Onkar Nath Vs. Ved Vyas - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
tenancy - landlord - section 13 (3) of east punjab urban rent restriction act, 1949 - respondent filed suit eviction of appellant and finding was to effect that respondent required premise for own occupation - no evidence or averment in plaint that land lord not occupying other residential building and that he not vacated such other building without sufficient cause - court observed that inadequacy of pleadings as well as absence of proof of vital requirement of section 13 (3) (a) makes it clear that respondent could not be granted eviction of appellant. - land acquisition act (1 of 1894)section 23 :[tarun chatterjee & v.s.sirpurkar,jj] market value of acquired property - burden of proof held, the burden of proving the true market value of acquired property is on the state that has acquired it for a particular purpose. where the landowner has been able to show, by the testimony and valuation report of the expert valuer, that the award of compensation passed by the land acquisition officer was inadequate, the onus now shifts in civil cases is that of balance of probability and not that of beyond reasonable doubt. thus minor inconsistencies in evidence are not relevant in civil cases in considering the question of discharge of this burden. if the state has been unable to produce any evidence at all to support its claim of sufficiency of the award, and the conclusion of the high court is backed only by assertions rather than by acceptable reasoning based on proper appreciation of evidence, the order of the high court cannot be sustained. section 23: [tarun chatterjee & v.s.sirpurkar,jj] market value of acquired property-held, proximity to develop urbanized area needs to be necessarily considered, while deciding on the compensation to be paid for acquisition of land, on the basis of evidence available. where there is evidence to show that acquired property is situated near highway and the state has not given any evidence to rebut this contention, the court cannot overlook the proximity of the acquired property to a developed area, and the high court cannot set aside the order of the reference court merely on grounds of minor inconsistencies and technicalities. the compensation provision of the act is in the nature of welfare stipulation and thus the state government must be just and fair to those whose land it acquires. section 51-a :[tarun chatterjee & v.s. sirpurkar, jj] market value of acquired land -valuation report by expert valuer based on his personal visit to site, map drawn after measurements and after deducing cost of depreciation - pwd practice and standard engineering norms adopted for deciding value - all such factors, held, made the report worthy of credence. he being expert in his filed he can rely on his knowledge, experience and judgment to come to conclusion regarding type of material used in construction and its source, it is not necessary for him on report of some other person. section 51-a :[tarun chatterjee & v.s. sirpurkar, jj] meaning of expression may held, section 51-a permits acceptance of the certified copy of the sale transaction, as produced by the witness, even without examination of the vendor or vendee. however, the use of the term may in the said provision shows that there is discretion with the court to the extent of reliance to be placed on the same. where the state has been unable to adduce any evidence to rebut the sale deed, reliance on the same and to consider it genuine is permissible section 54: [tarun chatterjee & v.s.sirpurkar, jj] appeal - jurisdiction of supreme court under article 136 of constitution - interference with finding of fact - principles regarding - held, on the question of exercising power to interfere with findings of fact by the supreme court under article 136 the principles that emerge, are (1) the powers of supreme court under article 136 are very wide. (2) it is open to supreme court to interfere with the findings of fact given by the high court if the high court has acted perversely or otherwise improperly. (3) when the evidence adduced by the parties in support of their respective cases fell short of reliability and acceptability and as such it is highly unsafe and improper to act upon it. (4) the appreciation of evidence and finding is vitiated by any error of law of procedure or found contrary to the principles of natural justice, errors of record and misreading of the evidence, or where the conclusions of the high court are manifestly perverse and unsupportable from the evidence on record. (5) the appreciation of evidence and finding results in serious miscarriage of justice of manifest illegality. (6) where findings of subordinate courts are shown to be perverse or based on no evidence or irrelevant evidence or there are material irregularities affecting the said findings or where the court feels that justice has failed and the findings are likely to result in unduly excessive hardship. (7) when the high court has re-determined a fact in issue in a civil appeal, and erred in drawing inferences based on presumptions. (8) the judgment was not a proper judgment of reversal. where in a land acquisition matter, the evidence and material was duly considered by the reference court and the compensation amount was enhanced, there was no justification for the high court to interfere with the findings of the reference court and to set aside order of the reference court and to restore the order of lao merely on suggestions given by the state in cross-examination of the witnesses of landowner. the findings made by the high court were arbitrary and improper inasmuch as the high court had failed to consider the total lack of evidence adduced by the state and disregarded the witnesses produced before it without sufficient justification for doubting their credibility. such arbitrariness in findings had caused serious miscarriage of justice as against the landowner by denying him a just and reasonable compensation for property acquired from him by the state. order1. leave granted. 2. we have heard counsel on both sides in this short rent control case. the ground on which eviction was sought was in terms of section 13(3)(a)(i) of the east punjab urban rent restriction act, 1949. the sub-section reads thus:3. (a) a landlord may apply to the controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession:(i) in case of the residential building,(a) he requires it for his own occupation; (b) he is not occupying any other residential building in the urban area concerned; and(c) has not vacated such a building without sufficient cause after the commencement of this act, in the said urban area; it is common ground that there are three requirements to make out a cause of action for eviction under that provision, and indeed this is apparent from a bare reading of the sub-section. in the present case the finding is to the effect that the landlord requires the residential building for his own occupation. but, the legislation has taken care to insist upon two more conditions, namely, (a) that the landlord is not occupying any other residential building in the area concerned; and (b) that he has not vacated such a building without sufficient cause. there is not a scintilla of evidence nor indeed there is any averment in compliance with these latter conditions. the necessary consequence follows that not merely is there inadequacy of pleadings sufficient to make out a cause of action but total absence of proof of two vital requirements.3. the statute benignly designed to protect tenants from unreasonable evictions has taken care to put restrictions which must be rigorously construed to fulfill the purpose of the statute. a mere affidavit at a late stage of the litigative process can hardly be adequate to meet the mandate of section 13(3) of the act. in these circumstances, we are constrained to allow the appeal. it is unfortunate that the respondent who moved for eviction is himself an advocate and at least for that reason, cannot plead ignorance of law. the appeal is allowed but as a special extenuation in favour of his ignorance of law, we allow him to file proceedings for eviction de novo if so advised making it clear that the allowance of the present appeal will not stand in his way. the appeal is allowed with costs quantified at rs. 1000/-.

Judgment:
ORDER

1. Leave granted.

2. We have heard Counsel on both sides in this short rent control case. The ground on which eviction was sought was in terms of Section 13(3)(a)(i) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949. The Sub-section reads thus:

3. (a) A landlord may apply to the Controller for an Order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession:

(i) in case of the residential building,

(a) he requires it for his own occupation;

(b) he is not occupying any other residential building in the urban area concerned; and

(c) has not vacated such a building without sufficient cause after the commencement of this Act, in the said urban area;

It is common ground that there are three requirements to make out a cause of action for eviction under that provision, and indeed this is apparent from a bare reading of the Sub-section. In the present case the finding is to the effect that the landlord requires the residential building for his own occupation. But, the legislation has taken care to insist upon two more conditions, namely, (a) that the landlord is not occupying any other residential building in the area concerned; and (b) that he has not vacated such a building without sufficient cause. There is not a scintilla of evidence nor indeed there is any averment in compliance with these latter conditions. The necessary consequence follows that not merely is there inadequacy of pleadings sufficient to make out a cause of action but total absence of proof of two vital requirements.

3. The statute benignly designed to protect tenants from unreasonable evictions has taken care to put restrictions which must be rigorously construed to fulfill the purpose of the statute. A mere affidavit at a late stage of the litigative process can hardly be adequate to meet the mandate of Section 13(3) of the Act. In these circumstances, we are constrained to allow the appeal. It is unfortunate that the respondent who moved for eviction is himself an advocate and at least for that reason, cannot plead ignorance of law. The appeal is allowed but as a special extenuation in favour of his ignorance of law, we allow him to file proceedings for eviction de novo if so advised making it clear that the allowance of the present appeal will not stand in his way. The appeal is allowed with costs quantified at Rs. 1000/-.