Shivmuni Ram Vs. Road Construction - Court Judgment

              IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI                                          W. P. (S) No.  2298 of 2013 ­­­­ Shivmuni Ram...... ...............   Petitioner Versus 1. The State of Jharkhand.  2. The Principal Secretary, Road Construction Department, Govt. of Jharkhand, Ranchi.  3. The Engineer­in­Chief, Road  Construction Department, Govt. of  Jharkhand, Ranchi.  4. The Special Secretary, Road  Construction Department, Govt. of  Jharkhand, Ranchi                .....Respondents.  ­­­­­ CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH ­­­­­­ For the Petitioner                  :  M/s. Navin Kumar Singh  & Manoj Tandon, Advs.  For the Respondents   : M/s. Abhay Kumar Mishra, S. C. III & Bhola Nath Ojha, J.C. to S. C. III ­­­­­­ 13/23.9.2015 Heard learned counsel for the parties.            Petitioner has been imposed with a punishment of reduction to the  lowest scale of pay of his substantive post and recovery of Rs.80,60,800/­  by the impugned order (Annexure­11) dated 15th January, 2013 bearing  Memo   No.   445(S)   issued   by   Engineer­in­Chief,   Road   Construction  Department, Govt. of Jharkhand, Ranchi, respondent no. 3.   2. Petitioner's appeal has also been rejected by order dated 26th July,  2013   (Annexure­13)   passed   by   Principal   Secretary,   Road   Construction  Department,   Govt.   of   Jharkhand,   Ranchi,   respondent   no.   2,   during  pendency   of   the   writ   petition   which   has   also   been   allowed   to   be  challenged by the order dated 14th August, 2013 passed in I. A. No. 5995  of  2013 .  3. The chronology of facts which are material for adjudication of the  instant issue are being briefly narrated hereunder:  Petitioner was working in the capacity of Junior Engineer in Road  Construction   Department   and   the   charges   in   the   departmental  proceedings   relate   to   the   period   of   his   posting   at   Road   Division,  Daltonganj in 2006.   4. As a matter of fact, petitioner was proceeded in two different  2. charge­sheets, one under office order no. 17 dated 24th January, 2012  bearing Memo no. 563 issued by the respondent no.3, Engineer­in­Chief,  Road Construction Department, Govt. of Jharkhand. Charges therein are  also   in   substance   similar   to   the   charges   contained   at   Annexure­5/1  bearing Order no. 4, Memo no. 106 (S) dated 6th January, 2012 issued by  the same respondent no. 3.   Under the office order no. 17 containing  four   charges,   the   allegations   relate   to   sanction   of   forged   vouchers   of  bitumen in relation to agreement no.1F2/2004­05 with M/s.  Kaushalya  Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited which were entrusted  with execution of specified works under Road Division, Daltonganj. It  was alleged that the petitioner did not verify the invoices and Bills were  prepared while 26 of the invoices were found to be forged.  Petitioner did  not   verify   the   invoices   and   also   did   not   check   the   quality   of   the  execution   of   work   nor     empty   bitumen   drums   were   returned   by   the  contractor.  Charge nos. 2, 3 and 4 are similar to the charges nos. 2,3 & 4  at Annexure­5/1 issued through office order no.4 dated 6th January, 2012  though in relation to a different agreement with a different contractor.    5. Four charges contained in “Prapatra (Ka)”, Charge­sheet issued by  the   disciplinary   authority,   Engineer­in­Chief,   Road   Construction  Department enclosed to the office order no. 4 dated 6th January, 2012,  Annexure­5/1 shows that they are also in relation to grave charges of  irregularities and dereliction of duties on his part.   Charge No. 1 shows that petitioner while posted in Road Division,  Daltonganj,   did   not   verify   the   bitumen   invoices   submitted   by   the  Contractor,   M/s.     Kalawati   Construction   Private   Ltd.,   Garhwa     in  connection with Agreement no. 11F2/2003­04 and Bills were prepared  while 61 of the invoices were found to be forged and one was found to be  issued for another work.  It was also alleged that without verification of  the   quality   of   the   work   executed   despite   less   use   of   bitumen,   the  invoices were allowed to be made  the basis for preparation of the bills  for payments of the amounts to the contractor.   3. Charge no. 2 shows that the estimated amount of bitumen were  neither used for the work nor purchased  but forged invoices of claim  were furnished .  The quality of the work had obviously suffered.   Charge   no.   3   alleges   violation   of   Para   243   of   the   Bihar   Public  Accounts Code.   Charge no. 4 alleged that the contractor had also not returned the  empty drums used for the purposes of bitumen. These were not verified  by the officer which made the whole transaction suspicious.    6. The  substance of the  charge, as canvassed  by the  respondents,  relate   to   a   bitumen   scam   detected   in   execution   of   work   in   the  respondent   department.  These   were   also   subject   matter   of   vigilance  inquiry   and   were   later   on  handed  over   to   the   CBI   pursuant   to   the  direction of the learned Division Bench of this Court in a Public Interest  Litigation.  7. It appears from the pleadings on record that initially the Finance  Secretary, Mrs. Rajbala Verma pointed out the objections found during  audit by the office of Accountant General in the matter of procurement  of   bitumen   for   road   work   to   the   Secretary,   Road   Construction  Department through letter dated 22nd November, 2008 ( Annexure­1).  The said letter refers to the audit objection in relation to procurement of  bitumen  in 15  divisions  at a  cost  of  Rs.06.74   Crores paid  against  308  invoices   bearing   identical   invoice   codes.     It   also   refers   to   payments  made   to   Contractor   of   Rs.   36.86   lakhs   against   22   invoices   bearing  identical   invoice   code   for   purchase   of   huge   amount   of   bitumen   in  execution of two works under two divisions.  The letter further refers to  payments  made  to  contractor  in similar  manner  on the  basis  of fake  invoices.  The   audit   objections   were   communicated   for   taking   action  against   responsible   officials   and   persons   and   also   for   initiation   of  vigilance inquiry. It also recommended disciplinary action against the  concerned official and corrective measures to avoid repetition of such  acts.

4. 8. As would appear from Annexure­2, Memo no. 917 dated 28th July,  2009, Mrs. Rajbala Verma while posted as Vigilance Commissioner wrote  to   the   Director   General   (Vigilance   Bureau)   to   undertake   vigilance  inquiry in respect of the purchase of bitumen under Road Construction  Department also enclosing certain communications from the office of  His Excellency the Governor on the subject. She also gave permission to  take   assistance   for   Technical   enquires   through   the   Chief   Engineer  Technical Evaluation Cell. Annexure­3 is another noting on the file in the  capacity   of  Vigilance   Commissioner   by   the   same   officer   dated   13th  October,   2009   to   the   Advisor,   Department   of   Cabinet   (Vigilance)  referring the direction of the High Court in W.P.(PIL) No. 803/2009 for  CBI  enquiry  into the irregularity  in procurement of bitumen for road  works.    9. Petitioner was put under suspension vide Annexure­4 dated 6th  January,   2011   issued   by   Road   Construction   Department.   The  disciplinary   authority,   respondent   no.3,   thereafter   initiated  departmental   proceeding   against   the   petitioner   for   the   charges  discussed hereinabove vide office order nos. 4 and 17 dated 6th January,  2012   and   24th   January,   2012   bearing   Memo   nos.   106(S)   &   563(S)   at  Annexures­5/1 and 5 respectively.  The Principal Secretary, Department  of Food, Civil Supplies and Consumer Affairs, Govt. of Jharkhand, Mrs.  Rajbala Verma, I.A.S., was appointed as the Inquiry Officer to conduct  the inquiry  against the petitioner.   On conclusion of the  enquiry, the  inquiry report submitted by the same officer indicted the petitioner on  all counts.   Petitioner  was asked to furnish  reply  to the  second  show  cause notice by the respondent no.3 through letter dated 5th September,  2012   bearing   no.   6464(S)W   Annexure­8   enclosing   copy   of   the   inquiry  report.   After   consideration   of   the   petitioner's   reply   the   impugned  punishment has been imposed.   10. It   is   evident   from   the   notings   enclosed   by   the   petitioner   at  Annexure­10, undisputed by the respondents, that before imposing the  5. punishment   of   recovery,   the   approval   of   Principal   Secretary,   Road  Construction Department was also obtained.   The officer, Mrs. Rajbala  Verma was then posted as Principal Secretary of the Road Construction  Department.   Since the order was passed by the Disciplinary Authority  i.e., Engineer­in­Chief, respondent no. 3,  a remedy of appeal lied before  the Secretary of the department as the petitioner was a Junior Engineer.  Petitioner's   appeal   has   also   been   rejected   by   the   same   officer,   Mrs.  Rajbala Verma in her capacity as the Appellate Authority­cum­Principal  Secretary,   Road   Construction   Department.     These   facts   on   being  canvassed   were   noticed   in   the   order   dated   26th   June,   2015,   quoted  hereunder:     “The impugned order at Annexure­11 dated 15.01.2013 issued by the   Engineer­in­Chief,   Road   Construction   Department,   has   imposed   the   punishment of reduction in rank and recovery of Rs. 80,60,800/­ upon   the   petitioner   who   is   a   Junior   Engineer   in   the   Department.   This   punishment is based upon the inquiry initiated vide office order no. 04  dated 06.01.2012 enclosing a charge sheet in Prapatra (Ka) where one  Smt. Rajbala Verma, IAS, Principal Secretary, Food, Public Distribution   and   Consumer   Affairs,   Jharkhand   was   appointed   as   Conducting   Officer.   On   the   basis   of   the   Inquiry   Report   furnished   by   the   said   Conducting   Officer   dated   16.02.2012,   the   Engineer­in­Chief,   Road  Construction Department, Government of Jharkhand issued the second  show­cause notice (Annexure­8) upon the petitioner as to why a major   penalty be not imposed upon him. After imposition of such punishment,  petitioner   preferred   an   appeal   before   the   Appellate   Authority­cum­ Secretary, Road Construction Department, vide Annexure­12. The said   appeal has been rejected by order dated 26.06.2013 (Annexure­A to the   counter affidavit) issued under the signature of Deputy Secretary, Road   Construction   Department   based   upon   the   decision   of   the   Appellate   Authority­cum­Principal Secretary, Road Construction Department.      2.     Counsel for the petitioner has referred to the notings on the   file, extracts of which is at Annexure­10, as per which, a direction has   been issued for recovery of Rs. 80,60,800/­ from the petitioner by Mrs.   Rajbala Verma. It is stated on his behalf by virtue of statements made at   para­6   of   the   rejoinder   that   the   said   officer   had   become   Principal   Secretary of Road Construction Department on 18.06.2012 itself while   the Inquiry Report was submitted on 16.02.2012. It is further stated at   para­7   of   the   rejoinder   that   the   appeal   filed   by   the   petitioner   was   rejected by order dated 06.07.2013 by the same officer in her capacity as   Principal   Secretary,   Road   Construction   Department   who   was   the  Inquiry   Officer   of   the   petitioner   also. Therefore,  the   impugned   order   and the Appellate Order suffer from violation of principles of natural   justice as the same person cannot become judge in his own cause who  was herself the Inquiry Officer.  3.    Petitioner   has   relied   upon   the   judgment   rendered   by   the   Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of  Mohd. Yunus Khan Vs. State of  Uttar Pradesh & others [(2010) 10 SCC 539]  and  Roop Singh Negi Vs.  Punjab National Bank & others [(2009) 2 SCC 570]  and also  State of  Uttaranchal and others vs. Kharak Singh [(2008) 8 SCC 236].  4. Learned Standing Counsel No. III submits that the aforesaid  procedural infirmity pointed on behalf of the petitioner go to the root of   the matter as it may have bearing on the conduct of the Departmental   Proceeding   from   the   stage   of   submission   of   the   Inquiry   Report.   He   further   submits   that   before   taking   a   final   decision   in  the  matter,  he  may  be  allowed  time  to  deliberate  with  the  6. concerned   authorities   under   the   respondent   Government   and   the  Department and come out with a fresh response.  5. Having regard to the conspicuous facts noted hereinabove, as   prayed for on behalf of the counsel for the State, before taking a final   decision in the matter, one more opportunity is allowed to the counsel  for the respondent to come out with their considered stand.  6. As   prayed   for,  four   weeks   time   is   allowed.  List   the   case   on   07.08.2015”

11.     An   affidavit   was   filed   thereafter   sworn   by   Assistant   Engineer,  Road Construction Department, Ranchi, reiterating the actions taken by  the   respondents   and   justifying   the   impugned   decisions   taken   by   the  concerned officer while posted as Principal Secretary, Food, Civil Supply  and Consumers Affairs Department, Govt. of Jharkhand  as the Inquiry  Officer   and   thereafter   in   the   capacity   of   Principal   Secretary,   Road  Construction Department, Jharkhand as a disciplinary authority as well  as appellate authority.  Considering the seriousness of the issues raised,  the Principal Secretary, Road Construction Department, Government of  Jharkhand was asked to file a response on affidavit sworn by himself in  terms of the order dated 26th June, 2015.   Such an affidavit has been  filed   and   sworn   by   Mrs.   Rajbala  Verma   in   the   capacity   as   Principal  Secretary, Road Construction Department, Govt. of Jharkhand. Paras­ 5  & 6 of the affidavit containing the stand is being quoted hereunder:  “Para­ 5 : That Smt. Rajbala Verma, I.A.S. was posted as the  Principal  Secretary,  Food  and Civil  Supplies, Jharkhand, Ranchi  when   she   was   appointed   as   the   Enquiry   Officer   in   the   Departmental Proceeding against Shri Shivmuni Ram vide order   contained in memo no. 563(S) dated 24.01.2012 and 106(S) dated  06.01.2012  Para­6:  That   the   Enquiry   Officer   submitted   the   report  being on the same post of the Principal Secretary, Food and Civil   Supplies,  Jharkhand,  Ranchi   on   16.02.2012./  That   Smt.  Rajbala   Verma,   I.A.S.     was   transferred   and   she   became   the   Principal   Secretary,  Road   Construction   Department,  Jharkhand.    She   was  the disciplinary authority and acted as the appellate authority by  virtue of the post held by her.”

12.     It does not dispute the fact that she acted as an Inquiry Officer  in the departmental proceeding and also in the nature of a disciplinary  authority and the appellate authority as well. Justification advanced to  support the impugned order is that such action was taken by virtue of  post held by her.  7.

13.   The impugned orders have been challenged by the petitioner on  the   grounds   of   complete   violation   of   principles   of   natural   justice.   In  support thereof the following judgments rendered by Hon'ble Supreme  Court have been relied upon.   i) Mohd. Yunus Khan Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & others [(2010) 10 SCC539 ii) Roop Singh Negi Vs. Punjab National Bank & others [(2009) 2 SCC570 iii) State of Uttaranchal and others vs. Kharak Singh [(2008) 8 SCC236.

14.       It is urged that the same person who was the complainant was  appointed inquiry officer and indicted the petitioner of the charges.  She  again acted in the capacity of disciplinary authority and also sat over the  appeal preferred by the petitioner.   At every stage, therefore, a person  became a judge of his own cause which is in teeth of the principles of  natural justice.   Therefore, the impugned orders cannot survive the test  of   legal   scrutiny   as   the   decision   making   process   has   been   vitiated  beyond redemption.    15. Counsel   for   Respondent­State   submits   that   the  charges against the petitioner are of very serious nature.   It relates to  actions/omissions   done   by   the   petitioner   in   the   capacity   of   a   Junior  Engineer   during   his   posting   at   Road   Division,   Daltonganj,   which   has  resulted   in   huge   defalcation   of   Government   money   and  misappropriation   of   funds   by   the   Contractor   and   several   persons.  Petitioner   has   also   been   facing   two   CBI   cases   in   relation   to   same  charges.  Learned counsel has made an attempt to defend the impugned  action   on   the   submission   that   the   officer   did   not   carry   any   personal  grudge  against the petitioner.  She only discharged her duty of the post  held   at   different   points   of   time.     However,   learned  counsel   for  Respondent­State   is   not   in   a   position   to   dispel   the   well   settled   legal  proposition   that   a   person   who   has   been   the   author   of   the   inquiry  reaching to the finding of guilt against an delinquent employee could  not act as the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority.  He has  8. sought to dispel the contention of the petitioner that the said officer was  the complainant by stating that she had only forwarded the audit reports  in the capacity of Finance Secretary or as a Vigilance Commissioner to  the concerned Vigilance Bureau for investigation.  16.       It   is   submitted   that   considering   the   gravity   of   the   charges  therefore, this Court in exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction may not  like to interfere in the same.  17.       I have heard learned counsel for the parties at some length and  gone through the relevant materials on record. The sequence of relevant  facts do not leave an iota of doubt that the departmental proceedings  have suffered to a point beyond salvage as the same person who not  only made recommendation in the capacity of the Finance Secretary to  the Road Construction Department and as the Vigilance Commissioner  for action and initiation of vigilance enquiry, was appointed the enquiry  officer   and   also   acted   as   the   Disciplinary   Authority   as   well   as   the  Appellate   Authority   in   the   departmental   proceedings   against   the  petitioner.     It  cannot   be   said   that   a   person   who  in   the   capacity   as   a  Vigilance Commissioner recommended initiation of vigilance inquiry in  respect of instances of misappropriation and defalcation of funds in the  matter   of   purchase   of   bitumen   had   not   applied   her   mind   while  recommending to the Director General Vigilance Bureau for initiation of  the vigilance inquiry and also investigation through its technical cell.  By  a strange quirk   of decision taken by respondent authorities the same  officer   became   an   inquiry   officer   and   conducted   the   departmental  inquiry   against   the   petitioner   for   the   alleged   charges   relating   to  purchase   of   bitumen   and   defalcation   of   government   money   on  submission of fake invoices by contractor, without verification.  Not only  that,   the   same   officer   acted   as    the   disciplinary   authority   as   the  disciplinary   authority  respondent   no.   3   chose   to   seek   approval   of  Principal   Secretary   of   the   Road   Construction   Department  before imposing the punishment of recovery upon the petitioner.  The  9. same   person   acted   in   the   capacity   of   the   Appellate   Authority   while  rejecting the petitioner's appeal.   18. The person may be holding different designations or post  at different point of time but the identity of the person does not change  by holding different posts. If that be so, then a person conducting an  inquiry while posted in a different capacity would always sit in judgment  over his own report  as a disciplinary authority or even as an appellate  authority.     Its   an   elementary   principle   of   the   law   which   any   officer  holding such a high and responsible post is supposed to know.  19.                 The principle that no man can be a Judge in his own cause is  one of the facets of the Principles of Natural Justice.  “  Nemo debt esse  judex in propria sua causa.”  The exposition of law laid down by the Apex  Court  in the  case   of  Crawford   Bayley   &   Co.  and   others   vs.  Union   of   India & Ors.    reported in (2006)6 SCC Page 25 as contained para 18 is  being quoted hereunder:  18. In this connection, a reference was made to Delhi Financial Corpn. v. Rajiv Anand with regard to personal bias i.e. an officer of the statutory authority has been appointed as an Estate Officer, therefore, they will carry their personal bias. However, this Court in the aforesaid case held that the doctrine “no man can be a judge in his own cause” can be applied only to cases where the person concerned has a personal interest or has himself already done some act or taken a decision in the matter concerned. Merely because an officer of a corporation is named to be the authority, does not by itself bring into operation the doctrine, “no man can be a judge in his own cause”. For that doctrine to come into play it must be shown that the officer concerned has a personal bias or connection or a personal interest or has personally acted in the matter concerned and/or has already taken a decision one way or the other which he may be interested in supporting. Such view has also been taken by the Apex court in the case of  Mohd. Yunus Khan­Vs.­ State of Uttar Pradesh and others  reported in  (2010) 10 SCC 539.  Paragraphs 26, 28 and 29 of the report are quoted  hereunder for better appreciation.  

“26. This Court in A.U. Kureshi v. High Court of Gujarat placed reliance upon the judgment in Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana and held that no person should adjudicate a dispute which he or she has dealt with in any capacity. The failure to observe this principle creates an apprehension of bias on the part of the said person. Therefore, law requires that a person should not decide a case wherein he is interested. The 10 question is not whether the person is actually biased but whether the circumstances are such as to create a reasonable apprehension in the minds of others that there is a likelihood of bias affecting the decision.

28. In Arjun Chaubey v. Union of India a Constitution Bench of this Court dealt with an identical case wherein an employee serving in the Northern Railway had been dismissed by the Deputy Chief Commercial Superintendent on a charge of misconduct which concerned himself, after considering by himself the explanation given by the employee against the charge and after thinking that the employee was not fit to be retained in service. It was also considered whether in such a case, the Court should deny the relief to the employee, even if the Court comes to the conclusion that the order of punishment stood vitiated on the ground that the employee had been guilty of habitual acts of indiscipline/misconduct. This Court held that the order of dismissal passed against the employee stood vitiated as it was in utter disregard of the principles of natural justice. The main thrust of the charges against the employee related to his conduct qua the disciplinary authority itself, therefore, it was not open to the disciplinary authority to sit in judgment over the explanation furnished by the employee and decide against the delinquent. No person could be a judge in his own cause and no witness could certify that his own testimony was true. Anyone who had a personal stake in an enquiry must have kept himself aloof from the enquiry. The Court further held that in such a case it could not be considered that the employee did not deserve any relief from the Court since he was habitually guilty of acts subversive of discipline. The illegality from which the order of dismissal passed by the authority concerned suffered was of a character so grave and fundamental that the alleged habitual misbehaviour of the delinquent employee could not cure or condone it.

29. Thus, the legal position emerges that if a person appears as a witness in disciplinary proceedings, he cannot be an enquiry officer nor can he pass the order of punishment as a disciplinary authority. This rule has been held to be sacred. An apprehension of bias operates as a disqualification for a person to act as adjudicator. No person can be a judge in his own cause and no witness can certify that his own testimony is true. Anyone who has personal interest in the disciplinary proceedings must keep himself away from such proceedings. The violation of the principles of natural justice renders the order null and void.” 20.          The Doctrine “ No man can be judge of his own cause” can be  applied   only   to   cases   where   the   person   concerned   has   a   personal  interest or has himself already done some act or taken a decision in the  matter concerned. For the Doctrine to come into play, it must be shown  that the Officer concerned has a personal bias or connection or personal  interest or personally acted in the matter concerned and/or has already  taken a decision one way or the other, which he may be interested in  supporting.

21. It is clear as noon from the relevant facts noticed hereinabove  that the concerned officer had not only recommended institution of  11. vigilance   inquiry   and   investigation   in   the   mater   relating   to   bitumen  scam, a subject matter with which the petitioner is concerned but had  also come to a finding of guilt as a Inquiry Officer on being appointed by  the disciplinary authority, respondent no.3.   In that sense,   the person  had taken  a decision one way or other which he/she may be interested  in supporting while taking a decision as a disciplinary authority or as an  appellate authority.   The inference that can be easily drawn is that the  entire decision making process has suffered. The inquiry stands  vitiated  from the stage of appointment of inquiry officer itself.        The   charges   are   reported   to   be   grave.   The   court   need   not  comment  upon  them   at  this  stage   as  fresh  inquiry   from   the   stage   of  appointment of inquiry officer is required to be undertaken on the same  set of charges where the prosecution and the delinquent employee will  have   opportunity   to   prove   the   charges   and/or   defend   themselves.  However,   the   impugned   orders   and   the   departmental   proceedings  cannot be saved in the eye of law.  Accordingly, the order of punishment  dated 15th January, 2013 (Annexure­11) and the appellate order dated  26th July, 2013 (Annexure­13)  are quashed.   However, liberty is reserved  with   the   respondent   authorities   to   proceed   afresh   from   the   stage   of  appointment of inquiry officer on the charges against the petitioner in  the   said   departmental   inquiry   in   accordance   with   law   and   after  observance of principles of natural justice in a time bound manner.   22. In view of the findings recorded herein above, let a copy of  this   order   be   sent   to   the   Chief   Secretary,   Government   of   Jharkhand,  Ranchi for taking corrective steps.  23.              The writ petition is accordingly, allowed.                                                                                                                                    (Aparesh Kumar Singh,J)      jk