Major V.P. Singh and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citationsooperkanoon.com/654707
SubjectProperty
CourtSupreme Court of India
Decided OnMar-20-1991
Case NumberCivil Appeals Nos. 1913-16 of 1980
Judge Ranganath Misra, C.J. and; Kuldip Singh, J.
Reported inAIR1991SC1502; [1993]199ITR188(SC); JT1991(3)SC14; 1991Supp(2)SCC346
ActsTransfer of Property Act, 1882 - Sections 122; Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 - Sections 5(6)
AppellantMajor V.P. Singh and Others
RespondentState of U.P. and Others
Cases ReferredAndhra Pradesh v. Khan Saheb Dost Mohd. Alladin
Excerpt:
- indian succession act (39 of 1925), section 276: [s.b. sinha, lokeshwar singh panta & b. sudershan reddy, jj] forgery of will - pendency of probate proceedings vis-a-vis criminal case involving allegations of forgery of will whether a civil suit or a criminal case should be stayed in the event both are pending - held, ordinarily a criminal proceeding will have primacy over the civil proceeding. precedence to a criminal proceeding is given having regard to the fact that disposal of a civil proceeding ordinarily takes a long time and in the interest of justice the former should be disposed of as expeditiously as possible. whether civil proceedings or criminal proceedings shall be stayed depends upon the fact and circumstances of each case indian evidence act, 1872 sections 41.....1. these appeals by special leave are directed against the decision of the allahabad high court in writ petitions arising out of proceedings under the uttar pradesh imposition of ceiling on land holdings act, 1960, as amended subsequently. the landholders are the appellants.2. there is no dispute that 24th january, 1971, is the appointed date under the statute. section 5(6) of the act categorically provides that any transfer of land after that date would be inoperative, if in the absence of transfer, that land in the hands of the transferor, would have been subjected to the provision of the act. it is not in dispute that the land in question is affected by that provision.3. reliance has been placed on the second clause of the proviso which saves transfers for adequate consideration.....
Judgment:

1. These appeals by special leave are directed against the decision of the Allahabad High Court in writ petitions arising out of proceedings under the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960, as amended subsequently. The landholders are the appellants.

2. There is no dispute that 24th January, 1971, is the appointed date under the statute. Section 5(6) of the Act categorically provides that any transfer of land after that date would be inoperative, if in the absence of transfer, that land in the hands of the transferor, would have been subjected to the provision of the Act. It is not in dispute that the land in question is affected by that provision.

3. Reliance has been placed on the second clause of the proviso which saves transfers for adequate consideration between the appointed date and the date on which the statute came into force being 8th June, 1973. We are concerned with the gift which is the alienation in question, in favour of the landholder's wife's brother. The High Court dismissed the claim of the appellants by holding that Clause (b) of the proviso did not apply. That clause provides :

A transfer proved to the satisfaction of the prescribed authority to be in good faith and for adequate consideration and under an irrevocable instrument not being a benami transaction or for the immediate or deferred benefit of the tenure-holders or other members of his family.

4. One of the basic requirements for availing the benefit of the proviso is that the transfer should be for adequate consideration. 'Adequate consideration' has not been defined by the Act and, therefore, the High Court has relied upon the concept of gift in the Transfer of Property Act. This being a gift, reference has been made to Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act where gift has been defined as under :

'Gift' is the transfer of certain existing movable or immovable property made voluntarily and without consideration, by one person, called the donor, to another, called the donee, and accepted by or on behalf of the donee.

5. A gift is a transaction without consideration whereas exception under the proviso is in regard to a transaction for adequate consideration. In the absence of a definition of the phrase 'adequate consideration', the common parlance meaning of the term has to be accepted. A reference to the decision of Hidayatullah, J. as he then was in Tulsidas Kilachand v. Commr. of Income-tax, Bombay City I : [1961]42ITR1(SC) shows that the words 'adequate consideration' were held to denote consideration other than mere love and affection which, in the case of a wife, may be presumed. When the law insists that there should be 'adequate consideration' and not good consideration, it excludes mere love and affection. The same view has been taken by this Court in Commr. of Wealth-tax, Andhra Pradesh v. Khan Saheb Dost Mohd. Alladin : [1973]91ITR179(AP) . Mr. Jain wanted us to accept his submission that these cases related to tax aspects and the meaning ascribed to the term in tax law should not be introduced into the present matters. We do not think this submission should be accepted. The appeals are devoid of merit and are dismissed. No costs.