Sh. R.K. Singla Vs. Punjab National Bank and anr. - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citationsooperkanoon.com/685971
SubjectService
CourtDelhi High Court
Decided OnFeb-27-2002
Case NumberCivil Writ Petition No. 5055/2001
Judge Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.
Reported in2002VIAD(Delhi)250; 97(2002)DLT297; 2002(62)DRJ293; [2002(94)FLR1053]; (2002)IILLJ716Del
ActsIndian Penal Code (IPC), 1860 - Sections 120B, 209, 228, 350, 406, 409, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 477A; Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973 - Sections 228, 240, 246 and 253; Army Act; Army Rules
AppellantSh. R.K. Singla
RespondentPunjab National Bank and anr.
Appellant Advocate Bharat Bhushan,; Harish Sharma and; B.R. Saini, Advs
Respondent Advocate Rajat Arora, Adv.
DispositionPetition dismissed
Cases ReferredIn Union of India and Ors. v. Major General Madan Lal Yadav
Excerpt:
bipartite settlement - clause 19.4--expression 'put on trial'--purpose of the clause itself has to be considered--initial portion, makes it clear that in case the employee is not put on trial within a year of the commission of the offence--management may deal with him as if he has committed gross misconduct--delay in trial--departmental proceedings should not be delayed--'put on trial' has to be interpreted, and must apply where charges are framed. ; the expression ''put on trial' has to be read with the object that normally departmental proceedings should not be delayed because of the pendency of criminal case. the bipartite settlement in fact is limited to the extent as it is provided in para 19.4 of the said settlement. the fir in the present case was lodged as far back as on 10.3.1998 and more than four years have been lapsed. if the expression 'put on trial' is interpreted to imply that no departmental proceedings can take place even without framing of charges, the departmental proceedings will be brought to a stand still. thus i am of the considered view that the expression 'put on trial' has to be interpreted in context of the judgment of the supreme court in common cause case (supra) and must apply where charges are framed. - - this is precisely what judicial opinion holds. so far as criminal cases are concerned, it is well known that they drag on endlessly where high officials or persons holding high public offices are involved. if a criminal case is unduly delayed that may itself be a good ground for going ahead with the disciplinary enquiry even where the disciplinary proceedings are held over at an earlier stage. the interests of administration and good government demand that these proceedings are concluded expeditiously. the displinary proceedings are meant not really to punish the guilty but to keep the administrative machinery unsullied by getting rid of bad elements. disciplinary proceedings are not meant to punish the guilty but to keep the administrative machinery unsullied and get rid of bad elements and thus it is in the interest of delinquent employee to have a prompt conclusion of disciplinary proceedings. decided on 5th february, 2002 and it has been held that by their very nature the disciplinary proceedings and criminal proceedings operate in different fields and good administration requires the disciplinary proceedings to be concluded expeditiously.sanjay kishan kaul, j.1. the meaning and connotation of the expression 'put on trial' with reference to the simultaneous continuation of departmental and criminal proceedings has given birth to this judgment.2. the petitioner is an employee of the punjab national bank (respondent bank) and was last posted in the rani bagh branch before the transfer to the regional office, north delhi. soon thereafter the petitioner was placed under suspension in march 1998 in contemplation of disciplinary action against him by the respondent.3. the bank thereafter lodged an fir under sections 406/409/420/468/471/477-a/120-b of the ipc.4. respondent no. 1 issued a charge sheet dated 8.1.2001 with the object to initiate departmental proceedings against the petitioner. the petitioner pleaded not guilty and thereafter departmental enquiry was constituted with respondent no. 2 as an enquiry officer. the petitioner took objection to the departmental proceedings in view of clause 19.4 of the first bipartite settlement between the employees and the management of the respondent bank. the said clause is as under:'19.4 if after steps have been taken to prosecute an employee or to get him prosecuted, for an offence, he is not put on trial within a year of the commission of the offence, the management may then deal with him as if he had committed an act of 'gross misconduct' or of 'minor misconduct' as defined below; provided that if the authority which was to start prosecution proceedings refuses to do so or come to the conclusion that there is no case for prosecution it shall be open to the management to proceed against the employee under the provisions set out below in clauses 19.11 and 19.12 infra relating to discharge, but he shall deemed to have been on duty during the period of suspension, if any, and shall be entitled to the full wages and allowances and to all other privileges for such period. in the even of the management deciding, after enquiry, not to continue him in service, he shall be liable only for termination with three months' pay and allowances in lieu of notice as provided in clause 19.3 supra. if within the pendency of the proceedings thus instituted he is put on trial such proceedings shall be stayed pending the completion of trial after which the provisions mentioned in clause 19.3 above shall apply.5. it is thus apparent from the reading of the aforesaid clause that departmental proceedings may continue if an employee is not put on trial within a year of the commission of the offence. it is further provided that if within the pendency of the departmental proceedings an employee is put on trial then such proceedings shall be stayed pending completion of trial.6. in view of the aforesaid fact the only question to be considered is the meaning of the expression 'put on trial' as used in para 19.4 of the bipartite settlement. learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that since criminal proceedings have been initiated, the petitioner should be treated as having been put on trial. learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the expression 'put on trial' means where a prosecution decide to put a person on trial. on the other hand learned counsel for respondent contends that the meaning of 'put on trial' as used in clause 19.4 is where charges are framed against such person and till such time charges are framed the person cannot be stated to be put on trial. learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to the judgment of the allahabad high court in ram jeet v. the state, : air1958all439 in support of his contention. para 9 of the said judgment is as under:'this is precisely what judicial opinion holds. a division bench of the calcutta high court in jiban molla v. emperor : air1933cal551 , held that the word 'trial' has no fixed or universal meaning and must be construed with regard to the particular context in which it is used and with regard to the scheme and purpose of the measure concerned. this was approved by the federal court in piare dusadh v. emperor . the decision of the madras high court in venkatachennaya v. emperor air 1920 mad 337 , and of this court in inayat v. rex : air1950all369 (e) subscribe to the same view. it is thereforee evident that 'trial' in the code was not intended by the legislature to have a constant meaning and that the meaning has to be determined in the context and intendment of each individual section in which the terms is found used.'7. thus in terms of the aforesaid observations the word 'trial' has no fixed or universal meaning and has to be understood in the context in which it is used.8. learned counsel for the petitioner also referred to the judgment reported as dagdu govindset v. punja vedu, air 1937 bom 55, where it has been held that the expression 'trial has always been understood to mean the proceedings which commence when the case is called on with the magistrate on the bench, the accused in the dock and the representatives of the prosecution and defense, if the accused be defended, present in court for the hearing of the case'.9. it may also be stated that in the said judgment it has been noted that the lahore high court has also held that for the purpose of section 350 of the code a trial cannot be said to commence only when a charge is framed as the trial covers the whole of the proceedings in a warrant case. but a different view was taken by the madras high court in sriramulu v. veerasalingam, air 1915 mad 23 that in warrant case the trail only commences from the framing of charge.10. learned counsel also referred to the judgment of the supreme court in union of india and others v. major general madan lal yadav, : [1996]3scr785 where the expression 'trial commences' in the context of army act and the army rules were considered. it was held that trial commences the moment the gcm assembles for proceedings with the trial. the supreme court while considering the provisions of the code observed as under:'it is settled law that under the said code trial commence the moment cognizance of the offence is taken and process is issued to the accused for his appearance etc.. equally at a sessions trial, the court considers the committal order under section 209 by the magistrate and proceeds further. it takes cognizance of the offence from that stage and proceeds with the trial. the trial begins with the taking of the cognizance of the offence and taking further steps to conduct the trial.'11. learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand referred to the judgment of the supreme court in common cause v. union of india & others, 1997 1 c.l.r. 6 whereby phrase 'pendency of trial' was considered and the supreme court observed as under:'11. the phrase 'pendency of trials' as employed in paragraphs from 1(a) to 1(c) and the phrase 'none-commencement of trial' as employed in paragraphs from 2(b) to 2(f) shall be construed as under :(i) in cases of trials before sessions court the trials shall be treated to have commenced when charges are framed under section 228 of the code of criminal procedure, 1973 in the concerned cases.(ii) in case of trials of warrant cases by magistrates if the cases are instituted upon police reports the trials shall be treated to have commenced when charges are framed under section 240 of the code of criminal procedure, 1973 while in trials of warrant cases by magistrates when cases are instituted otherwise than one on police reports such trials shall be treated to have commenced when charges are framed against the concerned accused under section 246 of the code of criminal procedure, 1973.(iii) in cases of trials of summons cases by magistrates the trials would be considered to have commenced when the accused who appear or are brought before the magistrate are asked under section 253 whether they plead guilty or have any defense to make.'12. learned counsel for the respondent thus contends that in view of the aforesaid latest pronouncement by the supreme court, it is apparent that the case of trial before the sessions court the trial shall be treated to have commenced when charges are framed. learned counsel for the respondent further states that the expression in question has also to be interpreted keeping in view that the scope of departmental proceedings and criminal proceedings are quite difference. learned counsel referred to the judgment of the supreme court in state of rajasthan v. b.k. menna and ors., : (1997)illj746sc , to contend that it could not be the intention of bipartite settlement that in case of criminal proceedings the departmental proceedings shall not commence. learned counsel referred to the observation of the supreme court in para 14 which is as under :'one of the contending consideration is that the disciplinary enquiry cannot be and should not be - delayed unduly. so far as criminal cases are concerned, it is well known that they drag on endlessly where high officials or persons holding high public offices are involved. they get bogged down on one or the other ground. they hardly ever reach a prompt conclusion. that is the reality in spite of repeated advise and admonitions from this court and the high courts. if a criminal case is unduly delayed that may itself be a good ground for going ahead with the disciplinary enquiry even where the disciplinary proceedings are held over at an earlier stage. the interests of administration and good government demand that these proceedings are concluded expeditiously. it must be remembered that interests of administration demand that undesirable elements are thrown out and any charge of misdemeanor is enquired into promptly. the displinary proceedings are meant not really to punish the guilty but to keep the administrative machinery unsullied by getting rid of bad elements. the interest of the delinquent officer also lies in a prompt conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings. if he is not guilty of the charges, his honour should be vindicated at the earliest possible moment and if he is guilty, he should be dealt with promptly according to law. it is not also in the interest of administration that persons accused of serious misdemeanor should be continued in office indefinitely, i.e. for long periods awaiting the result of criminal proceedings. it is not in the interest of administration. it only serves the interest of the guilty and dishonest. while it is not possible to enumerate the various factors, for and against the stay of disciplinary proceedings, we found it necessary to emphasis some of the important consideration in view of the fact that very often the disciplinary proceedings are being stayed for long periods pending criminal proceedings. stay of disciplinary proceedings cannot be, and should not be, a matter of course. all the relevant factors, for and against, should be weighed and a decision taken keeping in view the various principles laid down in the decisions referred to above.'13. i have heard the learned counsel for he parties. in order to appreciate the expression used in the clause 'put on trial' the purpose of the said clause itself has to be considered. the initial portion of the clause makes it clear that in case the employee is not put on trial within a year of the commission of the offence the management may deal with him as if he has committed gross misconduct as defined therein. thus the purpose of initial clause is that where there is delay in putting an employee on trial, the departmental proceedings should not be delayed. it is further provided that where during the pendency of such proceedings if person is put on trial. such proceedings shall be stayed pending the completion of trial. the object is thus clear i.e. departmental proceedings must proceed expeditiously but in case the trial begins then the employee should not be compelled to defend both the proceedings simultaneously.14. the supreme court in state of rajasthan v. b.k. meena case (supra) and in subsequents judgments has clarified the scope and ambit of departmental and criminal proceedings holding the said two proceedings operate in two different fields. disciplinary proceedings are not meant to punish the guilty but to keep the administrative machinery unsullied and get rid of bad elements and thus it is in the interest of delinquent employee to have a prompt conclusion of disciplinary proceedings. the object of the criminal proceedings is to punish. the supreme court has noted the problem of delays in criminal proceedings and has observed that the departmental proceedings cannot be postponed till such date as the criminal proceedings conclude.15. in capt. m. paulanthony v. bharat gold mines ltd. and anr., : (1999)illj1094sc , the supreme court observed that proceedings in a criminal case and the departmental proceedings can proceed simultaneously with a little exception as they operate in distinct and different jurisdictional areas. it was observed that whereas in the departmental proceedings the factors operating in the mind of disciplinary authority may be many such as enforcement of discipline or to investigate the level of integrity of the delinquent or the other staff, the standard of proof required in criminal case requires the charge to be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. this view was reiterated in depot manager a.p. state roadways transport corporation v. mohd. yousuf miya and ors., : (1997)iillj902sc . all these judgments have been considered in cw 852/2002 - shri prahma prakash kalra v. national thermal power corporation and ors. decided on 5th february, 2002 and it has been held that by their very nature the disciplinary proceedings and criminal proceedings operate in different fields and good administration requires the disciplinary proceedings to be concluded expeditiously. thus clause 19.4 of the bipartite settlement is in fact an exception to this normal rule.16. in ram jeet v. the state case (supra) cited by learned counsel for the petitioner, it has been stated that the word trial has no fixed or universal meaning and must be construed with regard to the particular context in which it is used. thus applying the ratio of ram jeet case (supra), the expression has to be considered taking into consideration the purpose of clause where this expression has been used. in union of india and ors. v. major general madan lal yadav case (supra) the supreme court was concerned with the expression 'trial commences' and was of the view that the trial commences the moment the cognizance is taken in terms of the code. this was in the context of the army act. however, in the subsequent judgments of the supreme court in common cause case (supra) it has been noted that a trial should be treated to have commenced when charges are framed under section 228 of the code. this is also the view of the madras high court in sriramulu case (supra).17. i am thus of the considered view that the expression 'put on trial' has to be read with the object that normally departmental proceedings should not be delayed because of the pendency of criminal case. the bipartite settlement in fact is limited to the extent as it is provided in para 19.4 of the said settlement. the fir in the present case was lodged as far back as on 10.3.1998 and more than four years have been lapsed. if the expression 'put on trial' is interpreted to imply that no departmental proceedings can take place even without framing of charges, the departmental proceedings will be brought to a stand still. thus i am of the considered view that the expression 'put on trial' has to be interpreted in context of the judgment of the supreme court in common cause case (supra) and must apply where charges are framed.18. in view of the aforesaid interpretation the expression 'put on trial' there could be no impediment in the continuation of the departmental proceedings by the respondents.19. the writ petition is thus dismissed. interim orders passed on 23rd august, 2001 stand vacated. it is however, made clear that in case charges are framed, clause 19.4 of settlement would come in to play and further departmental proceedings would be liable to be stayed.parties are left to bear their own costs.
Judgment:

Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.

1. The meaning and connotation of the expression 'put on trial' with reference to the simultaneous continuation of Departmental and criminal proceedings has given birth to this judgment.

2. The petitioner is an employee of the Punjab National Bank (respondent bank) and was last posted in the Rani Bagh Branch before the transfer to the Regional Office, North Delhi. Soon thereafter the petitioner was placed under suspension in March 1998 in contemplation of disciplinary action against him by the respondent.

3. The Bank thereafter lodged an FIR under Sections 406/409/420/468/471/477-A/120-B of the IPC.

4. Respondent No. 1 issued a charge sheet dated 8.1.2001 with the object to initiate departmental proceedings against the petitioner. The petitioner pleaded not guilty and thereafter departmental enquiry was constituted with respondent No. 2 as an enquiry officer. The petitioner took objection to the departmental proceedings in view of clause 19.4 of the First Bipartite Settlement between the employees and the Management of the respondent bank. The said clause is as under:

'19.4 If after steps have been taken to prosecute an employee or to get him prosecuted, for an offence, he is not put on trial within a year of the commission of the offence, the management may then deal with him as if he had committed an act of 'gross misconduct' or of 'minor misconduct' as defined below; provided that if the authority which was to start prosecution proceedings refuses to do so or come to the conclusion that there is no case for prosecution it shall be open to the management to proceed against the employee under the provisions set out below in Clauses 19.11 and 19.12 infra relating to discharge, but he shall deemed to have been on duty during the period of suspension, if any, and shall be entitled to the full wages and allowances and to all other privileges for such period. In the even of the management deciding, after enquiry, not to continue him in service, he shall be liable only for termination with three months' pay and allowances in lieu of notice as provided in Clause 19.3 supra. If within the pendency of the proceedings thus instituted he is put on trial such proceedings shall be stayed pending the completion of trial after which the provisions mentioned in Clause 19.3 above shall apply.

5. It is thus apparent from the reading of the aforesaid clause that departmental proceedings may continue if an employee is not put on trial within a year of the commission of the offence. It is further provided that if within the pendency of the departmental proceedings an employee is put on trial then such proceedings shall be stayed pending completion of trial.

6. In view of the aforesaid fact the only question to be considered is the meaning of the expression 'put on trial' as used in para 19.4 of the Bipartite settlement. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that since criminal proceedings have been initiated, the petitioner should be treated as having been put on trial. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the expression 'put on trial' means where a prosecution decide to put a person on trial. On the other hand learned counsel for respondent contends that the meaning of 'put on trial' as used in clause 19.4 is where charges are framed against such person and till such time charges are framed the person cannot be stated to be put on trial. Learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Ram Jeet v. The State, : AIR1958All439 in support of his contention. Para 9 of the said judgment is as under:

'This is precisely what judicial opinion holds. A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Jiban Molla v. Emperor : AIR1933Cal551 , held that the word 'trial' has no fixed or universal meaning and must be construed with regard to the particular context in which it is used and with regard to the scheme and purpose of the measure concerned. This was approved by the Federal Court in Piare Dusadh v. Emperor . The decision of the Madras High Court in Venkatachennaya V. Emperor AIR 1920 Mad 337 , and of this Court in Inayat v. Rex : AIR1950All369 (E) subscribe to the same view. It is thereforee evident that 'trial' in the Code was not intended by the Legislature to have a constant meaning and that the meaning has to be determined in the context and intendment of each individual section in which the terms is found used.'

7. Thus in terms of the aforesaid observations the word 'trial' has no fixed or universal meaning and has to be understood in the context in which it is used.

8. Learned counsel for the petitioner also referred to the judgment reported as Dagdu Govindset v. Punja Vedu, AIR 1937 Bom 55, where it has been held that the expression 'trial has always been understood to mean the proceedings which commence when the case is called on with the Magistrate on the Bench, the accused in the dock and the representatives of the prosecution and defense, if the accused be defended, present in Court for the hearing of the case'.

9. It may also be stated that in the said judgment it has been noted that the Lahore High Court has also held that for the purpose of Section 350 of the Code a trial cannot be said to commence only when a charge is framed as the trial covers the whole of the proceedings in a warrant case. But a different view was taken by the Madras High Court in Sriramulu v. Veerasalingam, AIR 1915 Mad 23 that in warrant case the trail only commences from the framing of charge.

10. Learned counsel also referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India and Others v. Major General Madan Lal Yadav, : [1996]3SCR785 where the expression 'trial commences' in the context of Army Act and the Army Rules were considered. It was held that trial commences the moment the GCM assembles for proceedings with the trial. The Supreme Court while considering the provisions of the Code observed as under:

'It is settled law that under the said Code trial commence the moment cognizance of the offence is taken and process is issued to the accused for his appearance etc.. Equally at a sessions trial, the court considers the committal order under Section 209 by the Magistrate and proceeds further. It takes cognizance of the offence from that stage and proceeds with the trial. The trial begins with the taking of the cognizance of the offence and taking further steps to conduct the trial.'

11. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Common Cause v. Union of India & Others, 1997 1 C.L.R. 6 whereby phrase 'pendency of trial' was considered and the Supreme Court observed as under:

'11. The phrase 'pendency of trials' as employed in paragraphs from 1(a) to 1(c) and the phrase 'none-commencement of trial' as employed in paragraphs from 2(b) to 2(f) shall be construed as under :

(i) In cases of trials before Sessions Court the trials shall be treated to have commenced when charges are framed under Section 228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in the concerned cases.

(ii) In case of trials of warrant cases by magistrates if the cases are instituted upon police reports the trials shall be treated to have commenced when charges are framed under Section 240 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 while in trials of warrant cases by magistrates when cases are instituted otherwise than one on police reports such trials shall be treated to have commenced when charges are framed against the concerned accused under Section 246 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

(iii) In cases of trials of summons cases by magistrates the trials would be considered to have commenced when the accused who appear or are brought before the magistrate are asked under Section 253 whether they plead guilty or have any defense to make.'

12. Learned counsel for the respondent thus contends that in view of the aforesaid latest pronouncement by the Supreme Court, it is apparent that the case of trial before the Sessions Court the trial shall be treated to have commenced when charges are framed. Learned counsel for the respondent further states that the expression in question has also to be interpreted keeping in view that the scope of departmental proceedings and criminal proceedings are quite difference. Learned counsel referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v. B.K. Menna and Ors., : (1997)ILLJ746SC , to contend that it could not be the intention of Bipartite settlement that in case of criminal proceedings the departmental proceedings shall not commence. Learned counsel referred to the observation of the Supreme Court in para 14 which is as under :

'One of the contending consideration is that the disciplinary enquiry cannot be and should not be - delayed unduly. So far as criminal cases are concerned, it is well known that they drag on endlessly where high officials or persons holding high public offices are involved. They get bogged down on one or the other ground. They hardly ever reach a prompt conclusion. That is the reality in spite of repeated advise and admonitions from this Court and the High Courts. If a criminal case is unduly delayed that may itself be a good ground for going ahead with the disciplinary enquiry even where the disciplinary proceedings are held over at an earlier stage. The interests of administration and good Government demand that these proceedings are concluded expeditiously. It must be remembered that interests of administration demand that undesirable elements are thrown out and any charge of misdemeanor is enquired into promptly. The displinary proceedings are meant not really to punish the guilty but to keep the administrative machinery unsullied by getting rid of bad elements. The interest of the delinquent officer also lies in a prompt conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings. If he is not guilty of the charges, his honour should be vindicated at the earliest possible moment and if he is guilty, he should be dealt with promptly according to law. It is not also in the interest of administration that persons accused of serious misdemeanor should be continued in office indefinitely, i.e. for long periods awaiting the result of criminal proceedings. It is not in the interest of administration. It only serves the interest of the guilty and dishonest. While it is not possible to enumerate the various factors, for and against the stay of disciplinary proceedings, we found it necessary to emphasis some of the important consideration in view of the fact that very often the disciplinary proceedings are being stayed for long periods pending criminal proceedings. Stay of disciplinary proceedings cannot be, and should not be, a matter of course. All the relevant factors, for and against, should be weighed and a decision taken keeping in view the various principles laid down in the decisions referred to above.'

13. I have heard the learned counsel for he parties. In order to appreciate the expression used in the clause 'put on trial' the purpose of the said clause itself has to be considered. The initial portion of the clause makes it clear that in case the employee is not put on trial within a year of the commission of the offence the Management may deal with him as if he has committed gross misconduct as defined therein. Thus the purpose of initial clause is that where there is delay in putting an employee on trial, the departmental proceedings should not be delayed. It is further provided that where during the pendency of such proceedings if person is put on trial. Such proceedings shall be stayed pending the completion of trial. The object is thus clear i.e. departmental proceedings must proceed expeditiously but in case the trial begins then the employee should not be compelled to defend both the proceedings simultaneously.

14. The Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v. B.K. Meena case (supra) and in subsequents judgments has clarified the scope and ambit of departmental and criminal proceedings holding the said two proceedings operate in two different fields. Disciplinary proceedings are not meant to punish the guilty but to keep the administrative machinery unsullied and get rid of bad elements and thus it is in the interest of delinquent employee to have a prompt conclusion of disciplinary proceedings. The object of the criminal proceedings is to punish. The Supreme Court has noted the problem of delays in criminal proceedings and has observed that the departmental proceedings cannot be postponed till such date as the criminal proceedings conclude.

15. In Capt. M. Paulanthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. and Anr., : (1999)ILLJ1094SC , the Supreme Court observed that proceedings in a criminal case and the departmental proceedings can proceed simultaneously with a little exception as they operate in distinct and different jurisdictional areas. It was observed that whereas in the departmental proceedings the factors operating in the mind of disciplinary authority may be many such as enforcement of discipline or to investigate the level of integrity of the delinquent or the other staff, the standard of proof required in criminal case requires the charge to be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. This view was reiterated in Depot Manager A.P. State Roadways Transport Corporation v. Mohd. Yousuf Miya and Ors., : (1997)IILLJ902SC . All these judgments have been considered in CW 852/2002 - Shri Prahma Prakash Kalra v. National Thermal Power Corporation and Ors. decided on 5th February, 2002 and it has been held that by their very nature the disciplinary proceedings and criminal proceedings operate in different fields and good administration requires the disciplinary proceedings to be concluded expeditiously. Thus Clause 19.4 of the Bipartite Settlement is in fact an exception to this normal rule.

16. In Ram Jeet v. The State case (supra) cited by learned counsel for the petitioner, it has been stated that the word trial has no fixed or universal meaning and must be construed with regard to the particular context in which it is used. Thus applying the ratio of Ram Jeet case (supra), the expression has to be considered taking into consideration the purpose of clause where this expression has been used. In Union of India and Ors. v. Major General Madan Lal Yadav case (supra) the Supreme Court was concerned with the expression 'trial commences' and was of the view that the trial commences the moment the cognizance is taken in terms of the code. This was in the context of the Army Act. However, in the subsequent judgments of the Supreme Court in Common Cause case (supra) it has been noted that a trial should be treated to have commenced when charges are framed under Section 228 of the Code. This is also the view of the Madras High Court in Sriramulu Case (supra).

17. I am thus of the considered view that the expression 'put on trial' has to be read with the object that normally departmental proceedings should not be delayed because of the pendency of criminal case. The bipartite settlement in fact is limited to the extent as it is provided in para 19.4 of the said settlement. The FIR in the present case was lodged as far back as on 10.3.1998 and more than four years have been lapsed. If the expression 'put on trial' is interpreted to imply that no departmental proceedings can take place even without framing of charges, the departmental proceedings will be brought to a stand still. Thus I am of the considered view that the expression 'put on trial' has to be interpreted in context of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Common Cause case (supra) and must apply where charges are framed.

18. In view of the aforesaid interpretation the expression 'put on trial' there could be no impediment in the continuation of the departmental proceedings by the respondents.

19. The writ petition is thus dismissed. Interim orders passed on 23rd August, 2001 stand vacated. It is however, made clear that in case charges are framed, Clause 19.4 of settlement would come in to play and further departmental proceedings would be liable to be stayed.

Parties are left to bear their own costs.