T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad Vs. Union of India (Uoi) and ors. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- state as a litigant/party; constitution of india : [c.k.thakker & d.k. jain, jj] held, it is the duty of state/public authority to place entire facts before court for appropriate decision. where in the matter in question the state filed interim applications before the tribunal concerned and orders were passed thereon, the state ought to have placed all the said facts before the supreme court during hearing of the matter by it. -- inter state river water disputes act, 1956. sections 5 & 11: inter-state river water dispute - invocation of jurisdiction under articles 32,226 or 131 of constitution of india for adjudication of writ petition by way of pil filed by residents of mahabubnagar district of state of andhra pradesh, challenging sanction granted by the state of karnataka for construction of a mini hydel power project at rajolibanda diversion scheme (rds), raichur district, karnataka - held, article 262 of the constitution deals with adjudication of disputes relating to waters of inter-state rivers or river valleys. it is an enabling provision and empowers parliament to enact a law providing for adjudication of such disputes or complaints, excluding the jurisdiction of all courts including the supreme court. in exercise of power under article 262 of the constitution, parliament enacted the inter-state river water disputes act, 1956. in the light of the scheme as envisaged by the makers of the constitution as also by parliament under the 1956 act in connection with the water disputes between states, it is clear that such disputes cannot be made the subject-matter of the petition either in a high court under article 226 or in the supreme court under article 32 of the constitution. further, article 131 of the constitution which enables the central government or a state government to institute a suit in the supreme court on its original side in certain cases also cannot be invoked in inter-state water disputes in view of section 11 of the 1956 act. the provisions of article 131 of the constitution have to be construed harmoniously subject to the provisions of article 262 of the constitution. the inter-state river water dispute is covered by article 262 of the constitution and should be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the 1956 act and it cannot be challenged in any court including the supreme court. the submission of the petitioners that the bar envisaged under section 11 of the 1956 act would not cover cases of private individuals appsroaching the supreme court as pro bono public, and its application is limited only to states, has no force and is thus rejected. what is contemplated by the 1956 act is to look into, to protect and to safeguard interests of the state as also of its subjects and citizens. precisely for that reason, section 3 thereof has been worded widely. it provides for constitution of a tribunal for adjudication by the central government on a dispute raised or complaint made by any state that interest of the state or any of the inhabitants thereof has been prejudicially affected or is likely to be affected. therefore, the preliminary objections raised on behalf of the contesting respondents are well founded and are required to be upheld. the present writ petition is held to be not maintainable in view of the aforesaid reasons and also having regard to the fact that the issue raised herein is pending before the tribunal constituted under the inter-state river water disputes act, 1956 and the matter is sub judice. order1. this is an application by the learned amicus curiae seeking clarification in relation to the working of the high power committee which was constituted by this court.2. the first clarification which is sought is with regard to the orders passed by the high power committee (hpc) imposing a penalty based on actual adjudication at the behest of the units even if it results in the imposition of penalty larger than the penalty originally imposed. the question is whether such a penalty and/or additional penalty which is imposed on the basis of the documents produced by the units is valid and permissible.3. the hpc fixed normal recovery norms after obtaining data and expert advice from different sources. the norms so fixed showed as to how much veneer etc. could be recovered from the timber and it is on that basis that it proceeded to examine the records of the different units and then determined whether there has been excess production indicating use of illegal timber and thereby justifying imposition of penalty and/or additional penalty.4. after hearing the learned counsel for the parties, we are in agreement with the norms adopted by the hpc. we also hold that on the basis of the documents and records produced by the units, the hpc was and would be entitled to impose penalty larger than the penalty originally imposed, as long as this penalty is based on the records so produced.5. a question has arisen with regard to cases where orders had not been made by the hpc on or before 15th january, 1998. this court's order dated december 1996 had contemplated documents being filed and orders being passed by 15th january, 1998 it is possible that due to volume of work, the hpc may not have been able to pass orders by 15th january, 1998 even though papers and other relevant material had been submitted to the hpc by that date. we, therefore, make it clear that the hpc would be entitled to look into the records and pass orders in every case, where documents and material had been placed before the hpc by 15th january, 1998. we further make it clear that wherever any penalty and/or additional penalty has been imposed by the hpc, the unit concerned will have a right to approach the hpc to examine the matter afresh. in modification of paragraph 14 of the order of december 1996, we permit any unit in respect of which penalty and/or additional penalty has been levied by the hpc to approach the hpc for reconsideration on the basis of the material which it may choose to produce provided such provided such a request is made by the unit within one month of the passing of the order by the hpc or, in those cases where orders have already been passed, within one month from today.6. inasmuch as the hpc would in effect be discharging quasi-judicial functions, it will be appropriate that the hpc may briefly indicate the reasons in support of the order passed by it.7. it is further clarified that wherever the hpc has given clearance to a unit after 9th february, 1998, the unit will be entitled to relocation.8. it is, however, made clear that no unit which had not furnished the record and particulars before 15th january, 1998, will be entitled to the benefit of this order.9. this i.a. stands disposed of.

Judgment:
ORDER

1. This is an application by the learned Amicus Curiae seeking clarification in relation to the working of the High Power Committee which was constituted by this Court.

2. The first clarification which is sought is with regard to the orders passed by the High Power Committee (HPC) imposing a penalty based on actual adjudication at the behest of the units even if it results in the imposition of penalty larger than the penalty originally imposed. The question is whether such a penalty and/or additional penalty which is imposed on the basis of the documents produced by the units is valid and permissible.

3. The HPC fixed normal recovery norms after obtaining data and expert advice from different sources. The norms so fixed showed as to how much veneer etc. could be recovered from the timber and it is on that basis that it proceeded to examine the records of the different units and then determined whether there has been excess production indicating use of illegal timber and thereby justifying imposition of penalty and/or additional penalty.

4. After hearing the learned Counsel for the parties, we are in agreement with the norms adopted by the HPC. We also hold that on the basis of the documents and records produced by the units, the HPC was and would be entitled to impose penalty larger than the penalty originally imposed, as long as this penalty is based on the records so produced.

5. A question has arisen with regard to cases where orders had not been made by the HPC on or before 15th January, 1998. This Court's order dated December 1996 had contemplated documents being filed and orders being passed by 15th January, 1998 It is possible that due to volume of work, the HPC may not have been able to pass orders by 15th January, 1998 even though papers and other relevant material had been submitted to the HPC by that date. We, therefore, make it clear that the HPC would be entitled to look into the records and pass orders in every case, where documents and material had been placed before the HPC by 15th January, 1998. We further make it clear that wherever any penalty and/or additional penalty has been imposed by the HPC, the unit concerned will have a right to approach the HPC to examine the matter afresh. In modification of paragraph 14 of the order of December 1996, we permit any unit in respect of which penalty and/or additional penalty has been levied by the HPC to approach the HPC for reconsideration on the basis of the material which it may choose to produce provided such provided such a request is made by the unit within one month of the passing of the order by the HPC or, in those cases where orders have already been passed, within one month from today.

6. Inasmuch as the HPC would in effect be discharging quasi-judicial functions, it will be appropriate that the HPC may briefly indicate the reasons in support of the order passed by it.

7. It is further clarified that wherever the HPC has given clearance to a unit after 9th February, 1998, the unit will be entitled to relocation.

8. It is, however, made clear that no unit which had not furnished the record and particulars before 15th January, 1998, will be entitled to the benefit of this order.

9. This I.A. stands disposed of.