Vikram Singh Vs. State of Haryana - Court Judgment

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criminal - applicability of act - section 2(1) of juvenile justice (care and protection of children) act, 2000 and rule 97 of juvenile justice (care and protection of children) rules 2007 - appellant accused claimed to be juvenile on date of incident - appellant was convicted by trial court and latter confirmed by high court - held, according to school certificate of appellant on date of incident his age was sixteen years - during trial juvenile justice act of 1986 was applicable - after coming into force of act of 2000 'juvenile in conflict with law' means child who had not completed age of eighteen years - considering facts and circumstances of case benefits of act of 200 be given to appellant - period of sentence be adjusted for sentence already gone - appellant be released from custody unless required to be in custody in any other case - appeal allowed - m.p. lok seva (anusuchit jatiyon, anusuchitjan jatiyon aur anya pichhade vargon ke liye arakshan) adhiniyam [21/1994]. sections 5(5a) [as inserted by amending act of 2002) & 13 & m.p. public service commission (services promotion)_ rules, 2002, rule 1: [a.k. mathur & markandey katju, jj] promotion with consequential seniority held, where by virtue of the 77th and 85th constitutional amendment and consequential act and rules framed by the state of madhya pradesh, it is possible to provide a proper seniority to the persons who have been promoted against scheduled caste and scheduled tribe quota - a seniority as a result of their appointment against reserved post of scheduled caste or scheduled tribe but, this has all come into force from 2002 only, however, in the present case, the controversy dates beck to1985 on the post of executive engineer as there was no vacancy in general category and the appellant was earlier promoted in1980 against scheduled caste category, the appellant would not be entitled for seniority as against the general category candidates, because neither the constitutional amendments had come into force at that time nor were the rules. neither the 77th constitutional amendment nor the 85th constitutional amendment had been made retrospective from 1985 and at that time, the circular of the government of 1975 was in force and as per that circular of the government, incumbent was not entitled to the seniority on account of his accelerated promotion against the reserved quota, and he was only entitled to the accelerated promotion but not the seniority. -- constitution of india. article 16 (4a) [as inserted by constitution (seventy-seventh amendment) act, 1995]: promotion with consequential seniority held, where by virtue of the 77th and 85th constitutional amendment and consequential act and rules framed by the state of madhya pradesh, it is possible to provide a proper seniority to the persons who have been promoted against scheduled caste and scheduled tribe quota - a seniority as a result of their appointment against reserved post of scheduled caste or scheduled tribe but, this has all come into force from 2002 only, however, in the present case, the controversy dates beck to1985 on the post of executive engineer as there was no vacancy in general category and the appellant was earlier promoted in1980 against scheduled caste category, the appellant would not be entitled for seniority as against the general category candidates, because neither the constitutional amendments had come into force at that time nor were the rules. neither the 77th constitutional amendment nor the 85th constitutional amendment had been made retrospective from 1985 and at that time, the circular of the government of 1975 was in force and as per that circular of the government, incumbent was not entitled to the seniority on account of his accelerated promotion against the reserved quota, and he was only entitled to the accelerated promotion but not the seniority. arijit pasayat, j.1. heard learned counsel for the parties.2. the controversy lies within a very narrow compass which relates to legality of the proceedings before the learned sessions judge, kurukshetra, in dealing with the present matter. according to the appellant, he was a juvenile when the occurrence took place on 20/2/1996. the appellant was shown to have been arrested on 1/3/1996.3. relying on the certificate issued by the central board of secondary education it is contended that the appellant was born on 4.5.1980 and on the date of incident he was below 16 years of age. on 5/6/1998, the appellant was convicted for life imprisonment and other terms between 7 and 10 years.4. at the time of conviction the juvenile justice act, 1936 (hereinafter referred to as '1986 act') was in operation.5. the 1986 act was subsequently repealed by juvenile justice (care and protection of children) act, 2000 (hereinafter referred to as '2000 act'). on 22.3.2006 section 2(1) of the act was amended stating that 'juvenile in conflict with law' means juvenile who is alleged to have committed an offence and has not completed 18 years of age as on the date of commission of such offence. the juvenile justice (care and protection of children) rules 2007 (hereinafter referred to as '2007 rules') were brought into force on 26th october 2007.6. as per rule 97(2) all the cases pending which have not received a finality will be dealt with and disposed of in terms of the provisions of the 2000 act as amended on 22/8/2006 and 2007 rules. it appears that the high court judgment is of 26/5/2006 when the rule 97(2) as applicable was not in existence as it was brought into force in 2007 (i.e. 26th october, 2007).7. we are of the view that the appellant is entitled to the benefit under the provisions of 2000 act as amended from 22.8.2006, and 2007 rules. therefore while confirming the conviction, considering the period of custody already suffered by the appellant, we direct that he shall be released from custody forthwith unless he is required in custody in any other case. normally we would have remitted the matter to be dealt with by the appropriate court. but considering the long passage of time and period of custody, we have passed the present order.8. the appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.