Sitaram Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh - Court Judgment

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criminal - implication - sections 34, 149 and 302 of indian penal code, 1860 - appellants convicted and sentenced for offence committed under sections 302, 149 and 34 - appeal against conviction - contended that eye-witness failed to identify them and did not disclosed circumstances of occurrence - court found he was not material witness - evidence of witnesses was in corroboration with prosecution witness - no error found in judgment of courts below and accordingly appeal dismissed. - [] section 2(b) of the delhi and ajmer-merwara rent control act 1947, provided as follows:-, "s. 2. in this act, unless there is anything repugnant in in the subject or context,- (a)......................................................... (b) premises' means any building or part of a building which is, or is intended to be, let separately for use as a residence or for commercial use or for any other purpose...... but does not include a room in a dharamshala, hotel or lodging house." the respondent occupied two rooms in the appellant's hotel, described as the ladies' and gents' cloak rooms, where he used to carry on his business as a hair-dresser. the document executed by the parties purported to be one as between a licenser and licensee and provided, inter alia, that the respondent was to pay an annual rent of rs. 9,600 in four quarterly installments, which was later reduced to rs. 8,400 by mutual agreement. the respondent made an application for standardisation of rent under s. 7(1) of the delhi and ajmer-merwara rent control act, 1947, and the rent controller of delhi fixed the rent at rs. 94 per month. on appeal by the appellant, the i district judge reversed the order of the rent controller and dismissed the application holding that the act did not apply. the high court in revision set aside the order of the district judge and restored that of the rent controller, holding that the agreement created a lease and not a license and that s. 2 of the act did not exempt the two rooms from the operation of the act. the two questions for determination in this appeal were, (1) whether the agreement created a lease or a license and, (2) whether the said rooms were rooms in a hotel within the meaning of s. 2(b) of the act. held, (per s. k. das and sarkar, jj., subba rao, j. dissenting), that the rooms let out by the appellant to the respondent were rooms in a hotel within the meaning of s. 2(b) of the ajmermerwara rent control act, 1947, and were as such excluded from the purview of the act and the respondent was not entitled to claim standardisation of rent under its provisions. per s. k. das, j in order that a room may be 'a room in a hotel' within the meaning of the act, it must fulfill two conditions, (1) it must be part of the hotel in the physical sense and, (2) its user must be connected with the general purpose of the hotel of which it is a part, a hair-dresser's business provided one of the amenities of a modern hotel and as such it was connected with the business of the hotel. there could be no doubt from the terms of the agreement executed by the parties in the instant case that it was a lease and not a licence. per sarkar, j.-the words "room in a hotel" in s. 2(b) of the act must be given their plain meaning and a room in a hotel must, therefore, mean any room in a building in the whole of which the business of a hotel was carried on. per subba rao, j.--although the document executed by the parties was apparently in a language appropriate to a licence, the agreement between them, judged by its substance and real intention, as it must be, left no manner of doubt that the document was a lease. it had all the characteristics that distinguished it from a license, namely, (1) that it created an interest in the property in favour of the respondent, and, (2) it gave him exclusive possession thereof, which, in the absence of any circumstances that negatived it, must indicate a clear intention to grant a lease. errington v. errington, [1952] 1 all e.r. 149 and cobb v. lane, [1952] 1 all e.r. 1199, referred to. the words 'room in a hotel', properly construed, must mean a room that was part of a hotel and partook of its character and did not cease to do so even after it was let out. consequently, where a hotel, as in the instant case, occupied the entire building, and rooms were let out for carrying on a business different from that of a hotel, such rooms could not fall within purview of s. 2 of the act. there could be no reasonable nexus in this case between a hair-dresser's business and that of a hotel as there was nothing in the document in question to prevent the tenant from carrying on any other business, or to bind him to give any preferential treatment to the lodgers, who could take their chance only as general customers, the tenant's only liability being to pay the stipulated rent. - both the courts below while accepting the testimony of these witnesses were fully alive to these infirmities, but have chosen to accept their statements by holding that the witnesses were reliable. gupta who has been of great assistance to us in deciding this case and has tried his best to support the case of the appellants, but in the view of the findings of facts arrived at by the two courts below, we are unable to interfere.fazal ali, j.1. in these two appeals by special leave, the appellants, except sita ram who has been wrongly included as one of the appellants, have been convicted under sections 302/149 and 302/34 and some of them have been sentenced to imprisonment for life and others to various terms of imprisonment under different sections of ipc. it is not necessary to give the necessary particulars in the view that we taken in this case. the prosecution case has been detailed in the judgment of the high court and the sessions judge. we have gone through the judgment of the sessions judge; and the high court and we do not find any error of law in the judgment of the high court mr. gupta appearing for the appellants, submitted that the occurrence was the result of a fight between two factions and it was contended that all the members of one family have been implicated due to previous enmity. in order to fortify his argument, counsel for the appellants relies on the report given by one babu kotwar which appears to be at page 1349 of the paper book. this report shows that one babu kotwar of bhandaria appeared at the police station and reported that a quarrel was going on between deshwalis and bharuds in the village, bhandaria. the report does not show that babu kotwar was an eye-witness who had himself seen the occurrence, nor does his report disclose any cognisable offence nor does the informant mention as to whether he had identified any of the accused nor does he disclose the circumstances in which the occurrence took place. under these circumstances, therefore, babu kotwar was not at all a material witness. it was, however, argued by mr. gupta that this witness was cited in the charge-sheet as a prosecution witness but was given up later. that by itself would not show that he is a material witness. the information which he gave does not at all show that his evidence was necessary for the unfolding of the prosecution narrative. 2. it was then contended that all the eight witnesses examined by the prosecution are interested and inimical and therefore no reliance should be placed on them. both the courts below while accepting the testimony of these witnesses were fully alive to these infirmities, but have chosen to accept their statements by holding that the witnesses were reliable. moreover, it appears that the evidence of these witnesses was corroborated by p.ws. 11, 13 and 39. this court in special leave would not reappraise the evidence for itself unless a clear error of law in the appreciation of the evidence is found. no other point was argued before us although, some reference is made to certain questions of fact which this court does not entertain in appeal by special leave. we are extremely grateful to mr. gupta who has been of great assistance to us in deciding this case and has tried his best to support the case of the appellants, but in the view of the findings of facts arrived at by the two courts below, we are unable to interfere. for these reasons, therefore, we do not find any error in the judgment of the high court or any merit in this appeal. the appeals are accordingly dismissed. 3. appeals dismissed.