Suresh Chandra Vs. the State of Gujarat - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- land acquisition act (1 of 1894)section 23 :[tarun chatterjee & v.s.sirpurkar,jj] market value of acquired property - burden of proof held, the burden of proving the true market value of acquired property is on the state that has acquired it for a particular purpose. where the landowner has been able to show, by the testimony and valuation report of the expert valuer, that the award of compensation passed by the land acquisition officer was inadequate, the onus now shifts in civil cases is that of balance of probability and not that of beyond reasonable doubt. thus minor inconsistencies in evidence are not relevant in civil cases in considering the question of discharge of this burden. if the state has been unable to produce any evidence at all to support its claim of sufficiency of the award, and the conclusion of the high court is backed only by assertions rather than by acceptable reasoning based on proper appreciation of evidence, the order of the high court cannot be sustained. section 23: [tarun chatterjee & v.s.sirpurkar,jj] market value of acquired property-held, proximity to develop urbanized area needs to be necessarily considered, while deciding on the compensation to be paid for acquisition of land, on the basis of evidence available. where there is evidence to show that acquired property is situated near highway and the state has not given any evidence to rebut this contention, the court cannot overlook the proximity of the acquired property to a developed area, and the high court cannot set aside the order of the reference court merely on grounds of minor inconsistencies and technicalities. the compensation provision of the act is in the nature of welfare stipulation and thus the state government must be just and fair to those whose land it acquires. section 51-a :[tarun chatterjee & v.s. sirpurkar, jj] market value of acquired land -valuation report by expert valuer based on his personal visit to site, map drawn after measurements and after deducing cost of depreciation - pwd practice and standard engineering norms adopted for deciding value - all such factors, held, made the report worthy of credence. he being expert in his filed he can rely on his knowledge, experience and judgment to come to conclusion regarding type of material used in construction and its source, it is not necessary for him on report of some other person. section 51-a :[tarun chatterjee & v.s. sirpurkar, jj] meaning of expression may held, section 51-a permits acceptance of the certified copy of the sale transaction, as produced by the witness, even without examination of the vendor or vendee. however, the use of the term may in the said provision shows that there is discretion with the court to the extent of reliance to be placed on the same. where the state has been unable to adduce any evidence to rebut the sale deed, reliance on the same and to consider it genuine is permissible section 54: [tarun chatterjee & v.s.sirpurkar, jj] appeal - jurisdiction of supreme court under article 136 of constitution - interference with finding of fact - principles regarding - held, on the question of exercising power to interfere with findings of fact by the supreme court under article 136 the principles that emerge, are (1) the powers of supreme court under article 136 are very wide. (2) it is open to supreme court to interfere with the findings of fact given by the high court if the high court has acted perversely or otherwise improperly. (3) when the evidence adduced by the parties in support of their respective cases fell short of reliability and acceptability and as such it is highly unsafe and improper to act upon it. (4) the appreciation of evidence and finding is vitiated by any error of law of procedure or found contrary to the principles of natural justice, errors of record and misreading of the evidence, or where the conclusions of the high court are manifestly perverse and unsupportable from the evidence on record. (5) the appreciation of evidence and finding results in serious miscarriage of justice of manifest illegality. (6) where findings of subordinate courts are shown to be perverse or based on no evidence or irrelevant evidence or there are material irregularities affecting the said findings or where the court feels that justice has failed and the findings are likely to result in unduly excessive hardship. (7) when the high court has re-determined a fact in issue in a civil appeal, and erred in drawing inferences based on presumptions. (8) the judgment was not a proper judgment of reversal. where in a land acquisition matter, the evidence and material was duly considered by the reference court and the compensation amount was enhanced, there was no justification for the high court to interfere with the findings of the reference court and to set aside order of the reference court and to restore the order of lao merely on suggestions given by the state in cross-examination of the witnesses of landowner. the findings made by the high court were arbitrary and improper inasmuch as the high court had failed to consider the total lack of evidence adduced by the state and disregarded the witnesses produced before it without sufficient justification for doubting their credibility. such arbitrariness in findings had caused serious miscarriage of justice as against the landowner by denying him a just and reasonable compensation for property acquired from him by the state. - 1. i have heard submissions of sri agarwala counsel for the petitioner, on the alleged errors of law and wrong appreciation of evidence largely plausible exercises in coquetry with technicality, inelegance of expression and like arguments which did not pay dividends in the two courts below and cannot be re-opened in this court. penological innovation in the shape of parole is claimed to be a success in rehabilitation and checking recidivism.orderv.r. krishna iyer, j.1. i have heard submissions of sri agarwala counsel for the petitioner, on the alleged errors of law and wrong appreciation of evidence largely plausible exercises in coquetry with technicality, inelegance of expression and like arguments which did not pay dividends in the two courts below and cannot be re-opened in this court. after all, romance with legal niceties and probative nuances, if exaggerated beyond a limit, produce in the long run, a justice gap which is socially injurious. i see no grave error or miscarriage of justice in law or fact.2. the petitioner is a tax inspector trapped in the act of taking a bribe of rs. 100/- a small sum and a small official in the wide perspective of indian public service. may be, it is the lesser minions who get caught and purging public life of maxi-corruption by deterrent sentences is more desirable but less feasible. both these alibis, perhaps valid outside court, cannot attenuate the quantum of punishment or the propriety of its severity. the watershed of pollusion in the administration cannot be permitted to be crossed by misconceived judicial compassion or high level executive indifference. one public official who slips out of the processual meshes of the anti-corruption law is the hope of the hundred in hiding. indeed the culprit in this case is but one sales-tax inspector who has stumbled into a police-laid marked-note magnetic field as against many whose operations are too secretive for detection. if only all our tax authorities at all levels were stern, strict, wide-eyed, activist, of inviolable probity and indifferent to disingenuous pleas of evasion, from big tax dodgers, inequality of wealth and income would, in a large measure, wither away-a social order devoutly to be wished. i refuse leave, sanguine that judicial relentlessness in this area may help sweep clean our public services, both at the higher and lower echelons.3. i venture to make one observation before parting with this case. penological innovation in the shape of parole is claimed to be a success in rehabilitation and checking recidivism. here the petitioner is a first offender and a small official relatively young in his carrer. although the crime is of the white-collar brand and deserves no sympathy, it is a matter for consideration of the prison authorities or others vested with the requisite power, whether the present petitioner should not be considered for parole after he has served a fair portion of his sentence. it is also open to the petitioner to move under section 432. criminal procedure code for earlier release before the full term has run out. all this depends upon his behavior in jail showing that he has turned a new leaf. if he does not, he cannot hope for law's clemency in this regard and may have to serve his full incarceration term. with these observations, i refuse leave.

Judgment:
ORDER

V.R. Krishna Iyer, J.

1. I have heard submissions of Sri Agarwala counsel for the petitioner, on the alleged errors of law and wrong appreciation of evidence largely plausible exercises in coquetry with technicality, inelegance of expression and like arguments which did not pay dividends in the two courts below and cannot be re-opened in this Court. After all, romance with legal niceties and probative nuances, if exaggerated beyond a limit, produce in the long run, a justice gap which is socially injurious. I see no grave error or miscarriage of justice in law or fact.

2. The petitioner is a tax inspector trapped in the act of taking a bribe of Rs. 100/- a small sum and a small official in the wide perspective of Indian public service. May be, it is the lesser minions who get caught and purging public life of maxi-corruption by deterrent sentences is more desirable but less feasible. Both these alibis, perhaps valid outside court, cannot attenuate the quantum of punishment or the propriety of its severity. The watershed of pollusion in the administration cannot be permitted to be crossed by misconceived judicial compassion or high level executive indifference. One public official who slips out of the processual meshes of the anti-corruption law is the hope of the hundred in hiding. Indeed the culprit in this case is but one sales-tax inspector who has stumbled into a police-laid marked-note magnetic field as against many whose operations are too secretive for detection. If only all our tax authorities at all levels were stern, strict, wide-eyed, activist, of inviolable probity and indifferent to disingenuous pleas of evasion, from big tax dodgers, inequality of wealth and income would, in a large measure, wither away-a social order devoutly to be wished. I refuse leave, sanguine that judicial relentlessness in this area may help sweep clean our public services, both at the higher and lower echelons.

3. I venture to make one observation before parting with this case. Penological innovation in the shape of parole is claimed to be a success in rehabilitation and checking recidivism. Here the petitioner is a first offender and a small official relatively young in his carrer. Although the crime is of the white-collar brand and deserves no sympathy, it is a matter for consideration of the prison authorities or others vested with the requisite power, whether the present petitioner should not be considered for parole after he has served a fair portion of his sentence. It is also open to the petitioner to move under Section 432. Criminal Procedure Code for earlier release before the full term has run out. All this depends upon his behavior in jail showing that he has turned a new leaf. If he does not, he cannot hope for law's clemency in this regard and may have to serve his full incarceration term. With these observations, I refuse leave.