itc Bhadrachalam Paper Boards Ltd. Vs. State of A.P. - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citationsooperkanoon.com/672083
SubjectSales Tax
CourtSupreme Court of India
Decided OnMar-21-2001
Judge S.P. Bharucha,; N. Santosh Hegde and; Y.K. Sabharwal, JJ.
Reported in(2003)11SCC679; (2003)11SCC743; [2002]126STC541(SC)
ActsAndhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957
Appellantitc Bhadrachalam Paper Boards Ltd.
RespondentState of A.P.
Appellant Advocate M.L. Verma and; Kailash Vasdev, Senior Advs., ; Devadatt Kama
Respondent Advocate T. Anil Kumar and ; P. Venkata Reddy, Advs.
DispositionAppeal allowed
Excerpt:
- [v.n. khare and; syed shah mohammed quadri, jj.] the appellants were the owners of the disputed premises, originally leased out to k, who died in 1969. after the death of k, the original landlord executed a fresh lease deed on 2-12-1970 in favour of the respondent, r, one of the sons of k. in 1984 the landlord filed a suit for eviction against r on grounds of bona fide requirement, as well as default in payment of rent; the relief of recovery of arrears of rent was also prayed for. the trial court dismissed the suit for eviction, but decreed it for recovery of arrears of rent equalling rs 245. the appellate court, however, allowed the landlord's appeal on both grounds, holding that the landlord's need was bona fide and also that r was in default. when r filed a revision petition, the high court allowed it, finding that the suit was bad for non-joinder of necessary parties, because all the heirs of the original tenant, k, had not been impleaded in the suit. the high court thus set aside the order of the appellate court and dismissed the suit. before the supreme court, it was submitted, inter alia, that since the suit was based on the second lease (in favour of r) and evidence was led in respect of it, it was not open to the high court to dismiss the suit on the basis of the original lease deed. allowing the appeal, the supreme court. it was very well understood before the trial court that the parties were litigating on the basis of the second lease deed, namely, lease deed dated 2-12-1970. it is no doubt true that one of the preliminary objections taken by the respondent tenant in his written statement was that the suit was bad for non-joinder of the other legal heirs of the original tenant and also an issue was struck to that effect. but the mere objection or framing of an issue in that respect was not sufficient, as no factual foundation was laid in that regard in the written statement and, therefore, there was no occasion for the court to embark upon the said inquiry. there having been no factual foundation about the said plea, the high court was not justified in entering into that question. - order 1. we have heard learned counsel and find no good reason to differ from the view of the high court in regard to the first question which reads thus :(1) whether coal and coal-ash (cinder) are to be treated as the same commodity or as different commodities for the purpose of taxation under the andhra pradesh general sales tax act, 1957 ?' 2. in so far as the second question is concerned, we take a different view.order1. we have heard learned counsel and find no good reason to differ from the view of the high court in regard to the first question which reads thus :'(1) whether coal and coal-ash (cinder) are to be treated as the same commodity or as different commodities for the purpose of taxation under the andhra pradesh general sales tax act, 1957 ?'2. in so far as the second question is concerned, we take a different view. the second question reads thus :'(2) whether coal-ash is a product of the petitioner's industrial unit and whether the sale of 'coal-ash' by the petitioner is eligible for exemption under g.o. ms. no, 606, dated april 9, 1981?'3. the high court was of the view that the main production activity of the appellant was the manufacture of paper and paper boards, that coal-ash was only the left-over residue after burning coal as fuel in the manufacture of paper and paper boards, and that, therefore, the appellant was not entitled to the exemption on the sale of coal-ash under g.o. ms. no. 606, dated april 9, 1981 as the coal-ash was not a product of the appellant. the aforesaid order gives 'complete exemption to the products of the industry from sales tax for a limited period of five years'. the coal-ash that is produced as a result of the burning of coal as fuel is a product of the appellant-industry though it might not be the principal product for which the industry was established. even so, being a product of the industry, it is entitled to the exemption given by the said order. this second question, therefore, must be answered in favour of the appellant,4. given these two answers, the consideration of the third and fourth questions does not arise.the civil appeals are allowed to the extent aforestated.no order as to costs.
Judgment:
ORDER

1. We have heard learned counsel and find no good reason to differ from the view of the High Court in regard to the first question which reads thus :

'(1) Whether coal and coal-ash (cinder) are to be treated as the same commodity or as different commodities for the purpose of taxation under the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957 ?'

2. In so far as the second question is concerned, we take a different view. The second question reads thus :

'(2) Whether coal-ash is a product of the petitioner's industrial unit and whether the sale of 'coal-ash' by the petitioner is eligible for exemption under G.O. Ms. No, 606, dated April 9, 1981?'

3. The High Court was of the view that the main production activity of the appellant was the manufacture of paper and paper boards, that coal-ash was only the left-over residue after burning coal as fuel in the manufacture of paper and paper boards, and that, therefore, the appellant was not entitled to the exemption on the sale of coal-ash under G.O. Ms. No. 606, dated April 9, 1981 as the coal-ash was not a product of the appellant. The aforesaid order gives 'complete exemption to the products of the industry from sales tax for a limited period of five years'. The coal-ash that is produced as a result of the burning of coal as fuel is a product of the appellant-industry though it might not be the principal product for which the industry was established. Even so, being a product of the industry, it is entitled to the exemption given by the said order. This second question, therefore, must be answered in favour of the appellant,

4. Given these two answers, the consideration of the third and fourth questions does not arise.

The civil appeals are allowed to the extent aforestated.

No order as to costs.