Mummidi Durgaiah Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- constitution of india. article 14: [dr. arijit pasayat &p. sathasivam, jj] legitimate expectation held, the decision maker has the choice in the balancing of the pros and cons relevant to the change in policy. it is, therefore, clear that the choice of policy is for the decision maker and not the court. the legitimate substantive expectation merely permits the court to find out if the change of policy which is the cause for defeating the legitimate expectation is irrational or perverse or one which no reasonable person could have made. a claim based on merely legitimate expectation without anything more cannot ipso facto give a right. its uniqueness lies in the fact that it covers the entire span of time, present, past and future. how significant is the statement that today is tomorrows yesterday. the present is as we experience it, the past is a present memory and future is a present expectation. for legal purposes, expectation is not same as anticipation. legitimacy of an expectation can be inferred only if it is founded on the sanction of law. indian evidence act,1872[c.a.no.1/1872] section 115: [dr. arijit pasayat & p. sathasivam, jj] promissory estoppel/legitimate expectation alleged assurance by state government for purchase of 500 sets of compilation of local laws from publisher refusal to place any order petition seeking direction to maintain and keep promise claim based on departmental note to which concurrence of various departments/ministries not obtained there was interpolation of document and also dispute as to whether intended purchase was of volumes or sets - held, some oral expression of desire by the then law minister, would not be relevant. on facts, doctrine of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation is not attracted. section 115: [dr. arijit pasayat & p. sathasivam, jj] promissory estoppel held, in order to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel clear, sound and positive foundation must be laid in the petition itself by the party invoking the doctrine and bald expression without any supporting material to the effect that the doctrine is attracted because the party invoking the doctrine has altered its position relying on the assurance of the government would not be sufficient to press into aid the doctrine. the courts are bound to consider all aspects including the results sought to be achieved and the public good at large, because while considering the applicability of the doctrine, the courts have to do equity and the fundamental principles of equity must for ever be present in the mind of the court.order1. leave granted.2. we have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned judgment and other documents.3. the allegation against the appellant is that he was spreading rumours that pw-6 (kapu usha) was having illicit intimacy with one painter and at the time of commission of the crime, he also instigated the main accused for commission of the crime.4. it may be pertinent to mention that three other co-accused a-2, a-3 and a-6 had also filed a separate special leave petition and this court after granting leave, in criminal appeal no. 359/2007, converted their conviction from section 302 i.p.c. to one under section 304 part-ii of the i.p.c. and they were sentenced to eight years' imprisonment. in the facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the considered view that the appellant also deserves the same treatment.5. admittedly, the appellant was not having any arm at the time of the incident. looking to the role of the appellant, in our considered view, the ends of justice would be met if his conviction is converted from section 302/149 i.p.c. to one under section 304 part-ii read with section 149 i.p.c.6. accordingly the conviction of the appellant under section 302 i.p.c. is set aside and the appellant is convicted under section 304 part ii read with section 149 i.p.c. and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for a period of eight years.7. the appeal is partly allowed and disposed of accordingly.

Judgment:
ORDER

1. Leave granted.

2. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the impugned judgment and other documents.

3. The allegation against the appellant is that he was spreading rumours that PW-6 (Kapu Usha) was having illicit intimacy with one painter and at the time of commission of the crime, he also instigated the main accused for commission of the crime.

4. It may be pertinent to mention that three other Co-accused A-2, A-3 and A-6 had also filed a separate special leave petition and this Court after granting leave, in Criminal Appeal No. 359/2007, converted their conviction from Section 302 I.P.C. to one under Section 304 Part-II of the I.P.C. and they were sentenced to eight years' imprisonment. In the facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the considered view that the appellant also deserves the same treatment.

5. Admittedly, the appellant was not having any arm at the time of the incident. Looking to the role of the appellant, in our considered view, the ends of justice would be met if his conviction is converted from Section 302/149 I.P.C. to one under Section 304 Part-II read with Section 149 I.P.C.

6. Accordingly the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 I.P.C. is set aside and the appellant is convicted under Section 304 Part II read with Section 149 I.P.C. and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for a period of eight years.

7. The appeal is partly allowed and disposed of accordingly.