Shiba Kumar Dutta and ors. Vs. Union of India (Uoi) and ors. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- indian railways act (24 of 1989) section 124-a & railway claims tribunal act (54 of 1987), section 16: [altamas kabir & dr. mukundakam sharma, jj] claim for compensation - grant of interest-absence of statutory provision - power of courts to grant interest held, admittedly, neither the railway claims tribunal act, 1987, nor the railway act, 1989, make provision for payment of interest on any awarded amount. while sections 16 of the 1987 act prescribes the procedure for making an application to the claims tribunal, the right to receive compensation is contained in sections 124 and 124-a comprising chapter xiii of the 1989 act dealing with the liability of the railway administration for death and injury to passengers due to accidents. even though there is no provision in either of the acts for payment of interest on the awarded sum, there is no denying the fact that the right to claim compensation accrued on the date of the incident. in cases where the statute does not make any specific provision for payment of interest on any awarded sum, the power of the courts to grant interest can also be referred to from the provisions of the interest act, 1978 and the code of civil procedure. though, there are two divergent views, one indicating that interest is payable from the date when claim for the principal sum is made, namely, the date of institution of the proceedings for the recovery of the amount, the other view is that such interest is payable only when a determination is made and order is passed for recovery of the amount, the other view is that such interest is payable only when a determination is made and order is passed for recovery of the dues. however, the more consistent view has been the former and in rare cases interest has been awarded for periods even prior to the institution of proceedings for recovery of the dues, where the same is provided for by the terms of the agreement entered into between the parties or where the same is permissible by statute. accordingly, the order of the railway claims tribunal directing payment of interest on default of the payment of the principal sum within a period of 45 days would not be sustainable. when there is no specific provision for grant of interest on any amount due, the court and even tribunals have been held to be entitled to award interest in their discretion, under the provisions of section 3 of the interest act and section 34 of the civil p.c. in the instant case, even if, the appellants may not be entitled to claim interest from the date of the accident the claim to interest on the awarded sum has to be allowed from the date of the application till the date of recovery, since the appellant cannot be faulted for the delay of approximately 7 years in the making of the award by the railways claims tribunal. had the tribunal not delayed the matter for so long, the appellants would have been entitled to the beneficial interest of the amount awarded from a much earlier date and we se no reason why they should be deprived of such benefit. payment of interest is basically compensation for being denied the use of the money during the period which the same could have been made available to the claimants. therefore, not granting any interest whatsoever to the appellants, except by way of a default clause, was not proper.order1. delay condoned.2. this special leave petition arises from the orders of the administrative tribunal, calcutta bench, made on june 21, 1995 in oa no. 213 of 1992 and the review order dated july 26, 1996.3. the admitted position is that the petitioners, who are working as fitters (t & g), had sought to be fused in the category of, and to be on par with, jig borers. they sought equal pay on par with them. they contend that they were drawing higher pay-scales than the fitter; instead of elevating their cadre and placing them in the higher pay-scales, they have been brought them down in the category as a fitter after removing the two nomenclatures. thereby, it is arbitrary on account of invidious discrimination. the third pay commission had gone into that aspect of the matter and fixed the scales of pay. thereafter, admittedly, expert classification committee and anomalies removal committee had also gone into the matter and made distinction between them. subsequently, nomenclature of all of them were removed and fused into one category, namely, fitter. nomenclature and fitment is one of executive policy of the government. unless the action is arbitrary or there is invidious discrimination between persons similarly situated, doing same type of work, as is pointed out, it would be difficult for the courts to go into the question of equation of posts or fitment into a particular scale of pay. they must be left to be decided by the expert committees and government. the courts cannot go into them and evaluate the job criteria and scales of pay prescribed for each category. under those circumstances, the tribunal is justified in refusing to go into the question.4. the special leave petition is accordingly dismissed.

Judgment:
ORDER

1. Delay condoned.

2. This special leave petition arises from the orders of the Administrative Tribunal, Calcutta Bench, made on June 21, 1995 in OA No. 213 of 1992 and the Review Order dated July 26, 1996.

3. The admitted position is that the petitioners, who are working as Fitters (T & G), had sought to be fused in the category of, and to be on par with, Jig Borers. They sought equal pay on par with them. They contend that they were drawing higher pay-scales than the Fitter; instead of elevating their cadre and placing them in the Higher pay-scales, they have been brought them down in the category as a Fitter after removing the two nomenclatures. Thereby, it is arbitrary on account of invidious discrimination. The Third Pay Commission had gone into that aspect of the matter and fixed the scales of pay. Thereafter, admittedly, Expert Classification Committee and Anomalies Removal Committee had also gone into the matter and made distinction between them. Subsequently, nomenclature of all of them were removed and fused into one category, namely, Fitter. Nomenclature and fitment is one of executive policy of the Government. Unless the action is arbitrary or there is invidious discrimination between persons similarly situated, doing same type of work, as is pointed out, it would be difficult for the Courts to go into the question of equation of posts or fitment into a particular scale of pay. They must be left to be decided by the Expert Committees and Government. The Courts cannot go into them and evaluate the job criteria and scales of pay prescribed for each category. Under those circumstances, the Tribunal is justified in refusing to go into the question.

4. The special leave petition is accordingly dismissed.