Ambalal Mansukhram Joshi Vs. the Additional Special Land Acquisition Officer, Ahmedabad and anr. - Court Judgment

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- labour & servicesappointment: [r.v. raveendran & markandey katju,jj] reservation kerala state & subordinate services rules, 1958, rr.14(a), (b); 15 to 18 - rule14(b) providing that reserved category candidate qualifying in open merit should not be adjusted against reserved seat held, when rule 14(a) providing the method of implementing reservation does not state that 50% seats are for open merit candidates, 40% for obc candidates and 10% for sc/st candidates, but states that the unit of appointment for the purpose of the rule shall be 20. rule 14(b) which provides that if a sc/st/obc candidate qualify in the open merit then he would not be treated as a sc/st/obc candidate and he will be adjusted against the 10 seats meant for open merit, has to be applied to each unit of appointment and not to total number of vacancies notified for appointment by treating total vacancies as unit of appointment. harmonious interpretation has to be given to rules 14(a) and rule 14(b), and neither has to be real as prevailing over the others. applying rule 14(b) to total vacancies by giving overriding effect to rule14(b) would increase the total reservation in favour of the reserved categories beyond 50% and dilute the merit of those chosen to even lower levels in violation of rule 15 of the rules. the correct interpretation of the rules is that a common rank list as per merit for all the successful candidates in respect of selection to the vacancies notified by the public service commission should be prepared, and reservation should be applied with reference to units of 20. that is, the first 20 most meritorious candidates, that is, from serial no.1 to 20 in that common rank list should first be considered for the purpose of reservation. at that stage, candidates from serial no. 21 and below are not to be considered. out of these 20 most meritorious candidates, the appointments have then to be made in accordance with rule 14(c) which provides for order of rotation in every cycle of 20 vacancies. it is only after the selections have been made against these first 20 most meritorious selected candidates, that the p.s.c. should move to the next batch of 20 in the rank list i.e., from serial no. 21 to 40, and the same process is to be repeated again. the plea of hardship to some sc/st/obc candidates is not tenable as hardship is not relevant consideration when the meaning of the rule is plain and clear. where the language of the act or the rules is clear and explicit, the words of the statute alone represents the intention of the legislature. the high court could not have read a proviso into rule 14(a) providing that where the number of vacancies reported to the commission for advice exceeds 20, the unit of appointment shall be the number of vacancies reported to the commission. this is not a legitimate method of interpretation. such interpretation could not be made by placing reliance on the fact that the annexure to rule 15 containing the integrated cycle is based n a roster of 100 points. the terms integrated cycle and unit of appointment are entirely different concepts. the concept of an integrated cycle could never be the basis for rendering the unit of appointment of 20 in rule 14(a) otiose in cases where the number of vacancies reported to the kerala public service commission exceeds 20. - yet the appellant is not satisfied with what he has got. on the facts of this case, there is no justification for re-examining the evidence in a detailed manner when we are fully satisfied that the appellant had been paid more than six times the real value of its rights.k.s. hegde, j.1. this is an appeal by certificate. apart from technicalities of law, on merits, the claim of the appellant appears to be a preposterous one. the appellant was the owner of final plot nos, 9 and 42 in the city of ahmedabad. he had granted the same, on permanent lease to certain company in the year 1905, under the lease deed, he was entitled to a rent of rs. 150/- in respect of final plot no. 9 and rs. 131/- in respect of final plot no. 42.2. these plots were notified for acquisition under section 4 of the land acquisition act in the years 1952-55 by two different notifications. thereafter, they were duly notified under section 6 and taken possession in due course.3. the lessee of the plot settled his claim with the government by private agreement. therefore, only the compensation payable by the appellant had to be determined. before the land acquisition officer, the appellant claimed compensation for plot no. 9 at the rate of rs. 25 per sq. yard & for plot no. 42 at the rate of rs. 20/- per sq. yard. the land acquisition officer valued the first plot at rs. 11/- per sq. yard and the second plot at rs. 8/- per sq. yard. on a reference to the land acquisition judge, the compensation payable in respect of the land acquired were enhanced to rs. 12/- per sq. yard in respect of plot no. 9 and rs. 9/- per sq. yard in respect of plot no. 42. under section 20 of the land acquisition act the learned judge apportioned the compensation between the lessee and the lessor at the ratio of 5 : 1. on appeal at the instance of the appellant, the compensation in respect of plot no. 9 was enhanced to rs. 14/- per sq. yard and in respect of plot no. 42 to rs. 9/- per sq. yeard. in the result, the appellant got over rs. 45,000/- as compensation in respect of his rights for which he was getting annually a sum of rs. 381/-. the value of his right to reversion a remote one-is little or nothing. even if we calculate the interest on the compensation amount at 6% per annum, the appellant is now getting over rs. 2,700/- per year in the place of rs. 381/- which he was getting previously. a greater windfall can hardly be expected. yet the appellant is not satisfied with what he has got. he is insisting that we should grant the real value of the land and give him his 1/4 share thereof.4. we have been taken through the relevant portions of the judgment of the high court. we have not found any reason to differ from the conclusions reached by that court in respect of the valuation made. it had properly assessed the evidence before it. on the facts of this case, there is no justification for re-examining the evidence in a detailed manner when we are fully satisfied that the appellant had been paid more than six times the real value of its rights.5. in the result, this appeal fails and the same is dismissed with costs.