Uma Shankar Vs. State of U.P. - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citationsooperkanoon.com/652062
SubjectCriminal
CourtSupreme Court of India
Decided OnMar-22-1979
Case NumberCriminal Appeal No. 168 of 1974
Judge A.D. Koshal and; S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, JJ.
Reported inAIR1979SC1456; 1979CriLJ1119; 1979Supp(1)SCC407; 1979(11)LC779(SC)
ActsIndian Penal Code (IPC) - Sections 34 and 307
AppellantUma Shankar
RespondentState of U.P.
Excerpt:
- [a.k. sarkar,; raghuvar dayal and; v. ramaswami, jj.] the annual value of certain premises occupied by the appellant was ascertained by the methods prescribed in cl. (b) of s. 127 of the calcutta municipal act, 1923, with a view to assess the municipal rates payable in of the premises. the appellant lodged objections under s. 139 claiming,inter alia, that the basis of valuation was wrong as it should have beenmade by the method prescribed in cl. (a) of s. 127 and that the valuationwas in any event excessive. the deputy commissioner rejected the objections, except that he reduced the valuation slightly; but an appeal under s. 141 to the court of small causes was allowed and that court directed that a fresh valuation had to be made under cl. (a) of s. 127 by the executive officer, starting from the proceeding mentioned under s. 131(2)(b). the respondent thereupon appealed to the high court. but the contentions raised by it were rejected; however, in view of the fact that the time-limit for an assessment by the executive officer under s. 131(2)(b) having expired he could no more make the valuation which the court of small causes directed him to make and to prevent the corporation being deprived of its rates as a result of such expiry of time, the high court made an order remanding the case to the court of small causes and directed it to make the valuation itself. in the appeal to this court it was contended on behalf of the appellant that as the original valuation had been cancelled because of an irregularity, the present case fell within s. 131(2)(b), and the high court had no power to remand the case for a valuation by the lower court-. and that in any event the order of remand was unjustifiable because it converted the appellant's appeal to the court of small causes into a proceeding wholly alien to what it was originally meant for. in that it went beyond the scope of the objection made by the appellant under s. 139. on the other hand, it wag the respondent's contention that the present case was one of revision and alteration of a valuation contemplated in ss. 147 and 164 and not one of cancellation of a valuation within the meaning of s. 131(2)(b). held:(per sarkar and raghubar dayal jj.) the high court's order remanding the case to the court of small causes with a direction to ascertain the annual value could not be sustained. the liability for rates is a statutory liability under the act and for such liability to arise the valuation had to be made as provided in the statute. the act does not contemplate that rates may be fixed on the basis of a valuation made by a court such a valuation would create no statutory liability. it would be fruitless to direct the court of small causes to make a fresh valuation. [548 c-e] the direction of the high court to the court of small causes was not to revise or alter a valuation but to make a fresh valuation and is such the high court's order could not be upheld as directing a revision or alteration of the valuation under s. 147 or 164 of the act. [548 f, g] royal asiatic society of bengal v. corporation of calcutta, 58 c.w.n. 537; disapproved. governor general of india in council v. corporation of calcutta, 51 c.w.n. 517; north british & mercantile insurance co. ltd. v. corporation of calcutta (calcutta high court case no. 6 of 1943, unreported); corporation of calcutta v. chandoo lal bhai chand modi 57 c.w.n. 882; referred to. (per ramaswami j. dissenting) (i)the high court having remanded the case to the lower court with a direction to ascertain the annual value under s. 127(a) after allowing the parties to give further evidence, the valuation had not been finally determined, but was awaiting final adjudication. it was not therefore correct to say that there had been a cancellation of the valuation within the meaning of s. 131(2)(b). the present case was one of the revision of valuation and fell under the purview of s. 147, so that the revised valuation when finally determined would take effect retrospectively from the point of time mentioned in that section. [557 h-558 b] (ii)though the objection made by the appellant tinder s. 139 was an objection to the valuation, whatever be the ground of objection, the primary object of the appellant was to get the valuation set aside. it could not therefore be said that the order of remand made by the high court was beyond the scope of the appeal. [558 d, g] - he submitted that the evidence clearly shows that there was animus between the complainant and the appellant and the appellant was falsely implicated due to enmity. pw 1 clearly admitted in his evidence that there was enmity between the parties and in that connection the witness deposed as follows :the case under section 307 was decided on 19-4-69 and we were acquitted.s. murtaza fazal ali, j.1. this appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the allahabad high court (lucknow bench) by which the appellant has been convicted under section 302/34 and sentenced to imprisonment for life as also under section 307/34 and sentenced to five years' r. i. a detailed narrative of the prosecution story has been given in the judgment of the high court and the sessions judge and it is not necessary for us to repeat it all over again.2. appearing for the appellant mr. goswami has raised a short point before us. he submitted that the evidence clearly shows that there was animus between the complainant and the appellant and the appellant was falsely implicated due to enmity. it appears that in the fir it was categorically stated that umasharskar alongwith ram lakhan and deena nath armed with kanta reached the place of occurrence and all of them said that the deceased should be killed. yet this allegation has been given a complete go by in the evidence of fw 1 who has attributed the overt act of incitement to uma shankar alone and not to the others. pw 1 clearly admitted in his evidence that there was enmity between the parties and in that connection the witness deposed as follows :the case under section 307 was decided on 19-4-69 and we were acquitted. in that 307 ipc case accused persons named umashankar and pikarma present in court and satti din and lal bihari were prosecution witnesses. against all these four witnesses a case regarding giving of false evidence was started. there accused persons were inimical to my nephew padum prasad and myself.it was argued by mr. goswami and in the background of this enmity, it appears, that uma shanker has been falsely implicated. there is no reason by the prosecution for the vital change of the act attributed to uma shanker when the case was put forward in the court, as compared to the one which was mentioned at the first instance in the fir no other act of participation in the crime hat been attributed to the appellant uma shankar at all. there appears to be a very reasonable possibility of the appellant having been implicated due to enmity and given the assignment of incitement to seek personal vendetta. in the circumstances, therefore, we feel that the appellant is entitled to the benefit of the doubt. for these reasons, therefore, the appeal is allowed, the conviction and sentence passed on the appellant is set aside and he is acquitted of the charges framed against him. the appellant, now, shall be discharged from his bail bonds.
Judgment:

S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, J.

1. This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) by which the appellant has been convicted under Section 302/34 and sentenced to imprisonment for life as also under Section 307/34 and sentenced to five years' R. I. A detailed narrative of the prosecution story has been given in the judgment of the High Court and the Sessions Judge and it is not necessary for us to repeat it all over again.

2. Appearing for the appellant Mr. Goswami has raised a short point before us. He submitted that the evidence clearly shows that there was animus between the complainant and the appellant and the appellant was falsely implicated due to enmity. It appears that in the FIR it was categorically stated that Umasharskar alongwith Ram Lakhan and Deena Nath armed with Kanta reached the place of occurrence and all of them said that the deceased should be killed. Yet this allegation has been given a complete go by in the evidence of FW 1 who has attributed the overt act of incitement to Uma Shankar alone and not to the others. PW 1 clearly admitted in his evidence that there was enmity between the parties and in that connection the witness deposed as follows :

The case under Section 307 was decided on 19-4-69 and we were acquitted. In that 307 IPC case accused persons named Umashankar and Pikarma present in Court and Satti Din and Lal Bihari were prosecution witnesses. Against all these four witnesses a case regarding giving of false evidence was started. There accused persons were inimical to my nephew Padum Prasad and myself.

It was argued by Mr. Goswami and in the background of this enmity, it appears, that Uma Shanker has been falsely implicated. There is no reason by the prosecution for the vital change of the act attributed to Uma Shanker when the case was put forward in the Court, as compared to the one which was mentioned at the first instance in the FIR No other act of participation in the crime hat been attributed to the appellant Uma Shankar at all. There appears to be a very reasonable possibility of the appellant having been implicated due to enmity and given the assignment of incitement to seek personal vendetta. In the circumstances, therefore, we feel that the appellant is entitled to the benefit of the doubt. For these reasons, therefore, the appeal is allowed, the conviction and sentence passed on the appellant is set aside and he is acquitted of the charges framed against him. The appellant, now, shall be discharged from his bail bonds.