravened in the present case. this court is not sitting in appeal from the findings of the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority.evidence which was led before the inquiring officer has not been brought on record in the present suit. the statutory authorities have acted within the regulations and there could be no challenge to their action. i am quite aware that pleadings are not to be construed strictly or examined minutely, but then the rules relating to pleadings cannot be given a complete go-by. the court cannot look beyond the pleadings when examined as a whole and the evidence in support of the pleadings. it appears to me that all the relevant facts hadbeen examined by the disciplinary authority and the impugned orders cannot be said to be illegal or invalid on any of the submissions made by the plaintiff.because of the view which i nave taken, it is not necessary for me to refer to other judgment cited at the bar though those were mostly rendered with reference to the provisions of article 226 of the constitution.(19) the appeal, thereforee, fails and is dismissed. since the matter has been pending in court all this period, i will not like to burden the appellant with costs.