Tulsi Singh Vs. State of Punjab - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citationsooperkanoon.com/667633
SubjectCriminal
CourtSupreme Court of India
Decided OnAug-07-1996
Case NumberCriminal Appeal No. 589 of 1986
Judge M.K. Mukharji and; S.P. Kurudukar, JJ.
Reported in1996VIAD(SC)14; AIR1996SC3477; 1996(3)Crimes319(SC); 1996(5)SCALE681; (1996)6SCC63; [1996]Supp4SCR340
ActsIndian Penal Code (IPC), - Sections 302; Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1974 - Sections 164
AppellantTulsi Singh
RespondentState of Punjab
Appellant Advocate O.P. Khullar and; R.C. Kohli, Advs
Respondent Advocate H.M. Singh and ; R.S. Suri, Advs.
Prior historyFrom the Judgment and Order dated 30.1.85 of the Special Court at Ferozepur in Case No. 64/84 T.No. 18/85 and F.I.R. No. 151 of 1984
Excerpt:
- multi state co-operative societies act (51 of 1984)sections 18 & 95: [s.b. sinha & dr. mukundakam sharma,jj] state co-operative society area of operation falling in two states on reorganisation of state held, it automatically becomes a multi-state society. procedure prescribed for conversion of state society to multi-state society under section 18 need not be followed. section 95: [s.b.sinha & dr.mukundakam sharma,jj] u.p. state re-organization act (2000), sections 67,86 & 93 - state co-operative society - bifurcation of state on reorganization area of operation of co-operative society falling in both states held, section 95 of the multi-state act, 1984 has been incorporated to meet a particular situation. the said section provides that it would be operative as a consequence of reorganisation of states and particularly when any area or portion of area of the society is bifurcated or divided and then falls in the jurisdiction of two state administrations. the idea is to obviate the administrative stalemate arising out of creation of a new state and new administration. the very purpose of having this kind of provision is to stop the applicability of a state co-operative societies act over more than one state as a state act cannot have extra-territorial operation and the multi-state co-operative societies cannot be regulated by a state co-operative societies act. section 67 of re-organisation act cannot prevent such conversion when under section 95 of the multi-state act already exists in the form of central law which takes care of and makes provisions for such co-operative societies which as and from the day of the re-organisation of a particular state become multi-state co-operative societies. section 95: [s.b. sinha & dr. mukundakam sharma, jj] uttaranchal co-operative societies act (5 of 2003), section 129 - u.p. state co-operative society - bifurcation of state on re-orgainsation - object of society falling in area of both states held, once a state co-operative society becomes multi-state society on re-organisation of state a state legislation viz. uttaranchal act 2003 which has been enacted subsequently cannot have an overriding effect over a central law viz. the multi-state act and make the central act inapplicable. the bye-laws of the u.p. state society which is an apex society have not been amended so far. the area of operation of the state-society as laid down in its bye-laws it still the same as it was on the date of the reorganization of the state of u.p. therefore, it would be legally impermissible to say that now the area of operation of the state apex society is confined to the state of u.p. alone and that it has ceased to be a multi-state co-operative society. as far as withdrawal of member-co-operative societies of the u.p. state co-operative society operating in the state of uttaranchal is concerned, the deemed conversion of a co-operative society into a multi-state co-operative society by virtue of section 95 of the multi-state act, 1984 is an irreversible process and the membership of a multi-state co-operative society in a particular state at a given point of time is only a fortuitous circumstances on the basis of which a multi-state co-operative society cannot automatically revert to assume the character of a state co-operative society. further, there is no provision in the multi-state act which permits such automatic conversion of a multi-state co-operative society into a state co-operative society by operation of law. - though the learned magistrate testified that before recording the confession he satisfied himself that the accused (appellant) was making a voluntary statement and that after giving due caution he recorded it, the confession does not anywhere indicate as to whether before recording the same he gave him the requisite caution and put questions to satisfy himself that it was being made voluntarily.1. tulsi singh, the appellant before us, was arraigned before the special court, ferozepur for the murder of his wife chhinder kaur. the trial ended in an order of conviction and sentence recorded against the appellant under section 302 i.p.c. and aggrieved thereby he has filed the instant appeal.2. in absence of any eye witness to the murder, the prosecution rested its case upon the confession made by the appellant before a judicial magistrate and the evidence of the doctor who held post mortem examination upon the deceased and opined that her death was homicidal.3. from the impugned judgment we find that the appellant did not dispute the fact that his wife met with an homicidal death. he, however, contained that he was not responsible for the murder, nor did he make any voluntary confession in respect thereof as alleged by the prosecution. the special court, however, found the confession made by the appellant to be voluntary and true and relying solely thereupon convicted the appellant.4. the only point that has been urged on behalf of the appellant in support of this appeal is that the special court was not justified in entertaining the confession as evidence - much less relying upon the same - as it was not recorded in accordance with the provisions of section 164 cr.p.c. in elaborating this contention is has been submitted that before recording the confession shri o.p. garg (pw .1), the learned magistrate, did not explain to the appellant that he was not bound to make confession and that if he did so it might be used against him nor did he put any question to him to satisfy himself that the confession was being voluntarily made, as required under sub-section (2) of section 164 cr.p.c.5. to ascertain whether the above contention is borne by the record or not we have carefully looked into the evidence of the magistrate as also the confession (ext. p/6). on perusal thereof, we find that after his arrest the appellant was produced before the magistrate on june 16, 1984 and sent to police custody for a week on the prayer of the investigating officer. he was thereafter produced before the magistrate on june 22, 1984 when he volunteered to make a confession. the magistrate remanded him to judicial custody with a direction that he be produced on the following date, that is, on june 23, 1984. it appears that immediately after he was produced on that day the learned magistrate recorded his confession. though the learned magistrate testified that before recording the confession he satisfied himself that the accused (appellant) was making a voluntary statement and that after giving due caution he recorded it, the confession does not anywhere indicate as to whether before recording the same he gave him the requisite caution and put questions to satisfy himself that it was being made voluntarily. these are the basic pre-requisites for recording a confession under sub-section (2) of section 164 cr.p.c. and a mere endorsement in accordance with sub-section (4) after recording it would not fulfil the requirements of the former sub-section. since none of the two requirements of section 164(2) cr.p.c. has been complied with we are left with no other alternative to hold that the special court was not at all justified in entertaining the confession as a voluntary one. once the confession is left out of consideration - as it has got to be the impugned conviction cannot be sustained in absence of any other incriminating evidence against the appellant.6. in the result, we allow this appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence recorded against the appellant. the appellant, who is on bail, is discharged from his bail bonds.
Judgment:

1. Tulsi Singh, the appellant before us, was arraigned before the Special Court, Ferozepur for the murder of his wife Chhinder Kaur. The trial ended in an order of conviction and sentence recorded against the appellant under Section 302 I.P.C. and aggrieved thereby he has filed the instant appeal.

2. In absence of any eye witness to the murder, the prosecution rested its case upon the confession made by the appellant before a Judicial Magistrate and the evidence of the doctor who held post mortem examination upon the deceased and opined that her death was homicidal.

3. From the impugned judgment we find that the appellant did not dispute the fact that his wife met with an homicidal death. He, however, contained that he was not responsible for the murder, nor did he make any voluntary confession in respect thereof as alleged by the prosecution. The Special Court, however, found the confession made by the appellant to be voluntary and true and relying solely thereupon convicted the appellant.

4. The only point that has been urged on behalf of the appellant in support of this appeal is that the Special Court was not justified in entertaining the confession as evidence - much less relying upon the same - as it was not recorded in accordance with the provisions of Section 164 Cr.P.C. In elaborating this contention is has been submitted that before recording the confession Shri O.P. Garg (PW .1), the learned Magistrate, did not explain to the appellant that he was not bound to make confession and that if he did so it might be used against him nor did he put any question to him to satisfy himself that the confession was being voluntarily made, as required under Sub-section (2) of Section 164 Cr.P.C.

5. To ascertain whether the above contention is borne by the record or not we have carefully looked into the evidence of the Magistrate as also the confession (Ext. P/6). On perusal thereof, we find that after his arrest the appellant was produced before the Magistrate on June 16, 1984 and sent to police custody for a week on the prayer of the Investigating Officer. He was thereafter produced before the Magistrate on June 22, 1984 when he volunteered to make a confession. The Magistrate remanded him to judicial custody with a direction that he be produced on the following date, that is, on June 23, 1984. It appears that immediately after he was produced on that day the learned Magistrate recorded his confession. Though the learned Magistrate testified that before recording the confession he satisfied himself that the accused (appellant) was making a voluntary statement and that after giving due caution he recorded it, the confession does not anywhere indicate as to whether before recording the same he gave him the requisite caution and put questions to satisfy himself that it was being made voluntarily. These are the basic pre-requisites for recording a confession under Sub-section (2) of Section 164 Cr.P.C. and a mere endorsement in accordance with Sub-section (4) after recording it would not fulfil the requirements of the former sub-section. Since none of the two requirements of Section 164(2) Cr.P.C. has been complied with we are left with no other alternative to hold that the Special Court was not at all justified in entertaining the confession as a voluntary one. Once the confession is left out of consideration - as it has got to be the impugned conviction cannot be sustained in absence of any other incriminating evidence against the appellant.

6. In the result, we allow this appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence recorded against the appellant. The appellant, who is on bail, is discharged from his bail bonds.