M/S. Jit Ram Shiv Kumar Vs. National Insurance Company Ltd. - Court Judgment

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consumer - interest - apex court ordered deposit of decretal amount with 12% interest - such order on appeal field by respondent against award of compensation and interest at rate of 24% - appeal disposed of confirming impugned order except regarding payment of compensation - respondent not entitled to claim that liability to pay interest limited to 12% only. - [a.k. mukherjea,; k.k. mathew and; m.h. beg, jj.] the petitioner were detained by orders under s. 3(2)(a) of the maintenance of internal security act, 1971. the first ground of detention stated that the petitioners were responsible for unauthorised milling of paddy and smuggling the resultant rice to meghalaya for selling it at undue profit. the petitioners sent representations to the state government raising various grounds against the validity of the orders of detention. the state government rejected the representations. but even before that, and when the matter was pending before the advisory board, the petitioners filed petitions under art. 32 for the issue or a writ of habeas corpus. it was contended that, (i) the grounds given in the detention orders were vague and indefinite that therefore the constitutional right of making a representation against the detention order was defeated and hence the detention orders were vitiated; (ii) there was inordinate delay by the government in disposing of the representations of the petitioners; and (iii) the detaining authorities had not applied their minds to the facts or the cases with a view to determining the need for detaining the petitioners for preventing them from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community.held : (per mathew and mukherjea, jj) (i)the first ground of detention was vague and hence the detentions orders are vitated and the petitioners are entitled to be released from custody. [18g-h]. (a)the requirement of art. 22(5) of the constitution will not be satisfied unless the detenu is given the earliest opportunity to make a representation against his detention, and no opportunity to make the representation can be effective unless the detenu is furnished with adequate particulars of all the grounds of detention. [20a-b]. (b) the first ground postulated that the petitioners were indulging authorised milling of paddy and also in smuggling the resultant rice to laya for earning undue profit. it is an independent ground and refers past activities of the petitioners, namely, unauthorised milling of paddy smuggling of resultant rice to meghalaya. it was not a case where the ground was that the petitioners were responsible for unauthorised milling of paddy for the purpose of smuggling the resultant rice to meghalaya for earning undue profit, in which case, it could have been said that particulars about smuggling were not available, but that it was a natural inference that the unauthorised milling was for smuggling. [19d-f] (c)the period during which the unauthorised milling of paddy had been carried on was not stated in the grounds of detention nor is there anything to indicate when and how the resultant rice was smuggled to meghalaya. the grounds mentioned the seizure of paddy and rice from the unauthorised possession of the petitioners but gave no particulars as regards the unauthorised milling of paddy or the smuggling of the resultant rice to meghalaya. the, fact that one of the grounds mentioned that paddy and rice had been unearthed and seized from the unauthorised possession of the petitioners would not necessarily lead to the inference that the petitioners had been indulging in unauthorised milling of paddy, much less that they were smuggling the resultant rice to meghalaya for earning undue profit. [18f-g;-20e-f] (d) as one of the grounds communicated to the petitioners is found to be vague the detention orders must be pronounced bad. it could not be predicated that if the first ground was excluded the detaining authority would have passed the order of detention. [20c, e] keshav, talpade v. emperor, a.i.r. 1943 fc p. 1 (p. 8), dr. ram krishan bhardwaj v. the state of delhi & ors.; [1953] s.c-r. p. 708, motilal fain v. state of bihar & ors. [1968] 3 s.c.r. p. 587, mishrilal lain v. the district magistrate, kamrup & ors. [1971] 3 s.c.r. p. 693, state of bombay v. atma ram sridhar vaidya [1951] s.c.r. 167. (e) this is not a case where one of the grounds of detention was merely vague. it is a case where the detaining authority did not apply its mind at all to one of the grounds of detention. if the detaining authority had no particulars before it as regards the smuggling it could not have been possible for the authority to have been satisfied that the petitioners were smuggling rice to meghalaya. if there is any particular instance of smuggling of the kind in the mind of the detaining authority it would have been possible to specify the particular instance. [20g-21b] (f) the fact that the advisory board would consider the representations of the petitioners wherein they have also raised the contention that the grounds are vague would not in any way prevent this court from exercising its jurisdic- tion under art. 32. the detenu has a right under art. 22(5) to be afforded the earliest opportunity for making a representation against the order of detention. that constitutional right includes within its compass the right to be furnished with adequate particulars of the grounds of the detention order. if this constitutional right of theirs is violated they have every right to come to this court under art. 32 complaining that their detention is bad. [21b-d]. (g) this is not a case of where any public interest was involved justifying the detaining authority under art. 22(6), in not disclosing all the particulars. [22b-c] lawrence joachim joseph d'souza v. state of bombay [1956] s.c.r. 382 distinguished. (h) if a ground communicated to the detenu is vague, the fact that the petitioners could have asked for further particulars, but they did not do go, is immaterial and would not be enough to salvage the orders of detention. that fact would only be relevant for considering the question whether the ground is vague or not. [22e-f] (i) the gravity of the evil to the community resulting from anti-social activities can never furnish an adequate reason for invading the personal liberty of a citizen, except in accordance with the procedure established by the constitu- tion and the laws. the history of personal liberty is largely the history of insistence on observance of procedure. social security is not the only goal of a good society. our country is taking singular pride in the democratic ideals enshrined in its constitution and the most cherished of these ideals is personal liberty. therefore, whatever its impact on the maintenance of supplies and service,essential to the community may be, when a certain procedure is prescribed by the constitution or the laws for depriving a citizen of his liberty, it is the duty, of the court to see that the procedure is rigorously observed. [22g-23d] (2) in view of the finding on the first question it is not necessary to consider the question whether the disposal of the representations by the government was inordinately delayed; nor is it necessary to consider whether the detaining authority applied its mind to the other grounds in the detention order. [22f-g] per beg, j. the petitioners have not proved that the detaining authority exceeded its power in detaining the petitioner on the grounds alleged against them, nor have they proved that their detentions had become subsequently illegal due to denial of their constitutional rights to make effective representations. [37d] (1) (a) this court can go into the question whether the grounds are so vague as to disable the petitioners from making effective representations against the detention orders or otherwise vitiated the detention orders. in doing so, the totality of relevant facts ,in circumstances of each case must be taken into account in determining whether the opportunity of effective representation has been denied. the alleged vagueness or want, of particulars, must be viewed in the context of the nature of activities alleged, the substance of the allegations, the contents of the representations made, and the effect they have actually pro- duced. the fact that the case is still under consideration, within the legally fixed period of 10 weeks from the detention, before an advisory-board, which has full power and jurisdiction to eliminate some grounds as vague or wanting in particulars and to determine the sufficiency or otherwise of the rest of the grounds and particulars supplied, cannot be ignored. [29c.,36f-h] (b) in the present case, particulars of recoveries made from the premises of the mills were given; particulars of recoveries of rice and sugar said to have been hoarded in an unauthorised manner and the times and places, were given; the quantities recovered on each occasion as well as the qualities of the rice recovered were given. therefore, the sentences at the beginning and the end of the detention orders, stating the grounds in each case, apparently constitute the conclusion or inferences reached from the particulars given in the body. a document, in order to correctly understand its meaning, should be read as a whole. a perusal of the explanations submitted by the petitioner-, to the government, wherein, after asserting that they were unable to understand, or make representations against the grounds of detention, because of vagueness, the petitioner proceeded to refute the allegations of fact makes it difficult to see how the petitioners were really prejudiced by the alleged vagueness. [28d-14; 29d-e] (c) assuming, however, that there was some infirmity or vagueness in some parts of the detention order containing the grounds it could not be said that it was of such a kind as to vitiate the detention order. [29-f] (i) the question whether a detenu was or was not given due opportunity of making an effective representation in a particular case is largely a question of fact which must be decided after taking into account the totality of facts. [31h] (ii) it is true that the detenu has a right under art. 22(5) of the constitution to be afforded the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order. in the present case, that opportunity had been afforded to the detenus and they have made representations which included the grievance that some of the grounds were vague and indefinite. [31g] (iii) the right of making the representation cannot be construed so unreasonably as to practically demolish the unchallenged power, under a constitutionally valid statutory provision, to consider and decide the objections contained in a representation. there may be cases where the grounds of detention may, prima facie, show that the detention is invalid or ordered for some collateral purpose in excess of the power to detain; or the facts indicating the denial of the right of making an effective representation may be so patent and clear that it would be an unnecessary prolongation of an illegal detention to wait for the advisory board. which is given under s. 11. 10 weeks time from the date of detention to make its report. when the advisory board has full power to consider every kind of representation against the grounds of detention the using a grievance that any grounds are too vague or indefinite to be understood or to enable the detenu to make an effective representation the detenu should ordinarily wait at last until the report has been made by the advisory board before he complains that he has been really deprived of any right under the act. [32b-g]. (iv) mere allegation of vagueness of grounds or insufficiency of particular,%, without calling upon the detailing authority to remedy the defect is not enough to vitiate a detention order. [30f]. keshav talpadc v. emperor, a.i.r. 1943 p. 1 (p.8), dr. ram krishan bhardwaj v. the state of delhi & ors. [1953] s.c.r. p. 708, motilal jain v. state of bihar & ors., [1968] 3 s.c.r. p. 587, mishrilal jain v. the, district .magistrate, kamrup & ors. [1971] 3 s.c.r. p. 693, rameshwar lal patwari v. state of bihar, [1968] 2 s.c.r. 505, the state of bombay v. atma ram sridhar vaidya, [1951] s.c.r. 167, lawrence joachim joseph d'souza v. the state of bombay. [1956] s.c.r. p. 382, shibban lal saksena v. state of u.p.. [1954] s.c.r. 418, pushkar mukherjee & ors. v. state west bengal [1969] 2 s.c.r. 635, and naresh chandra gonguli v. the state of west bengal & ors., [1960] 1 s.c.r. 411, referred to. (d) the fact that a past occurrence used for forecasting probable future conduct of the detenu, could also be the subject matter of a prosecution for an offence would not affect the validity of preventive detention. [33b] (e) the fact that the recovery of sugar was more than a year ago would not vitiate the detention order on the ground of its irrelevance. the recovery was not so remote ,is to be considered irrelevant in view of the recovery of hoarded rice on later dates. it is the chain of events which, considered together, enabled the detaining authorities to form a reasonable apprehension regarding the future conduct of the detenus. preventive detention orders involve forecasts. all that can be done is to give a statement of an apprehension in the form of grounds as to what the detenu is likely to do having regard to the particulars of past activities which may be given so that preventive detention for one of the purposes for which it can be ordered is shown to have become necessary in his case. the grounds and particulars must have a rational nexus with these purpose,. that is, they must be relevant. [33c-d,f]. bhim sen v. state of punjab, [1952] s.c.r. 18 and rameshwar shaw v. district magistrate, buradwan & anr., [1964] 4 s.c.r. 921, referred to. (f) a distinction between grounds which are merely vague and those which ,ire extraneous and irrelevant should not be overlooked. further particulars can be asked for by the detenu and supplied by the detaining authority to cure the defect in a vague ground, but an extraneous ground vitiates the detention order. if there is an extraneous or irrelevant ground, the court cannot separate the irrelevant from relevant. the court can only order release of the detenu because an extraneous or irrelevant ground affected the decision to detain. [33g-h]. tarapade de & ors. v. the state of west bengal, [1951] s.c.r. 212 @ 218219, followed. (g) but, whether some of the grounds were only vague or were irrelevant and extraneous to the purposes of the act, the detenu can make a representation against them to the advisory board. the advisory board has full jurisdiction to declare a detention invalid or to recommend, after excluding what may be vague or irrelevant, that the detention should continue. [34f] (2) in those cases where detention is vitiated only on the ground that particulars were not supplied at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity so that the right of a detenu to make a representation is held to be defeated, the detention would, strictly speaking, not be vitiated ab- initio, but, it would become illegal only from the time when the infringement of the right to sufficient particulars to make a representation takes place. in the present case, government has satisfactorily explained the time taken in considering the detenu's representation, and, therefore, it could not be said there was an undue delay which defeated the right of the detenu to make a representation. the representations show that the petitioners had disputed every single fact and made detailed allegations justifying the possession of the rice. therefore- government naturally had to take some time to verify the statements of the petitioners. [34g-h; 35e-f] babul mitra v. state of west bengal & ors. a.i.r. 1973 s.c. 197, khaidam lbocha singh etc. v. stare of manipur, [1972] 1 s.c.r. 1022 and deonarayan mandal v. state of west bengal, a.i.r. 1973 s.c. 1353, referred to. (3)(a) it could not be said that the detaining authority had not applied his mind, on the contention that the allegations made against the petitioners were not true. it is not for this court to consider the correctness or otherwise of the sections made on questions of fact in the returns filed by the government. (b) it could not also be said that the detaining authority had not applied its mind, because the government had taken nearly three weeks to verify the details, so that, it must be presumed that they were not there before the detention was ordered. the government could not be presumed to be in possession of all the facts taken into account by the detaining officer. the detaining officer had not consulted the government before ordering detention. therefore, the time taken by the government in making the inquiries only shows that government took care to verify the correctness of allegations made by the petitioners', or, in other words, that it, on the contrary, applied its mind to the facts of the cases. [36a-c] (4) in a case of preventive detention where fairly triable questions of fact or law, which can be more appropriately gone into an, decided by an advisory board, are pending before the board, the petition should be dismissed as prema- ture except in very exceptional circumstances. the court, no doubt, must zealously protect the personal free-of citizens against arbitrary or unconstitutional invasions of it by executive authorities. but, to do that, it is not necessary to stultify what is, in some respects, the more effective method of consideration of the whole case by an advisory board which could consider the sufficiency of grounds or detention also. to allow the legally prescribed procedure for protection of personal liberty to operate freely and consistently with the social interests preventive detention is meant to safeguard, appears to be the path of judicial wisdom. even if some of the grounds of detention are vague but others could reasonably satisfy the detaining authority that, to prevent much greater apprehended harm to social good from the anti-social activities of an individual, his preventive detention is imperative, the sufficiency of the remaining grounds of detention should be allowed to be determined by those charged with the duty to consider the question. the court should not undertake to determine what really and substantially is only a question of sufficiency of grounds of detention. it is only where a vagueness or indefiniteness is disclosed which either makes the satisfaction quite illusory and unreasonable or which really disables a detenu from making an effective representation that the detention would be vitiated on such a ground. [37a- h; 38a-b]   - the learned counsel further submitted that a certificate issued by the chartered accountant clearly shows that an amount of rs.shivaraj v. patil, j. 1. leave granted. 2. in this appeal the controversy raised is limited in regard to payment of interest and it arises out of the order passed by the national consumer disputes redressal commission on execution side. for the purpose of disposal of this appeal it is unnecessary to narrate the facts in detail. hence we briefly state them as under: -3. the appellant filed original petition no.30 of 1992 before the national consumer disputes redressal commission (for short the 'national commission') against the respondent national insurance co. ltd. the said petition was allowed by the order of the national commission dated 15.4.1993. operative portion of it reads: -'there is, therefore, no doubt that the repudiation of the claim by the opposite party-insurance company is malafide. there has also been inordinate delay in repudiating the claim depriving the complainant of a sum of rs.8,20,575/- which obviously would have caused serious inconvenience and financial embarrassment of the insured. we therefore order as under: the opposite party - insurance co. should pay to the complainant-insured as under; 1. rs.8,20,575/- the full insured value of the consignment, actually paid by the complainant for import of logs of wood. 2. interest at the rate of 18% per annum after the elapse of 6 months from the date of lodging of the claim on 12.2.1987 viz. from 12.6.1987. 3. a compensation of rs.1.00 lakh for the unjustified delay and harassment to the insured in repudiating the claim. 4. interest at the rate of 18% on the above mentioned amounts after 30 days of the date of this order till the payment is made.' 4. against the said order of the national commission the respondent filed civil appeal no. 3110/93 and the appellant filed civil appeal no. 4330/93 in this court to the extent they were aggrieved. this court, by order dated 23.9.1999, disposed of both the appeals. by the said order civil appeal no. 3110/93 was partly allowed rejecting the claim of the appellant for compensation to the tune of rs.1.00 lakh and dismissed civil appeal no. 4330/93 filed by the appellant. while dealing with civil appeal no. 3110/93, filed by the respondent, this court has stated, thus: -'so far as the question of quantum of interest is concerned, we see no infirmity in the order passed by the commission except that the order of the commission requires a little alteration so that the date '12.6.1987' is altered to '12.8.1987' in consonance with the judgment of the commission itself. the amount of compensation to the tune of rs. 1 lakh has been ordered by the commission on the ground of unjustified delay and harassment of the respondent. having regard to the facts of this case, specially the fact that the loss of timber which was purchased was loaded at malaysia and the ship which was to come to visakhapatnam was lost on high sees and having regard to the further fact that the investigation in the claim of the respondent who had initially not furnished all the documents to the appellant, had to be carried in a foreign country with the help of the surveyor, the appellant were justified in taking time in repudiating the claim of the respondent after due investigation. to that extent therefore, the claim of the respondent is liable to be rejected and is hereby rejected. in view of the above the appeal is partly allowed. the claim of the respondent for compensation to the tune of rs. 1 lakh allowed by the commission is rejected but the rest of the order is maintained. the appeal is disposed of in the matter indicated above.' 5. since the amount paid by the respondent did not satisfy the claim fully, the appellant filed execution petition before the national commission being miscellaneous petition no. 5/2000 (in original petition no. 30/1992). the national commission passed the following order in the said miscellaneous petition: -'we have read the papers. we are of the view that the order of the supreme court is carried out by the insurance company. the miscellaneous petition is disposed of.' 6. it is this order, which is impugned in this appeal. 7. the learned counsel for the appellant, pointing out to the order of this court dated 23.9.1999, aforementioned, contended that the order of the national commission giving direction for payment was confirmed by this court except direction 3, i.e., payment of the compensation of rs.1.00 lakh for the unjustified delay and harassment to the respondent in repudiating the claim. he added that this court did not find any infirmity as far as the question of payment of interest is concerned. the learned counsel submitted that the national commission did not consider as to whether the entire amount that was to be paid according to the order of the national commission contained in directions 1, 2 and 4 as affirmed by this court, was paid to the appellant or not; without anything more the national commission simply stated that the order of the supreme court was carried out by the insurance company;hence the miscellaneous petition was disposed of. the learned counsel further submitted that a certificate issued by the chartered accountant clearly shows that an amount of rs.4,02,649/- is still due to be paid to the appellant, calculated on the basis of the order by the national commission as modified by this court. 8. the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that this court in civil appeal no. 3110/93, while granting interim order, directed the respondent to deposit a sum of rs.8,20,575/- with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from 12.8.1987 within six weeks with the liberty to the appellant to withdraw the said amount; the respondent accordingly deposited a sum of rs.13,91,995.44; since the respondent had already deposited the amount along with interest of 12% per annum, it was not liable to pay 6% interest on the principal amount of rs.8,20,575/-. the learned counsel further urged that the national commission having ordered for payment of interest at the rate of 18% per annum as per direction 2, payment of further interest at the rate of 18% per annum on the amount mentioned in directions 1 and 2 amounts to granting interest on interest. 9. we have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties. it is clear from the order dated 23.9.1999 of this court that the order of the national commission stood confirmed except direction 3 given in the operative portion of the order of the national commission. this court on 30.10.2000 in the present case at the slp stage, had passed the following order:-'notice will be issued to show cause why the matter should not be disposed of on the basis of the certificate issued by the chartered accountant of the petitioner, dated 24.8.2000.' 10. the national commission unfortunately has not gone into the details and did not discuss as to the rival contentions. we do not see any difficulty in accepting the contentions urged on behalf of the appellant that the order of the national commission dated 15.4.1993 was confirmed by this court except direction 3 and a correction of date with regard to payment of interest in direction 2 from 12.6.1987 to 12.8.1987. hence the respondent was bound to satisfy the claim of the appellant including the interest as stated in item 4 of the order of the national commission. it is not an interest over interest but it is an interest awarded on delayed payment. merely because this court, while granting an interim order, directed the respondent to deposit a sum of rs.8,20,575/- with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum in civil appeal no.3110/93 pending disposal of the appeal, it cannot be said that liability of the appellant to pay interest at the rate of 18% per annum as per direction 4 of the order of the national commission, ceased 11. under these circumstances we find merit in the appeal. in the light of what is stated above, the respondent is liable to pay the remaining amount as indicated in the certificate issued by the chartered accountant in terms of the order of the national commission dated 15.4.1993 as modified by the order of this court dated 23.9.1999 in civil appeal no. 3110/93. the respondent is entitled to deduct the amount already paid to the appellant. we make it clear that the respondent is not liable to pay interest from the date on which such amount has actually been received by the appellant in terms of the order of the national commission as modified by this court. 12. the appeal is allowed accordingly. there shall be no order as to costs.